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FOREWORD
The U.S. Army War College and the National Bureau
of Asian Research (NBR) are two organizations with
which I have a strong connection. I was in the class of
1976 at Carlisle and I currently serve on the Board of
NBR where I am closely aligned with the Strategic Asia
Program.
As such, I was quite pleased when the NBR joined
the continuing efforts of the U.S. Army War College’s
Strategic Studies Institute to study developments in
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as cosponsors
of the 19th PLA Carlisle Conference from October 6-8,
2006.
Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the
Contours of China’s Military is the ninth volume in this
series published by the Strategic Studies Institute and
represents the collective scholarly efforts of those who
contributed to the 2006 conference. The book addresses
how the leadership of China and the PLA view what
size of PLA best meets China’s requirements. Among
other things, this analytical process makes important
new contributions on the question of PLA transparency,
long an issue among PLA watchers.
Throughout my professional career, both during
and since my service in the military, a great deal of
emphasis has been put on understanding not only
how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some
of the determining factors are national policies and
strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions,
and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive,
it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and
deep military interests run.
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I had a number of meetings with the Chinese
military leadership during my time as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs. They were very interested in learning
from our experiences in Operation DESERT STORM,
and specifically in missile defense. It is my belief to
this day that they were trying to learn how they might
engage Taiwan should the military option be called
into play.
Bearing this in mind, it is important when we look
at the structure and strategy for growth within the
Chinese military that we not restrict ourselves to the
lens of our Western focus. Rather, we need to see the
world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which
the “Taiwan issue” as well as that of North Korea and
others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit
into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership
role in the region and in the world.
This latest volume makes an important contribution
to this effort. The authors—and the 65 conference
participants from academia, think tanks, the U.S.
Government, and overseas whose observations were
of great help—have each done a terrific job and are to
be thanked for their efforts. Only through sustained,
systematic efforts such as this can we begin to
understand how China’s military modernization might
affect the Asia-Pacific security situation in the years to
come.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
General, USA Retired
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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PART I:
FRAMING THE ISSUE

1

2

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell
China is the emerging power having “the greatest
potential to compete militarily with the United States
and field disruptive military technologies that could
over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages
absent U.S. counter strategies,” according to the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review from the U.S. Department
of Defense.1 With military spending and modernization
that have persisted with little or no abatement or
recantation for well over a decade, China has the entire
international community wondering to what ends such
growth will be put.
HOW BIG, HOW CAPABLE, AND WHY?
To answer this question, the National Bureau of
Asian Research (NBR) and the U.S. Army War College’s
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assembled scholars and
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analysts for the 2006
PLA Conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.2
Only a year earlier, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
had observed in an interview that China’s “military
buildup looks outsized for its regional concerns.”3 The
question before the PLA Conference raises another
important question: What would a “right sized” PLA
look like? In other words, in terms of China’s national
security strategy, regional and global requirements
and expectations, and domestic drivers, what might an
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armed force consistent with Beijing’s legitimate selfdefense requirements be composed of and how large
would it be? The PLA Conference, by exploring the
right size for PLA missions, functions, and organization,
provided insight into future Chinese defense planning,
strategic intentions, and potential PLA missions.
This volume—harvesting the fruit of research and
discussion from the 2006 PLA Conference—considers
the force structure of the PLA and China’s latest
training, doctrinal, and procurement efforts across the
arms and services of its military forces. Organized on
a service-by-service basis, this assessment provides
new insights into the drivers behind the size, posture,
and arming of the Chinese military. Though China’s
military intentions have long been shrouded in a veil
of secrecy, the chapters herein draw vital information
from a diverse assortment of Chinese and American
sources to illuminate these hidden contours, offering
perspectives and conclusions with far-reaching
implications for policymakers and defense leaders in
the United States and worldwide.
One key theme emerging from this volume is that,
as far as modernization is concerned, the PLA is by
no means monolithic. A service-by-service analysis
reveals that while doctrines may be aligned under
the rubric of a broad national military strategy, some
service programs have larger handicaps—that is, are
further behind national requirements—than others. In
these instances, “surprise” modernization programs
may be likely to emerge.
A second critical theme, and one that cuts across
all service programs, is the growing importance of
the human dimensions of the PLA. As modernization
continues and systems become more complex, the
human elements—education, training, personnel
management, etc.—will be increasingly critical to
4

the development of the armed forces. The might of
a military, after all, is only as strong as the people
comprising it and the strategies they undertake.
CHINA’S THREAT ENVIRONMENT
AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
Chapter 2, contributed by Michael Chambers,
explores China’s threat environment, analyzing the
extent to which exogenous factors are driving China’s
military growth. China’s immediate external threat
environment appears relatively benign—in spite of the
constant latent tension with Taiwan—while domestic
problems appear more likely to pose a threat to the
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)
rule, and could necessitate the use of military force.
These problems include, inter alia, separatist threats
from Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and popular protests
over inequality and poor regional governance.4 Even
so, such threats would probably not in their own right
justify force modernization and expansion.
Against this backdrop of unique peacetime
circumstances—a domestic threat environment that
does not immediately require force modernization, a
favorable external threat environment, and relatively
few international commitments—what factors
propel China’s determination upon military growth?
Chambers argues that, in the short term, China’s
primary concern is continued unease over conflict with
Taiwan. Despite improvements in cross-Strait relations
since 2006, China must nevertheless remain primed for
conflict and continue to pursue a strategy of proactive
deterrence. Over the longer term, military growth
could be linked to a broader “great power” strategy to
secure global economic interests and trade routes, and
to build “muscle” to reinforce its diplomatic efforts—
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particularly vis-à-vis the United States. The rise of
China as a global economic and trading power makes
the protection of critical sea lines of communication,
energy assets, and other maritime interests imperative
for the country’s future.
The question then follows: Does China possess a
systematic plan for reaching these modernization goals?
In Chapter 3, “China’s National Military Strategy,”
David Finkelstein’s ground-breaking primary source
research clearly demonstrates that China does have a
plan: the current National Military Strategic Guidelines
promulgated in January 1993 by Jiang Zemin. These
so-called “Military Strategic Guidelines for the
New Period,” Finkelstein argues, direct all PLA
modernization: “Every modernization program, every
reform initiative, and every significant change that the
PLA has undergone . . . for over a decade, are the results
of some of the fundamental decisions made when the
new guidelines were promulgated.”
In an effort to catalogue the PLA’s bold military
buildup and get to the source of what China is seeking
to achieve, Finkelstein revisits the vast yet cryptic body
of literature on PLA reform from the past 13 years—
from PRC Defense White Papers to military speeches
to U.S. Government reports. He begins by identifying
three “pillars” of PLA reform and modernization: the
acquisition of new weapons and combat capabilities;
institutional and systemic reform; and the development
of new warfighting doctrines. Taken together, changes
in these three areas have helped the PLA become a
more capable and professional force.
China’s National Military Strategy, derived primarily from the military strategic guidelines issued
to the PLA by the CCP Central Committee’s Military
Commission, addresses a number of key points—six of
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which Finkelstein elaborates upon more explicitly: (1)
the strategic assessment; (2) adjusting the content of the
strategic concept of active defense; (3) articulating the
strategic missions and strategic objectives; (4) guidance
for military combat preparations; (5) identifying the
main strategic decision; and (6) determining the focus
for “Army building.” Assessing these six components
for the “New Period,” Finkelstein finds that China’s
new guidelines can be reduced to five major tasks:
(1) defending national territory and sovereignty, (2)
securing the nation’s maritime rights and interests, (3)
maintaining the unity of the motherland, (4) ensuring
internal stability, and (5) maintaining a secure and
stable external environment—especially along China’s
periphery.
Finkelstein reminds us, however, that such
guidelines and tasks have not been arrived at overnight.
Rather, they are the result of a series of carefully
calculated decisions on funding, prioritization, and
compromise. These pragmatic steps, moreover, are
based on the types of studied assessments that any
professional military establishment would be expected
to undertake—there is nothing, as Finkelstein writes,
“foreign, strange, exotic, or exceptional” about them.
Ultimately, the PLA’s overarching military strategy
is to develop the operational capabilities that will
enable China to deter conflict and, if deterrence fails, to
prosecute conflicts successfully—an objective that will
allow the country to achieve its larger national goals.
The PLA’s Strategic Forces.
With the understanding that the “Military
Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” provides
basic guidance for each of the PLA’s services and
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tactical areas, a service-by-service evaluation lends
deeper insight into the modernization process. The
first component of China’s warfighting architecture
is comprised of the PLA’s strategic systems. Among
these systems are China’s strategic missile forces,
discussed in Chapter 4, “‘Minding the Gap’: Assessing
the Trajectory of the PLA’s Second Artillery,” written
by Evan Medeiros. He analyzes the current trajectory
of the PLA branch known as the Second Artillery,
examining the doctrine-capabilities relationship
between nuclear and conventional missile forces and
asking what this comparison reveals about the Second
Artillery’s future evolution. Using Chinese military
writings drawn from military books and journals from
1996 to the present, Medeiros finds that there is broad
consistency between doctrine and capabilities within
the PLA’s nuclear and conventional forces. However,
while both are rapidly evolving, they are still, to some
extent, playing “catch-up” to meet the dynamic, everchanging doctrinal requirements.
China’s nuclear doctrine, argues Medeiros, has not
radically changed despite shifts in the global nuclear
landscape. Instead, it has responded by developing
new missile systems focused on retaliatory capabilities,
deterrence, and survival. To date, there are few
indications that the growth of China’s nuclear missile
force will extend beyond prevailing doctrines. China’s
policy assertions, most prominent of which is China’s
“no first use” (NFU) pledge, are an important factor as
well. Medeiros argues that the pledge contains a degree
of conditionality such that observers ought to spend
less time attempting to figure out whether or when
Beijing might lift the pledge altogether, and more time
in understanding those situations in which Beijing
might justify a first strike within its NFU pledge.
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Meanwhile, conventional missile forces are readily
evolving to accommodate joint attacks, and are prepared to launch a variety of campaigns within and beyond the region. The Second Artillery is deploying increasingly sophisticated Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
(SRBMs) while procuring Land-Attack Cruise Missiles
(LACMs) and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
(MRBMs) that will allow greater operational flexibility,
including maritime strike missions against Taiwan.
Missile forces, however, represent but a part of the
PLA’s strategic systems. What of the actual literature,
training, and information technology driving China’s
so-called “revolution in military affairs”? In Chapter
5, Larry Wortzel takes a closer look at the command,
control, and targeting architecture of the PLA (formally
known as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,
or C4ISR). He suggests that the PLA leadership is
in many ways seeking to emulate those command
and control systems of the United States, the “gold
standard” against which their warfare capabilities are
currently measured. Official military pronouncements
and literature consistently highlight the need for
greater “informationization” and digitalization, plus
“a more comprehensive system of networked forces
and command and control.” The PLA has already
begun devoting greater attention to the application of
modern technology and information and has developed
a networked warfare architecture that is effective on a
limited scale.
China’s drive to modernize its C4ISR capabilities,
largely inspired by the United States itself, reflects
the threat perceived regularly by China as the United
States pursues actions calculated to prevent China’s
emergence as the regional hegemon. At the theoretical,
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operational, and training levels, PLA leaders appear
to have grasped the significance of modernizing their
capabilities to compete with the United States and are
exploring ways to apply traditional Chinese military
doctrine in five domains—land, maritime, air, space,
and cyberspace—to the information age. Wortzel
estimates that it will be only 2 to 5 years before China
possesses the level of networking that U.S. forces are
able to apply today. In that small window of time,
China could in fact achieve a viable anti-access strategy
that, at a minimum, would impede United States and
Japanese military operations in the neighboring Asia
Pacific.
China’s Ground Forces.
China’s ground forces still constitute two-thirds
of the PLA, and the modernization of conventional
land capabilities presents both major challenges and
opportunities. With a wide range of missions spread
across a vast territory—from the western border with
India to Central Asia and beyond—the management
of China’s Army will be critical in the future. In
Chapter 6, Cortez Cooper takes note of these myriad
developments, arguing that a “hybridized” land unit
is emerging—one that blends old and new capabilities,
unit organizations, and equipment. The modern force
will be prepared to meet both internal and external
exigencies in an informationized society, leveraging
the advantages of an authoritarian regime to accord
with broader national development priorities.
This hybrid force will be capable of dealing not only
with crises beyond its borders—a conflict with Taiwan
being the most obvious case—or along the periphery,
but also with traditional domestic control activities,
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including disaster relief efforts, local civil development
projects, and back-up support for local security
operations. More mission-specialized than ever before,
the PLA will be strengthened by a well-trained noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, carry out more
integrated joint and combined arms operations, and
place greater responsibility on personnel with hightech expertise. It will benefit as well from a number of
key technological developments: space-based sensors
and aerial surveillance platforms that can pass nearreal time data to a variety of PLA systems; automated
“logistic interaction platforms” that facilitate joint
projects; and a newer, more advanced helicopter force
that will project presence more easily and rapidly.
According to Cooper, the Chinese leadership
appears convinced that hard military power must
accompany and undergird a “peaceful rise.” Whether
the battlefield is in the East China Sea or the Korean
peninsula, the Chinese intend to have available a taskorganized, technologically superior armed force that
can be expeditiously deployed. While Beijing presently
touts the PLA as possessing the right size for defensive
missions, its continental force is becoming increasingly
capable of conducting offensive operations both
within and beyond its borders. The United States and
other potential foreign competitors must not become
complacent when considering the security dilemmas
that could face them as a result of a more offensivelyoriented PLA.
In the bigger picture, Army force modernization as
analyzed by Cooper appears to correlate neatly with
trends identified by the 2006 PRC Defense White Paper.
In Chapter 7, “PLA Ground Force Modernization and
Mission Diversification,” Dennis Blasko outlines some
of these developments. Over the next few decades,
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China’s Army will build forces to support China’s
overall deterrence posture and, if deterrence fails,
to assume warfighting capabilities. China’s recent
assignment of domestic land troops to UN peacekeeping
operations in Lebanon, Sudan, and Liberia is evidence
of Beijing’s growing confidence in executing overseas
operations, and of its goal to augment the prestige of
the PLA via domestic, regional, and complex “real
world” missions.
Blasko also reminds us that, over time, the human
element will be as important as the technical one. In
coming years, party loyalty—institutionalized through
the political commissar and the party committee
systems—may be tested as a more sophisticated
personnel force begins to question certain ideological
aspects of training to a greater degree than their
predecessors. With the current trends in personnel
downsizing, the increasing incidence of corruption,
and the consequent low morale among troops, human
resource development becomes even more critical.
Though some of these problems will be mitigated as
the PLA shrinks and hones its technical expertise, the
success of the Army in combat operations will directly
correlate with the abilities of the PLA officers and NCO
corps to plan and execute a new joint doctrine.
China’s Air Force.
Chapter 8 by Phillip Saunders and Erik Quam
on the future force structure of the PLA Air Force
(PLAAF) utilizes a scenario-based approach to
interpret impending developments. They review
PLAAF missions, cataloguing past and present
capabilities and limitations, and then examine the
newest systems and the Air Force’s future aspirations.
Finally, they analyze how decisions and trade-offs are
12

made within the Air Force, e.g., between foreign versus
domestic production, and high-technology versus lowcost systems. They conclude that perceptions of the
international threat environment and budget concerns
will have a significant influence on the size of the
PLAAF and the speed of its modernization.
Since assessing these possibilities is hardly an exact
science, Saunders and Quam sketch three alternative
scenarios to illustrate a range of potential outcomes:
(1) an expedited effort to maximize capability; (2) a
high-technology Air Force; and (3) a domesticallyproduced Air Force. A common denominator in all
of these scenarios, however, is that budget realities,
technological limitations, and regional relations—
especially with the United States and Taiwan—will act
as constraints on the PLAAF’s modernization efforts.
These factors already seem to point to a Chinese Air
Force that is smaller, yet more technologically capable,
in the foreseeable future.
In Chapter 9, Kevin Lanzit and Kenneth Allen delve
further into the specifics of this smaller yet more capable Air Force, evaluating how institutional and doctrinal developments—underway since the 1990s—are
being operationalized by the PLAAF. Such reforms
include significant changes in leadership, force structure,
organizational and enlisted personnel structure,
education, and training. New mission requirements,
force structure modernization, and the addition of
advanced information and weapons technology are
inducing the PLAAF to rethink old concepts of air
doctrine, restructure command elements, and revamp
its education and training programs.
Many still predict that a comprehensive force
structure modernization will take at least 10-15 years
to complete. Weighed down by lingering hardware
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deficiencies, obsolete aircraft, and delays in fielding
command and control and air surveillance aircraft,
this process cannot be expected to occur overnight, or
even over the course of a few years. Introducing and
operationalizing reforms in air doctrine to accommodate hardware advances will require at least a decade of sustained effort. Furthermore, the human element—training a new generation of military professionals who are proficient with these new systems—
will be among the greatest continuing challenges facing
the PLAAF.
China’s Navy.
Whither the PLA Navy (PLAN)? What factors have
been driving developments in force posture, size, and
capabilities of the PLAN over the past 15 years? In
Chapter 10, Michael McDevitt argues that the recent
expansion of China’s maritime operations is indicative
of a belief among Chinese leaders that the strategic
interests of the state can be secured only with a robust
naval force. While this approach represents a departure
from historical Chinese naval thinking, McDevitt
proposes five factors animating such change: (1) a shift
in the major strategic direction of the PLA from coastal
to offshore defense; (2) a maritime strategy aligned
with the continental strategic tradition of China; (3)
the need to deter Taiwan’s bid for independence and,
if necessary, combat a U.S. relief effort in the Strait; (4)
the unique set of circumstances in which international
seaborne trade drives China’s economic growth; and
(5) China’s increasing dependency on oil and resources
transported by sea.
According to McDevitt, the rough blueprint for the
PLAN’s growth seems to derive not from the Westernstyle blue water Navy—which, in addition to being
14

expensive, would represent a departure from China’s
continentalist military tradition—but instead from
a Soviet-style anti-access/sea denial model. Similar
geographic circumstances, affordability, and access to
Soviet-developed technology and concepts make this
design particularly congruous with and amenable to
Chinese interests. This approach to Navy building
comports not only with the Chinese land-based military
worldview but as well with Beijing’s new political
message of a peaceful and nonthreatening rise.
Pressure from the United States for China to become
a “responsible stakeholder” and other such exhortatory
signals from the West seem to have encouraged Chinese
leaders to begin thinking about including peacetime
operations among their missions set. Such sorties will
require the PLAN to learn how to deploy and sustain
surface combatants, amphibious ships, and support
ships on distant stations for extended periods of time—
and possibly to acquire an aircraft carrier. According to
McDevitt, these signals could lay the groundwork for a
“second iteration” of the Navy in which China furthers
its own interests while demonstrating that it too can be
a responsible partner and good neighbor in the world
community’s humanitarian undertakings.
What will this Navy look like in 10 years, and
how will it be disposed? Bernard Cole answers these
questions in Chapter 11, “Rightsizing the Navy: How
Much Naval Force Will Beijing Deploy?” Cole suggests
that 10 years from now, the character of naval forces
will be linked closely with Beijing’s perceptions of the
interests, resources, and intentions of the international
environment—particularly those countries in maritime
Asia. Cole uses a scenario-building approach similar
to that employed by Saunders and Quam to project
three alternative “maritime futures”: the first involves
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Taiwan, the second the East China Sea, and the third
the Straits of Malacca.
In the event of a conflict with Taiwan, the PLAN
would employ maritime forces to execute any number
of operations, ranging from the restriction of seaborne
trade to a full-scale amphibious invasion. However,
its principal role would be to isolate the battlefield
by deploying submarines to prevent intervention by
outside forces.
In the case of the East China Sea, where China
has contested territorial interests over the Diaoyutai
(Senkaku) islands, a number of analysts have concluded
that a conflict in the near future is not unlikely. Both
Beijing and Tokyo currently have a military presence
in the area, and intensive patrolling by their ships and
aircraft amplifies the possibility of an inadvertent rift.
Military action by either side would likely involve
surface combatants supported by long-range aircraft
and submarines, while planning for such a conflict
would entail upgrading joint and integrated operations
doctrine, as well as the PLAN’s submarine force.
In the third scenario, the invaluable sea lines of
communication through the Straits of Malacca are
compromised, stanching the flow of key resources and
posing a direct threat to the economic welfare of China.
Here, the Navy would have to increase the number of
state-of-the-art warships and sea replenishment ships
to support those surface ships permanently stationed
in the Strait. In this scenario, as in the other two, the
PLA Navy is large, capable, and prepared for joint
operations. Thus, by 2016, the Navy might be expected
to become dominant among East Asian navies, and
a formidable competitor to the U.S. Navy in Asia’s
maritime theater.
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To What Ends?
Cataloguing the advances in China’s strategic
systems and doctrines, plus its Army, Air Force, and
Navy capabilities, enables us to see how the Chinese
military’s size and composition accord with its rhetoric,
and to evaluate the parameters within which China
determines the appropriate scale for the PLA. In accord
with a military strategy based on deterrence and denial,
and focused on enhancing China’s broader national
objectives, the rapid modernization undertaken by the
PLA over the past 10-15 years has been calculated and
gradual, yet comprehensive and broad.
In Chapter 12, “The ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military:
To What Ends?” Ellis Joffe takes one last look at the
drivers of PLA modernization. While many analysts
will agree that the primary impetus for China’s military
buildup over the past decade or so has been the need to
deter Taiwan from pursuing independence, the specter
of war along the Strait has diminished dramatically
since 2006—and with it the immediate need for military
muscle. Why then does China continue to build and
update its armed forces?
Joffe reiterates that the development of a more
robust military force is part and parcel of China’s
unalterable, long-range objective of achieving “great
power” standing among the international community.
Because this goal is longitudinal and generational,
efforts to build a force commensurate with the
country’s international prominence are seen as a
gradual process, composed of a series of short-term
steps and activities. The first of these objectives, writes
Joffe, might be the attainment of a preeminent position
in the East Asian region. Driving this aspiration are
the same forces—physical presence, nationalism, and
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economic power—that underlie the country’s global
motivations. Although China’s present-day regional
strategy has converged on Taiwan—preventing the
province from seceding and interdicting any U.S.
naval intervention—PLA forces have so far failed to
demonstrate an outright intention to compete with
U.S. dominance in the Western Pacific. Instead, China
has been engaging in defensive maneuvers designed to
protect the country’s maritime security interests—and
to hedge against increasing U.S. military might in the
region.
Thus, while the speed and scope of China’s military
modernization may change in the future, its direction
will probably not. Joffe reminds us that China’s security
interests vis-à-vis the United States will continue to
drive PLA missions, functions, and organization for
years to come.
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CHAPTER 2
FRAMING THE PROBLEM:
CHINA’S THREAT ENVIRONMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Michael R. Chambers
What is the proper size and structure of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)? The answer to this question
will be based at least in part on the nature and source
of the threats to the security of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC). As government officials and military
officers plan for the size, structure, and equipping of
a military force to defend their country, many factors
will be taken into consideration. But the first will be the
requirement to defend the nation against immediate
and potential threats to its security.
This being the case, a first step toward understanding the “proper” size and structure of the PLA will
be to understand the threat environment that China
faces. This chapter argues that there are few direct,
immediate external threats to the PRC today against
which it needs to prepare. However, there are several
potential threats worrying the Chinese civilian and
military leadership. The principal external threat that
the Chinese perceive is from the United States. Over
the long term, the United States is seen as a potential
constraint on China’s rise to great power status. In the
short term, the United States poses a potential threat to
China’s territorial integrity via its support for Taiwan’s
ability to defend itself prior to a peaceful resolution
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to the cross-Strait situation. U.S. involvement in a
Taiwan conflict scenario also interacts with other
external security threats to the PRC, such as China’s
sense of threat to its energy security specifically and
the more general security of its maritime lines of
communication. Disruption of Chinese access to the
sea lanes, and in particular to China’s energy imports,
by the United States during a conflict over Taiwan
could seriously harm the continued growth of the PRC
economy, thereby undermining one of the key elements
of continued legitimacy for the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). Prudent leadership in Beijing will take
the steps necessary to enhance the PLA’s capabilities
to cope with these threats. Other external security
challenges confronting Beijing include border, island,
and offshore mineral rights disputes that threaten the
territorial integrity of the PRC, nontraditional security
threats such as the international narcotics trade, and
regional instability that could negatively impact the
regional environment for China’s continued strategic
economic development—or even lead to refugee flows
into the PRC.
However, the most pressing threats to China’s
security are to be found not in the international arena,
but at the domestic level. These are the threats of
separatism to China’s territorial integrity—specifically
Taiwan,1 Tibet, and the Uyghurs and other Muslim
groups of Xinjiang—and the threats to the legitimacy of
the CCP’s rule from popular protests over corruption,
illegal taxes, and illegal land-grabs. Reactions to
the separatist threats, particularly the Taiwan issue,
could require the use of military force, and thus will
require planning for adequate numbers of troops and
appropriate weapons systems. However, the political
threats are more of a police issue than a military
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issue, and it will be hard to justify increasing the size
or enhancing the weaponry of the PLA to meet these
threats.
A second factor that might affect the size and
structure of the Chinese military will be the PRC’s
international commitments. The U.S. military has
been shaped to meet its commitments to its allies in
Europe and Asia; to what extent do China’s alliance
commitments affect the shaping of its military forces?
Or its participation in regional security organizations,
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum (ARF)? Might Chinese involvement
in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations
also help to determine the size and structure of the
PLA? As will be argued below, China’s international
commitments do not have a significant impact on
determining the size and structure of the PLA. Nor
do they directly address the more significant external
security challenges facing the PRC, although some
of these obligations and commitments address these
threats indirectly. Several of these commitments, such
as the SCO, do help to address domestic-level threats,
such as separatism.
If the PRC’s international commitments have little
effect on the sizing of the PLA, and its most pressing
security threats are more domestic and political in
nature than external and military, then how are we to
understand the motivations shaping Chinese military
modernization? In the near term, clearly it is Beijing’s
desire to win any conflict over Taiwan—and this
involves coping with a U.S. military intervention.
Over the longer term, it would appear that Chinese
aspirations and ambitions to become a global great
power might be the driving force. To play such a role,

21

the PRC would want to develop the capabilities to
secure its global economic interests and trade routes,
and to have military capabilities to provide muscle
behind its diplomacy. In addition, it would need
military capabilities to defend against or deter those of
other great powers—including the United States.
The next section of this chapter will briefly consider
what it is that China seeks to “secure” with its military
force, and point to a potential expansion of its definition
of its national interests. Then the chapter will turn
to analyzing the threat environment, beginning with
external threats to Chinese security and following
with the internal security environment. The PRC’s
international obligations and commitments will then
be examined before turning to the conclusion.
SECURING WHAT?
CHINA’S SECURITY INTERESTS
Before examining the potential and real threats to
China’s security, we should consider precisely what
these security interests are that might be threatened.
According to the white paper, “China’s National
Defense in 2006,” the PRC’s national defense policy is
defined as:
• Upholding national security and unity, and
enhancing the interests of national development.
(This includes security against external and
internal threats.)
• “Achieving the all-round, coordinated, and
sustainable development of China’s national
defense and armed forces.”
• “Enhancing the performance of the armed forces
with informationization as the major measuring
criterion.”
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• “Implementing the military strategy of active
defense” such that the PLA is prepared to win
“local wars under conditions of informationization” and to enhance “national sovereignty,
security, and interests of development.”
• “Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy” to
deter other countries from using or threatening
to use nuclear weapons against China.
• Fostering an international security environment
conducive to China’s peaceful development.2
Similarly, Chinese officials have summarized the goals
of China’s security policy as intended to safeguard the
PRC’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, as
well as maintain the conditions for China’s economic
development—including a stable and peaceful international and regional environment.3
What is clear from these and other similar statements is that Beijing is not concerned simply with the
survival of the nation. Comments in the 2004 defense
white paper (and in the 2000 and 2002 versions of these
white papers), as well as in major speeches (such as
Jiang Zemin’s report to the 16th Party Congress in 2002)
that “peace and development remain the dominating
themes of the times,” suggest that the general security
situation remains favorable for the PRC.4 In his report,
former President and Party Secretary Jiang asserted, “It
is realistic to bring about a fairly long period of peace
in the world and a favorable climate in areas around
China.”5 This confidence is even more pronounced in
the 2006 defense white paper, which states: “China’s
overall security environment remains sound. . . . Its
overall national strength has considerably increased,
as has its international standing and influence.
. . . Balancing developments in both domestic
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and international situations, it is well prepared to
respond to complexities in the international security
environment.”6
China is not in any danger of being overrun by a
military adversary at the moment. However, Beijing is
concerned about the loss of territory through separatist
actions and/or foreign aggression, and seeks to
maintain the unity of its national territory. Taiwan and
Tibet are the two most prominent examples of territory
that the PRC wants to keep integrated with the national
territory, but there are also disputes concerning islands
and waters in the East China Sea (the Diaoyu Islands)
and in the South China Sea (the Spratly Islands), as
well as border territories that remain under dispute
(such as along the Sino-Indian border). Beijing is also
concerned about “unity” in the sense of maintaining
social stability under the Party’s political leadership. In
October 2006, the CCP Central Committee adopted a
resolution on “Major Issues Regarding the Building of
a Harmonious Socialist Society”; according to a Xinhua
commentary in December 2006, this was the first major
Party document to address the issue of “mass incidents”
(riots and protests) and to make this an important task
for the Communist Party. The same commentary also
labeled these mass incidents as “the most outstanding
problem that seriously disturbs social stability” and
stated that such disturbances represented a “major
threat” to the Party’s ability to govern the country.7
Not surprisingly, China’s communist rulers want at
all costs to maintain the existing regime (or political
system). Regime security could be threatened by
domestic turmoil and opposition, or by the efforts of
foreign powers to undermine the legitimacy of the
Communist Party’s rule (short of military invasion
and occupation, foreigners would have to work with
domestic forces to effect regime change).
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Besides these military and political interests that
need to be secured, the Chinese are also seeking to
safeguard their economic interests. This should not
be surprising either, since most governments seek
to do the same, and economic performance is often
linked to the success and legitimacy of a government
or ruling party. However, what is interesting here is
that China’s economic interests seem to be expanding
beyond its own territory. China is now the third largest
trading power in the world (since 2004) and the fourth
largest economy (since 2005). Its booming economy
is highly dependent on trade for its success, and the
PRC has become heavily dependent on the sea lines of
communication.
As noted in the 2004 defense white paper, the PLA
is tasked with protecting China’s “maritime rights and
interests,” a task for which it is not yet fully prepared.
In a December 2006 meeting of senior Party members
in the PLA Navy (PLAN), President Hu emphasized
that China is a maritime power, and asserted that the
PRC “should endeavor to build a powerful people’s
navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a
new century and a new period.” Hu further claimed
that the PLAN has an “important” and “glorious”
task of protecting China’s “authority and security and
maintaining our maritime rights.”8
Similarly, an editorial in Jiefangjun Bao to
commemorate the paper’s 50th anniversary noted that
conceptions of national interests had already extended
from national territory, seas, and airspace to include
further out into the deep seas, outer space, and the
electromagnetic sphere, arguing that the PRC needed
to develop the capabilities to secure these interests. The
Jiefangjun Bao editorial then nailed down its point: “In
order to accelerate national development and safeguard
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national security, China has great strategic interests in
the deep seas and in outer space.”9 In addition, many
Chinese analysts are now also calling for the PRC to
play a more active role in maintaining international and
regional peace and stability, as these are prerequisites
for China’s continued economic growth, itself a critical
source of legitimacy for the CCP.10
Thus, China’s security today is predicated not only
on safeguarding its national territory from attacks
by major powers, but also on maintaining territorial
integrity against separatist threats and on preserving
domestic social stability. And it requires a peaceful and
stable regional and international environment as well
as secure access to economic resources and to the sea
lines of communication. The growth of China’s economic interests as it becomes a global economic power
is prompting a concomitant expansion of China’s
security interests as it emerges as a great power. As
we will see below, these new challenges may well help
shape the size and structure of the PLA even though
they do not represent direct, immediate external threats
to China’s security.
THE EXTERNAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT
As of mid 2007, China faces few direct, immediate
external threats to its security. Consequently, “China’s
overall security environment remains sound,” and the
PRC is able to point to “peace and development” as
the “principal themes” in the international security
environment, as well as to the stability of the overall
security situation in the Asia-Pacific region.11 Nevertheless, there are a number of external security
challenges that the Chinese face and for which
Beijing feels it must plan, including the acquisition
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of new weapons systems. Such challenges include
territorial disputes that continue to threaten the
territorial integrity of the PRC; the security of the
maritime lines of communication, upon which China
is increasingly dependent as a major global trading
power and one of the largest global energy importers;
nontraditional security threats such as the international
narcotics trade; and potential regional instability (for
example, on the Korean peninsula) that could threaten
the continued vibrancy of the Chinese economy either
by undermining the sense of stability and security in
the East Asian region that incubates China’s growth, or
by more directly harming it with an influx of refugees
that disrupt the local Chinese economy.
While each of these security challenges is felt to
require attention from the leadership in Beijing, the
principal external security challenge is the one posed
by the United States. In the long term, the United States
poses a potential threat to strategically contain or encircle
China; in the short term, American support for Taiwan
represents a potentially powerful obstacle to Beijing’s
efforts to reunify the island with the PRC. Moreover,
the U.S. factor (particularly American intervention in a
conflict with Taiwan) intermingles with several of the
other external challenges, aggravating China’s sense of
potential threat.
The United States as Potential Threat.
Beijing is clearly worried about a hegemonic and
unilateralist United States, as was made evident in
the 2004 and 2006 defense white papers.12 This is
because the United States, as the “lone superpower”
in the world today, is the sole country with the
military and economic wherewithal to thwart China’s
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rise to great power status not only within the AsiaPacific region but also globally. Based on American
political, economic, and military influence, it is feared
that Washington might attempt to contain the PRC’s
rise, particularly through strategically encircling it.
The increased U.S. military presence in Central Asia
and Pakistan as a result of the war on terrorism and
the invasion of Afghanistan aggravated such fears,
as has the intensification of U.S.-Japanese security
cooperation in the last few years.13 China’s pursuit of
a “good neighbor” policy since 1997 and its efforts to
promote East Asian regionalism, particularly through
the ASEAN Plus Three Process (the regional dialogue
involving the 10 members of ASEAN plus China,
Japan, and South Korea), are intended to create a ring
of friendly states surrounding the PRC that could serve
as a strategic buffer against pressures that the United
States might exert in a containment ploy.14 Astute
Chinese diplomacy has thus proved beneficial in trying
to blunt the potential threat from the United States.
Likewise, Chinese trade policy has intentionally
sought to create interdependencies between the PRC
and its neighbors as a means to further bind their interests to those of China in ways that would preclude their
siding with American containment efforts. However,
as noted by Rear Admiral Yang Yi, director of the
Institute of Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, “compared with the political, diplomatic,
and cultural means of safeguarding China’s interests,
China’s military force lags far behind. As a responsible
big power, China needs to build a military force worthy
of its international status.”15 The PLA thus sees itself as
requiring adequate weapons systems to deter or blunt
possible U.S. containment efforts through military
pressures. But such considerations also suggest the
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role of China’s ambitions, not just current security
challenges, in shaping the PLA.
While strategic encirclement or containment by the
United States is a potential problem, the more pressing
security challenge is the possibility of U.S. intervention
to protect Taiwan in the event of a cross-Strait conflict.
The United States has promised to assist Taiwan
should the PRC launch unprovoked aggression against
the island, with President George W. Bush promising
in April 2001 that Washington would do “whatever
it takes” to help Taiwan defend itself in such an
event.16 With the PLA pledged to protect the territorial
integrity of the nation, including preventing the formal
separation of Taiwan from China, Chinese civilian and
military leaders feel the need to plan for the possibility
of confronting American military forces in the event of
war with Taiwan. Such an eventuality requires Beijing
to acquire modern weapons systems that could defeat
the U.S. Seventh Fleet and other forces that would be
used against the PLA in a Taiwan conflict, as well as the
weapons systems necessary to project adequate power
to subdue the island. And as the PLAN has changed its
strategy to implement an area-denial maritime strategy
in China’s littoral areas to thwart a U.S. intervention,
new naval assets need to be acquired. As Thomas
Christensen has noted, it is not necessary for the PLA
to directly match American military capabilities in
the Western Pacific in order to pose problems for U.S.
forces; instead, the Chinese could use asymmetrical
capabilities to meet these challenges.17 This course is
likely a key rationale behind the PRC’s testing of an
anti-satellite weapon in January 2007—to demonstrate
to the United States that it already possesses such
capabilities. Whether conventional or asymmetric, the
PLA will develop and deploy new capabilities to meet
the potential threat from the United States.
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The U.S. challenge in a Taiwan conflict scenario
also blends into some of the other external security
challenges facing the PRC. In particular, it is possible
that the United States would try to disrupt Chinese
shipping through the critical sea lanes of the South
China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, hampering Chinese
trade but especially Chinese oil imports. As discussed
below, this is one of the critical aspects of China’s
maritime and energy security. Should such a disruption
occur, it would cause serious harm to the Chinese
economy, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the
Communist Party’s rule (which has come to rest heavily
on economic performance as well as nationalism as the
twin pillars of its continued legitimacy in the reform
era). To cope with this potential threat, China will need
to acquire power projection capabilities that it currently
lacks. Recent improvements in the PLAN’s submarine
forces—including purchases of Kilo-class submarines
from Russia and indigenously produced Yuan (Type
094) and Shang (Type 093) class submarines—could
help in this regard, but aircraft carriers might also be
necessary.
Despite these apprehensions, the United States
remains only a potential threat to China: although the
two countries are not truly friends, neither are they
truly adversaries. The United States and the PRC have
a mix of common and conflicting interests, which lead
to broad areas for potential cooperation even while
they lead to areas of tension and dispute. Yet because
of such security challenges, Beijing, as a matter of
prudence, perceives the need to develop and modernize
the PLA to address the potential threats China faces
from the United States. However, the actual level of
(potential) threat may not be as significant due to the
successful diplomacy that Beijing has engaged in over
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the past decade. China’s “good neighbor” diplomacy
as well as its trade diplomacy have created degrees
of interests in the PRC’s neighbors such that many of
them—including U.S. allies South Korea and Australia
as well as many Southeast Asian countries—would be
hesitant to side with the United States against China in
a conflict over Taiwan. They also desire to avoid being
put into a position where they would be forced to
choose. As a result, Beijing has succeeded in weakening
American alliances in the region, and in complicating
American access to military facilities that could prove
critical in the event of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan
conflict. These developments mitigate some of the
potential threat that the United States might pose to
China, although they do not eliminate it.
Territorial Disputes.
Since the end of the Cold War, the PRC has settled
several of its border disputes with neighbors, including
with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam (land and
coastal maritime borders, although agreement on the
latter is being implemented slowly). The resolution of
these disputes has greatly reduced the potential threat
to China’s territorial integrity. However, there are
still some border and territorial disputes that remain
unresolved, and these are potentially quite troubling
for the PRC.
The first of these is with India. The Sino-Indian border dispute dates back to the 1950s and disagreements
over the legitimacy of the McMahon Line. By 1959, tensions along the border escalated into armed combat,
and in 1962 China and India fought a brief border
war in which the Chinese forces soundly defeated
the Indian forces before halting and returning home.
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Although there have been numerous discussions of
the border dispute over the years, in 2003 Beijing and
New Delhi agreed to negotiate a political framework
for resolving the dispute, and in 2005 agreement was
reached during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s
visit on a set of principles intended to guide further
negotiations on the framework.18 Despite a few
small steps forward and continued calls for a swifter
resolution, little real progress has been made. In fact, on
the eve of President Hu Jintao’s November 2006 visit to
India, the PRC ambassador to India roiled the waters
by claiming that India’s Arunachal Pradesh state was
Chinese territory.19 President Hu and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh sought to reestablish calm, agreeing
during the visit to accelerate work on negotiating
a resolution of the border. This political desire for a
resolution, coupled with the overall improvement in
Sino-Indian relations over the last few years, would
seem to remove or at least undercut the Sino-Indian
border dispute as a rationale for development and
modernization of the PLA.
A second dispute involves China’s claims to the
South China Sea and the Spratly Islands. In addition
to their geostrategic position along critical sea lanes
through the South China Sea, the PRC is interested in
the Spratlys due to the rich fishing grounds near the islands and the possible energy deposits in the seabed
under them. Beijing’s claims to all of the Spratly
Islands—and perhaps to the whole of the South China
Sea—run afoul of claims by Vietnam to all of the Spratlys
and by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei to specific
Spratly islands within their exclusive economic zones.
(Taiwan has also asserted claims to the islands that
mimic those of the PRC.) In addition, China’s possible
claims to the Sea itself seem to challenge Indonesia’s
claims to waters around its Natuna Island.20
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The Spratly Islands have been a source of conflict in
the past between China and its neighbors. The PRC took
seven islands from the Vietnamese in a brief naval clash
in 1988, and the Chinese seized Mischief Reef from the
Philippines in 1995, aggravating regional fears at that
time of a “China threat.” Indeed, the PLAN has built
up and fortified the “fishermen’s shelter” on Mischief
Reef and has built an airstrip on Woody Island in the
Paracel Islands (an island group north of the Spratlys
and disputed between the PRC and Vietnam).
Overall, however, the Chinese have taken steps
in the last several years to dampen the potential for
conflict in the South China Sea. In 2002, China agreed
with the other claimants to the Declaration on Conduct
of Parties in the South China Sea, an interim step
while the various disputants continued to work out a
formal code of conduct (which is still not completed).
Equally significant, in September 2004 Chinese and
Philippine oil companies agreed to a joint exploration
project in an area which they dispute, and in March
2005 the Vietnamese joined the project.21 These steps,
combined with the success of China’s good neighbor
policy, have helped to ameliorate the sense of threat
that China feels over these disputed territories. Still,
the disputes have not been truly resolved but only
set aside for the time being, and the PLA may need
to continue thinking about developing the air and
naval capabilities (e.g., long-range aircraft, aircraft
carriers, advanced warships) required to safeguard the
Chinese claims. Moreover, should oil be discovered in
significant quantities under the Spratlys, the current
cooperation could devolve into forcible competition to
strengthen national claims to the islands and waters.
While China’s border dispute with India and its
territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries
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over the Spratlys are largely in abeyance, the same
cannot be said for the Sino-Japanese dispute over the
Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea. Although the
contention over the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese)
Islands has existed for decades, the dispute heated
up in the late 1960s with reports of potential energy
deposits nearby. The jostling became fairly intense in
the mid-to-late 1990s when the third UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) came into force
(1994). Both China and Japan sought to establish their
200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones in the
East China Sea and over the islands with less than 400
nautical miles separating the undisputed territory of the
two countries. To bolster Japan’s claims to the islands,
a group of Japanese citizens constructed a lighthouse
on the largest of the islands; Chinese responded
with attempts to raise Chinese flags on the disputed
territory. More recently, the scene of Sino-Japanese
contention has been the Chunxiao gas field in the East
China Sea, lying just on China’s side of the boundary
as recognized by Japan but with part of the deposit
possibly under Japanese territory. The Chinese started
to develop this energy source in 2003, and the China
National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) announced
in July 2006 that the project had become operational.22
To reaffirm China’s claims to the gas field in the face of
Japanese protests against the gas project, in September
2005 the PLA sent five naval vessels to visit the area,
and one of the warships trained its gun on a Japanese
surveillance aircraft.23
What makes this territorial dispute with Japan
particularly worrisome, unlike those with India or the
ASEAN countries, is that political tensions with Japan
have been increasing over the last couple of years
rather than subsiding—although such tensions eased
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in late 2006 following the hastily arranged October 8
summit meeting that year between new Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe and the Hu-Wen leadership team.
Since late 2004, we have seen a Han-class submarine
intrude into Japanese territorial waters, three weekends
of anti-Japanese riots in major Chinese cities during
the spring of 2005, and the temporary suspension of
Japanese economic aid to the PRC in the spring of
2006 in response to Chinese actions and statements
against Japan. Japan also is engaging in competition
with China for influence in the region, especially in
Southeast Asia, although it appears frequently to be
one or two steps behind the Chinese. Finally, Japan is
seeking to become a “normal” country, a country that
is not severely constrained in the use of its military to
work with friends and allies for common purposes.
As a result of these factors, many Chinese analysts
are identifying Japan as a potential threat to Chinese
security, arguing that increasing militarism and
nationalism in Japan and closer cooperation with
the United States—especially in the event of a SinoAmerican conflict over Taiwan—point to Japanese
efforts (in conjunction with the United States) to
contain the PRC’s rise.24 Concerns about the future
of Sino-Japanese relations and of a possible threat to
China’s security from this neighbor were a common
theme during discussions with several civilian foreign
policy and security analysts in Beijing in August 2006
(these analysts specialized in East Asia generally, or in
Northeast or Southeast Asia).25
Based on these mounting security concerns vis-à-vis
Japan, we can expect to see the PRC develop military
capabilities to deter Japanese involvement (even if
only in a support role) in a conflict over Taiwan that involved the United States, and capabilities to safeguard
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Chinese interests in the East China Sea and the Diaoyu
Islands. Such capabilities could certainly include the
new Zubr-class air-cushioned landing craft that China
has recently agreed to purchase from Russia, which
would enhance the PLA’s amphibious capabilities.26
Maritime and Energy Security.
China’s emergence as a major trading power has
led it to develop a heavy dependence on sea lines of
communication (SLOCs). The phenomenal growth
of the Chinese economy (averaging approximately 9
percent annual growth since 1979) has been driven by
Chinese exports, which in turn depend on the import
of components and raw materials. Maintenance of the
growth and development of the economy is a crucial
aspect of the continued legitimacy of the Communist
Party’s rule, with disruption of Chinese trade not only
affecting the economic security of the PRC, but also
the secure rule of the current regime. Yet, since the
PLA’s naval capabilities are not adequate to protect
Chinese shipping in the East Asian SLOCs (especially
into the southern reaches of the South China Sea
and the Southeast Asian straits), China must rely on
the United States to provide the public good of the
freedom of the seas and the security of the sea lanes.
However, if there is a Sino-American conflict over
Taiwan, there is the strong possibility that this public
good could become an excludable good to China.
Thus, prudent military planners in Beijing will seek to
enhance Chinese military capabilities to protect the sea
lanes that Chinese shipping uses.27 The need to pursue
SLOC security helps to explain the priority placed
on building naval power as reflected in the 2004 PRC
defense white paper, and in President Hu’s December
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2006 call to build a “powerful people’s navy that
meets the demands of carrying out our army’s historic
missions in the new century and new stage.”28 It also
bolsters the 2006 defense white paper’s emphasis on
gradual extension of the PLAN’s “strategic depth.”29
This dependence is particularly salient with respect
to China’s oil imports. The PRC imports approximately
40 percent of its oil, and of that amount 80 percent
comes through the Strait of Malacca. In December
2003, President Hu Jintao expressed “extreme concern”
over this vulnerability to China’s oil supplies because
the country would face a “predicament” should
some incident happen and/or foreign countries
blockade the Strait.30 Chinese security analysts remain
concerned about the possibility of piracy or terrorism
in the Strait, as well as the possibility of the Strait
being blocked by another country’s naval forces.31
Hu called on the country to find ways to alleviate this
“Malacca Dilemma,” including energy conservation
and diversification of sources.
Beijing has also pursued discussions with the three
Strait countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore)
on cooperation to maintain security in the Strait;
although Indonesia and Malaysia have been hesitant
to allow a significant role for any outside power in the
Strait, avenues for cooperation that do not impinge
on the sovereignty of the three littoral states are
being explored. In order to enhance the security of
the Malacca Strait, the PLA will need to build up its
power-projection capabilities to extend down into that
area (e.g., aircraft carriers and long-range aircraft).
It is also possibly seeking bases in friendly countries
along the route from oil sources in the Persian Gulf;
this potential “string of pearls” strategy has received a
fair bit of attention in Western news media, although it
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is not clear that China actually has an explicit strategy
along these lines.32
As the Chinese have sought to diversify their sources
of oil and gas, they have turned increasingly to Russia
and Central Asia as suppliers. In 2005, Russia supplied
10 percent of China’s crude oil imports, and in March
2006 China and Russia signed an agreement to supply
Russian gas to the PRC.33 Beijing has also provided a
gift of $400 million to Russia for a feasibility study on
constructing a spur of the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean
(ESPO) pipeline to China.34 In Central Asia, the Chinese
have helped to build an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan
to the PRC which is now operational, purchased a
major oil company in Kazakhstan (PetroKazakhstan) in
October 2005, and struck a deal with Turkmenistan in
April 2006 to purchase gas from that country beginning
in 2009 and build a pipeline to deliver it.35 Chinese oil
companies are seeking additional deals as well.
As China becomes a larger player in the Central
Asian energy game, it will develop important assets
that it will desire to secure against terrorism or other
types of threats. To do so, the PLA will need to further
develop its land- and air-based power projection
capabilities—thus pulling the military in a somewhat
different direction from sea- and air-based power
projection capabilities for dealing with threats to Chinese
maritime interests. In addition, China might find itself
increasingly in rivalry with Russia, which has sought to
maintain its virtual monopoly on Central Asian energy
exports as a way to continue its political influence in
the region. At the moment, Sino-Russian relations are
quite good, with growing economic interdependence
as well as continuing Chinese purchases of Russian
weaponry to modernize the PLA. However, if SinoRussian rivalry in Central Asia becomes intense, this
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development could join with Russian dissatisfaction
over trade asymmetries, Chinese immigration, or other
factors to create a more assertive Russia, resulting in
the perception of Russia as a threat to Beijing. Should
that happen, the Russian contributions to China’s
military modernization would likely be terminated,
and the PRC’s whole security calculus would have to
be revised.
Nontraditional Security Threats.
As is true of many countries, China is facing
challenges from nontraditional security threats. Some
of these, like the spread of infectious diseases, are not a
military threat, and although the military could play a
role in humanitarian efforts to cope with an outbreak,
the size and structure of the PLA will not be affected by
them. Others, however, do have military aspects. One
of these is transnational crime such as international
drug trafficking. China borders two of the most
prolific drug productions centers in Asia: Afghanistan
(heroin and opium) and Myanmar, formerly known
as Burma (heroin and opium, and increasingly
methamphetamines). Many of these drugs are making
their way into China. Although combatting illegal
drug trafficking is primarily a police issue, China has
involved the PLA at times to strengthen control over
its border in order to staunch the flow of drugs into the
country, such as it did along its border with Myanmar
in August-September 2003. Yet, such a threat will not
drive the modernization of the PLA.
Like counternarcotics, combatting terrorism is
another of the nontraditional security challenges facing
the PRC that is more characteristically a matter of
police work but that can also involve the use of military
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forces. For China, fears of terrorism are linked closely
to the threat of separatism, particularly in the Xinjiang
region, and Beijing is concerned about the links among
Muslim separatists (particularly the East Turkestan
Islamic Movement, or ETIM) and al-Qai’da. It is also
concerned about separatists in Xinjiang receiving
assistance from allies in neighboring countries, such
as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Because of
the transnational nature of terrorism, China has been
working with its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) to fight terrorism in the Central
Asian region. The SCO held multilateral joint antiterrorism exercises in 2003, and is planning another
exercise for 2007. China also held bilateral antiterrorism exercises with Kazakhstan in August 2006,
which involved police and special operations forces,
and with Tajikistan in September 2006.36
Combatting terrorism will likely have some small
impact on the structure of the PLA and some of the
hardware it seeks to acquire or develop, particularly
in terms of the missions that special operations forces
would train for and the surveillance equipment they
would need. However, addressing this threat will be
handled as much by the People’s Armed Police as by
the PLA, and is not likely to have a major impact on the
size and structure of the PLA.
Regional Instability.
Instability in neighboring countries is the final
external security challenge for the PRC. Such political,
economic, and social troubles would affect the general
regional environment for China’s security, including
China’s need for strategic economic development:
turbulence in neighboring countries could affect the
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general business climate in the region, with spill-over
effects in China. As Beijing has said repeatedly, it desires
peace and stability in its region of the globe in order
for it to concentrate on economic development. More
worrying for the Chinese leadership than this general
environmental impact, however, is the possibility that
instability in a neighbor bordering the PRC could have
a direct impact on the Chinese economy. This could
occur particularly through refugee flows into China;
significant influxes of refugees could negatively
impact the local economy for the affected Chinese
border provinces. Because of the importance of
continued strong economic growth for the legitimacy
of Communist Party rule and for China’s drive to
become a great power, Beijing needs to guard against
such borderland disruptions.
Central Asia is one area where China will not want
to see turmoil because it could flow into already restive
Xinjiang. Political disturbances in Central Asia could
also harm Chinese economic interests and assets (e.g.,
in the energy and mineral sectors) in those countries,
or they could link with the terrorist threat. Likewise,
China’s promotion of closer economic integration
between its southern provinces and the countries of
the Mekong subregion will increase Beijing’s desire
for stability in those Southeast Asian neighbors. But
the Korean peninsula is the place of most concern to
the PRC because of the current nuclear crisis there.
Estimates over the past several years have suggested
that there are already tens of thousands of North
Koreans living in northeastern China; political turmoil
in North Korea, economic collapse, or war with the
United States and South Korea could send tens of
thousands more refugees streaming across the border,
straining a local economy that was previously one of
the PRC’s “rust belts.”
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Diplomacy has been and will continue to be
the principal method for addressing these security
challenges, as Beijing has shown with the North
Korean situation. Economic tools—such as increasing
trade with, aid to, and investment in neighbors—could
also be used to promote stability in these countries.
However, military forces might be involved as well. In
August-September 2003, as tensions were rising over
North Korea’s nuclear program, Beijing replaced its
border police with regular PLA troops, with reports
suggesting that between 15,000 and 150,000 PLA
troops had been stationed on the Sino-North Korean
border.37 In July 2006, following Pyongyang’s test of
several ballistic missiles, China reportedly beefed up
its border with additional regular troops.38 While the
exact purpose of these military moves is not known for
certain, one of the reasons commonly assumed is that
China wanted to prevent massive refugee flows from
crossing the border.
Such a rationale is completely defensive in nature.
However, as China becomes more proactive in the
region on achieving great power status, or as the
Chinese leadership accedes to becoming a “responsible
stakeholder” in the region with concomitant responsibilities for maintaining neighborhood peace and
stability, then we could imagine that Beijing would
use expeditionary forces to quell nearby turmoil before
it crossed national borders. The reported stationing
of 4,000 Chinese troops in southern Sudan to protect
Chinese oil interests there may be a sign of things to
come.39
As this change of mindset occurs, the PLA will need
to develop adequate power projection capabilities,
including not only weapon platforms but also troop
transport capabilities. According to the Pentagon’s 2006
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report on the Chinese military, the PLA’s expeditionary
forces currently consist of three airborne divisions, two
amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades,
about seven special operations groups, and one
regimental-size reconnaissance element in the Second
Artillery missile force. The capabilities of these units are
steadily improving, not least through the introduction
of new equipment.40
To summarize, there are few direct, immediate
threats to the national security of China that originate
from beyond its borders. Nevertheless, there are
several external security challenges that Beijing will
likely address, and many of these—such as coping with
the United States, protecting Chinese claims to islands
in the East and South China Seas, and safeguarding
the PRC’s energy supplies and access to SLOCs—will
affect the size and structure of the Chinese military.
Challenges of this nature will require that the PLA
acquire new weapon systems as it modernizes its
forces.
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Domestic threats present more of a direct threat to
the security of China, and to the leadership. As noted in
a December 2006 Xinhua commentary, “The prevention
and proper handling of mass incidents is a major test
for the CPC’s [Communist Party of China] governing
ability.”41 Separatism, based on ethnic differences or
the unresolved civil war with the Republic of China
on Taiwan, threatens the territorial integrity of the
country. Domestic turmoil and social unrest generated
by corruption and official malfeasance threaten to
undermine the legitimacy of the Communist Party’s
rule and of the political system as a whole. Because
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the international security environment is relatively
peaceful and non-threatening for the PRC, some
analysts of Chinese security policy see Beijing placing
greater emphasis on these two domestic-level security
threats than on external threats in their list of security
priorities.42 Whether these are indeed the top two
security issues for the Chinese leadership or not, they
are critical challenges to Beijing. However, only the
issue of separatism truly involves the potential use
of military forces, and thus has the potential to affect
the size and structure of the PLA. Similarly, the PLA
has traditionally played a role in addressing domestic
natural disasters and humanitarian crises, and has
even served to an extent as a social security net. While
the PLA will likely continue to serve these functions,
their impact on the size and structure of the military
are not likely to be strong—especially as the PRC
further develops the People’s Armed Police and a
social security system.
The Separatist Threats.
As enunciated in China’s defense white papers
and in agreements of the SCO, Beijing is concerned
about the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism,
and extremism.43 Yet all three of these forces seem to
boil down to the same broad threat—the placing in
jeopardy of China’s borders by groups willing to use
political violence to pursue their goal of tearing away
a piece of Chinese territory. The primary geographical
areas of concern for the Chinese leadership are Taiwan,
Tibet, and Xinjiang. All three of these areas have links
to external actors (and many would argue that Taiwan
is an external actor), and military force has been used
in the past by Beijing in efforts to exert control over
these regions.
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The threat in Xinjiang is ethnic and religious
separatism. Although the ethnically Han Chinese have
become a narrow majority of the population there
recently, the ethnically Turkic Uighurs—Muslims
who retained their faith during the communist era—
used to be the dominant group in the region. During
the tumult of the 1930s-1940s, the people of what is
now Xinjiang managed twice to establish short-lived
autonomous East Turkestan republics. In 1950, the
PLA reestablished Chinese control over this region.
Since then, the people of Xinjiang have had an uneasy
relationship with Beijing due to their desire for greater
autonomy or even independence.
Tensions between the Uighurs and the Chinese
authorities escalated during the 1990s as Muslim
separatists seeking to re-create East Turkestan
engaged in bombings of civilian targets such as buses
and markets, as well as government institutions in
Xinjiang; they also allegedly bombed a bus in Beijing
in March 1997. During the 1990s, these separatists also
became linked to al-Qai’da and the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan, where some Uighur members of the
ETIM (one of the most radical of the Muslim separatist
groups) received terrorist training. With funding,
training, and arms from abroad, the Muslim separatists
in Xinjiang have forced Beijing to use military as well
as police forces to suppress this threat.44
The Chinese have also engaged in security
cooperation with their SCO partners to address the
threat posed by these Muslim separatists, including
periodic joint anti-terrorism exercises, such as those
with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in 2006. In addition,
Chinese authorities have sought to increase the presence of ethnically Han Chinese in Xinjiang in order to
shift the local balance of power away from the Uighurs,
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and have also encouraged a “Go West” program of
economic development to try to bring more prosperity
to this northwestern region of the country.
The situation in Tibet today is not as ominous as
the one in Xinjiang, although in the past Tibet has
presented a more serious threat. Like Xinjiang, Tibet
enjoyed de facto autonomy from central Chinese
authority in the early-to-middle 1900s, and was
brought under Beijing’s control in 1950 by the PLA.
Tensions rose during the 1950s between the Tibetans
and the Communist Party leadership, leading to a
revolt in 1959, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, and
a crackdown by the PLA. Tibetan resistance continued
through the 1960s, supported by the United States and
the Tibetan government-in-exile in India. Tensions
rose again as Tibetans clamored for independence in
the late 1980s, leading to suppression of protest and
the declaration of martial law in Lhasa in 1989. Since
then, Beijing has sought to infiltrate ethnic Han into
Tibet, encouraged economic policies to bring enhanced
prosperity to the region, and carefully monitored
events for signs of protest. It has also occasionally
engaged in quiet discussions with representatives of
the Dalai Lama, who claims only to want autonomy
for Tibet rather than independence. But the Chinese
leadership, not trusting the Dalai Lama, remains wary
of pro-independence sentiments in Tibet.
In both Xinjiang and Tibet, Beijing has used
the PLA in the past to quell disturbances, but the
development of the capabilities and training of police
forces means that uprisings in either area today will
first be a police issue, and will involve the military
only if the turmoil escalates. The Chinese leadership
is also employing economic and population policies
to address the situation in these two areas. And since
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the PLA already possesses the capabilities to deal with
these contingencies when military force is required,
it is unlikely that separatism in Tibet or Xinjiang will
have a major impact on the future size and shape of the
PLA.
This is far from the case with regard to Taiwan.
Because the Taiwan issue originates in the unresolved
civil war from 1946 to 1949, military force is very much
relevant. The PRC’s largest concentration of forces
today is arrayed against Taiwan, with the threat of
military action should the government in Taipei declare
independence and thus formally separate from China.
Beijing’s fears that Taiwan might seek independence
contributed to the 1954-55 and the 1958 Taiwan Strait
crises, and the PRC engaged in military coercion
(including live-fire missile tests) during 1995-96 in a
futile attempt to thwart the reelection of Taiwanese
President Lee Teng-hui when it feared he was becoming
pro-independence. Concerns about the desire of current
President Chen Shui-bian to push for independence
led the Chinese government to pass an anti-secession
law in March 2005. The threatened use of military force
to deter Taiwanese independence is a critical part of
Chinese policy toward the island. Because of Taiwan’s
security relationship with the United States, the PRC
must also prepare for an American intervention in a
conflict over Taiwan, and because of tightening U.S.Japan relations and Sino-Japanese tensions, there is
also a possibility of Japanese involvement (through
logistical support) in such a U.S. intervention.
However, threatened military force is not the only
policy of Beijing toward Taiwan. The PRC is also actively using diplomacy to prevent Taiwan independence
and to isolate the regime internationally. The most
important element of this part of the strategy is to
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play on the American desire not to allow either side
of the Strait to change the status quo unilaterally—
Washington would rather avoid war between China
and Taiwan. Thus, as President Chen appeared in late
2003 to be moving toward a position more strongly in
favor of independence, Beijing worked on Washington
to warn Chen against any such moves. President
George W. Bush did so while standing next to PRC
Premier Wen Jiabao at the White House. In addition to
diplomacy, China is using trade with and investment
from Taiwan to create economic interdependence as
a way to bind the Taiwanese economy so tightly to
the mainland economy that declaring independence
would have enormous economic costs to the island.
While the diplomatic and economic strategies seem
to be working at the moment, military strategists in
Beijing feel the need to plan for the possibility of their
failure. Thus, the PLA will continue to increase and
modernize the Chinese military forces in preparation
to use force to halt Taiwanese independence.
The Threat of Domestic Turmoil.
Social unrest and mass protests are growing in
China, presenting a serious threat to the legitimacy
of the Party’s rule by an increasingly assertive public.
According to official government statistics, the number
of “mass incidents” in 2004—including protests, riots,
and mass petitioning—reached 74,000, compared to
58,000 in 2003 and only 10,000 in 1994. In 2005 there
were 87,000 “disturbances of public order,” up 6.6
percent from 2004.45 Many of these protests have turned
violent in the last few years, due either to the actions
of the protestors or to overly zealous police forces,
and news of these violent incidents has frequently
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leaked out to the foreign media. The causes of such
protests and disturbances are many, but common ones
include official corruption; illegal land seizures or
extremely low compensation for land confiscated for
industrial or commercial development; illegal taxes
on farmers by local officials; serious environmental
pollution by factories and inadequate responses from
the companies or government officials; and laid-off
workers demanding welfare payments.
Because the Communist Party is supposed to
represent the interests of the people, and is seen as
doing anything but representing the people in these
cases of unrest, the legitimacy of Party rule is potentially
at risk from the increasing assertiveness of the people
in voicing complaints against the government and
Party. This social unrest could also negatively impact
local economic development, which is a key goal of the
leadership.
As noted earlier, the Party leadership is clearly
aware of this security threat, and makes noises about
addressing it. In summarizing the lessons of his 13
years of leadership at the 16th Party Congress in 2002,
out-going Party Secretary Jiang Zemin’s sixth lesson
was: “Ensure stability as a principle of overriding
importance and balance reform, development, and
stability. Stability is a prerequisite for reform and
development.”46 In order to achieve social stability,
corruption has to be tackled. Jiang warned his
colleagues: “If we do not crack down on corruption,
the flesh-and-blood ties between the Party and the
people will suffer a lot and the Party will be in danger
of losing its ruling position, or possibly heading for
self-destruction.”47 Premier Wen Jiabao noted in his
March 2006 report on the work of the government
that officials still needed to clean up corrupt practices,
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provide better social security services, better protect
the environment, reform the rural tax system, and
take other steps in order to better protect the “vital
interests” of the people so that China can achieve
stability and a “harmonious society.”48 Likewise, in a
speech commemorating the 85th anniversary of the
founding of the CCP, President and Party Secretary
Hu Jintao reminded his colleagues that corruption
threatened to undermine the Party’s hold on power.49
The October 2006 Party resolution on “Major Issues
Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist
Society” and the December 2006 Xinhua commentary
on the need to correctly handle “mass incidents” point
to the seriousness with which the leadership is taking
this issue.50
Beijing has also been seeking to address the issue
of income disparities between the coastal and inland
regions of western China through its “Develop the
West” program. In early July 2006, the Chinese
government announced plans to spend an additional
$21 billion on major industrial, infrastructural, and
social projects in western China, adding to the nearly
$125 billion spent since 2000.51
Dealing with social stability is an issue for the
police rather than the PLA. It is also an issue to be
dealt with through political and legal reforms as well
as economic policies. Addressing the issue of domestic
turmoil is not going to be a critical factor affecting the
PLA. Nevertheless, it is a major security challenge to
the Chinese leadership.
CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
AND OBLIGATIONS
Efforts to address the security threats that China
faces will shape the size and structure of the Chinese
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military. Addressing the challenge of the United
States—either strategic encirclement or American
intervention in the Taiwan Strait—is a major driver
of PLA modernization and weapons acquisitions.
Defending Chinese claims to islands in the East and
South China Seas, or preparing for an invasion of
Taiwan in the event that Taipei declares independence,
will require enhanced amphibious capabilities. These
tasks plus the need to protect Chinese shipping in the
SLOCs will require air and naval power-projection
capabilities. Securing China’s energy interests in
Central Asia, or playing the role of regional stabilizer
there or on the Korean peninsula, will require air- and
land-based power-projection capabilities.
The same cannot be said for China’s international
obligations and commitments, with the exception of
peacekeeping. As the United States and other countries
have discovered, peacekeeping requires skills different
from those of warfighting, and a different mind-set.
China has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations over the last several years, and if this
trend continues the PLA may create more specialized
units for peacekeeping operations (it has already created
some engineering units for de-mining operations and
has special peacekeeping training facilities). But the
PRC’s other international commitments, whether they
be to allies or international organizations, are not of a
nature or extent such that they will help to shape the
size and structure of the PLA.
For the most part, China’s international obligations
and commitments do not directly address the
important external security challenges facing the PRC.
To some extent, such commitments may address these
threats indirectly (e.g., the role that Pakistan may play
in providing port and communication facilities from
which the PLAN can monitor China-bound shipping
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from the Persian Gulf), and they may address domestic
security threats such as the threat of separatism.
Although China’s alliances with North Korea and
Pakistan were created to deal with specific external
security threats (from the United States and India,
respectively), the commitments in these two alliances
are not terribly strong, and the threats themselves are
no longer as salient as they once were. In addition, the
international organizations to which the PRC belongs
(such as the SCO and the ASEAN Regional Forum)
require little of their members beyond talking.
China’s Alliance Commitments.
China today has only two remaining alliances: the
formal alliance with North Korea (Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, or DPRK), and the informal alliance
(or entente) with Pakistan.52 I am defining “alliance”
here to mean a relationship of security cooperation
between two (or more) countries directed against a
common adversary and which entails a level of defense
assistance in the event that one of the allies is attacked
by the common adversary. China has a patronclient type of relationship with Myanmar as well as
security cooperation whereby Beijing provides arms
to Myanmar and receives access to certain military
facilities. However, China has apparently not promised
any degree of defense assistance to Myanmar in case
it is attacked by a common enemy. Sino-Myanmar
relations are thus not truly relevant to the discussion
here.
The 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea
formalized the informal alliance that had existed
between these two neighbors since 1950. If either party
was attacked (presumably by the United States or its
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South Korean ally, the Republic of Korea [ROK]), the
other was committed to “immediately render military
and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”53 So
far, this provision has never been activated. Moreover,
it is unclear how China would respond today if the
United States attacked North Korea. With its pursuit
of a nuclear weapons program and its indifference to
Chinese interests, the DPRK has become a rogue ally,
distinguished by saber-rattling and truculence in its
dealings with pereceived enemies. This is especially
true since Pyongyang’s July 2006 missile tests and
its October 2006 nuclear test, but it was evident even
by 2003 when China moved troops to their common
border. Despite the existence of the formal alliance,
as early as the mid-1990s and the first North Korean
nuclear crisis Beijing was warning its neighbor that the
Chinese would not bail them out if they got themselves
into hot water.54 During the current nuclear crisis, China
has attempted to restrain the more outlandish behavior
of its ally: the PRC has pressured the North Koreans
to attend talks, has refused to provide weapons that
Pyongyang felt it was entitled to by virtue of the alliance, and allegedly requested the termination of the
mutual assistance clause of the alliance.55 It also participated in UN Security Council-imposed sanctions following Pyongyang’s nuclear test. Rather than maintain or
uphold some military commitment in this case, China
seems to be trying to minimize its obligations to the
DPRK.56
The Sino-Pakistani entente has no codified treaty to
formalize the relationship, but an understanding was
reached between the two countries around the turn of
the year 1962 that China would help Pakistan if it was
attacked by India. China made credible noises to this
effect during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, but rattled
its saber at India too late in the 1971 war. Realizing that
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it would be difficult to provide extended deterrence
to protect Pakistan, or to punish India for aggression
against Pakistan, China decided to provide Pakistan
with the wherewithal to defend itself and maintain
a balance of power against India. In the 1980s, China
conveyed to Pakistan the blueprints and possibly some
materials to make a nuclear bomb; in the 1990s, Pakistan
acquired technology and parts to enhance its missile
capabilities from the PRC. In the 2000s, China is helping
Pakistan to build a second major port city at Gwadar,
further from the border with India and providing more
strategic depth to its friend and ally.57 Yet even as the
PRC is providing Pakistan the defensive capabilities
to deter or defend against Indian aggression, it is
trying to restrain its ally from provoking conflict in the
subcontinent. These Chinese efforts at restraining its
ally were evident during the 1999 Kargil crisis, as well
as the crisis of 2001-02.
As of mid 2007, it is totally improbable that the
United States would invade China via North Korea. It
is also most unlikely that India will attack Pakistan, and
the trend in Sino-Indian relations suggests that tensions
between these two countries are on the wane. Thus,
the original rationales for the alliances are perhaps no
longer valid. Still, they have not completely dissipated.
China still wants North Korea as a buffer against the
U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, and it wants Pakistan
to continue to serve as a strategic counterweight to
India. Moreover, Pakistan can serve as a means for the
PRC to address one of its external security challenges,
albeit indirectly: the new port at Gwadar might be one
of the “string of pearls,” serving as a basing facility
for Chinese combat vessels in the PLAN’s efforts to
safeguard the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf.
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Chinese Participation in UN Peacekeeping.
Because sending troops on UN peacekeeping
missions is purely voluntary, China has no formal obligation or commitment to provide them. However, as
one of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security
Council, and as a rising great power, the PRC feels a
sense of obligation to contribute to such endeavors as
a way to demonstrate that it is a responsible member
of the international community. It also demonstrates
China’s commitment to the UN as the proper venue
for addressing international security issues, rather
than allowing “certain countries” to take up that role
unilaterally. China first contributed military observers
to UN peacekeeping operations in 1990, and has
contributed a total of approximately 6,800 personnel
to 21 UN peacekeeping operations since then.58
Chinese commitments jumped from 358 personnel
as of December 31, 2003, to 896 as of June 30, 2004.
As of December 31, 2006, China had 1,666 personnel
involved in peacekeeping missions. Moreover, in midSeptember 2006 the Chinese government pledged
to increase its commitment to the UN peacekeeping
mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by over 800 personnel to a
total of 1,000.59 Coming in the wake of Israel’s incursion
into southern Lebanon to fight Hezbollah, this Chinese
offer was seen to demonstrate the PRC’s desires to be
a responsible international power; it also scored points
for Beijing with Arab and Muslim countries. Despite
this pledge, however, Chinese participation in UNIFIL
stood at 343 troops as of February 28, 2007, far short of
its September 2006 pledge.
If China fulfills its pledge to increase its contribution
to UNIFIL (and does not reduce its contributions
to other missions), just over 2,400 PLA personnel
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(troops, police, and military observers) will be
involved in UN peacekeeping operations. While this
is a new high for the PRC, it is still a small number
of personnel compared to the total PLA strength of
approximately 2.3 million troops. As earlier noted,
since peacekeeping requires somewhat different skills
than fighting wars, Beijing decided to create specialized
units for peacekeeping operations (e.g., engineering
units for de-mining operations), and it joined the UN
Standby Arrangement System in 2002 with pledges of
engineering, medical, and transport teams.60 Beijing has
also established two peacekeeping training facilities
to enhance its participation in such operations: one at
the PLA’s International Relations Academy in Nanjing
(which is related to China’s defense intelligence and
defense attaché programs) and the China Peacekeeping
Police Training Center (which trains civilian police in
Langfang, Hebei Province).61 With dedicated units
and related training facilities, the PRC’s voluntary
commitments to UN peacekeeping are already having
some effect on the structure of the PLA, and will
continue to do so as China’s participation increases.
Nevertheless, this effect will likely be quite minimal in
the grand scheme of things.
Involvement in International Organizations
and Strategic Partnerships.
China’s involvement in international security
organizations such as the SCO and the ARF, and in
strategic partnerships (with countries such as Russia
and Indonesia), does not and will not have much of
an impact on the size and shape of the PLA. These
relationships involve security cooperation, but as of yet
do not entail military commitments that would require
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specific weapon systems, skills, or structures of the
PLA (as we might find in an alliance). Rather, China’s
participation in these arrangements entails political
commitments. Promises to cooperate on security
issues for the most part mean holding dialogues and
discussions to improve general relations, which include
security relations. Security and strategic dialogues,
joint military exercises, and even working together
on the production or purchase of weapons might be
part of the broad avenue of cooperation. Yet, in the
case of some of China’s strategic partners, they are
not sure what exactly is involved in the relationship:
for example, many Indonesians are still waiting to see
specific content to the special relationship declared in
the spring of 2005.62
As for the SCO and ARF, there is certainly content
to security cooperation in these organizations. The
ARF was inaugurated in 1994 as a means to promote
dialogue and discussion on security issues in the
Asia-Pacific region and to foster the development of
confidence-building measures (CBMs) among the
members of the dialogue with the hope of eventually
achieving preventive diplomacy. Unofficially—from
the perspective of the other members—it was created
as a mechanism to acculturate a rising and potentially
threatening China into the norms of international society
in the region. Although the Chinese were initially
hesitant about participation in the ARF, they have come
to be quite active participants. As such, the Chinese
have made commitments to the other members of the
ARF, but these are commitments to engage in dialogue
and to strive to build confidence in dealings with each
other, in part through attendance at and hosting of the
various intercessional workshops and seminars on
topics ranging among CBMs, peacekeeping, search-
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and-rescue operations at sea, training for disaster relief,
and the law of armed conflict.
Similarly, the SCO involves commitments to
cooperate in discussing regional security issues with an
eye toward dampening potential problems. Originating
in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five” and involving efforts by
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
to build confidence and reduce troop levels along their
mutual frontiers, the SCO so-named was launched
in June 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan and
with the additional goals of combating international
terrorism and international drug trafficking, among
other transnational issues. SCO members have drafted
and signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating
Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, and they
have created the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure
(RATS) to assist their cooperative efforts to combat
terrorism. The SCO has also hosted multilateral and
bilateral antiterrorism exercises. Yet there is no formal
commitment of troops under the SCO for specific
common tasks, only a commitment to cooperate with
other SCO members on the common security threats.
Thus, China’s participation in the SCO—like its
participation in the ARF—should not have significant
impact on the size, weapon systems, or structure of the
PLA.
CONCLUSION
In examining China’s security environment, it
seems that threats to the PRC’s security will have a
stronger impact on the size, shape, and weaponry of
the PLA as it modernizes than China’s international
security commitments and obligations will. To a
large extent, this is because these commitments are
essentially political in nature rather than military, and
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even when there is Chinese military participation,
relatively small numbers of troops are involved. This is
true even of Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping
operations, where the nature of these activities has led
to the creation of special training facilities as well as
dedicated peacekeeping units, but with the numbers of
personnel involved remaining small compared to the
total number of troops in the PLA. Nor will the PRC’s
alliance commitments have a large effect: Beijing has
done more to try to restrain than to support Pakistan
and North Korea over the last few years, and China’s
current relatively benign relationships with the targets
of both alliances (India and the United States) reduce
the salience of the alliances.
While threats to China’s security will have more
impact on the shape and size of the PLA than will the
PRC’s international security obligations, there are few
direct and immediate external threats confronting the
PRC today. Rather, any such “threats” are more in the
nature of potential security challenges. Nevertheless,
these external issues interact with the more salient
domestic threats—such as separatism—to become
matters of concern to the Chinese civilian and military
leaderships. In fact, the primary external security
challenge (the United States) combines with the primary
separatist threat (Taiwan) as the most powerful forces
shaping in Beijing’s thinking on how to modernize the
PLA over the near term. The challenge from the United
States also interacts with other external threats, such as
maritime security and energy security, to compound
the relevance of those challenges.
More than external security challenges, domestic
security threats are the most pressing for Beijing, in
particular the threats of separatism (especially Taiwan)
and domestic turmoil. However, the threat of domestic
instability is really a political issue better suited for the
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police (and the government’s economic policies and
legal system) than for the PLA—unless the Chinese
people were to rise up in mass rebellion against the
CCP. Even the separatist threat, in the cases of Xinjiang
and Tibet, is more of a police issue than a military
one, and the PLA already possesses the capabilities to
address such challenges should it become involved.
Thus, the separatist threat in these regions will not have
a significant impact on the size and shape of the PLA.
Taiwan, on the other hand, is affecting the shape of the
modernization of the PLA and will continue to do so.
Not only does Taiwan have a capable military of its own,
but the separatist threat it poses links with the external
challenges of the United States, Japan, and maritime
vulnerability to drive the near-term modernization of
the PLA. Because Beijing has not ruled out the use of
force against Taiwan, it must be prepared to match or
otherwise address the military capabilities of these hitech, “informationalized” potential adversaries.
While countering such external security challenges
and the Taiwan threat requires military planning,
Beijing has used astute diplomacy and economic/
trade policies to mitigate the severity of these threats.
Economic interdependence and common interests on
a host of international issues have encouraged the
PRC and the United States to develop a cooperative
working relationship despite the potential for conflict
over Taiwan. Beijing’s conscious effort to reverse
the escalating tensions with Japan during late 2006
is another case in point. And even with regard to
Taiwan, Beijing seems more assured in mid 2007 than
it has been in recent years, as evidenced by the more
confident and less strident tone of the 2006 defense
white paper compared to the previous two editions.
Security challenges, China has discovered, can be
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managed through political and economic relationships
and policies, not just military capabilities.
Finally, the PRC’s conception of its threat environment is in a period of gradual expansion to
embrace considerations beyond border and territorial
defense. The rise of China as a global economic and
trading power is prompting the Chinese leadership
to perceive interests that are more far-flung than
previously conceived. Protection of Chinese energy
and other ocean-going cargo along the Southeast
Asian SLOCs, even from ports as distant as the Persian
Gulf, and protection of Chinese energy industry assets
in Central Asia or farther afield (such as the Sudan)—
are emerging economic and maritime imperatives
shaping the longer-term vision for modernizing the
PLA. Likewise, China’s aspirations to be a great power
may influence its perceived need to provide stability
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Such interests will
require China to develop power-projection capabilities
well beyond those the PLA currently possesses. Without
any serious external threats driving the modernization
of the PLA, these aspirations—along with the desire
to develop the capabilities to address external security
challenges and the Taiwan threat—will be key drivers
for the continued modernization of the PLA.
The author thanks Luke Amerding and Hsieh Pei-Shiue for their
research assistance.
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CHAPTER 3
CHINA’S NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE
“MILITARY STRATEGIC GUIDELINES”
David M. Finkelstein
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A Decade of Impressive Change.
In the immediate wake of Tiananmen in 1989 and
for at least 2 years thereafter, the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) was deeply engaged, for
obvious reasons, in an intense period of political
work. The seemingly singular focus of the Chinese
armed forces on strengthening Party-Army ties and
on ideology was cause for foreign students of Chinese
military affairs to wonder whether the first decade of
the 1990s, like the 10 years during the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution, would turn out to be another “lost
decade” from the standpoint of military modernization
and enhanced professionalism. Clearly, this turned out
not to be the case. If anything, the decade of the 1990s
should be viewed as a period during which the PLA
made tremendous strides as a professional military
force.
At mid 2007, the PLA is over 3½ years beyond
a seminal decade of focused and sustained efforts
to modernize. For more than a decade, the armed
forces of China have been undergoing transformative
adjustments of such a profound nature relative to
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their past that one group of Chinese military authors
considers this ongoing period of reform to constitute
the PLA’s “Third Modernization.”1
Since the end of Beijing’s ninth Five Year Plan in
2000, many of the outputs and “deliverables” of this
remarkable period of change have become evident to
foreign observers of Chinese military affairs. Ardent
analysts, scholars, and other observers of the PLA are
familiar with the long list of changes that have unfolded,
and it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a
comprehensive accounting of them. At the same time,
for those less familiar with what has transpired, a brief
overview may usefully provide some appreciation
of the scope and scale of the changes undergone or
underway.2
For the sake of brevity, almost all the reforms or
modernization efforts the PLA has engaged in over
the past 13 years can be treated under at least one of
what I refer to as “The Three Pillars” of PLA reform
and modernization. They are:
Pillar 1: The development, procurement, acquisition, and fielding of new weapons systems, technologies, and combat capabilities. Under this pillar, one
would cite:
• End item purchases from Russia such as SU27 and SU-30 aircraft, Kilo Class submarines,
Sovremenny destroyers, and precision-guided
munitions (PGMs);
• Indigenously produced conventional weapons
systems such as Chinese-made submarines and
surface vessels, armor, and communications
equipment;
• Production of conventional missiles and upgrading the quality and survivability of China’s
nuclear arsenal; and
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• Basic research and development in which the
PLA is engaged domestically to produce information-age military technologies, to include
the creation of a fourth general department (the
General Equipment Department, 1998) in yet
another rectification of the military research and
development (R&D) establishment.
Pillar 2: The vast array of institutional and systemic
reforms. These include critical changes to the PLA’s
corporate culture that are focused on raising the levels
of professionalism of the officer corps and enlisted
force (especially NCOs) and making them more
adept at employing and maintaining new battlefield
technologies. This pillar also encompasses the myriad
organizational changes aimed at optimizing the force,
many of which came into effect in the mid-to-late 1990s.
Under this pillar, one could list:
• Major changes to the officer professional military
education system;
• The creation—for the first time—of a corps of
professional NCOs;
• More stringent requirements for officer commissioning, the diversification of the sources
of commissioning, and the standardization of
criteria for promotion; and
• Force structure adjustments that include a
significant new emphasis on the Navy, Air Force,
and strategic rocket forces, the downsizing of
staffs, the consolidation of ground force units
at the division and brigade levels, and new
battlefield logistics paradigms.
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Pillar 3: The development of new warfighting
doctrines for the employment of these new capabilities.3
In 1999 the PLA revised its operational-level doctrine
from its previous emphasis on ground force-centric
combined arms operations to one emphasizing joint
operations in the aerospace, maritime, and electromagnetic battle space dimensions. This new operational
doctrine is aimed at shifting the PLA:
• From a focus on operational planning to
prosecute protracted wars on the mainland to
short-duration high-intensity joint campaigns
off China’s littoral;
• From focusing on an enemy’s weakest forces to
attacking and destroying the enemy’s most vital
assets;
• From the concept of mass to the concept of
concentration of firepower; and
• From static defenses to mobile offenses.
In short, the attention of the PLA is now doctrinally fixed
on being able to prosecute short campaigns inflicting
shock and paralysis (vice long wars of attrition) to
level the technological playing field at the inception
of hostilities by concentrating PLA’s best capabilities
against the enemy’s most important assets.
Taken in their totality, the programs instituted by
the PLA to date constitute a set of significant strides
in modernization and reform—efforts that will enable
the PLA to become over time a more capable force
in an operational sense and a more professional one
in an institutional sense. None of this happened
overnight. It is the result of a series of carefully made
decisions, sustained focus, increased levels of funding,
prioritization, and incrementally implemented changes
and adjustments over time.
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Many of the most important changes under Pillars
2 and 3, and a good number of the major deliverables
under Pillar 1 (though clearly not all), are wellknown and in the public domain. These programs are
universally acknowledged and understood among
those who regularly follow the Chinese armed forces.
There is, however, much less certainty, less agreement,
and much room for discussion as to the larger rationale
for what is unfolding year by year.
What is the PLA trying to achieve and, more
importantly, why is it trying to achieve it? What
calculations, assumptions, and assessments are driving
Beijing to enact these changes in its military forces?
What objectives does the leadership of the PLA seek to
achieve? It is not just the cadre of international scholars
and specialists of the PLA at universities and research
institutes who are discussing these questions. Such
questions continue to be asked in various quarters of
the U.S. Government, especially within the Department
of Defense (DoD). The answers being reached, and
especially the assumptions underlying those answers,
are laden with potentially profound foreign policy and
force structure implications for the United States—
witness the attention given China in the Pentagon’s
most recent Quadrennial Defense Review.
These fundamental questions about the rationale
and objectives of PLA modernization were included
in the important policy front piece to the Pentagon’s
Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China in 2006, as quoted here:
China’s leaders have yet to adequately explain the
purposes or desired end-states of their military
expansion . . . this lack of transparency prompts
others to ask, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
did in June 2005: Why this growing investment?
Why these continuing large and expanding
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arms purchases? Why these continuing robust
deployments?4

However, while the 2006 DoD report (and its
predecessors) provides significant details about the
manifestations of PLA modernization, it leaves the
larger questions open-ended, putting the burden on
China to answer them. At the 2005 and 2006 ShangriLa (International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS])
conferences in Singapore, then U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld posed these larger-order questions
about the aims of PLA modernization in his addresses,
as alluded to in the quotation above.
In essence, these larger-order questions are
inquiring whether Beijing has a particular national
military strategy that is guiding the modernization and
transformation of the PLA; and if it does have such a
strategy, what is it?
This chapter, not surprisingly, will argue that China
does in fact have the equivalent of a national military
strategy, the elements of which are contained in the
“Military Strategic Guidelines” issued to the PLA.
Revisiting China’s National Military Strategy.
The first efforts. Attempting to understand the
elements of China’s national military strategy is a
challenge with which this author has grappled in the
past. In 1998, for a conference jointly hosted by the
RAND Corporation and the Council of Advanced
Policy Studies, I prepared a paper titled “China’s
National Military Strategy.”5 A little more than a
year later (2000), based on new developments in PLA
programs, I published a revised and updated version
of that paper as a CNA Corporation monograph.6
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Almost 9 years have passed since that first paper was
written. To some degree, given what was understood
at the time, the first effort has stood up reasonably
well. A strategic level context was provided for what
was beginning to unfold in PLA modernization. The
“Two Transformations” program was identified and
explained (possibly for the first time in Western writings about the PLA). Differentiations were made between the PLA’s strategic objectives and its implementing programs, and a linkage was established between
nondefense PRC national objectives and nationallevel military objectives. Moreover, the paper and its
sequel adjudged that significant institutional changes
and adjustments could be expected in the future, so
that a modicum of predictive power inhabited those
papers that has stood the test of time.
Yet, in retrospect, there are some issues in those
first papers that were either incorrectly drawn or
incompletely understood. Among these shortcomings
was the discussion of the active defense (jiji fangyu)
in terms of an “operational concept” or a “doctrine”
(more on this to follow). In the category of omissions, a
very significant term that came up in some of the data
reviewed at the time was glossed over, its significance
simply not being fully appreciated—to wit, the phrase
“military strategic guideline.”
Finally, the approach used to explain China’s
national military strategy in those previous papers can
be seen today as inadequate, although at the time it
made sense. In those first papers, a Western analytic
framework was employed as a way to lend structure
and rigor to my speculative efforts to visualize what
China’s actual national military strategy might look like
were it published in the public domain. The approach,
here quoted from the original paper, was as follows:
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This paper . . . offers a notional, annotated national
military strategy for China. It is notional because the PRC
has not published a detailed national military strategy.
It will ask and answer the question: “If China, like the
United States, published a national military strategy,
what would it look like and what would it say?”
The U.S. Army War College (AWC) model of military
strategy serves as the superstructure of the following
analysis of the PLA. While the PLA would certainly
not use an American construct to articulate its national
military strategy, this model is nevertheless a useful tool
for the descriptive and analytic purposes of this paper.
Useful frames of reference from the planners on the
Joint Staff who produce the Pentagon’s national military
strategy as well as several universal military concepts
such as “center of gravity” and other terms are also used.
Into these “frames” we shall place Chinese “lenses” to
articulate a vision of the bigger picture.

In other words, in order to derive the PRC’s national
military strategy in the absence of an officially published document, the outputs and programs associated
with PLA modernization that were then knowable
were identified and analyzed. They were then placed
into a non-Chinese framework to explain the larger
whole. What was presented, therefore, was a national
military strategy for the PRC that was inferential and
deduced. By and large, this is the methodology that is
still used by DoD in its annual report to Congress.
New possibilities. In the intervening years since those
first papers were written, China has not all of a sudden
published an official “National Military Strategy” under
such a title. And China will not do so simply because
this would impose upon the PLA the expectation that
it would adopt an American approach to articulating
its plans for military modernization, impose U.S.
terminology upon the Chinese defense establishment
(to include the title “National Military Strategy”), and
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expound upon a rationale for military modernization
that would make sense to foreign readers as opposed
to making sense to the PLA itself.
So what has changed over the course of the
intervening years to permit a new approach to this
topic? The short answer is, quite a bit.
(1) More Data. Throughout the course of the
1990s—especially during the period of the ninth Five
Year Plan (1996-2000) and since then—the PLA’s
military modernization and reform efforts have been
accompanied by a veritable explosion of published commentary from credible Chinese military authorities.
These publications have been necessary to stimulate
discussion among PLA strategists and planners
responsible for the reform effort and equally necessary
to inform the greater PLA, and in some cases other
non-PLA PRC government officials, about defense
modernization plans, programs, and rationales.
Moreover, this data is now increasingly accessible to
foreigners.
(2) More Context About the Data. Not only is there
more data available to draw upon, but the degree of
sophistication that foreign consumers of this literature
have developed in carefully vetting and evaluating
this data has increased as well. In addition, many in
the field of PLA research have been involved in an
explication of Chinese military terminology. There is
now a much better grasp of the professional lexicon by
which the PLA speaks to itself (and others in China)
about military issues.
(3) Five Successive PRC Defense White Papers.
Since 1998 Beijing has published five official white
papers devoted to military and security affairs—
China’s National Defense, in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and
2006. None of these white papers by themselves tells
the entire story of the national military strategy under
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which the PLA is currently operating. Taken together,
however, they provide more official insights into, and
explanations of, that military strategy than one might
expect or that some give the Chinese credit for.
(4) The “Canonization” of Jiang Zemin’s “Military
Thought.” Finally, circa August 2003, Jiang Zemin’s
speeches, directives, and guidance to the PLA during
his tenure as Chairman of the Central Military
Commission (CMC) were elevated to the level of
enduring “thought” (sixiang) in the hierarchy of CCP
political theory. The PLA now adds “Jiang Zemin
Thought on National Defense and Army Building”
to the canon of “Mao Zedong Military Thought” and
“Deng Xiaoping Thought on Army Building in the
New Period.” The elevation of Jiang’s role in military
modernization resulted, predictably, in a wave of
publishing. And since the national military strategy
under which the PLA is still operating was issued
on Jiang’s watch, these publications, many of which
are publicly available, provide new insights. One
important example would be the three-volume Selected
Works of Jiang Zemin (2006).7
The approach in this chapter. Given the new sources
of data and the new contexts for interpreting this data,
it is now possible to offer a preliminary exposition on
the essence of China’s equivalent of a national military
strategy. Drawing upon a body of Chinese literature,
both primary source and secondary source, we are
now in a position to: (1) identify and explain the most
important Chinese terms, constructs, elements, and
components that comprise the equivalent of Beijing’s
national military strategy as a generic framework
employed by PLA strategic planners; and (2) discuss the
key features and basic content of the current national
military strategy, its evolution, and the drivers and
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assessments associated with it. In short, this chapter
discusses China’s national military strategy in terms
the Chinese use to discuss it.
REVIEWING THE BIDDING:
WHAT ARE “NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES”?
While there is no need to go into great detail on the
question of what, generically, constitutes a national
military strategy, a quick review is appropriate in
order to set the stage. As a general proposition, national
military strategies around the world share certain
common features. At the most basic levels, there are
six.
• First, of course, is that they represent
authoritative guidance. Whether this guidance
is publicly released or classified varies from
nation to nation.8 Either way, national military
strategies represent a set of policy decisions that
set the azimuth for actual planning or action.
• Second, national military strategies usually
provide direction on how the military element of
national power should support larger national
objectives and, in varying degrees of detail, how
it will do so.
• Third, the elements that comprise national
military strategies are usually articulated in
broad directives and large concepts, not minute
detail. These broad concepts eventually lead
to more detailed planning and programs to
implement the larger concepts.
• Fourth, national military strategies usually
serve as planning guidelines. These planning
guidelines are often associated with specific time
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frames and provide guidance across a spectrum
of near-term, mid-term, or long-term horizons.
• Fifth, while different nations organize the
components of their national military strategies
in different ways and use different terminology
to identify those components, all usually
address the issues of “ends, ways, and means.”
As explained so clearly by Harry R. Yarger, the
“ends” represent “what” must be accomplished
(objectives). The “ways” (strategic concepts and
courses of action) talk to how the objectives will
be accomplished. The “means” speak to resources, that is, which resources will be used,
or what resources need to be developed. These
“means” are not focused just on weapons,
technologies, or other “hard” capabilities.
They also include “intangible resources” such
as “will,” “courage,” or “intellect” as well as
organizational changes, the need for new types
of operational units, new doctrines, and other
institutional infrastructures or professional
paradigms.9
• Sixth, national military strategies are usually
informed by, and oftentimes articulate, the
analytic assessments driving the rationale for
the strategy. These analyses can include threat
perceptions or likely contingencies, capabilitiesbased assessments, larger-order strategic
assessments, or domestic factors driving or
constraining the strategy.
A classic example of the basics of a national military
strategy is the 1992 National Military Strategy of the United
States — the first time Washington ever produced a
public domain document on this issue. A mere twenty80

seven pages long, the 1992 “NMS” addressed four
major issues: (1) a review of the security environment,
national interests, and national objectives, (2) broad
strategic principles and operational guidance for
the U.S. armed forces to follow or be able to achieve
(“strategic deterrence and defense,” “forward
presence,” “crisis response,” etc.), (3) operational
planning requirements and deployment postures
based on possible contingencies or threats, and (4) the
requirements for current and future force structures,
capabilities, and supporting infrastructures.
“MILITARY STRATEGIC GUIDELINES”—
CHINA’S NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
What Are “Strategic Guidelines”?
As a general practice in China, “strategic guidelines”
(zhanlüe fangzhen) serve as one type of policy format
among many that can be used to articulate nationallevel directives, policies, or principles that guide
action. “Strategic guidelines” delineate the PartyState’s fundamental decisions or approaches on major
domestic issues, foreign policy issues, or security
issues. There can be strategic guidelines for foreign
policy, strategic guidelines for economic policy, and
strategic guidelines for the reform of this or that sector,
etc.10 While it is unclear as to where, exactly, strategic
guidelines fit in the hierarchy of authority as applied
to PRC policy pronouncements, it is clear that they
are high-level dictates that in terms of supremacy
and rank reside generally at or around the strata of
the “general line” (zong luxian) and “general policies”
(zong zhengce).11
Usually, strategic guidelines are issued by the top
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leader of the Party-State on behalf of the collective
leadership or on behalf of the Party-State organ
responsible for the portfolio under consideration.
Strategic guidelines, therefore, provide authoritative
direction for action to the members of the particular
policy community (xitong) to which they are issued,
and it is these members who subsequently flesh out
the details.
Military Strategic Guidelines.
The highest level of national guidance and direction
to the armed forces of China is known as the “Military
Strategic Guidelines” (junshi zhanlüe fangzhen).
The Military Strategic Guidelines issued to the
PLA, and the detailed plans and programs that are
subsequently developed to implement them, constitute
China’s national military strategy. As explained by
the Army Building Research Department of the PLA’s
National Defense University (NDU), “The military
strategic guidelines are the fundamental military
policies (junshi zhengce) of the party and the nation.
They are the overall principles (zong yuanze) and
guiding principles (zong gangling) for planning and
guiding the development and utilization of the armed
forces.”12
Military Strategic Guidelines are issued to the PLA
under the authority of the Military Commission of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,
usually abbreviated CMC.
The issuing of a new set of Military Strategic
Guidelines is a significant event. According to a senior
PLA strategist, prior to 1993, this has happened only
four times since the founding of the PRC in 1949.13
New guidelines are usually issued under the name of
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the Chairman of the CMC, who has often also served
concurrently as the CCP secretary general and state
president. Historically and systemically, significant
changes to the Military Strategic Guidelines are
initiated by a major speech delivered by the CMC
Chairman to the leadership of the PLA at an expanded
meeting of the CMC.14 These expanded meetings
(kuoda huiyi) include not only the sitting members of
the CMC but can include as many as several hundred
key PLA leaders from the four general departments,
the military regions, the services, and other nationallevel organizations such as the AMS and the NDU.15
These speeches contain a mere handful of core
concepts, subsequently considered by the PLA as
“strategic guiding thoughts” or “strategic guiding
ideology” (zhanlüe zhidao sixiang) that serve as the
basis for the leadership and planners in the Chinese
armed forces to take for implementation: planning,
programming, adjustments, acquisitions, resource
allocations, priorities, etc. At their heart and at a
minimum, the “strategic guiding thoughts” underlying
the Military Strategic Guidelines for any particular
period provide official judgments that include:
• The ideological and political basis for the
Military Strategic Guidelines;
• An assessment of the international environment
and its impact on China’s security;
• China’s overall national security objectives,
its domestic objectives, and the relationship of
military objectives to other national objectives;
• The most likely type of conflict for which the
PLA must prepare (either a capabilities-based
assessment, a contingency-based assessment, or
both); and
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• Broad guidance to the PLA on how it will
prepare, reform, or adjust to meet the challenges
of the new situation.
All the bullets above except the first are also part of the
“strategic assessment” (zhanlüe panduan) that informs
the Military Strategic Guidelines.
To recapitulate, the “strategic guiding thought”
that is the “core” of the Military Strategic Guidelines
forms the basis for fleshing out the details of the
“ends, ways, and means” of the PRC’s national
military strategy, and major changes to it can have
far-reaching programmatic and operational planning
implications for the PLA. For example, and to be
quite brief, in the mid-1980s Deng Xiaoping made
radical changes to the “strategic guiding thought”
underlying the Military Strategic Guidelines inherited
from Mao Zedong. Where Mao had characterized the
international situation as one of “war and revolution,”
Deng saw “peace and development” as the “keynote
of the times.” Where Mao kept the PLA on a wartime
footing and directed the PLA to prepare to fight “early
wars, major wars, and nuclear wars” that assumed
an invasion of the mainland, Deng directed the PLA
to enter a period of “peacetime army building” but
also to develop the capabilities for dealing with local
wars and “incidents” that might erupt on China’s
periphery. 16
Clearly, the preceding example does not do justice to
the complex analyses of either Mao or Deng, nor to the
myriad resulting adjustments the PLA made to China’s
national military strategy as a result of these differing
directives. The point is to provide an example of the
type of large-order assessments or directives that are
encapsulated in the term “strategic guiding thought”—
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which becomes bureaucratic/ideological shorthand for
PLA planners to use in developing detailed programs
under the Military Strategic Guidelines.
Finally, it is important to point out that major
adjustments to the Military Strategic Guidelines must
also address (either to revalidate or change) China’s
domestic objectives and China’s larger national
security objectives. This is because China does not
formally generate the equivalent of a “National Security
Strategy” (as does the United States) that PLA planners
can use as the basis for their subsequent preparations,
or which they can use as the supra-institutional basis
for coordinating their military plans and programs
with larger national objectives and other relevant
nondefense organizations.17
Key Components of the Military Strategic
Guidelines.
When new Military Strategic Guidelines are
promulgated, there are several key “strategic issues”
(zhanlüe wenti), or questions, that must be addressed.
Some of these issues are addressed outright in the initial
promulgation of new Military Strategic Guidelines;
others can only be dealt with or resolved over time and
with subsequent military staff work, planning, and
resource allocation. Below is a list of the key strategic
issues that the Military Strategic Guidelines address as
suggested by the body of literature canvassed for this
chapter. There may be other factors or strategic issues
contained within the Military Strategic Guidelines that
are not apparent in the data at hand, and it is not certain
at this point that the issues identified below are being
presented in the correct sequence. At bottom, however,
these issues address two fundamental questions: “What
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kinds of conflicts must the PLA be prepared to fight?”
and “How should PLA modernization and reform
programs adjust to comport with the new operational
imperatives?” The key concerns or strategic issues
are:
• Presenting the Strategic Assessment (zhanlüe
panduan);
• Adjusting the Content (nei rong) of the Active
Defense Strategy (jiji fangyu zhanlüe);
• Articulating the Strategic Missions (zhanlüe
renwu) and Strategic Objectives (zhanlüe mubiao)
of the armed forces;
• Issuing guidance for Military Combat Preparations (junshi douzheng zhunbei);
• Identifying the Main Strategic Direction (zhuyao
zhanlüe fangxiang); and
• Determining the Focus for Army Building
(jundui jianshe).
The Strategic Assessment.
The “strategic assessment” (zhanlüe panduan) is
both a political assessment and a military assessment.
Politically, it usually provides judgments on the state of
international relations and the global order, identifies
trends in relations among the major powers or other
major groups of nations, and judges China’s situation in
the global order and that order’s impact on larger PRC
national objectives—especially domestic objectives.
This judgment also assesses the prospects for global
security affairs and how they impact China. Is the world
at peace or at war? What are the underlying causes of
the conflicts that are occurring? How do they affect
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China? It was within the context of these larger-order
political and strategic assessments that Deng Xiaoping
expressed the judgments in the mid-1980s that “peace
and development” were the main trend of the times,
that a world war between the two superpowers (the
United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[USSR]) was not imminent, and that China could look
to a period of peace in order to focus on domestic
development. From a military standpoint, the strategic
assessment issues judgments about the nature of
contemporary warfare. It addresses the general forms
or types of wars being fought (zhanzheng xingtai) and
the more specific forms of combat operations (junshi
douzheng xingshi) by which they are characterized.
These judgments are clearly articulated when Military
Strategic Guidelines are issued.
Of great import, then, changes to the Military
Strategic Guidelines—either adjustments to the
guidelines or the issuing of a new set of guidelines—
are usually the result of a major change in one or more
of the issues addressed in the strategic assessment. To
recapitulate, these are (1) changes in the international
order; (2) changes in the security environment and
China’s security situation; (3) changes in China’s
domestic situation; and (4) changes in the nature of
warfare itself.
Adjustments to the Active Defense Strategy.
The relationship between the “Active Defense
Strategy” and the “Military Strategic Guidelines” is so
intimate—indeed, the two are nearly indistinguishable
in the minds of the PLA—that one often encounters the
phrase “The Military Strategic Guidelines of the Active
Defense.” But speaking of the two as being identical
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is technically incorrect. What, therefore, is the “Active
Defense” and what is its relationship to the Military
Strategic Guidelines?
The “Active Defense” (jiji fanyu) or “Active Defense
Military Strategy” (jiji fangyu junshi zhanlüe) establishes
a set of broad strategic concepts and principles, and a
set of very general operational concepts, for prosecuting
war at the strategic level of conflict. The term itself
originates from “Mao Zedong Military Thought” (Mao
Zedong Junshi Sixiang), specifically Mao’s 1936 essay,
“The Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary
War,” in which he expounded the concept of fighting
a strategically defensive war while at the same time
engaging in offensive operations at the campaign and
tactical levels of war.”18 It was not until 1956, however,
that the “Active Defense Strategy” and the “Military
Strategic Guidelines” became intertwined. In that year,
Marshall Peng Dehuai linked the two at an expanded
meeting of the CMC by adding a political component
to the active defense strategy (i.e., strategically, China
does not attack until it is attacked), and declaring that
China would adopt the “military strategic guideline of
the active defense.”19
Over time, the higher-order strategic-level
principles informing the “Active Defense” strategy
have remained relatively constant. Briefly, as the PLA
would address them, they would include the following
tenets:
• Overall, our military strategy is defensive.
We attack only after being attacked. But our
operations are offensive.
• Our counteroffensive will not be limited by
space or time.
• We will not put boundaries on the limits of our
offensives.
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• We will wait for the time and conditions that
favor our forces when we do initiate offensive
operations.
• We will focus on the opposing force’s weaknesses.
• We will use our own forces to eliminate the
enemy’s forces.
• Offensive operations against the enemy and
defensive operations for our own force protection will be conducted simultaneously.
• We will maximize our advantages against the
opposing forces.20
Obviously, the levels of generality inherent in the
tenets bulleted above are not conducive to operational
planning; the development of capabilities and doctrines; training; resource allocations; the generation
of priorities; or deployment decisions under specific
scenarios or conditions. Consequently, the basics of
the “Active Defense Strategy” as shown are at bottom
a framework that must be filled in with details in
order for it to become an implementable strategy.
True, the major decisions, assessments, judgments,
determinations, and policies encompassed in the other
components of the Military Strategic Guidelines inform
the development of the specifics of the “Active Defense
Strategy” during any given period of time. Hence, the
interconnectedness between the two. In other words,
without the major components of the Military Strategic
Guidelines to flesh it out, the “Active Defense Strategy”
is a near-empty construct. Without the need to flesh out
the “Active Defense Strategy,” the Military Strategic
Guidelines have no higher operational focus. Hence,
as a PLA military theorist might say, the relationship
is “dialectical.”
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Strategic Missions and Strategic Objectives.
PLA materials usually employ the terms “strategic
missions” (zhanlüe renwu, alternately “strategic tasks”)
and “strategic objectives” (zhanlüe mubiao) as part of
the same phrase. As best as can be determined, the
PLA does not differentiate between the concepts of
“missions” and “objectives.” The “strategic missions
and objectives” of the PLA are usually articulated in
the Military Strategic Guidelines, are set down in the
broadest of terms, and are derived from the “strategic
assessment” as well as the PRC’s larger security
objectives. Examples of “strategic tasks and missions”
would be to “defend sovereignty and maintain internal
stability.”
Military Combat Preparations.
The term “Military Combat Preparations” (junshi
douzheng zhunbei) refers to the type of warfare the PLA
must be prepared to fight, and therefore also constitutes
an official assessment of the next type of war that is most
likely to be fought by the PLA. This guidance is couched
mainly in terms of a capabilities-based assessment, not
a contingency-based assessment. It is about the nature
of contemporary warfare, not about identifying the next
enemy or any specific operational scenario or planning
contingency. The guidance contained under “Military
Combat Preparations” is closely linked to the issue of
“Army Building” because of its obvious programmatic
implications for the development of operational
capabilities. Examples would be directing the PLA to
prepare to fight: (1) total war versus limited or local
war; (2) local wars “under normal conditions” versus
“local wars under modern high-tech conditions”; or (3)
conventional warfare versus nuclear warfare, etc.
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The Main Strategic Direction.
Whereas the guidance under “Military Combat
Preparations” is mainly geared to a capabilities-based
analysis, the concept of the “Main Strategic Direction”
(zhuyao zhanlüe fangxiang) is a contingency-based
assessment. Explaining this concept requires a brief
digression.
The term “main strategic direction” (zhuyao zhanlüe
fangxiang) is a concept from Chinese military science
that informs both warfighting (the actual prosecution
of a war in progress) and war planning during
peacetime.
As a Warfighting Concept. In the case of warfighting,
the term is applicable at both the strategic level of war
as well as at the “campaign level” (zhanyi ji) of warfare
in specific theaters of war (war zones, or zhan qu).21 In
essence, as a warfighting concept, the “main strategic
direction” represents a decision and determination
about where (geographically) and against which
enemy forces operations must be conducted to achieve
the strategic and/or operational results desired. As
a warfighting concept, think “theater of operations,”
“decisive operations,” “center of gravity,” and “main
effort” as described in U.S. doctrinal literature.22
Most PLA encyclopedia and military dictionary
entries for this term generally focus on its application
as a warfighting concept. The example below from the
Chinese Military Encyclopedia is representative:
Strategic Direction (zhanlüe fangxiang)—Refers to the
operational direction with an important influence on
the overall situation of the war. It directs the strategic
objectives and has a defined depth and width including
the ground as well as the multidimensional space of air,
sea, and outer space. It is often determined on the basis
of the military, political, economic, natural geographical,
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and demographic factors of the participating sides and
other relationships as well as their strategic tasks that
must be completed. Whether the strategic direction is
selected correctly or not directly impacts the process
and the result of the war. No matter if it is dealing
with [offensive operations] or [defensive operations],
the strategic direction always [distinguishes] between
its main direction (zhuyao fangxiang) and secondary
direction (ciyao fangxiang). Within a certain [time frame],
there can only be one main strategic direction. The main
strategic direction focuses on combat with the enemy,
its center of gravity. . . . Because of this, determining the
main strategic direction is the most important issue of
strategic guidance [for prosecuting a particular war].23

As a War Planning Concept. However, in the
context of the Military Strategic Guidelines, the main
strategic direction speaks to the issue of war planning
and preparations in peacetime. It identifies the most
likely geographic direction, and usually the most
likely potential adversary, that is assessed as posing
the highest risk to the PRC as regards the outbreak of
a future conflict. Hence, at this level, identifying the
“Main Strategic Direction” serves as a “worst case
scenario” planning tool for developing forces and
capabilities, making force deployment decisions, and
making other preparations should conflict erupt.
This larger context for the term comes through very
clearly in the excerpt below from the 2003 Outline for
Studying Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and
Army Building, produced by the PLA General Political
Department:
Planning for the national defense and modernization
of army building, and planning for military combat
preparations requires a prominent main strategic
direction (zhuyao zhanlüe fangxiang). While paying
attention to other directions (qita zhanlüe fangxiang), the
main strategic direction is the impetus for army building
(jundui jianshe) in other strategic directions.24
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In other words, if the worst possible case scenario is
identified (main strategic direction) and preparations,
modernization programs, training, deployments, etc.,
are focused on being able to counter that threat, then
other contingencies considered less pressing will ipso
facto be taken care of as well.
Since 1949, as China’s security situation has
changed, the main strategic direction (and other major
elements of the Military Strategic Guidelines) has been
shifted four times according to one PLA strategist.
• Mid 1950s-Early 1960s: East against the United
States and “other invasionary forces”;
• Mid 1960s-Early 1970s: To the north and west
against the Soviets, and east (still) against the
United States (causing, obviously, a serious
dilemma for PLA planners who, doctrinally
speaking, assert that there can be only one main
strategic direction);
• Early 1970s-Mid 1980s: North (the “three northern regions”) against the Soviets who “became
our main target of defensive operations”; and
• Mid 1980s-Early 1990s: The beginnings of a
coastal concept with no specific enemy identified.
“Under the premise of a stable strategic situation
on the northern front, gradually improving
the strategic situation of the southern front,
strengthening the development of border
and maritime defense, attaching importance
to managing and maneuvering on the high
seas and maintaining our maritime rights and
interests.”25
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Giving Focus to Army Building.
The PLA uses the term “Army Building” (jundui
jianshe) when it speaks of modernization and reform
efforts. Under the rubric of “Army Building” within
the Military Strategic Guidelines can be found the
specific modernization objectives the PLA must
pursue, the reforms it must enact, and the capabilities
it must develop to enable the armed forces of China
to accrue the operational wherewithal it needs and the
institutional superstructure it must have to provide
for the national defense in any given period of time.
Army Building is the programmatic “guts” of China’s
national military strategy. It covers every aspect of
modernization that was briefly enumerated under the
Three Pillars posited at the beginning of this chapter—
(1) The development, procurement, acquisition,
and fielding of new weapons systems, technologies,
and combat capabilities; (2) institutional, structural,
systemic, and personnel reforms; and (3) doctrinal
adjustments, etc.
The Military Strategic Guidelines lend focus to the
PLA’s modernization efforts (Army Building). They are
the basis for the development of more detailed plans,
programs, and resource allocations. In some cases, the
Military Strategic Guidelines will provide priorities
among those programs. Programmatically, the largerorder guidance for Army Building becomes the grist
for subsequent documents that are developed by the
PLA, such as the very important Outline of the Plan
for Army Building (Jundui Jianshe Jihua Gangyao) that is
apparently generated at the beginning of each national
Five Year Plan.26
Overall, the outputs and deliverables under Army
Building answer the question, “What is the PLA doing
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in the realm of modernization?” And to the degree
that these outputs are observable or knowable, they
constitute the subject of the majority of foreign writings
and news media reportage about the PLA. However, it
is the Military Strategic Guidelines that provide a larger
strategic and programmatic context for answering the
question, “Why is the PLA doing it?”
These, then, are the key components of the Military
Strategic Guidelines as described in a most generic
sense. With the preceding as background, the next
section moves on to discuss the content of the current
guidelines.
THE MILITARY STRATEGIC GUIDELINES
FOR THE NEW PERIOD
On January 13, 1993, Jiang Zemin, then CMC
Chairman, delivered a speech to an expanded meeting
of the CMC in which he promulgated a new set of
Military Strategic Guidelines.27 Known officially as the
“Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period,”
this document represents the national military strategy
under which the PLA has been operating for some 14
years.
Every modernization program, every reform
initiative, and every significant change that the PLA
has undergone, and which foreign observers have been
writing about for over a decade, are the results of some
of the fundamental decisions made when the new
guidelines were promulgated—especially the ensuing
programs the PLA initiated after 1993 to comport with
the new guidelines.
Like the Military Strategic Guidelines issued prior
to 1993, the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New
Period” is a “rolling national military strategy.” This
means that while the strategic guiding thought of any
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iteration of the guidelines continues to serve as the
foundation and justification for action over time, it is
the concrete programs subsequently developed and
implemented that give body to the Military Strategic
Guidelines. In the case of the “Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period,” the implementing
programs have been “rolled out” over the course of
four Five Year Plans: the eighth Five Year Plan (199195) when the new guidelines were promulgated,
and throughout the ninth Five Year Plan (19962000), 10th Five Year Plan (2001-05), and the current
11th Five Year Plan (2006-10). Clearly, this type of
“rolling strategy” allows for adjustments along the
way. For example, by 1999 PLA professional military
literature began to re-characterize the most likely
type of future warfare as “Local Wars Under Modern
Informationalized Conditions” vice “Local Wars Under
Modern High-Tech Conditions” (the latter being the
initial articulation in 1993). By 2002 the former term,
substituting “informationalized” for “high-tech,” was
officially incorporated into the lexicon of the “Military
Strategic Guidelines for the New Period.” As such,
it represents an adjustment to the military strategic
guidelines, not a new set of military strategic guidelines
or a new “national military strategy.”28 It represents,
in the words of a September 2006 article in the PLA’s
official newspaper, Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun
Bao), an “enrichment and improvement” to the old
guidelines, not a new set.29
In this section of the chapter, the key elements of
the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period”
will be presented. Before proceeding, however, some
caveats are in order. It is unknown whether there is
a sole official document in which the PLA formally
commits to paper its Military Strategic Guidelines as
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does the United States when it publishes its official
“National Military Strategy.” Therefore, the overview
of the main aspects of the “Military Strategic Guidelines
for the New Period” that follows is based on data in the
public domain: published excerpts of Jiang Zemin’s
1993 speech to the CMC, a PLA study guide (gangyao)
on Jiang Zemin “military thought” that discusses the
“Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period”
in one chapter, and various PLA commentaries and
articles in professional military literature. Therefore,
while the data set used is relatively small, it is
considered authoritative as far as it goes. However, the
data set could not possibly be considered complete at
this point.
The Strategic Assessment.
The perceived need to issue a new set of military
strategic guidelines in 1993 was driven by three key
assessments. First, of course, was a major change to
the international order as a result of the demise of
the Soviet Union and the other communist regimes in
Eastern Europe. Jiang’s original forecast in 1993 that
the trend in major power relations would be toward
“multipolarity” has since proven overly optimistic, and
the PRC now talks about “unipolarity” and a global
order dominated by a “sole superpower.” Nevertheless,
the basic 1993 assessment of China’s larger security
situation has fundamentally remained in place since
that time.30 At the CMC meeting on January 13, 1993,
at which the new guidelines were introduced, Jiang
reiterated the Dengist assessment from the late 1980s
that the prospects for a world war involving China
were slim, and that China was enjoying a window of
opportunity for its own economic development and
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military modernization. Jiang went so far as to opine
that China’s regional security situation at the time was
likely the best it had been since 1949. According to
Jiang:
The contemporary world is in a historic period of
momentous change. Overall, the present international
situation is beneficial to our country’s development.
First, for a relatively long time to come, it is probable
that the international environment will be peaceful with
new world wars being avoided. This is an extremely
important strategic assessment [here quoting Deng]:
“The increase in the forces for peace in the world is
surpassing the increase in the forces for war.”
. . . Moreover, compared with other regions of the
world, the Asia-Pacific region has maintained a
relative degree of stability with economic contacts and
cooperation between countries becoming closer by
the day with many traditional hot spots either already
resolved or in the process of realizing a political
resolution. Our country’s peripheral security environment is
continuing to improve and friendly relations with neighboring
countries have entered their best period since the founding of
the nation. (Emphasis added)
. . . These conditions and factors mentioned above
provide a relatively good external environment for us
to consolidate our energy on developing the national
economy.31

At the same time, Jiang pointed out the challenges
to Chinese national security, as follows:
• “Ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes that
were covered up by the rivalry between the
United States and the USSR have become more
prominent by the day, with bloody conflicts and
local wars continuing to spread.”
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• “Although negotiations over arms control and
force reductions have made some progress, the
arms race has transitioned into a new high-tech
arena that has produced an impact on the world
and in the Asia-Pacific region that cannot be
ignored.”
• “Although we should not need to fight new
world wars and total wars that affect our country
for some time, factors giving rise to local wars,
armed conflict, and domestic social turmoil
(shehui dongluan) still exist.”
• “Although the competition for economic and
technical strength in order to lay a foundation
for comprehensive national power has become a
leading aspect of international struggle, military
measures still play an important role.”
• Although Jiang revalidated Deng Xiaoping’s
assessment that the “keynote of the times”
remains “peace and development” (heping
yu fazhan), he also noted that “hegemony and
power politics have already become the main
obstacles to world peace and development.”
• Moreover, Jiang asserted, “Viewing our
country’s security environment, we can see
that no matter if it is a political or an economic
problem, no matter if it is an external military
threat or a problem hindering the completion
of unification of the motherland and unstable
domestic factors, they are all either directly or
indirectly related to hegemonism and power
politics, and in all cases we can see the shadow
of hegemonism and power politics. Regarding
this, we must be strategically farsighted. We
must resolutely struggle against actions that
damage the rights and interests of our people
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and national sovereignty. Of course, we must
be flexible in taking hold of the methods of this
struggle.”
• Finally, regarding Taiwan, “Although work
towards the great cause of the unity of the
motherland continues to make progress, many
new complex factors are emerging.”32
The second assessment revolved around domestic
issues: (1) China would continue with the program of
“reform and opening up”; (2) economic development
was still a paramount objective; (3) China required
a stable domestic, international, and peripheral
environments to succeed; and (4) PLA modernization
would have to be accomplished within the broader
context of other national objectives.
Fundamentally, Jiang revalidated the centrality
of economic reform in China’s search for enhancing
its “comprehensive national power” and the critical
requirement of maintaining a peaceful and favorable
external environment:
In summary, we must fully evaluate these favorable
factors, grasp this rare opportunity, strengthen our
foreign affairs work and foreign exchanges, expand our
country’s latitude in the international situation, and
increase our initiative in handling international affairs in
order to create even better external conditions for domestic
development that are beneficial to our acceleration of
the pace of reform, opening up, and the development
of modernization, consolidating our energy in handling
the national economy, and continuing to enhance our
country’s comprehensive national power. This is the
fundamental essence of guaranteeing the nation’s longterm peace and good governance, and the consolidation
and development of the cause of constructing socialism
with Chinese characteristics.33
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Jiang’s rededication to Deng’s domestic line of
“reform and opening up” might seem gratuitous from
today’s vantage point. But it is worth remembering
that in the wake of Tiananmen (1989), Deng Xiaoping
encountered serious resistance from some CCP elders
as to the wisdom of the economic and foreign policies
he had put into place. Some elders expressed the view
that the crisis of 1989 was the result of the emergence
of new socio-economic and political forces attendant to
“reform and opening up.” It took what is now known
as “Deng’s Southern Tour” in 1992 to sweep away
the last vestiges of post-Tiananmen resistance to the
decision to push forward.
Thus, as regards the “Military Strategic Guidelines
for the New Period,” it has been clear since 1993 that
the PLA’s modernization and reform programs have
been viewed as but one element of China’s search for
enhanced “comprehensive national power.” Although
the PLA has unquestionably been the beneficiary of
steadily increasing financial resources, especially since
1999, military modernization is not being accomplished
in isolation from other PRC national objectives. This
fact comes through clearly in a volume authored by
the PLA NDU’s Army Building Research Department
(2004):
The military strategic guidelines of the new period persists
with obeying and serving the development strategy of
our nation. . . . Our national development strategy (guojia
fazhan zhanlüe) is a strategy of comprehensive national
development that employs the strategy of economic
development as the core, and is the general strategy (zong
zhanlüe) for guiding the coordinated development of our
nation’s economy, politics, military, diplomacy, culture,
[etc]. The military strategic guidelines for the new period
are a component of the national development strategy so
without a doubt they should obey and serve the nation’s
general strategy.34
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However, it was the third assessment concerning the
changing nature of warfare and the self-recognized
inadequacies of the PLA which served as by far
the most important impetus for issuing a new set of
military strategic guidelines in 1993.
Today, of course, it is almost trite among students
of Chinese military affairs to dwell on the impact of the
U.S. first Gulf War on the PLA. Even so, it is still useful
to remind ourselves occasionally that once the strategic, operational, and tactical implications of Operation
DESERT STORM became clear, the leadership of the
PLA was forced to confront the disconcerting reality
that China’s armed forces were woefully inadequate
for the demands of modern warfare, and that this
inadequacy demanded a major adjustment to China’s
national military strategy. Here are Jiang’s words from
his 1993 speech to the CMC:
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the scope of high-tech
competition throughout the globe has intensified by
the day. Now, each country is readjusting their own
development strategies, making the development of
modern and especially high technology a crucial measure
of strengthening their comprehensive national power
and national defense strength, striving to take hold of
the strategic initiative. The facts of the Gulf War have
shown that along with the utilization of high technology
in the military arena, the enhancement of precision attack
weapons and unprecedented operational intensity,
the characteristics of sudden, three-dimensional,
mobile, rapid, and in-depth attacks, have become more
prominent, and the use of high-tech superiority has
obviously taken hold of the strategic initiative to an
even greater degree. In the present world, if a country
does not work hard to strengthen its national defense
power alongside its economic and social development,
enhancing its military quality and the level of its
weapons and equipment, its operational capabilities will
not be strong under modern high-tech conditions. As
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soon as a war breaks out, it will be in a passive position
and suffer attacks, with its national interest, the people’s
dignity, and its international prestige all suffering
greatly. Because of this, many countries in the world are
. . . readjusting their military strategy in order to adapt to
the needs of developments to the international situation
and the situation of military combat.

Ten years later, in 2003, the Outline For Studying Jiang
Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building
(gangyao) still acknowledged the centrality of the Gulf
War as a determinant of the need for new guidelines:
At the onset of the Gulf War, [Jiang Zemin] brought up
the need to study the special characteristics of modern
warfare through this conflict. He personally managed
open symposiums and conferences and pointed out that
“modern warfare is becoming high-tech warfare.” In
addition, according to our country’s security situation,
he promptly brought up [the need] for studying the
formation of the Military Strategic Guidelines for the
New Period. At the beginning of 1993, the Central
Military Commission formulated the Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period, implementing major
adjustments on military strategy.35

Consequently, almost everything that the “Military
Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” speaks to,
and what every subsequently implemented program
has been about, is what must be done to develop the
requisite capabilities to rectify PLA shortcomings.
Guidance For Military Combat Preparations.
Central to the current Military Strategic Guidelines,
therefore, is the question of what type of war the PLA
must be prepared to fight. As Jiang put it in 1993:
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Since the founding of our country, our military has
always implemented the military strategic guidelines
of the active defense. Under the new historical conditions,
exactly what kind of military strategic guidelines should we
be carrying out? We believe that we should continue to
carry out the military strategic guidelines of the active
defense. . . . At the same time, along with developments
and changes to the situation, we should bestow the military
strategic guidelines of the active defense with new content at
this appropriate moment. (emphases added)36

In this regard, the “Military Strategic Guidelines
for the New Period” have been crystal clear from their
inception in 1993. The PLA has been told to work towards
the ability to fight and win “Local Wars Under Modern
High-Tech Conditions.”37 As mentioned earlier, that
descriptor was changed in 2002 to “Local Wars Under
Modern Informationalized Conditions.” That change,
however, was basically a variation on the same theme.
The important point to make is that the PLA was
charged in 1993 to cease focusing its modernization
efforts on late industrial age warfare and shift to a longterm program of developing the necessary capabilities
for fighting late 20th-century and early 21st-century
conventional warfare as exemplified by U.S. forces in
1991. And to the degree that U.S. operations in Kosovo
in 1999 and to this day in Afghanistan and Iraq have
further defined and refined the nature of 21st-century
warfare in the minds of PLA analysts, those operations
and capabilities establish the “gold standard” for what
the PLA aspires to achieve eventually. As stated by
Jiang in his 1993 speech to the CMC:
In terms of strategic guidance, we have long since
transferred the key preparations from being based on
fighting early, fighting large, and fighting nuclear wars,
to dealing with local wars. Now, on the basis of developments
and changes to the international situation, we must give
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priority to preparations for dealing with local wars under
modern high-tech conditions. This is a further development
and perfection of our army’s strategic guiding thought.
(emphasis added)

As explained in 2004 by the PLA NDU’s Army Building
Research Department:
. . . the CMC with Jiang Zemin as the core clearly pointed
out that the focus of military combat preparations in the
new period would change from fighting to win local
wars under normal conditions to fighting to win local
wars under modern, high-tech conditions. . . . Looking
at these developing trends, for some time to come in
the future, these different characteristics, scopes, and
patterns of local wars and armed conflicts will be the
main types of warfare. In the local wars our country is
likely to face in the future, regardless of whether they are
wars to realize the unification of the motherland or wars to
resist and counter a localized invasion by an enemy (emphasis
added), in all cases we are likely to face an enemy that
possesses high-tech weapons and equipment. We can see
that making the focus of military combat preparations
on fighting to win local wars under modern high-tech
conditions is a necessary choice based on a scientific
analysis of the international strategic framework as well
as our national security environment.

It is interesting to note that there is a strain in this
assessment geared not just to the necessity for the
PLA to gain the capability of conducting offensive
operations at the campaign level (operational level) of
war, but also to the need for conducting defense at the
strategic level of war (see italicized words above).
As early as 1993, the PLA concluded that, while
the probability of a full-scale invasion of China was
low, the possibility of an attack on the PRC mainland
could not be discounted, given what it had observed
throughout the Gulf War of the new U.S. high-tech
precision-guided munitions. In other words, the new
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face of high-tech warfare left the mainland vulnerable.
Once again, Jiang’s words in his 1993 speech are
relevant:
At the same time, we must also recognize that local
wars under modern conditions are greatly different
from past wars. As soon as a conflict or a war breaks
out, the likelihood of an enemy first using precisionguided weapons and long-distance operational aircraft
to conduct air raids, as well as independent sea and
air wars, is high. Under these conditions, we must still
persist with implementing people’s war. . . .

A 2004 text published by the PLA Academy of Military
Science makes the point much more directly:
Future high-tech local wars are certainly very different
from the wars we have fought in the past. Looking at
the recent high-tech local wars, the odds of the enemy
sending a large number of troops to our national territory
to fight at the beginning of the conflict is relatively small.
If conflict or a war develops, the enemy will probably use
precision attack weapons, and long-distance operational
aircraft to launch air raids on strategic targets along
our coast or in the interior, carrying out relatively
independent maritime and air wars, conducting a socalled “surgical attack operation.” Regarding wars
conducted to maintain the unification of the motherland
in the direction of the Taiwan Strait, these also will be
carried out along the coastal areas, and feature both
maritime and air operations. Traditional means of
mobilization and organizing the masses to participate
in the war are already difficult to utilize; however, this
does not mean that the ideology of a people’s war is
already passé.38

Strategic Guiding Thought.
Given China’s assessment of the larger international
situation, its assessment of its own security require106

ments, its larger national objectives, and the imperatives of modern warfare, what “strategic guiding
thought” has been passed on to the PLA for the “new
period”? Basically, it consists of four directives derived
from Jiang’s initial pronouncements at the enlarged
CMC meeting:
• Ideologically, continue to adhere to the
fundamental military theories first set down in
“Mao Zedong Military Thought”; but especially
build upon “Deng Xiaoping Theory on Army
Building in the New Period” as a means to
further research the best ways to construct “a
modernized, regularized, revolutionary military
that is politically qualified, operationally
proficient, possesses a good work style, is strict
in discipline, and acts as a powerful safeguard”
for China’s national security interests.
• Second, the PLA “must obey and serve the
nation’s development strategy” and in doing so
must:
persist with embarking from the nation’s overall
situation, carefully guide army building [in
conjunction with] preparations for military combat,
closely coordinate with the political and the
diplomatic . . . in order to safeguard reform, opening
up, and the development of the economy, ensuring
that army building [does] an even better job of serving
the realization of the nation’s strategic objectives.39

• Third, “we must place the focus of future
preparations for military combat on fighting to
win possible local wars under modern high-tech
conditions,” and
• Fourth, when dealing with threats to national
security, the military strategic guidelines must
be flexibly applied.
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This latter point speaks to how China should
deal with perceived threats to its national security
and to why the military element of national power is
only one means, among others, to deal with security
issues. In explaining this point, Jiang exhorted the
PLA to continue to adhere to the military principle of
“striking only after the enemy has struck,” and using
the diplomatic element of national power to prevent
conflict when possible. He rejected wars of aggression
as a policy choice and reiterated that conflict can only
disrupt other central objectives.
Militarily, we must strictly guard our stance of selfdefense and never invade other countries or take the
initiative to cause trouble. Regarding actions that harm
our national sovereignty or interests, we must carry out
a struggle that is truthful (youli), advantageous (youli),
and controlled (youjie). In peacetime, the military must
make the containment of wars from erupting as an
extremely important duty, actively coordinate with the
political, diplomatic, and economic struggle, work hard
to improve our country’s strategic environment, reduce
insecure unstable factors, and work hard to contain
local wars and armed conflict from erupting, ensuring
that our national economic development is free from the
impact of war. Only with a relatively secure and stable
environment over a period of decades can our economic
power, defense power, and comprehensive national
power be able to greatly increase, will our national
security be guaranteed, our country’s international
position even more consolidated and enhanced, and
the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics be
enriched with even more vitality and vigor.40

Strategic Missions and Objectives for the PLA.
Maintaining the nation’s territorial sovereignty, maritime
rights and interests, and social order, as well as a
secure and stable internal and external environment for
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safeguarding national economic development and reform
and opening up are the strategic tasks given to our army
by the military strategic guidelines for the new period in
order to realize the state’s strategic objectives.41

The various biennial editions of the PRC defense
white papers, entitled China’s National Defense, have in
the past provided lists of missions and objectives for
the PLA. Depending upon the larger security context
prevailing when each was published (1998, 2000, 2002,
2004 and 2006),the order in which these missions
and objectives have been listed, and the length of the
list itself, has changed from year to year. The white
papers, however, have tended to mix and conflate the
PLA’s larger strategic missions and objectives with
some of its more granular Army building programs
and objectives. In this chapter macro goals are treated
separately from those associated with Army building,
with Army building objectives reserved for their own
section.
Reading across various samples of data focused on
the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period,”
we find that the strategic-level missions and objectives
assigned to the PLA come down to five major tasks.
• Defending national territory and sovereignty;
• Securing the nation’s maritime rights and
interests;
• Maintaining the unity of the motherland;
• Ensuring internal stability; and
• Maintaining a secure and stable external
environment, especially on China’s periphery
These missions and objectives are straightforward.
What becomes interesting is how the PLA translates
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these missions and objectives into larger-order notions
of how to enable PLA forces to achieve them.
Basically, PLA commentaries on the “Military
Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” suggest that
the only way the armed forces of China can play a role
in achieving China’s larger national objectives, and
achieve the missions and objectives given the PLA, is
to develop real and credible operational capabilities
in order to deter conflict or successfully prosecute
conflicts if deterrence fails.
Defending National Territory and Sovereignty. “Mission
One” for any military, of course, is the fundamental
requirement to defend the nation from attack, to defend
its territory, and to preserve the nation’s sovereignty.
China is no different than any nation in this regard.
And, like most nations, the PRC has charged the PLA
to develop capabilities that will deter any potential
enemy from attacking the nation and to defeat acts
of aggression if they cannot be deterred. Jiang makes
this quite clear in his 1993 speech: “Properly handling
preparations to fight to win local wars under modern
high-tech conditions is done in order to possibly
prevent or avoid these kinds of wars and is also the
fundamental measure to guarantee that as soon as they
erupt we are able to achieve victory.”42
Securing the Nation’s Maritime Rights and Interests.
Beginning in earnest in the 1980s, China became
enmeshed in various disputes in the regional seas off its
littoral. By the early 1990s, it became clearer to Beijing
that maritime resources would become increasingly
important to the PRC’s larger modernization objectives,
and the Chinese people were told to develop “sea
consciousness.” It is not surprising, therefore, that the
new military guidelines have made securing China’s
maritime rights a strategic mission for the PLA. And
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while China ostensibly prefers to handle these disputes
by diplomatic means, the PLA has been charged to
develop operational capabilities to enhance Beijing’s
diplomatic leverage.
. . . in the process of building a strong socialist modern
nation, there are still many problems concerning securing
and safeguarding our country’s long-term sustainable
development that are becoming more prominent by the
day, including how to maintain our maritime rights and
interests as well as exploit and utilize maritime resources,
how to maintain the security of our strategic and energy
shipping lanes. . . . The essence of our country’s guidelines
is the principles of common cooperation, equality, and
mutual benefit, resolving contradictions and disputes
through patient consultations. However, to do this we also
need a certain military force to serve as support. If we have
the ability to win high-tech wars, then we can take a position
of greater initiative in diplomatic consultations, and more
effectively maintain our country’s just rights and interests.43
(emphasis added)

A strategist from the AMS adds a strategic
perspective to this issue that goes beyond merely
providing Chinese diplomats the ability to negotiate
from a position of strength:
Our country is a large power close to the sea and it
uses vast territorial waters, the continental shelf, and
exclusive economic zones. The integrity of our country’s
sovereign territory includes this maritime area. In
order for the Chinese people of the future to exist and
develop, we must attach importance to managing and
maneuvering in the sea. Securing and maintaining our
country’s maritime rights and interests is an important
aspect of future strategic guidance over a long period
of time that must be considered. In terms of developing
military power, the standing army must take the ground
forces as the main body. However, we must give priority
to gradually strengthening the development of the navy
and the air force.44
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Note that as early as March 1993 when this lecture
was delivered—within 4 months of the articulation of
new guidelines—the need to give more attention to the
Navy and Air Force was already beginning to come to
the fore in the context of discussions about the newly
issued Military Strategic Guidelines.
Maintaining the Unity of the Motherland. The “Military
Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” demand that
the PLA develop credible capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan
for deterrence and coercion as well as actual military
operations, if need be. Without enhanced and credible
operational capabilities on the part of the PLA, so the
Chinese argument goes, the preferred official strategy
for resolving the Taiwan issue (political means) may
not be possible, and if force of arms is necessary then
actual operational capacities will have to be developed.
Either way, the PLA must develop the capabilities to
give Beijing serious options, political or otherwise. In
discussing the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the
New Period,” one PLA commentator sums up the logic
on the Taiwan issue as follows:
If our military power cannot defeat Taiwan and cannot
deter international interfering forces and Taiwan
separatist forces on the island, the Taiwan authorities
will not come to the political negotiating table, and
international interfering forces will also not abandon
their positions. If we have the ability to fight and win
high-tech wars, international interfering forces and
Taiwan separatist forces on the island will have to think
twice, and we can create more opportunities to use
peaceful methods to realize unification across the strait.
[But as] soon as the Taiwan authorities make a reckless
move, we also have the ability to defeat them.45

Ensuring Internal Stability. In 1993, a mere 4 years
after Tiananmen, concern about internal stability in
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the strategic guidelines is not surprising. And in the
context of the last few years when the Ministry of
Public Security continues to report rising numbers of
anti-government protests and incidents, the issue of
internal stability remains paramount from a CCP and
PLA perspective. But as described in the quotation
below (from 2004), concerns about internal stability increasingly encompass more than just anti-government
incidents. They also include natural disasters as well as
transnational security concerns such as pandemics and
issues associated with ethnic unrest.
At this time [2004] where China is a large developing
country, particularly at a time of important strategic
opportunity for reinvigoration of the Chinese people,
stability overrides everything. At a time when China is
a large country engaged in transformation, the military
plays a crucial role in safeguarding internal stability.
Safeguarding internal stability concerns political and
economic factors, for example political turmoil or
a financial crisis. It also includes . . . factors such as
serious natural disasters and epidemics. It also includes
taking hold of ethnic and religious factors, for example
contradictions between nationalities in the border region
or religious problems. Safeguarding internal stability
needs the establishment of mechanisms to deal with
handling important developing incidents to ensure that
important developing incidents can be handled and
controlled effectively in a timely fashion in order to
prevent them from leading to greater social turmoil.46

On the issue of maintaining internal stability, the
Outline For Studying Jiang Zemin Thought on National
Defense and Army Building (2003) makes specific
reference to the People’s Armed Police (PAP) as a
critical component of the armed forces charged with
“protecting national security and social stability.”47
Maintaining a Secure and Stable External Environment,
Especially on China’s Periphery. This particular
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objective is commonly viewed by the PLA as a core
responsibility for its contribution to the PRC’s larger
national development goals, and it is often articulated
in conjunction with the mission of “Providing a strong,
powerful and secure safeguard for reform, opening up,
and modernization.” At bottom, it charges the PLA
to develop the requisite capabilities, operational as
well as diplomatic-political, to maintain security and
stability on China’s periphery in order for economic
development to proceed at home.
In his 1993 speech to the CMC, Jiang spoke
specifically to the issue of improving relations with the
nations on China’s periphery:
Only with a relatively secure and stable environment
over a period of decades can our economic power,
defense power, and comprehensive national power be
able to greatly increase, our national security is even
more guaranteed, our country’s international position is
even more consolidated and enhanced, and the cause of
socialism with Chinese characteristics is enriched with
even more vitality and vigor. . . . Regarding peripheral
countries, we must do more work, eradicate anxiety, and
promote neighborly, friendly relations in accordance
with the guidelines of a stable periphery.48

However, from an operational perspective, the
Military Strategic Guidelines also direct the PLA to
move forward in developing the capabilities and plans
necessary to deal with conflicts on the periphery,
should they erupt. The PLA, according to one book
published by the Academy of Military Science, must
increase . . . planning in this regard and, on the
basis of differing strategic directions and differing
possible targets, we must properly handle all kinds of
preparations, establishing mechanisms to deal with and
handle all kinds of disputes, ensuring that any disputes
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that may arise are quickly and effectively resolved, in
order to safeguard stability and security.49

Identifying the Main Strategic Direction.
In the course of the research for this chapter, no
authoritative statement definitively identifying the
“main strategic direction” for the “Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period” was found. There
is, however, little question that a “main strategic
direction” has been designated. For example, in the
Outline For Studying Jiang Zemin Thought on National
Defense and Army Building, the PLA is exhorted to
manage the relationship carefully between the “main
strategic direction” and other pressing directions in its
“preparations for military combat”:
Another aspect is to take care of the relationship between
the main strategic direction (zhuyao zhanlüe fangxiang)
and other strategic directions (qita zhanlüe fangxiang).
Planning for the national defense and modernization
of army building, and planning for military combat
preparations requires a prominent main strategic
direction; while paying attention to other directions
the main strategic direction is the impetus for military
building in other strategic directions.50

The Outline does not, however, specify what
that “main strategic direction” happens to be, and it
is likely that it is not identified anywhere in public
domain data. However, some of the data reviewed
for this chapter would lead one to speculate that today,
as during the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the “main
strategic direction” is once again east, off China’s coast.
One hint comes from Jiang’s 1993 speech:
At present and for a period in the future, our priority
in terms of military struggle is preventing Taiwan from
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fomenting any great “Taiwan independence” incidents,
remaining vigilant against that which harms national
sovereignty and territorial integrity. . . .
. . . The military must actively support the Party and
government in strengthening its political, economic,
cultural, [etc.] attractiveness and influence over Taiwan,
giving play to the role of military deterrence, containing
“Taiwan independence” separatist forces, working hard
to promote peaceful reunification, while at the same time
seriously handling emergency military preparations.51

The littoral off China’s east coast as a potential
candidate for the current “main strategic direction,” and
the western border regions as a potential candidate for
today’s “secondary direction” (ciyao fangxiang), pose a
possibility rendered even more likely by Major General
Peng Guangqian’s comments in a lecture delivered in
1993.
Under the old backdrop of “fighting large,” we once
were based on large armed groups carrying out decisive
strategic battles within our national territory. Because of
this, the center of gravity of strategic guidance deviated
to the interior. Border and maritime defense only existed
as a shield area for the larger war. Relatively speaking,
border and maritime defense were relegated to
subordinate status. This was determined by the objective
environment of the times.
Under the new historical conditions, the strategic
position (zhanlüe diwei) of maritime and border defense
has become more prominent. The borders and coastal
areas are not only the frontlines and the window of
our country’s opening to the outside world in the new
period, but also the main battlefield for our country’s
local wars and military operations. Although the
unfavorable situation of border and maritime defense
combat cannot immediately constitute a great threat to
our country, it directly influences the nation and the
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dignity of the people, influences the nation’s territorial
sovereignty and rights and interests, and influences
popular sentiment and morale, as well as the smooth
implementation of national development strategy. In
particular, owing to the closely interwoven relationship
between problems in border and maritime defense with
ethnic problems, religious problems, and territorial
problems, they are highly sensitive and complex, and
their handling requires true skill. Because of this . . . we
need to attach sufficient importance to raising border
and maritime defense problems to strategic heights, and
must also attach high degrees of historical responsibility
to carefully preparing and guiding their command.52

Needless to say, the suggestions herein offered about
candidates for the main and secondary strategic
directions under the current military guidelines must
be labeled for what they are at this point: speculation in
the absence of authoritative PRC statements.
Finally, the sense that one gets from reviewing
various PLA materials is that the main strategic
direction is an element of the strategic guidelines
subject to constant study and review, and likely in need
of regular revalidation over time, since the Military
Strategic Guidelines for any particular period have a
relatively long shelf-life.
Determining the Focus for Army Building.
Each aspect of army building, together with all jobs—
military training, political work, logistics support,
national defense research, etc.—will fall under the
instruction and management of the Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period . . . based on the conditions
of winning a modern technological, especially hightech, local war. . . . The Military Strategic Guidelines
require each aspect of army building within the entire
military to obey and serve the needs of this one strategic
guideline. They must all center upon carrying out and
the implementing [the guideline] of winning a local
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war under modern technological, especially high-tech,
conditions.53
—Jiang Zemin

The programmatic guts of the “Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period” center on Army
building. The new guidelines announced by Jiang
in 1993 revolved around the fundamental decision
that the PLA would have to undergo an extended
period of significant reform and modernization to
cope with the imperatives of the changing nature of
warfare. In short, the PLA was told to develop the
operational capabilities and the institutional capacity
to prosecute “Local Wars Under Modern High-Tech
(subsequently “Informationalized”) Conditions.” And,
as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the
programs and outputs that come under the rubric
“Army building” in the guidelines have for many years
provided the grist for analyses by scholars and others
who follow Chinese military affairs. Consequently, the
actual details are already well known. However, it is
worth reviewing the key guidance for Army building
that was given to the PLA back in 1993 as well as some
of the subsequent directives. In retrospect, one cannot
but be impressed by how many of the fundamental
objectives originally articulated have actually been
put in place or have shown significant evidence of
progress.
When he issued the new Military Strategic
Guidelines to the CMC in January 1993, Jiang Zemin
specifically directed the PLA to begin development of
modernization programs or institutional reforms in
five key areas:54
(1) “First we must place the development of
science and technology for national defense and
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the development of unit equipment in a prominent
position.” The first order of business for the
development of military modernization would have to
be the accrual, over time, of modern weapons systems
and other supporting technologies, without which the
PLA would be unable to prevail in modern warfare.
The fighting spirit of the PLA notwithstanding, without
modern weapons, said Jiang, “We will have to pay a
relatively heavy price to achieve victory.”55 In 1993,
Major General Peng Guangqian expressed the same
idea without mincing words: “One cannot simply use
manpower superiority to compensate for technological
inferiority” given the nature of modern warfare.56 To
this end, in order to raise the operational effectiveness
of the armed forces, Jiang spoke to the need to “respect
science and technology and attach importance to the
role of weaponry;” enhance basic research and improve
the defense science and technology establishment;
and develop new weapons and technologies, while
at the same time “improving existing weapons and
equipment.”
(2) “Second, we must attach high degrees of
importance to enhancing the overall quality of officers
and enlisted personnel.” In this second injunction, Jiang
spoke to the need to improve the level of education
within the officer corps and enlisted force as well as
improving unit training:
Leading cadre and leading organs at all levels must
place their main energies on education and training,
act unswervingly, truly grasp, firmly execute, and
truly enhance the quality of education and training.
[They must] work hard to cultivate and create a batch
of talented outstanding personnel with high degrees of
political awareness and noble morale who take hold of
modern military technology and understand the art of
commanding modern warfare. We must recognize that
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this is a fundamentally important matter for realizing
our army’s modernization and winning future wars, as
well as an extremely important component of taking the
path of crack troops with Chinese characteristics, and
strengthening the development of our army’s quality.

Continuing, he made the following specific points:
• “We must focus on winning local wars under
modern high-tech conditions, strengthening
unit training, academy instruction, and military
science and research.”
• “We must embark from the needs of actual war,
further improve unit training, and truly enhance
unit tactical and technical levels under modern
high-tech conditions” (i.e., train the way we will
fight).
• “We must give prominence to properly grasping
training for command personnel at all levels,
cultivating them into the mature backbone for
running the army and taking hold of the art of
modern warfare.”
• “We must continue to strengthen and perfect
the development of academies and schools and
improve instructional content and methods in
order to develop and cultivate a large batch of
qualified, talented personnel to construct our
army’s modernization and develop science and
technology for national defense.”
• “We must focus on the characteristics of local
wars under modern high-tech conditions,
research in-depth and actively explore the rules
of the people’s war under modern conditions,
work hard to inquire about combat methods for
using inferior equipment to defeat an enemy with
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superior equipment, enriching and developing
a military theory with Chinese characteristics”
(i.e., new doctrine).
(3) “Third, we must further give priority to
army building.” In this narrower use of the term
“army building,” Jiang is referring to prioritizing
organizational changes. For example,
• “We must have the resolve to properly grasp
the development of priority units, ensuring that
they possess strong operational capabilities.”
• “We must adapt to the requirements of people’s
war under modern conditions and attach
importance to and strengthen the development
of the capabilities of the reserve forces.”
• “The general departments and the relevant state
organs must . . . further improve mechanisms for
national defense mobilization and give priority
to resolving the problems associated with rapid
mobilization for future local wars.”
(4) “Fourth, we must truly strengthen and improve the
military’s ideological and political work.”
• “No matter if it is peacetime unit building or
fighting to win any local war under modern
high-tech conditions that may erupt, none can be
divorced from strong and powerful ideological
and political work.”
• “We must strengthen the development of
military Party organizations and leading groups
at all levels, guaranteeing the Party’s absolute
leadership over the military, and guaranteeing
the high degrees of stability and collective unity
within units.”
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• “We must educate units in our army [on the
PLA’s] fundamental duties and honorable
traditions, giving play to outstanding traditions
and maintaining the essence of the red army. We
must vigorously launch education in Chinese
contemporary history, modern history, as well
as education [about the current] situation and
combat readiness. . . .”
• “We must closely center on education and
training, properly grasp regular ideological
and political work, intensify enthusiasm for
training, cultivate a combat work style that does
not fear sacrifice and is fierce and tenacious,
guaranteeing that units are able to maintain a
soaring fighting spirit under any kind of difficult
conditions, and satisfactorily complete the tasks
accorded to them by the Party and the people.”
(5) “Fifth, we must further strengthen the development
of military logistics.” Specifically,
• “We must fully recognize the role and function
of logistics support and continue to strengthen
the development of logistics.”
• “Upon a foundation of guaranteeing continuing
improvements in unit living, [we should] consolidate financial and material resources. . . .”
• “[We should] gravitate towards the development
of equipment for priority units and in the
important direction” (i.e., main strategic
direction).
• “On the basis of operational needs under modern
high-tech conditions, we must strengthen the
development of logistics and technical support
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capabilities and work hard to create multifaceted
assistance and support capabilities, particularly
enhancing comprehensive emergency support
capabilities.”
• “We must adapt to the requirements of
developing a socialist market economy and
improve methods for raising funds for goods
and materials and their supply, enhancing the
use and benefit of expenditures and materials.”
• “We must strengthen logistics mobilization
work and gradually form a joint civil-military
logistics support system”
Based on these larger-order directives to guide army
building, the PLA was told to begin to study, research,
and develop the concrete programs that would address
the key requirements of “Local Wars Under Modern
High Tech Conditions.” Hence, the beginning of the
1990s witnessed a deluge of writing, publishing, and
“debates” among Chinese military professionals as to
how to operationalize that which was handed down to
them in the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New
Period.”
While work on Army building issues began
immediately after Jiang’s promulgation of the new
guidelines in 1993, it appears that not until 1995 had
all the relevant communities within the PLA finalized
their initial plans for systemic reforms. In December
of that year, the CMC issued the Outline of the Plan for
Army Building During the 9th Five Year Plan (“Jiuwu”
Qijian Jundui Jianshe Jihua Gangyao) to give form and
structure to the programmatics for retooling Army
building to comport with the requirements contained in
the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period.”
This master blueprint—the first issued since the new
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guidelines were promulgated in 1993—ostensibly
provided a roadmap to key modernization and reform
objectives for the period 1996-2000.
Programmatically, the completion of the Outline
for Army Building at the end of 1995 was timed to
coincide with the development of the state’s ninth Five
Year Plan in order to ensure that the PLA received
requisite funding in the defense budget. The new
Outline for Army Building heralded the inception of the
“Two Transformations” program (liangge zhuanbian)
that directed the PLA to begin the transformation (1)
from preparing to fight Local Wars Under Ordinary
Conditions to preparing to fight and win Local Wars
Under Modern High Technology Conditions, and (2)
from being a military based on quantity to one based
on quality. It called as well for the PLA to transform
from being personnel intensive to becoming science
and technology intensive.
Not surprisingly, therefore, it was during the years
of the ninth Five Year Plan, certainly towards its close
in 1999 and 2000, that many of the deliverables under
the Three Pillars of PLA reform and modernization
broached early in this chapter began to attract notice
abroad—reform of the professional military education
system; new joint doctrine; new unit field training
regimens; countless new regulations on political work,
active duty officer management, finance and budgeting
procedures; creation of the fourth general department
(GAD); establishment of joint logistics bases—the list
goes on.
Finally, and worthy of particular note, in addition to
these general areas upon which to focus Army building
efforts, the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New
Period” also issued new Army building missions to
each of the PLA’s services (jun zhong) and branches (bing
zhong) based on the forecast that in future high-tech
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warfare, “control of the air” (zhi kong quan), “control of
the sea” (zhi hai quan), and “strategic strike” (zhanlüe
daji) capabilities would be operational imperatives.
Therefore, according to the Outline for Studying Jiang
Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building,
in addition to improving the ground forces, the PLA
was directed to “vigorously strengthen the building of
the navy, air force, and the Second Artillery.”
• The PLA Navy must “truly possesses the
comprehensive operational capabilities (zonghe
zuozhan nengli) to conduct maritime campaigns
in the near sea (jinhai).”
• The Air Force should “gradually realize the
transformation from a national territory air
defense model (guotu fangkong xing) to an
offensive-defensive model (gongfang jianbei
xing).”
• “The Second Artillery Corp (erpao) will have a
stronger nuclear deterrent and conventional
strike (changgui daji) capabilities.”
In addition, according to the Outline cited above, the new
Military Strategic Guidelines called for enhancing the
capabilities of “Emergency Mobile Combat Operations
Units” (yingji jidong zuozhan budui) for dealing with
near-term contingencies should they occur.
Each service and branch will place [army building for]
Emergency Mobile Combat Operations Units in a priority
position; safeguarding this main objective by providing
weapons and equipment, materials and funding, etc;
undergoing improved training in order to quickly deal
with local warfare and sudden incidents, and complete
the military combat tasks for the new period.57
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Moreover, in addition to extending priority for
equipment, funding, and other resources, the PLA
was directed to make the “Emergency Mobile Combat
Operations Units” the prototypes for developing other
future high-tech units throughout the PLA, and to use
them as test beds for the conduct of joint operations
and “informationalized” warfare.
Finally, each PLA service and branch was given
the Army building mission to “establish an intense
understanding of joint operations, launch in-depth
research into joint operations theory and combat
methods [i.e., doctrine], and establish and perfect a
joint operations command system that conforms to our
country’s national situation and military situation.”58
It is unclear when these latter service and branch
missions were actually articulated to the PLA as part of
the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period.”
These very specific mission areas were not included
in a recently released version of excerpts from Jiang’s
original speech in 1993. For all one knows, they may
have been there in the manuscript but were edited out
as the speech was being cleared for public release in
August 2006. What one can state with certainty is that
these missions were part of the strategic guidelines as of
2003. They are included in the Outline for Studying Jiang
Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building
that was published in 2003. But the Outline does not
specify whether these mission areas were part of the
original promulgation (1993) or were added as part of
subsequent adjustments to the strategic guidelines.
Either way, it is highly interesting to note that, with
the exception of the mission to enhance “emergency
mobile operations units,” the Army building objectives
set forth above for the services and branches as extracted from the Outline (2003) were publicly articulated in
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the PRC defense paper, China’s National Defense in 2004.
Moreover, that particular version of the white paper
provides a wealth of detail on various Army building
programs that were launched as a result of the strategic
guidelines in 1993. However, for whatever reasons, the
PLA does not make the direct linkage between these
programs and the “Military Strategic Guidelines for
the New Period” for its foreign readership.
Thus, in summarizing the major aspects of China’s
current national military strategy, let us call upon
Jiang Zemin one final time to wrap it all up with the
following excerpt from his 1993 speech.
In summary, for the period in the future the basic
content of the military strategic guidelines of the active
defense is: employing Mao Zedong Military Thought
and Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Army
Building in the New Period as the guide, observing and
serving the national development strategy, being based
on fighting to win local wars under modern high-tech
conditions, accelerating the development of our army’s
quality, working hard to enhance our army’s emergency
operations capabilities, enhancing strong points and
avoiding weaknesses, being flexible in meeting changes,
containing the war, winning the war, defending national
territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,
and maintaining the unity of the motherland and social
stability, in order to provide a strong powerful secure
safeguard for reform, opening up, and the development
of modernization. . . . These guidelines expound on the
fundamental guiding ideology that we must persist with
in our army building and military combat. They expound
on the relationship between our military strategic
guidelines and the national development strategy,
determine the strategic objectives and strategic tasks of
our army, determine the focus of our army building and
military combat preparations, and put forth the basic
ideology that strategic guidance must take hold of.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
First, by this time it should be very clear that the
PRC does in fact have a “national military strategy”
that is guiding the reform and modernization efforts of
the Chinese armed forces. Moreover, there should be
little question at this point that the Military Strategic
Guidelines are the vehicle used to transmit that strategy
to the PLA.
• When new guidelines are issued, it is the result of
major and significant changes in one or all of the
following areas of assessment: (1) changes in the
international order; (2) changes in the security
environment and China’s security situation;
(3) changes to China’s domestic situation; and
(4) changes in the nature of warfare itself.
• The Military Strategic Guidelines tend to have
a long shelf-life. The new guidelines issued in
1993 constitute only the fifth instance since 1949
that the PRC has made a major change to its
national military strategy.
• The Military Strategic Guidelines are the CMC’s
authoritative guidance to the PLA to take for
further planning and action. As a rolling military
strategy, the guidelines are fleshed out in detail
over time, and there are various systemic
events in the PLA and the PRC to which major
programmatic decisions are keyed, such as State
Five Year Plans and “Army Building Outlines”
(Gangyao) keyed to Five Year Plans.
• A major change to the Military Strategic
Guidelines, and especially the promulgation
of a completely new set of Military Strategic
Guidelines, is as much a major political event
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as it is a strictly military event. Consequently, it
ought to be a knowable event.
Second, Military Strategic Guidelines must address
what appear to be standard strategic issues or questions.
At a minimum, these components include:
• The Strategic Assessment (zhanlüe panduan);
• The Content of the Active Defense Strategy (jiji
fangyu de zhanlüe nei rong);
• Strategic Missions and Strategic Objectives for
the PLA (zhanlüe renwu, zhanlüe mubiao);
• Military Combat Preparations (junshi douzheng
zhunbei);
• The Main Strategic Direction (zhuyao zhanlüe
fangxiang); and
• The Focus for Army Building (jundui jianshe).
While over time some aspects of the key components
of the guidelines may change or be adjusted, such
adjustments do not necessarily constitute the
promulgation of a new iteration of the Military
Strategic Guidelines. It is important to understand the
difference between new programs, new “slogans,”
and new emphases on one hand, and the issuing of a
completely new set of guidelines, on the other.
Although some of the terminology applying to the
key components of the Military Strategic Guidelines
may be new to some, upon reflection, most of the content
of China’s national military strategy as described in
this chapter should not come across as new. In fact,
those who study the PLA on a regular basis have been
encountering and writing about many of the concepts,
directives, and programs contained herein for many
years. Now there is a Chinese framework that can
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be used to place developments in context, and there
is some basis for answering the oft-asked question,
“What is driving PLA modernization?”
Third, it is worth reiterating that every modernization program, every reform initiative, and every
significant change that the PLA has undergone, and
which foreign observers have been writing about
for over a decade, are the results of some of the
fundamental decisions made when the new guidelines
were promulgated in 1993—especially the ensuing
programs the PLA initiated after 1993 to comply with
the new guidelines.
Fourth, the “Military Strategic Guidelines for
the New Period” do not fundamentally speak to
“numbers”—it speaks to capabilities. The number
of systems, the number of units, and the number
of personnel are all worked out over time. But the
“Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period”
are first and foremost about developing strategic and
operational capabilities the armed forces of China have
hitherto not felt a need to acquire or have not been able
for various reasons to develop.
My own reading of the guidelines is that the PLA is
being told to develop the capabilities to accomplish the
following tasks:
(1) Provide for the defense of strategic assets on
the mainland in light of 21st-century precision-guided
munitions and other high-tech weapons that could
be used to threaten the PRC or actually be employed
against the mainland;
(2) Strengthen the deterrent value of its nuclear
forces;
(3) Fight and win high-tech joint campaigns in
the maritime, aerospace, and electro-magnetic battle
spaces off its littoral if need be; and
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(4) Field credible operational capabilities to deter
potential aggression against the mainland or its interests
(political or economic), support the diplomatic element
of national power with real “teeth,” and provide
options to China’s leaders across the full spectrum of
operations, from “show of force” to the application of
force in such a manner that any required escalation
control can be managed.
Fifth, slowly but surely—with the very important
exception of identifying outright the main strategic
direction—the PRC has been releasing information on
some of the key components of the “Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period” into the public domain
in China for the past few years. This is certainly the case
as regards PLA books, articles, and study materials
meant for Chinese military audiences.
As far as materials aimed at foreign audiences are
concerned, specifically the PRC defense white papers
and other materials, the Chinese still do not expound
directly the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New
Period.” They choose, instead, to repackage aspects of
the guidelines, condense them to a stock phrase or two
(such as “the military strategic guideline of the active
defense”), or talk around the guidelines. Why Beijing
chooses not to discuss the guidelines, the components,
and the content directly can only be left to conjecture,
especially given the release in August 2006 of the threevolume paean to Jiang Zemin that is rich in content on
this topic. At the same time, transparency creep does
seem to be underway. Especially beginning with the
publication of China’s National Defense in 2004, the PLA
is in fact beginning to discuss some, but certainly not
all, of the key components of the guidelines. This was
evident in the 2006 iteration as well.
Sixth, it is clear that the Chinese approach to crafting
a national military strategy is pragmatic, deliberate,
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and based on the types of calculations that any
professional military establishment would undertake.
Although the terminology and the organization of the
concepts are distinctly a reflection of PLA bureaucratic
culture and the intellectual constructs imposed by
“scientific” Marxism, there is nothing particularly
foreign, strange, exotic, or exceptional about the
Military Strategic Guidelines and the national military
strategy it transmits. At bottom it is a capabilities-based
and contingency-based strategy that sets the azimuth
for the development of warfighting capabilities as
well as professional and other institutional capacities
to provide for the national defense of China that are
subject to larger-order national objectives.
The panel reports and papers in the chapters of
this anthology which focus on the services—the PLA
Navy, PLA Air Force, and Second Artillery—will go
into great detail about programs, capabilities, weapons
systems, service missions, and other issues that reside
at the operational and tactical levels of warfare. But
every such chapter has at its root the basic guidance
given the PLA as contained in the “Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period.”
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CHAPTER 4
“MINDING THE GAP”:
ASSESSING THE TRAJECTORY
OF THE PLA’S SECOND ARTILLERY1
Evan S. Medeiros
INTRODUCTION
The Second Artillery is one of the most dynamic
branches of an already active and rapidly modernizing
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).2 Second Artillery
doctrine and force structure have been evolving in
the last decade in order to deter new threats and to
generate greater coercive military options. There
are strong and multiple indications that the Second
Artillery will continue to develop in the coming years.
The Second Artillery may even assume new missions,
such as counterspace operations. These changes are
highly consequential for U.S. security interests in Asia
and regional stability by dint of the Second Artillery’s
ability to “reach out and touch” other militaries in
East Asia rapidly and accurately, including forward
deployed U.S. forces. It is in this sense that the Second
Artillery is truly China’s strategic rocket force and thus
worthy of systematic examination and analysis.
This chapter examines the past and current
modernization activities of Second Artillery in an effort
to generate fresh insights about its future direction.
In doing so, it principally examines the relationship
between Second Artillery requirements and doctrine
on the one hand, and its force structure capabilities on
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the other. This chapter aims to answer the following
questions: What are the roles and missions of the Second
Artillery’s nuclear and conventional missile forces—
and do the two differ; what are the main attributes of
its current force structure and related modernization
activities; how consistent and congruent are its
doctrine and capabilities; how has the Second Artillery
adapted to emerging threats, including the possibility
of assuming new missions; and, ultimately, what does
this doctrine-capabilities comparison indicate about
the Second Artillery’s future evolution?
These questions provide an analytic construct
within which to assess the Second Artillery’s trajectory
of change. This approach seeks to avoid a classic
mistake in strategic analysis: inferring doctrine
from capabilities and thereby arriving at worst-case
assessments of doctrine because force structure data
is often limited.3 The answers to the questions raised
above will provide a baseline useful for assessing the
operational military challenges facing the United States
as it seeks to deter China from pursuing a military
resolution to the Taiwan question and as the United
States manages its regional security commitments in
the face of rapid PLA modernization.
This chapter is divided into five parts. Following
the introduction, the second and third sections
analyze the doctrine-capabilities relationship of the
Second Artillery’s nuclear and conventional missile
forces, respectively.4 The fourth section addresses the
possibility of new missions for the Second Artillery.
The chapter’s concluding section advances several
arguments about the degree of coherence within the
Second Artillery and discusses the implications of
these arguments for the Second Artillery’s future
force structure; it also enumerates factors which could
change current Second Artillery capabilities.
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The chapter principally relies on specialized
Chinese military writings for information on PLA and
Second Artillerey doctrine. These writings are drawn
from the wave of military books and journal articles
published following the PLA’s doctrinal flowering
that began during the ninth Five Year Plan (FYP)
(1996-2000) and continues today. The chapter treats
these professional military writings as authoritative
but not definitive, since they are statements made
outside the orbit of official doctrinal documents. Yet,
the professional military writings referenced herein
were chosen for their consistency of argumentation
in order to identify widely-held claims about Second
Artillery doctrine and operations. By contrast, the
information on Second Artillery missile capabilities is
drawn from publicly available U.S. data, such as the
U.S. Defense Department’s reports and those of other
U.S. government agencies.
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES
China’s nuclear missile forces are the oldest part
of the Second Artillery, which was created in 2 years
after China’s initial nuclear test in 1964. It has been the
custodian of China’s nuclear-capable missile systems
for over 40 years. It is also the youngest branch of the
PLA and, as such, for decades received limited attention
within a PLA which has long been dominated by
Army-centric thinking and leadership. It has been only
within the last decade that the Second Artillery has
been accorded a more equitable measure of political
influence and financial resources, similar to those of
the PLA’s services.5 These and other changes in the
Second Artillery are reflected in the modernization of
its doctrine and capabilities.
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The Institutional Development of Nuclear Doctrine.
The institutional context that shaped the development of China’s nuclear doctrine is critical to
understanding its current content and future direction.
For at least 20 years after China’s first nuclear test
in 1964, Chinese research on nuclear doctrine was
highly underinstitutionalized and undertheorized,
especially in comparison to U.S. and Soviet doctrine
during the Cold War. Few, if any, Chinese research
organizations (within or outside the PLA) conducted
substantive work on specifying the roles and missions
of nuclear weapons. This relative inattention to nuclear
issues was particularly acute within the PLA and its
Second Artillery. According to PLA sources, military
institutions did not begin researching nuclear strategy
questions until 1985.6
There are at least three reasons for this phenomenon.
First, China’s nuclear doctrine was largely defined by
the general beliefs of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping
about the need to possess a basic retaliatory capability
to deter an adversary from using or threatening to
use nuclear weapons against China. PLA and other
research institutions conducted very little work on the
requirements of possessing a credible second-strike
capability, aside from emphasizing the general notions
of survivability and holding at risk some enemy
targets. The evolving availability of certain missile and
warhead capabilities influenced nuclear doctrine, but
this occurred within the above framework.7
Second, China’s military education and research
system was closed for at least 10 years during the
Cultural Revolution (1966-76). This resulted in a serious
lack of expertise and experience within the PLA and
Second Artillery suitable for developing a detailed
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nuclear doctrine, as well as broader military doctrine.
The PLA did not reengage such issues until well into
the 1980s.
Third, there was limited political space in China
to discuss nuclear doctrine for decades. Such issues
were treated with such intense secrecy, internally and
externally, that the political environment did not lend
itself to broad interagency discussions. A related issue
was the political incorrectness of discussing doctrine
because it required using highly criticized Western
concepts and terminology such as “deterrence.”8
By the mid-1990s, a critical mass of expertise,
experience, and political space began to emerge within
China, especially within PLA circles, to discuss China’s
nuclear strategy and doctrine. PLA strategists and
operators began to think more systematically about
China’s nuclear threat environment, the requirements
of credible deterrence, and the capabilities necessary
to achieve such deterrence. China’s participation in
international arms control processes (beginning in the
early 1980s), in particular its direct involvement in the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations
in the early 1990s, prompted internal discussions
about nuclear doctrine and force structure issues. More
broadly, China had largely rebuilt its military education
and research institutions by the mid-1990s. At that time,
the Academy of Military Sciences and National Defense
University began leading the process of renovating
China’s entire military doctrine. This culminated in
the publication in 1999 of several documents called
“campaign outlines” (zhanyi gangyao) that collectively
detailed a new doctrine for “joint operations,” as well
as one specific to the Second Artillery.9
Although there was some internal discussion and
writing about nuclear doctrine from the mid-1980s
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to mid-1990s, in retrospect this discourse appears to
have been largely exploratory and had little impact
on doctrine or capabilities. Chinese specialists read
Western literature and debated among themselves
about how to characterize Chinese nuclear doctrine.
This process was manifested in debates about
“minimum deterrence” versus “limited deterrence”
as China’s official doctrine.10 As one senior AMS
strategists told this author, that period in the evolution
of nuclear doctrine was one of “let a hundred flowers
bloom” (baihua qifang).11
Chinese writing and deliberations on nuclear
doctrine since that time have become far more focused
and detailed. New PLA publications offer numerous
insights on the content of nuclear doctrine.12 This
development suggests that the locus of expertise on
nuclear questions is diversifying from the monopoly
of China’s nuclear scientific community (i.e., the bomb
builders in the “Ninth Academy”) to PLA theorists and
strategists. This was facilitated by the military’s work on
renovating its operational doctrine in the 1990s, and its
systematic thinking about the requirements of specific
military operations. This process included the Second
Artillery’s elaboration of its “nuclear counterstrike
campaign” (he fanji/baofu zhanyi), which gave the PLA
and the Second Artillery an opportunity to further
develop the concepts and actions that collectively
constitute nuclear doctrine.
Since the mid-1990s, the Second Artillery has made
consistent advances in researching and developing its
guidelines, principles, requirements, and tasks for nuclear
missile operations.13 PLA sources indicate that the
Second Artillery has completed a “basic system of
military theory” for nuclear operations, which included
publication of several internal documents elaborating
the elements of such operations. PLA sources also
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indicate there is still more work to be completed.
The Second Artillery, as of 2004, had published the
following documents related to a nuclear campaign:
Strategic Studies (Erpao Zhanlue Xue); Campaign Studies
(Erpao Zhanyi Xue); Tactics Studies (Erpao Zhanshu Xue);
Command Studies (Erpao Zhihui Xue); Logistics Studies
(Erpao Houqin Xue); Equipment and Technology Studies
(Erpao Zhuangji Xue); and Management Studies (Erpao
Guanli Xue). However, despite its intentions, the Second
Artillery had by 2004 not yet published the following
documents: Nuclear Military Thought (Erpao He Junshi
Sixiang); Nuclear Military Academic Research (Erpao He
Junshi Xueshu); and Intelligence Studies (Erpao Qingbao
Xue).14
More broadly than the above work on nuclear
doctrine, the Second Artillery has articulated the
concepts driving their current and future capabilities—
both nuclear and conventional. The Second Artillery
has adopted three basic principles (jiben yuanze) to
guide its future force structure as well as its future
operations.15 They are:
• Maintain conventional and nuclear [missile
forces], but put priority on conventional [missile
forces] (hechang jianbei, yi chang wei zhu);
• Bring out focal points, put priority on quality
(tuchu zhongdian, zhiliang weizhu) (the latter part
of this phrase is about improving survivability
of Chinese nuclear forces); and
• Aggressively explore and boldly innovate (jiji
tansuo, dadan chuangxin).
Analyzing Nuclear Doctrine.
Chinese leaders and PLA strategists continue to
view nuclear weapons as primarily political tools to
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maintain China’s freedom of action while minimizing
its vulnerability to coercion by other nuclear-armed
states. The legacy of Mao Zedong’s, Deng Xiaoping’s,
and Jiang Zemin’s views of nuclear weapons as a
means to deter both nuclear aggression and blackmail
continue to define China’s nuclear strategy, doctrine,
and policies. These views are reflected in multiple
ways in PLA writings as well as those of State and Party
organs.16
Strategic Intent. Chinese publications refer to three
missions for its nuclear weapons: deterring nuclear
aggression against China, preventing nuclear coercion,
and conferring great power status/eliciting deference.
Such writings, especially those within the PLA,
consistently emphasize possessing nuclear weapons to
prevent deterrence failures and to preclude other nuclear
powers from issuing nuclear threats to intimidate or
coerce China during crises. Chinese military writings
have identified only one mission for Second Artillery
nuclear forces, i.e., “a nuclear counterstrike campaign,”
in connection with which they discuss conducting
retaliatory nuclear strike operations.17 This single
campaign stands in stark contrast to the numerous
conventional missile campaigns and the fact that the
latter are far more offensive in orientation, as discussed
later.
PLA writings emphasize several themes that further
illuminate their conceptualization of nuclear doctrine.18
First, China’s possession of a limited numbers of nuclear
weapons is sufficient to deter nuclear aggression against
China. China does not seek a capability for assured
destruction, but rather assured retaliation. China seeks to
hold at risk enough enemy targets of value with the
threat of unacceptable damage such that adversaries
are deterred from using or threatening to use nuclear
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weapons against China. A second but related idea is
that China seeks to avoid being drawn into the trap
of a nuclear arms race, which most Chinese strategists
argue would waste scarce national resources and,
ultimately, undermine Chinese security. China will
not succumb to the same fate as the Soviet Union in
the Cold War, which was bankrupted by trying to
keep up with U.S. defense expenditures. How China
defines the elements of such a nuclear arms race so as
to avoid them remains unclear. Third, the PLA is most
focused on improving the survivability, reliability,
invulnerability, and penetrability of its nuclear forces
so as to bolster the PLA’s ability to deter nuclear
aggression and coercion. The military’s writings are
most systematic and technically detailed about these
three themes.19
These ideas are expressed in both PLA and CCP
publications, which have become more explicit in
recent years. China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper
publicly outlined for the first time the key principles
guiding Chinese nuclear strategy and doctrine. This is
China’s clearest articulation, to date, in a white paper
or other public document of the collective orthodoxy of
China’s nuclear strategy and doctrine.20 The 2006 white
paper stated that China pursues a “self-defense nuclear
strategy” (ziwei fangyu he zhanlue). The two principles
underlying this nuclear strategy are “self-defensive
counterattack” (ziwei fanji)) and “limited development
of nuclear weapons” (youxian fazhan). The report
stated that ultimately China seeks to possess a “lean
and effective nuclear deterrent capability” (jinggan
youxiao he liliang). These principles are especially
important because they are official ones used within
China’s intragovernmental deliberations about nuclear
strategy and doctrine.21 To be sure, additional research
is needed to understand their precise meaning.
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Furthermore, a 2004 report by a Central Committee
unit included very similar concepts. It stated that
China’s nuclear strategy is to possess a “limited, selfdefensive counter-strike” capability (youxian ziwei
fanji). This strategy’s primary characteristics are the
following: it is defensive (fangyuxing), it seeks to counter
coercion/intimidation (kang weishexing), it is limited
(youxianxing), and it will be effective (youxiaoxing). The
report added that China does not seek “to carry out
or win a nuclear war,” but that rather it “intends to
counter and contain nuclear war.”22 The similarity of
the ideas in these phrases with the 2006 National Defense
White Paper suggests relative congruity in beliefs about
the role and missions of nuclear weapons across the
system in China.
Operational Principles. PLA writings also identify a
few operational principles which guide the planning
and actual use of nuclear weapons; these concepts are
narrower than those mentioned above. Some of these
concepts have been widely used in the PLA since its
earliest Red Army days, and their use by the Second
Artillery should be interpreted as the application of
general PLA concepts to Second Artillery missions.23
The first two principles are persistently and consistently
identified by PLA and Second Artillery publications as
guiding Second Artillery operations. They are part of
the Second Artillery’s doctrinal orthodoxy.
• Close defense (yanmi fanghu): This concept was
one of the first articulated by the Second Artillery
in the early 1980s. It is a broad, catch-all concept
that embodies the policies and actions used to
improve the survivability of China’s nuclear
forces.
• Key point counterstrikes (zhongdian fanji): This
concept is about the Second Artillery’s conduct
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of nuclear counterstrikes. In conducting such
strikes, the Second Artillery seeks to elicit such
a heavy psychological shock that the adversary
does not escalate further and ends the nuclear
exchange. This concept includes targeting both
civilian and military sites in the hopes of causing
deep psychological trauma and degrading
the adversary’s military capabilities. Yet, PLA
writings suggest that retaliatory strikes are more
about shocking an adversary than inflicting
pain.
The following two principles are relatively new
and intermittently referenced in PLA publications;
it is not clear whether they inform Second Artillery
planning, procurement, and operations. In particular,
the principle of counternuclear deterrence is the subject
of some debate among nuclear strategists as to its
meaning and, thus, its applicability to China’s nuclear
strategy and doctrine.
• Effective nuclear deterrence (youxiao he weishe):
This concept is a relatively new addition; it
has not been part of the historical PLA lexicon.
An effective nuclear deterrent is regarded as
one that is reliable, survivable, and capable of
penetrating an adversary’s missile defenses. As
long as the PLA is assured that it can retaliate and
impose unacceptable damage on an adversary
following a nuclear attack, then its deterrent is
assessed to be effective. Yet, the level of forces
that meets this latter standard is unclear. An
idea closely related to effectiveness is sufficiency
(zugou), which also informs nuclear force
structure. A sufficient nuclear force is one sized
and scaled to survive an enemy’s initial nuclear
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strike, to execute counterattack and reattack
operations, and to penetrate an adversary’s
defenses. Sufficiency and effectiveness were
initially mentioned together in the 2001 version
of The Science of Military Strategy published by
the Academy of Military Sciences, but not in the
1999 version published by the National Defense
University.
• Counternuclear deterrence/intimidation (fan he
weishe): This concept is about military activities
that seek to signal China’s capability and resolve
to resist nuclear coercion or intimidation. It is
an expression of China’s effort to avoid being
blackmailed by an adversary’s nuclear threats.
It also reflects China’s traditional view of
“deterrence” by a potential enemy as highly
coercive and, thus, as a practice to be opposed. In
Western parlance, this concept is an expression
of nuclear signaling. There is disagreement
among PLA strategists about the accuracy of
this term and, thus, its applicability to PLA
operations.
External Threats, PLA Responses, and the ‘No-FirstUse’ Bugaboo. Another window into Chinese nuclear
doctrine is its responses to changes in PLA threat
perceptions. PLA perceptions of its nuclear threat
environment have shifted radically since the end of the
Cold War. During the 1970s and 1980s, much of China’s
nuclear forces were oriented to deterring and defeating
a large Soviet attack, which included China’s possible
use of tactical nuclear weapons to defeat a large Soviet
land invasion.24 Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the rise in U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan,
China’s nuclear strategists became far more focused
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on U.S. military capabilities and its forward-deployed
forces in Asia. PLA strategists and planners are now
heavily preoccupied with threats from U.S. strategic
offensive and defensive capabilities.
Currently, PLA strategists view their nuclear
security environment as highly complex and deeply
uncertain, with U.S. military capabilities as the most
dynamic element in their threat assessments. Many
Chinese view the U.S. 2001 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) as lowering the nuclear threshold and validating
the development of new “mini-nukes” to use for
coercive purposes in regional conflicts. In particular,
PLA strategists are very concerned about the threat
to China’s nuclear forces posed by the combination of
U.S. missile defenses, non-nuclear strike options, and
related threats from air attacks and special operations
forces; it is this combination of capabilities that many
in China believe could significantly compromise
China’s second-strike capability. In addition, Chinese
strategists remain concerned about Japan’s latent
ability to develop nuclear weapons and Indian nuclear
modernization. (Interestingly, North Korea’s nascent
nuclear capability is absent from the PLA analyses
surveyed for this chapter.) However, PLA writings
strongly suggest that U.S. capabilities are collectively
treated as “the inclusive case” against which most PLA
planning is conducted.25
How has PLA doctrine evolved in the context of
these changing threat perceptions? At a minimum,
China’s nuclear doctrine has received more attention
among strategists, which has resulted in a fuller
theoretical development of the beliefs and concepts
comprising nuclear doctrine. As discussed above, this
development was facilitated by many factors such as the
PLA’s improving institutional capabilities to address
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nuclear questions. Perhaps most significant, China’s
doctrinal discussions and debates have remained
focused on using nuclear weapons for deterrence,
countering coercion, and signaling great power status,
despite China’s increasingly dire perceptions of its
nuclear security environment.
Another place to look is China’s long-standing
policy on the no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons.
China has engaged in a debate in recent years about
eliminating or qualifying its NFU commitment as a
means to bolster China’s deterrent. This debate was
resolved in favor of not altering it, due in part to the
expected damage to China’s international image and
reputation. Some discussion and writing about NFU
and broader nuclear doctrine continued after that
decision, but as of at least June 2006 the government
banned further internal debate or public commentary
about NFU.26
PLA sources suggest the continued application
of NFU to its planning and operations. PLA internal
writings consistently treat China’s NFU pledge as a
structural feature of and constraint on Second Artillery
nuclear operations. A senior Second Artillery officer,
for example, described nuclear strike planning as
guided by the principle of “first resist, then penetrate”
(xiankang, houtu), in which the nuclear forces survive
a first strike and then retaliate by puncturing the
adversary’s missile defenses.27 This idea is repeated
in numerous other PLA and Second Artillery writings
about nuclear counterstrike operations. To be sure,
there is some questioning of NFU and related beliefs
within the PLA, especially within the Second Artillery;
yet, such reservations are expressed by indirection
and “straw-man arguments,” indicating the continued
existence of political constraints on criticizing long-
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standing aspects of China’s official nuclear policy, such
as NFU.28
The occurrence of this internal debate about NFU
does not appear to be indicative of a qualitative shift
in China’s nuclear doctrine. Rather, PLA strategists
are exploring means to improve the credibility of
China’s nuclear deterrent in the face of the dual threats
of America’s missile defense systems and its nonnuclear strike weapons (e.g., conventional Tomahawks).
Many Chinese fear the United States will use this
combination of strategic defense and offense to neuter
China’s nuclear capabilities, making China vulnerable
to coercion in a crisis. In other words, the viability of
China’s deterrent faces threats that some Chinese argue
could be countered by injecting a degree of ambiguity
into official doctrine, such as by conditionalizing
NFU.
In assessing the implications of China’s NFU debate,
a far more pressing issue is the precise conditions
under which China would adhere to its NFU pledge. It
remains unclear what foreign military actions constitute
“first use” for Chinese leaders, and thus what would
trigger nuclear retaliation. Some PLA writings state
that an enemy intention to carry out a nuclear strike
on China is grounds for retaliation.29 Other Chinese
sources suggest that conventional strikes on Chinese
“nuclear assets” or conventional strikes that produce
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-like effects could
justify nuclear “retaliation” by China. Chinese officials
and analysts are intentionally ambiguous on this point,
probably to bolster the PLA’s ability to deter such
actions.30 These conclusions about Chinese views on
NFU are reinforced by the author’s discussions with
Chinese strategists during a U.S.-China conference on
nuclear affairs held in June 2006.31
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The apparent absence of other debates within
the PLA also sheds light on the evolution of China’s
nuclear doctrine. In other words, there are numerous
nuclear dogs that are not barking. There is no evidence
of a Chinese discussion of using nuclear weapons as
a cost saver or substitute for conventional weapons;
indeed, China’s intense conventional buildup in recent
years belies that very notion. There is very little, if any,
substantive discussion about using tactical nuclear
weapons to deter major conventional aggression
against China.
Moreover, there is little indication in PLA and
Second Artillery writings that, for the purposes
of escalation control or damage limitation, they
seek primarily to use nuclear weapons to deny an
adversary specific military gains. In other words, there
appears to be little interest in Cold War-style “nuclear
warfighting” strategies in which nuclear exchanges can
be calibrated and finely managed. While some Second
Artillery operators have hinted at such notions in internal
military publications, their ultimate conclusions about
adhering to existing policy and strategy suggest a
political environment that is unwilling to engage
concepts of nuclear warfighting.32 PLA writings about
nuclear counter-strike operations do not extensively
and systematically discuss the conduct of nuclear
warfare and the modalities of nuclear escalation.
These writings do not indicate that PLA strategists are
“thinking the unthinkable” nor do such publications
possess the game-theoretic character of U.S. and Soviet
writings during the Cold War. The PLA’s most detailed,
systematic, and technologically sophisticated writings
focus on improving the survivability, invulnerability,
and penetrability of Second Artillery nuclear missile
forces.
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Nuclear Missile Capabilities.33
The main attributes and overall direction of
China’s nuclear force structure modernization have
been known to PLA observers for decades. Since the
mid-1980s, China has been expanding the size and
improving the quality of the Chinese missile forces
in an effort to enhance their reliability, survivability,
response time, and—most recently and urgently—
their penetrability. This has been a gradual effort, not
a crash program; many of the missile systems coming
online have their roots in decisions that date back to
the mid-1980s and, in some cases, even earlier. To be
sure, once these modernization programs are finished
and operationally implemented, perhaps by the end of
this decade, China will have significantly upgraded the
quality of its nuclear forces. When complete, China will
have revolutionized its nuclear capability, providing it
with a highly credible deterrent against major nuclear
powers for the first time since 1964.
In terms of quality, China’s nuclear modernization
efforts are focused on diversification. China’s nuclear
forces are moving beyond their decades-long reliance
on land-based, liquid-fuel, silo-based missile systems—
the DF-3A (2,790+ kilometers [km]), DF-4 (5,470 +
km), and DF-5A (12,900 + km) systems—to far more
complex mobile missile systems such as the DF-31
(7,250 + km) and its extended range-version, the DF31A (11,270 + km). For over a decade, China has fielded
one nuclear-capable road-mobile, solid-fuel, mediumrange missile known as the DF-21 (1,770 + km) and a
sea-based variant known as the JL-1 (1,770 + km). The
JL-1 is expected to be replaced by a longer range JL2 (8,000 + km) by the end of the decade, which will
be deployed in a new Jin-class ballistic missile nuclear
submarine (SSBN) under development. 34
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In addition, the PLA has been engaged in a militarywide effort to modernize its command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, which may
include improvements to its nuclear command and
control and missile-related early warning capabilities.
Public data on the latter two types of capabilities are
limited, but such modernization is critical to possessing
a credible second strike capability. Understanding
China’s progress in improving such capabilities is
essential in assessing accurately the strength of China’s
overall nuclear force structure.
In terms of quantity, China currently deploys some
20 DF-5A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 1624 DF-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs),
14-18 DF-3A and 40-50 DF-21 missile systems. These
numbers are expected to grow by 10s in the next decade
as China adds several new systems to its arsenal. Many
of the older, land-based missile systems (such as DF3A and DF-4) will likely be phased out as their solidfuel successors are deployed. China will likely retain
its DF-5As in service to add to its ICBM capabilities.
The new DF-31s are just now being deployed but in
unknown numbers.35
The U.S. Defense Department’s China Military Power
Report (2006) noted a highly dynamic and uncertain
dimension of Second Artillery nuclear modernization,
stating that China “will deploy several new conventional
and nuclear variants of medium range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) and IRBMs for regional contingencies and
augment its long-range missile forces. China is also
developing air- and ground-launched cruise missiles
that could have a nuclear capability.”36 Another area
of significant Second Artillery procurement is that of
capabilities to counter missile defenses such as decoys,
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penetration aids, and possibly multiple warheads.
China is likely pursuing several options at once
but an emphasis on multiple warheads could have
destabilizing consequences depending on their number
and operational capabilities. All such activities require
watching to see which option receives the most serious
investment.
Assessing the Doctrine-Capabilities Nexus.
In assessing the relationship between Second
Artillery doctrine and capabilities, three main trends are
discernible. First, China’s nuclear doctrine (regarding
both strategic intent and operational principles) have
become more developed and explicit while remaining
focused on the long-standing missions of deterrence,
counter-coercion, and great power status. This has
occurred despite the perceived emergence of numerous
new threats to China’s nuclear security, mainly those
related to U.S. capabilities. The PLA is now playing a
greater role in the process of doctrinal development as
well.
Second, there is a broad degree of consistency
between China’s stated objectives for its nuclear
forces and its modernization activities. Neither the
size, scope, nor pace of China’s nuclear force structure
modernization is indicative of new or hidden missions.
The Second Artillery’s procurement is focused on
deploying systems that improve the reliability,
survivability, and penetrability of Chinese nuclear
forces. This is consistent with a doctrine that seeks to
use nuclear weapons to deter nuclear aggression and
prevent coercion.
Absent evidence that China is significantly expanding the size of its missile forces and developing
highly accurate and lethal nuclear-capable missile
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systems (i.e., ones that can destroy hard targets), there
is little basis to conclude that China’s nuclear strategy
and doctrine are fundamentally changing. China would
have to make substantial and sustained improvements
to all aspects of its nuclear force structure—missiles,
warheads, command and control and early-warning—
to indicate a doctrinal shift that supported Cold Warlike nuclear warfighting strategies. China would have
to develop and deploy a significantly different force
structure if it sought to adopt a more aggressive nuclear
doctrine. If anything, China’s nuclear forces have more
work to do to ensure their survivability in perpetuity;
in this sense, the PLA’s longstanding nuclear doctrinecapabilities gap is closing but is not yet there.
This is not to say that China’s nuclear modernization
does not raise numerous implications for U.S. military
planners. China may very soon possess a sufficiently
invulnerable second strike capability, such as when it
deploys a real sea-based nuclear capability, that it will
affect U.S. calculations and limit U.S. options during
a crisis. To draw a rough analogy from history, the
Soviet Union’s deployment of its first Yankee-class
SSBN in the late 1960s convinced President Nixon that
the United States no longer possessed a viable damage
limitation option against Soviet nuclear forces. A
disarming first strike was no longer conceivable. This
accelerated a shift in U.S. thinking towards escalation
control options in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition.
As China’s deploys its new SSBNs equipped with
several 8,000 km range JL-2 missiles, the United States
will confront similar challenges.
Third, even China’s reported development of new
variants of nuclear-capable MRBM and IRBM systems
is arguably consistent with the strategic intent of
China’s current nuclear doctrine. Such systems improve
China’s ability to deter a broader range of threats, which
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is a weakness of the composition of its current arsenal.
Such MRBMs and IRBMs, if eventually deployed as
nuclear systems, would allow China to hold at risk a
greater variety of regional targets and do so in a more
credible manner than its currently deployed systems.
This is especially important for China as it confronts the
possibility of either conventional strikes on its nuclear
assets or limited nuclear threats by potential enemies
against China in a regional crisis. China’s ability to
credibly deter these two eventualities is currently
constrained by the large and blunt nature of its present
arsenal, which thereby reduces the credibility of China’s
threats to retaliate. Thus, the deployment of new
and more accurate theater nuclear strike capabilities
provides China with the ability to credibly threaten
retaliation without raising the immediate specter of an
all-out nuclear “wargasm,” as Herman Kahn so oddly
characterized it 4 decades ago.
CONVENTIONAL MISSILE DOCTRINE
AND CAPABILITIES
The Second Artillery’s conventional missile forces
differ in numerous ways from their nuclear brethren.
They are far younger, having been formed in the mid1990s as a relatively cheap and effective means to
threaten Taiwan. The Second Artillery has accorded
them a higher priority than that of the nuclear forces.37
Their numbers are far greater than China’s nuclear
missiles, and the numbers are growing at a more rapid
pace. Their doctrine is far more offensively oriented,
as addressed below. Overall, China’s conventional
missile force is by far the most dynamic leg of the
Second Artillery. The PLA’s emerging conventional
missile strike capabilities have several implications for
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regional security and stability, irrespective of Beijing’s
initial intentions in acquiring them.
Conventional missile doctrine and capabilities
are also converging, albeit in a different manner than
that of the nuclear forces. The doctrine-capabilities
relationship with regard to conventional missile
forces is highly dynamic because both aspects are
simultaneously evolving. Beginning in the mid-1990s,
the Second Artillery’s acquisition of conventional
missiles outpaced the development of a corresponding
doctrine for close to a decade; the completion of a
comprehensive doctrine for conventional missile strikes
may have been finalized in recent years—or it may not
be complete yet. Doctrine lagged behind force structure
capabilities because the latter were developed on the
basis of technological availability and the leadership’s
search beginning in the mid-1990s for a quick and
relatively inexpensive way to threaten Taiwan and
thus deter actions to a formalize independence.
However, it now appears that capabilities may be
lagging doctrine. As the Second Artillery completes
development of its conventional missile doctrine, the
missiles themselves remain limited in their ability to
conduct the types of precision strikes called for by the
new doctrine. Therefore, rather than talking in terms
of a classic “doctrine-capabilities gap” in assessing the
Second Artillery’s conventional missile forces, it may
be more appropriate to talk in terms of a “doctrinecapabilities dialectic.” This latter characterization
may help readers better appreciate the dynamism and
evolving interrelationship between these two aspects
of the Second Artillery’s conventional leg.
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Conventional Missile Doctrine.
As with nuclear doctrine, there are two central
concerns in assessing PLA doctrine for conventional
missile operations: the doctrine’s institutional
development and its content as expressed in various
principles. One of the most striking results of my research
for this chapter is the finding that the development
of conventional missile doctrine is in a nascent stage
and thus potentially incomplete. In fact, according to
PLA sources, internal “theory development work” on
conventional missile operations is far from finished. A
PLA study in 2004 stated that “work has just begun”
and that “little to no work” has been completed on
a “basic system of military theory” for conventional
missile operations. This source notes that a Second
Artillery goal for the 10th FYP (2001-05) was to establish
the discipline of conventional missile theory research.38
The 2004 study stated,
The development of conventional missile theory has
just recently begun in earnest; little to no work has been
done in this theoretical research area. It is urgent that we
quickly fill in these research gaps. . . . In addition, the
units that are responsible for researching conventional
missile theory are not yet on a sound foundation; they
have insufficiently strong research abilities. This is also
a major factor inhibiting the development of Second
Artillery military theory.39

The expected completion of such work is 2010 (at the
end of the 11th FYP). At that point, the task will enter
the stages of “refinement and advancement,” which
are similar to the Second Artillery’s characterization of
the status of nuclear doctrine during the 10th FYP.
As a further indication of the nascent level of
doctrinal development for conventional missile strike
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operations, the following precursor studies had not
yet been completed as of 2004: Conventional Missile
Strategy; Conventional Missile Campaign; Conventional Missile Tactics; Conventional Missile Command;
Conventional Missile Equipment and Technology;
Conventional Missile Logistics; Conventional Missile
Systems and Organizations; Conventional Missile
Management; Conventional Missile Intelligence; and
Conventional Missile Targeting. The first six topics
(strategy, campaigns, tactics, command, military
hardware, and logistics) were noted as particularly
important and would receive top priority in doctrinal
development.40 Completion of these documents would
be highly indicative of a fully developed doctrine for
conventional missile operations.
Doctrinal Principles. Institutional weaknesses aside,
China’s professional military writings detail the
evolving roles and missions of the Second Artillery’s
conventional missile forces. The main operational
activity of these forces as discussed in PLA literature
is conducting “joint firepower attacks” (lianhe huoli
daji), which appear to be the basic unit of analysis in
conventional missile doctrine.41 Such joint firepower
attack” can support at least three types of joint
PLA campaigns: (1) firepower campaign (or other
independent campaigns), (2) island landing campaign,
and (3) blockade campaign.42 Thus, the Second
Artillery conventional missile forces, in contrast to its
nuclear ones, contribute to a joint campaign involving
coordination with other PLA services.
PLA publications identify six “main combat
operations” or applications for the Second Artillery’s
conventional missile forces: (1) deterrence combat;
(2) countermissile attacks; (3) blockade attacks; (4)
disturbance attacks; (5) mobile force combat; and (6)
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firepower combat.43 These six types of operations can
be employed, individually or collectively, in a variety
of PLA campaigns. The Science of Military Campaigns
details several of the “main tasks” of conventional
missile strikes, which further underscore the requisite
coordination with other PLA services:
• Conducting a combined ground campaign
together with the Army and the Air Force to
attack key enemy targets in deep areas.
• Supporting the Army, Navy, and Air Force in
conducting a sea blockade, an island blockade,
or a landing campaign—by attacking key enemy
targets such as naval bases, air force bases, and
C4I systems, and seizing local campaign control
over the sea and sky.
• Conducting a combined air attack campaign
together with the Air Force against enemy
airports, air defense systems, C4I systems, and
other key targets to seize local control over the
sky.
• Carrying out other special combat tasks when
needed.44
The dominant theme in these writings is the
offensive nature of conventional missile operations, that
is, conventional missiles are not just for deterrence and
retaliation. The PLA emphasizes using conventional
missiles to strike first, strike hard, strike precisely, and
strike rapidly. The aim of this approach is to “seize
the initiative” and quickly gain “campaign control”
in order to speed up the process of warfare leading to
the adversary’s quick capitulation. PLA writings state
that the goals of such attacks are to “smash or weaken
the enemy’s military strength, to politically shock the
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enemy, to shake the [enemy’s] willpower [to wage]
war, to check the escalation of war, and to speed up
the progress of war.”45 The conceptual importance
of preemption and striking critical targets to joint
firepower attacks is reflected in the PLA’s “guiding
ideology” for conventional missile operations—
“forestalling the enemy and striking with focus” (xianji
zhidi zhongdian tuji)—which is repeatedly stressed in
PLA publications.46
As an indication of the continued evolution of
conventional missile doctrine, Li Tilin, then-head of
the Second Artillery’s Command Academy, relied on
the phrase “three strikes and one resistance” (san da yi
kang) in outlining in 2004 the goals for the development
of China’s conventional missile force. Li’s phrase means
to “strike accurately, strike quickly, strike ferociously,
and mount a successful resistance.”47 Li Tilin explains
these elements as follows:
Strike accurately means carrying out a precise attack
against the enemy’s strategic points and vital links, and
quickly paralyzing the enemy’s operational system. The
significance of this approach lies in its ability to gain
the most operational interest at minimum cost, reduce
collateral damage, avoid falling into a state of diplomatic
passivity, and seize the initiative in the battle.
Strike quickly means that in the midst of the constantly
changing conditions of the battlefield—and the fleeting
moments when an opportunity for victory appears—one
must gather intelligence on the enemy’s position as soon
as possible, manage information in real time, organize
command and control with the highest efficiency, quickly
launch the attack, and go all out to apply sufficient
pressure to enemy forces within the shortest possible
time frame.
Strike ferociously means that one must meticulously select
key strategic targets; adopt a method such as convergent
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strikes, sustained attacks, or multi-wave attacks; fully
bring into play the superiority of ‘information plus
firepower’; and carry out sabotage operations, paralytic
strikes, and devastating attacks against the enemy.
Mounting a successful resistance means that in the
informationized warfare of the future, when countering
enemy attacks against key sectors of our command
and control system, we must utilize the survivability
and reconstitution capabilities of an informationized
command and control system, effectively counter soft
and hard casualties inflicted by the enemy, and maintain
the continuity and stability of command and control
without interruption.48

These terms can be expected to evolve toward greater
specificity as the PLA and Second Artillery complete
the process of formulating a complete doctrine for
conventional missile strike operations.
One large area that remains unclear is the range of
contingencies to which Second Artillery joint firepower
attacks could be utilized. Current PLA writings specify
the aims of joint firepower attacks and the three types
of joint campaigns to which they could contribute
(i.e., firepower, island landing, and blockade). Yet,
it is possible that “joint firepower attacks” could be
applied to new types of campaigns as PLA needs grow,
as the PLA improves its ability for joint multiservice
operations, and as the Second Artillery’s capabilities
for long-range precision strikes improve. This is an
area worth watching as conventional missile doctrine
is completed and then used to organize, equip, and
employ Second Artillery forces.
Conventional Missile Capabilities.
The Second Artillery’s conventional missile
capabilities appear to be receiving the lion’s share of
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the political and financial resources within the Second
Artillery. This force is large (compared to those of
regional militaries), rapidly growing, and increasingly
accurate and lethal with its armaments. The Second
Artillery is also diversifying its conventional
capabilities with the development and deployment of
new SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and land attack cruise
missiles (LACMs). In terms of its collective capabilities,
this missile force is clearly focused on acquiring the
capability for precision strike and preemption, as
called for in its doctrine. Thus, there is an impressive
consistency between existing doctrinal concepts and
ongoing force structure modernization.
Most of these capabilities have been developed
for employment during a Taiwan conflict, specifically
to deter and counter both Taiwan independence and
third-party involvement in such a conflict. Yet, as the
Second Artillery’s conventional leg grows, modernizes,
and diversifies, it will acquire capabilities that have
broader implications for U.S. security interests in Asia
and regional military balances. In particular, the Second
Artillery’s evolving conventional missile capabilities
raise the possibility of America’s eventual loss of its
operational sanctuary in the Western Pacific.49
China’s current conventional missile force structure
is dominated by two families of SRBMs and one type
of MRBM. China currently deploys the CSS-6/DF-15
SRBM (600 km/500 kg) and the CSS-7/DF-11 (300 km/
500kg), most of which are garrisoned opposite Taiwan.
Both classes of SRBMs use solid fuel and are roadmobile; both also have variants possessing improved
accuracy and greater ranges. In terms of MRBMs, China
has developed a conventional version of the CSS-5/
DF-21 missile, which previously was deployed only
with a nuclear warhead. This conventional missile,
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reportedly known as the DF-21C, has a range of 17702500 km and is gradually replacing the liquid-fuel DF3A as it is phased out of service.50
The most pronounced feature of China’s conventional missile forces is the sheer rate of growth of its
SRBM force. Beginning in 1995, the total CSS-6 and
CSS-7 force grew from 30-50 missiles to well over 900
by 2007. The average annual growth rate increased
from 50/year in the late-1990s to roughly 100/year
by 2004. In 2006, the rate of expansion grew to over
100/year. These trends are detailed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Growth in China’s SRBM Force
(Average Numbers).
These quantitative trends are matched by qualitative
ones. China has developed new variants of both the
CSS-6 and CSS-7 with improved range, accuracy, and
lethality. China can use these newer variants to strike a
broader range of regional targets. For example, a CSS-6
variant can now reach U.S. airbases on Okinawa when
forward-deployed near China’s eastern coastline. These
variants importantly provide the Second Artillery
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with a true precision-strike capability, which the firstgeneration CSS-6s and CSS-7s lacked. China has been
actively using both terminal homing technologies and
satellite-assisted navigation to improve the accuracy
of these classes of missiles. China supplements the
CSS-6 and CSS-7 onboard guidance systems with
global positioning systems (GPS) and indigenous
satellite navigation technologies to archive circular
error probable (CEP) accuracies reportedly below 50
meters. China is also being assisted by Russia with the
application of its GLONASS GPS system to missile
guidance and control systems. China’s collective access
to the trinity of U.S. GPS, GLONASS, and its own
satellite systems (like BeiDou) may further improve
missile accuracies over time.51
China is also developing new conventional IRBMs,
MRBMs, and LACMs.52 These new missile systems,
if eventually deployed, offer numerous advantages
over existing SRBMs, suggesting that they could
become a new focus of Second Artillery procurement
and operations in the coming years. First, and most
basically, these capabilities will help the PLA conduct
precision strikes against a broader range of landbased and, possibly, sea-based targets. China could
use IRBMs, MRBMs, and LACMs to target—with
increased stand-off distances—foreign military assets
located far from the mainland, such as U.S. bases on
Guam. These new missile systems—depending on
their ultimate range, accuracy, and numbers—could
provide China with the capability to threaten all of
the U.S. operational sanctuaries in the Western Pacific,
further complicating U.S. power projection.
Second, IRBMs, MRBMs, and LACMs provide
China with multiple deployment options for attacking
targets it can already reach, such as those on Taiwan,
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Okinawa, and the Philippines. This provides the PLA
with greater operational flexibility. To strike such
targets, the Second Artillery missile launch sites would
no longer have to hug China’s coastline (as required
by existing SRBMs) and could operate with relative
impunity from inland provinces—potentially creating
an operational sanctuary for the PLA.
Third, such missile systems present far more
difficult interception targets for U.S. short-range
missile defense capabilities such as those deployed in
Taiwan and at U.S. airbases in Japan. IRBM and MRBM
reentry speeds are often too great for interception by
such point-defense systems. Therefore, China could
use an initial wave of MRBM and LACM strikes to
heavily degrade or even eliminate such missile defense
systems; this approach would help to ensure that
follow-on waves of SRBM strikes hit their targets with
maximum destructive effect.
Moreover, China is reportedly developing an
MRBM with a maritime strike capability to target a
U.S. aircraft carrier operating in the vicinity of Taiwan.
According to a 2006 U.S. Department of Defense report,
“One area of apparent investment involves the pursuit
of MRBMs, an extensive C4ISR system for geo-location
of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal
homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their
onshore support infrastructure.”53
China would have to overcome significant challenges related to locating, tracking, and targeting
U.S. naval vessels in order to acquire an effective
maritime strike capability. However, if developed, such
a capability would severely complicate the U.S. ability
to establish and maintain a 24-hour combat air patrol
over Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait during a conflict.
Research by retired U.S. Navy Admiral Eric McVaden
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provides details in China’s progress on developing
such a missile and its efforts to address the related
targeting challenges:
China is trying to move rapidly in developing ballistic
missiles that could hit ships at sea at MRBM ranges—in
other words, to threaten carriers beyond the range at
which they could engage Chinese forces or strike China.
Among its other advantages for China, this method of
attack avoids altogether the daunting prospect of having
to cope with the U.S. Navy submarine force—as antisubmarine warfare is a big Chinese weakness. . . .[The
Chinese are] working diligently to perfect the means
to locate and target our carrier strike groups (CSGs). In
that regard, an imperfect or rudimentary (fishing boats
with satellite phones) means of location and targeting
might be employed even earlier than the delay of several
more years likely needed to perfect more reliable and
consistent targeting of ships. Chinese missile specialists
are writing openly and convincingly of MIRV’d ballistic
missiles (missiles with maneuverable reentry vehicles)
that maneuver both to defeat defenses and to follow the
commands of seekers that spot the target ships. . . .54

An area of PLA modernization highly relevant to
the Second Artillery’s conventional capabilities is its
ability to locate, identify, track, and target an adversary;
such a capability directly contributes to greater missile
accuracy. This is a high priority for the PLA, which is
making substantial progress. According to the DOD’s
2006 report, “China has accorded building a modern
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
architecture a high priority in its comprehensive
military modernization, in particular the development
of advanced space-based C4ISR and targeting
capabilities.” China is taking a number of steps to
improve its [ISR], including using constellations of
satellites, unmanned aeronautical vehicles (UAVs),
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and special operations forces to gather targeting data
for long-range precision strikes. China’s development
of a robust and reliable C4ISR system will be a critical
link in acquiring the capacity for precision missile
strikes.55
Limitations of Conventional Missile Capabilities. Although the advances in Second Artillery conventional
missile capabilities have been steady and substantial,
the Second Artillery still faces operational constraints
on its ability to effectively carry out precision strikes
against a range of regional targets. Some PLA writings
have highlighted such limitations; many of these
stem from a lack of adequate C4ISR systems. It is not
clear how widely held these beliefs are within PLA
or Second Artillery circles, however. A 2004 article in
Junshi Xueshu argued that conventional missiles “have
their own flaws” and are not weapons with “do-it-all”
capabilities (baodatianxia).56 The article noted several
limitations of conventional missiles, as follows:
• “The preparation time for launching conventional [missiles] is lengthy and not suited for
instant surprise attacks after the campaign starts
. . . . They are only appropriate for surprise
attacks at the initial stage of a campaign.”
[Emphasis added.]
• “The launching of missiles is heavily affected
by natural conditions and thus [our] lack of [an]
all-weather launch capability. Conventional
[missile launches] must be conducted under
certain weather conditions or their precision
is compromised and may even lead to failure.
Furthermore, at this stage, our reconnaissance
and communication systems are underdeveloped and heavily affected by climate
factors. Terrain and climate factors also
175

need to be taken into consideration for troop
mobility and camouflage. Objectively speaking,
therefore, our conventional missile troops are
not yet equipped with all-weather operational
capabilities.”
• “The launch of conventional missiles is limited
by various logistics elements, and thus produces
less than ideal surprise attack results on certain
targets. Currently, we are unable to precisely
position the fixed spot targets or provide high
resolution target imaging. Consequently, it is
not appropriate to use conventional missiles to
attack those spot targets near sensitive areas,
such as residential areas, schools, and churches.
Concerning small moving targets, effectively
capturing, tracking, and providing instant
information for moving targets is a capability
that has not yet been established. Hence,
without guided warheads (mozhi daodan tou),
conventional missile attacks are unfit.”
• “Given their high costs, conventional missiles
are not suited for large-scale ‘blanket’ attacks.
Conventional missiles are manufactured with
the combination of highly advanced electronics
and mechanical technologies. Compared with
other weapons, they are rather costly. Therefore,
it is only sensible to deploy them based on
scientific selection rather than using them
as artillery or air bombings as one would in
‘blanket’ attacks.”
Assessing the Doctrine-Capabilities Nexus.
The above claims suggest several arguments about
the relationship between conventional missile doctrine
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and capabilities. First, there is a broad compatibility
between doctrine and capabilities in which both are
focused on giving the Second Artillery the capability
to rapidly and accurately strike a growing variety
of targets for the purposes of deterrence (of Taiwan
and the United States), escalation control, and
escalation dominance. These goals likely include
new applications of conventional missiles to missions
such as counteraircraft carrier operations. Yet, based
on the analysis above, there is little indication to date
that the Second Artillery’s conventional missile force
possesses broader regional missions. This force is
strongly preoccupied with Taiwan scenarios. For the
time being, the Second Artillery has its hands full
completing its doctrine and developing the requisite
panoply of conventional strike capabilities.
Second, the doctrine-capabilities relationship is
highly dynamic, with both elements steadily evolving.
It is not the case of capabilities catching up with
doctrine—as with China’s nuclear forces. Conventional
missile doctrine is just now becoming fully developed
as China continues to acquire a range of increasingly
precise conventional missiles and related ISR assets.
China’s conventional missile capabilities still face range
limitations. In this sense, force structure is growing into
congruence with the evolving doctrinal requirements
for conventional missile operations. Given their
uncertain future direction, the simultaneous evolution
of both doctrine and force structure is worthy of
continued attention.
Third, such trends have serious implications for
American military planners and U.S. regional security
interests. As China improves the range and accuracy
of its conventional missiles (especially MRBMs and
LACMs), the PLA will increasingly be able to hold at
risk in various ways a greater number of U.S. military
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assets in the Western Pacific, including possibly large
naval combatants on the high seas. This will further
complicate the U.S. ability to deploy and operate from
multiple locations in Asia because such forces could,
to a degree, become chronically vulnerable to Chinese
missile strikes. Thus the U.S. military might eventually
lose its operational sanctuaries in this part of the world.
In addition, China’s growing conventional missile
capabilities could threaten regional military balances.
The PLA may eventually possess the capability for conventional counterforce strikes on numerous regional
states flowing from to the preemptive and coercive
options inherent in China’s possession of precision
SRBMs, MRBMs, and LACMs. Such capabilities could
be used to facilitate coercive diplomacy or contribute to
adoption of a broader sea control strategy beyond the
waters surrounding Taiwan and China’s immediate
periphery.
NEW MISSIONS FOR THE SECOND ARTILLERY?
Beyond missiles, the Second Artillery could
diversify into new areas of military activity related to
other strategic capabilities. The Second Artillery could
assume responsibility for China’s antisatellite (ASAT)
weapons, its computer network attack capabilities,
or radio frequency (RF) and laser weapons. China is
actively acquiring the former two types of weapons.
Such capabilities, if inherited by the Second Artillery,
would create a PLA branch having a mandate similar
to that of the U.S. Strategic Command. To be sure,
such an expansion of the Second Artillery’s missions
remains decidedly uncertain. Such capabilities remain
under development and no part of the PLA has yet
been given responsibility for them.
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Regardless of whether the Second Artillery
eventually gains control of such assets, there are
multiple indications that China is working on acquiring
a range of such strategic capabilities. In January 2007,
China conducted its first successful test of a direct
ascent ASAT weapon; it used a ballistic missile with a
kinetic kill vehicle to destroy an old Chinese weather
satellite stationed in low-earth orbit. News media
reports indicated that this test was one of many in
the PLA’s ASAT development program.57 According
to the Pentagon’s 2006 report on Chinese military
power, China has initiated a “major effort” to develop
RF weapons including high-power radio frequency
sources, prime power generators, and antennas to
radiate RF pulses. These weapons could be used to
incapacitate guided missiles, C4ISR assets, computer
networks, and even carrier battle groups. Also, the
Pentagon report noted that China will eventually
possess the technological capability to produce lowand high-energy lasers, given its commercial work in
these areas; these technologies could be weaponized
in the future if the PLA so decided. Finally, the
PLA clearly sees information warfare and offensive
computer network operations as critical to “seizing the
initiative” in a crisis. It has been devoting significant
resources to developing such capabilities, including
development of specialized units and their integration
into military exercises.58
Such new missions, however, would also create an
organizational burden for a Second Artillery that is
already redesigning its command structures to better
manage its larger and more sophisticated nuclear and
conventional missile forces. The command and control
demands of mobile nuclear forces, in particular SSBNs,
are both new and onerous. Any future control of China’s
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ASAT, RF, laser, and information warfare capabilities
by the Second Artillery would serve as an important
indication of its evolving role within the PLA as well
as the broader ambitions of the PLA itself.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE SECOND
ARTILLERY ROLES AND MISSIONS
In returning to the original mandate of this volume,
the preceding analysis suggests several conclusions
about the future direction of the Second Artillery. At
present, there is a broad degree of congruency between
doctrine and capabilities within the Second Artillery’s
nuclear and conventional forces. While the relationship
between doctrine and capabilities in these two legs of
the Second Artillery is decidedly different, the degree of
overall compatibility suggests that the Second Artillery
remains focused on existing missions as expressed
in its current doctrine. At a minimum, the Second
Artillery is still in the process of acquiring nuclear
and conventional missile capabilities to meet existing
doctrinal requirements. This process may include new
applications of emerging capabilities, but within the
context of existing missions. To be sure, there appears
to be greater room for doctrinal evolution or “mission
creep” within the Second Artillery’s conventional
forces than within its nuclear forces.
The Second Artillery’s nuclear missile forces and
related capabilities are trying to catch up rapidly with
an increasingly explicit strategy and doctrine premised
on using nuclear weapons to deter nuclear aggression
and to preclude nuclear coercion. With the imminent
deployment of the DF-31 and the looming deployment
of a real sea-based nuclear retaliatory capability,
China will have substantially reduced its vulnerability

180

and upgraded the quality of its nuclear deterrent.
Substantial improvements in ballistic missile early
warning and nuclear command and control would
contribute materially to accomplishing these goals. It
is highly significant that even as China confronts an
increasingly complex nuclear threat environment,
neither its nuclear doctrine nor its nuclear force structure
has radically changed. Rather, the PLA has responded
by developing new missile systems (with better
accuracy, survivability, and penetrability) in order to
hold at risk a greater variety of regional targets. These
actions will inject a degree of flexibility into China’s
retaliatory options so as to bolster the overall credibility
of its deterrent. In other words, capabilities are being
acquired within existing doctrinal requirements.
There are few indications to date that the PLA plans
to move beyond the acquired wisdom and principles
comprising China’s nuclear strategy and doctrine. This
is not to say that the future will resist such changes,
but rather that several ideological, institutional, and
technological constraints persist.
The Second Artillery’s conventional missile forces
are its most dynamic leg. Both doctrine and force
structure are readily evolving. The PLA may just now be
completing a comprehensive doctrine for conventional
missile strike operations, though for at least the last 5
years the missions for such weapons have been fairly
evident. The evolution of conventional missile doctrine
bears watching. Joint firepower attacks could become
relevant to a range of regional campaigns lying beyond
the existing doctrinal focus on a Taiwan contingency. In
terms of capabilities, the Second Artillery is deploying
increasingly sophisticated SRBMs for launching
precision strikes around the mainland’s immediate
periphery and is procuring LACMs and MRBMs to

181

provide greater operational flexibility, potentially
including maritime strikes.
China’s acquisition of these latter capabilities bears
the closest watching. Given that both conventional
missile doctrine and capabilities are evolving at
the same time, the potential exists for the PLA to
contemplate using increasingly precise, accurate, and
lethal LACMs and MRBMs for regional missions lying
outside the boundaries of a Taiwan contingency. A
mutually reinforcing dynamic could emerge in which
new capabilities enable more coercive missions or a
broader geographic application of existing missions.
This could include using such strike capabilities for
anti-access missions in areas other than the Taiwan
Strait or missions to facilitate coercive diplomacy
for resolving off-shore territorial disputes. Such
developments would have serious implications for U.S.
force projection in the Western Pacific, the security of
U.S. allies and security partners, and regional stability
in the Asia-Pacific.
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CHAPTER 5
PLA COMMAND, CONTROL, AND TARGETING
ARCHITECTURES: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
AND WARFIGHTING APPLICATIONS
Larry M. Wortzel
This chapter examines contemporary Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military publications,
military literature, reports on exercises, and equipment
to determine how the PLA is incorporating new
information technology in its force and how the
technology will be integrated into China’s warfighting
architecture. I find that at the intellectual level, the
PLA understands the way technology has driven
a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) affecting
how commanders organize forces and how those
forces coordinate on the battlefield. I argue that, for
the most part, PLA military theorists are learning to
apply technology to war by watching how the U.S.
armed forces have experimented with technology and
performed in combat.
Senior PLA leaders and military strategists consider
the United States to be the most advanced military force
on which to model their own military development.
They also see the United States as the most advanced
and likely potential enemy; to counter this enemy, they
may need to employ the latest means of command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). In the view
of many in the PLA, it is the demonstrable power of
the United States, and their concern that the United
States has the potential to use that power to coerce or
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dominate China and its interests, that requires the PLA
to follow U.S. military developments more carefully
than those of other nations. The White Paper on National
Defense released by China’s State Council in December
2006 acknowledges that “a revolution in military affairs
is developing in depth worldwide,” noting also that
“military competition based on ‘informationalization’
is intensifying.”1 “Hegemonism and power politics”
are seen as intensifying, a code phrase often used
as an indirect way to characterize the United States.
In response to these concerns, the authors express
the belief that the PLA must be prepared to fight or
counter American forces. Senior leaders and military
strategists have developed both theory and doctrine
for the employment of information warfare concepts
by the PLA. More importantly, China’s military forces
have developed a networked warfare architecture that
is effective on a limited scale.
The long-term goal of the PLA is to create a more
modern force that can challenge (or deter) the best
military forces in the world.2 Therefore, PLA military
thinkers use the United States as the model for the force
they must train to counter. However, China’s military
today is still not a uniformly high-technology force. A
number of systems are able to work at sophisticated
levels, but across the spectrum of its military systems,
the PLA cannot field or operate a fully digitized
force. The PLA understands and is working to apply
“network-centric warfare” concepts, but lacks a
comprehensive set of data transfer systems necessary
to field and maintain a modern force that employs
these concepts in warfare in a uniform way. It may be
2 to 5 years until, in the Asia-Pacific region, the PLA
achieves anything close to the level of networking that
U.S. forces can apply globally today.3
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PLA military theorists are convinced that to
be successful in battle in the information age, any
commander must be able to use integrated C4ISR
systems.4 In the theoretical realm and in doctrine
development, the PLA has been aggressive and
quite successful in grasping the RMA. Senior PLA
leaders do more than merely discuss information
operations, they incorporate them in force-on-force
field exercises.5 New purchases of equipment from
Russia and technology from Europe are part of a
limited warfighting architecture that depends on
C4ISR technology. Moreover, they are applying the
technologies and weapon systems to platforms that
may be decades old.
As the PLA studies aspects of network-centric
warfare and the C4ISR systems that such warfare
requires, its theorists see the U.S. armed forces as
“the gold standard” on how to apply information
technologies and automated electronic data exchange
to war.6 The major works on the subject in PLA
military literature are drawn from American military
manuals or scholarship on modern war. There are no
explicit calls from senior Chinese leaders to prepare for
war against the United States, but it is clear that the
PLA sees American forces as presenting the greatest
challenge China’s military could face.
Perhaps the most authoritative long-term guidance
to the PLA on the subject of C4ISR and networked
warfighting architectures is from General Zhang
Wannian. He tells the PLA that “command and
control systems must be ‘networked’ to increase the
effectiveness of combat units . . . which will naturally
be accompanied by a reduction in the number of layers
of command and control.”7 Zhang was chief of the
General Staff Department of the PLA from 1992 to 1995
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and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
(CMC) after that. While he was CMC vice chairman,
he edited the treatise China’s National Defense and
Contemporary World Military Affairs, published by the
PLA Academy of Military Science. General Zhang,
citing the experience of the U.S. armed forces, says that
the process of digitization and networking reduced
the number of layers of higher command from five
to three in American command and control practice.
He predicts that the PLA can expect similar results to
produce a “comprehensive system of networked forces
and command and control.”8
Some of the PLA literature is not altogether realistic
about what changes digitization and information
technology will produce in the conduct of war. One
author, a veteran of the fighting on the Sino-Vietnam
border, believes that creating a high-technology force
able to engage in sophisticated information operations
has the potential to make warfare “more limited, less
bloody, and less destructive.”9 The examples he uses
are from the war in Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia.
Writing in 1997, however, the author clearly did not
foresee the way that urban guerrilla operations,
improvised explosive devices, and suicide attacks
tend to negate the blood-sparing potential of high-tech
systems through the killing and maiming of so many
troops and civilians. In a similar idealistic assessment,
a PLA armor officer opined that “electronic warfare
operations can be conducted without violating another
country’s sovereignty”; therefore, he believes that any
enemy response is likely to be in kind.10 This armor
officer clearly has not spent much time thinking about
kinetic responses to information or electronic attacks.
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THE U.S. MILITARY AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON CHINA’S C4ISR PROGRAMS
The PLA follows foreign military developments
closely, paying special attention to what is going on
in the United States. The lessons of the Falklands War,
the first Gulf War, and Kosovo awakened China’s
military theorists to what technology does in the realm
of war, as did American debates about the RMA and
information warfare.11 The performance of American
forces also convinced the PLA that if it had to confront
the United States, it faces a formidable enemy. General
Zhang Wannian, then chief of the General Staff
Department of the PLA, argued that “modern limited
warfare under high-technology conditions is conducted
under a cloud of a threat of becoming a nuclear war”
and that China must therefore pay special attention to
the great nuclear powers.12 In a discussion of the first
Gulf War, he suggests that the “forces of hegemony in
the world will use nuclear weapons to dominate other
nations,” a clear reference to the United States as a
potential enemy. Moreover, Zhang suggests that the
United States is of special interest to the PLA because
China’s nuclear weapons can be used to “deter moves
to split the sovereign state,” a reference to Taiwan.13
Therefore, it is the power of the United States, and
the potential to use that power to coerce or dominate
China and its interests, that requires the PLA to follow
U.S. military developments more carefully than those
of other nations.
One of the most respected PLA strategists and
leaders, Lieutenant General Li Jijun, makes it clear
why the PLA spends so much of its efforts preparing
its forces to confront the United States. Li commanded
a Group Army in Manchuria and was responsible
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for the ground warfare experiment that validated
combined arms group armies in the PLA. Later he was
the director of Deng Xiaoping’s military office. In his
evaluation of contemporary world security threats,
General Li Jijun sees the major problem facing China
as being “large countries” that create “threat theories,
including the countries that espouse the ‘China threat
theory’.”14 This is a clear, albeit indirect, reference to
the United States as the nation with the most capability
to threaten China because of its policies, its military
power, and its alliances.
Li draws historical parallels between England in
the Napoleonic age and the United States today. He
says,
like England (in the Napoleonic age), the U.S. is the
world’s strongest power; the United States has the
greatest number of international interests and “colonial”
[-like] relationships; U.S. military power is dispersed
widely throughout the world; the wide range of interests
and military deployments mean that U.S. forces are overcommitted and stretched thin; and there is a great need
to work with allies and coalition partners to achieve
security goals.15

Major General Wang Baocun of the Academy of
Military Science summarized his view of the United
States this way:
The new military transformation has led to the rise of
a United States possessed of overwhelmingly dominant
military might. The United States is also an arrogant
country with strong ambitions for hegemonism. The
United States will take advantage of its absolute
superiority in supreme military might in order to pursue
power politics and hegemonism, seek to maintain its
position as the world’s only superpower, and slow down
the process of multipolarization for the world’s strategic
structure.16
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Views of this type seem to represent official policy
at the highest levels in China. The 2006 White Paper on
National Defense complains that “a small number of
countries . . . have intensified their military alliances
and resorted to force or threats.” The same paper
expresses concern that Japan and the United States
“are strengthening their military alliance in pursuit
of operational integration,” and that “hegemonism
and power politics remain key factors undermining
international security.” These views, which put the
United States and its alliances at the center of China’s
threat perceptions, fuel the PLA’s efforts to build a
modern, information-based, digitized military force.
Indeed, even if the PLA did not envision seeking
a direct confrontation with the United States, an
awareness that the two countries could clash in the
event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is enough to drive
PLA modernization. The general tendency in Chinese
security thinking to be prepared in the event that a
larger power seeks to coerce or dominate China also
flows from this sort of analysis. Such concerns drive
the PLA to modernize itself.
PLA researchers are quite aware of the data links
that support combat systems for the U.S. military,
and they have created a catalogue of the knowledge
necessary to replicate, counter, or attack them. Two
PLA Air Force authors, Sun Yiming and Yang Liping,
have built a virtual roadmap for attacking joint U.S.
data control systems and communications. They have
carefully consulted dozens of corporate websites and
tactical data link operator guides, as well as North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. military
tactical and technical manuals, to produce a guidebook
for electronic warfare and jamming to disrupt critical
U.S. cooperative target engagement and C4ISR data
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links. Moreover, the two authors have produced other
books and manuals on how to disrupt tactical- and
campaign-level missile operations and U.S. electronic
systems.17
In a PLA National Defense University text on
nuclear warfare and nuclear strategy, researcher Wang
Zhongquan notes that strategic command and control
networks “have multiple uses and systemic effects.”18
Such networks, Wang concludes, “can contribute to
command and control systems, strategic warning
systems, and intelligence organizations when linked
together in a network. The parts of a network of this type
include defense communications networks, satellite
communications systems, national military command
and control networks, and networks of strategic or
regional command and control centers.”19 Wang goes
on in the book to provide a sophisticated analysis of the
U.S. strategic warning system and nuclear command
and control network based on a review of published
literature in the United States.20
This subject as seen through Western eyes is
relevant here. The U.S. effort to “harness the revolution
in military affairs” was a way to take advantage of
“technological leaps in surveillance, command and
control, and longer range precision guided munitions”
in order to make joint military forces more effective in
war.21 The RMA required the United States to explore
a range of force structure issues and changes that
revolve around advances in technology and weapons
requiring
“information-empowered,
dominantly
knowledgeable forces” that fight in “flattened, less
hierarchical organizations.”22 The U.S. Navy may well
have led the way in linking C4ISR with the concept of
“timely, sensor-to-shooter information direct to the
warfighter.”23 All the services caught on, however,
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in an effort to link command and control systems,
information technologies, dissemination systems, and
space assets to “strike targets with an accuracy of feet
from standoff distances.”24
These efforts were not lost on the PLA. One PLA
Academy of Military Science researcher expressed the
view that to engage in modern war the PLA must be
able to “attack the enemy’s knowledge systems and
such high value targets as communications, carrier
battle groups, and aviation warfare units.”25 The goal
set for the PLA by this researcher was to “destroy the
enemy’s ability to fight and control war.”26 Moreover,
the PLA’s information warfare battle doctrine was
largely drawn from U.S. manuals, such as U.S. Army
Field Manual 100-6, Information Warfare Doctrine.27
PLA generals working on military transformation
have mined the literature and experience of Western
military forces for ideas on incorporating information
technology into military doctrine and how to build
forces that can function in the information age.28 In
fact, in an interview with a Liaowang reporter, one
military analyst, Major General Zhang Ling, expressed
the view that “informationized war of the future will
be second only to nuclear war in terms of firepower”
when modern weapons are linked to technology.29
Addressing how the RMA has affected warfare, Li
Bingyan, a major general on the editorial staff of the
PLA’s newpaper, Jiefangjun Bao, pointed out in a recent
book that new forms of warfare involve more than
massing troops or massing fires against an enemy.
Instead, the introduction of high-technology warfare
means that to wage modern war, the PLA must be able
to “use precision guided missiles” instead of massing
traditional fires, and also be able “to use viruses to
attack enemy computer systems, and to carry out
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electronic warfare to attack enemy command and
control systems.”30 A significant focus of Li’s book is to
encourage PLA officers to think in terms of traditional
Chinese strategies and classics of military theory, such
as The Romance of the Three Kingdoms and The Thirty-Six
Stratagems, but Li encourages them to apply the lessons
from the Chinese classics to the modern battlefield.31
Thus, any Western military force facing the PLA must
be prepared for adapted applications of technology,
somewhat different from those they might expect from
a contemporary Western armed force.32
THE PLA AND C4ISR IN MODERN WAR
Military theory in China focuses on warfare across
a battlefield of five dimensions, or “domains” (or
“realms”) of war, as they are called in PLA military literature. These five dimensions are land, sea (including
undersea), air, space, and the electromagnetic
spectrum (some authors refer to the “information
realm or domain” instead of the electromagnetic
spectrum).33 PLA military science experts believe that
new technology and the development of automated
systems have made strategic cues and warning,
intelligence, communications, and command and
control more critical in all of these dimensions of
warfare.34 Moreover, PLA authors express the view
that “information age warfare has broken down the
traditional levels and structure of command.”35 Some
believe that “military forces must structure themselves
around the latent capacities of information.”36 Senior
American officers, like Admirals William Owens and
Jeremy Boorda, also concluded a few years earlier that
the RMA and information systems would generate a
restructuring of forces.
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Among the “domains” of war, the PLA particularly
emphasizes space, with some strategists arguing that the
PLA must be ready to conduct warfare in that domain.
One of the PLA officers interviewed in the Liaowang
article cited earlier in this chapter, Major General Zhang
Ling, expressed the belief that “control of space will
be of tremendous significance in future information
warfare [with] the primary combat operation in future
war [being] the struggle for space control.”37 Zhang
opined that militaries will engage in “soft strikes”
against space-based information systems to neutralize
enemy satellites and “hard” strikes to destroy enemy
space systems with anti-satellite weapons.38 Addressing
rules of engagement in space, he was clear that in space
warfare over 120 kilometers above the earth’s surface,
there are no restrictions related to national sovereignty
on military combat operations. Two researchers, Song
Yongxin and Guo Yizhing, make similar points in
an aeronautics electronics countermeasures journal
published in Nanjing. They argue that warfare in space
will be part of the information warfare battlefield and
that “whoever controls space will have the initiative in
war.”39
Senior PLA officers take a view toward the effects
of the RMA on a military’s force structure similar to
that of American military thinkers such as Owens and
Thomas Mahnken. Owens and Mahnken believed that
the RMA and the advances in C4ISR would have a
radical effect on force structure and warfare, changing
organizational structures and even modes of war.
Despite the emphasis on automation and electronic
systems, however, PLA writers still believe there must
be a “man-in-the-loop” in information age warfare
with a “strong will and a clear mind” because even
“advanced computer systems are no substitute for the
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strength of the human brain.”40 However, the discussion
of the importance of human control and decisions does
not explain exactly what that means and how military
planning will integrate the “man in the loop” in modern
war. There is no explicit recognition that automation
will speed engagement decisions. In any event, it is
unlikely that the PLA will ever opt for permissive
automated action links in place of redundant human
systems in making firing decisions.
In an interview with a correspondent from
Qingnian Cankao, Major General Li Deyi of the
Academy of Military Science stated firmly,” “It would
be inconceivable [today] if a commander in the PLA
did not know how to operate a command automation
system.”41 But Li opined that the PLA had fallen behind
both Russia and the United States in developing
an automated command and control system, with
the current system being “plagued by inadequate
integration and coordination, as well as incompatible
[foreign] imports.”42 The PLA therefore understands
its problems and envisions eventually correcting them
with indigenous systems.
Xin Qin, in his book, Warfare in the Information Age,
argues that the side with the most comprehensive
command and control system in a modern war will
also have the strongest maneuver capability and be
able to concentrate the greatest combat strength against
the enemy.43 According to Xin, good command and
control systems, including sound communications,
facilitate maneuver and thus the capability of a nation’s
military forces to exploit the strengths of mobility and
weapon systems in war. This is not a new concept for
the PLA. In a 1994 book on information warfare, PLA
authors argued that “information technology is the
core connecting link for high-technology command
and control.”44
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In exercises, PLA commanders challenge their staffs
through simulations of extended periods of combat.
In one exercise scenario, they intentionally created a
“highly informationized” Blue Force that overwhelmed
a PLA Red Force operating at a C4ISR disadvantage.45
The exercise was designed to demonstrate to a PLA
division (the Red Force) the advantageous effect of
sophisticated reconnaissance and networked command
and control systems. These networked systems
supported a Blue Force long-range precision strike on
the Red Force. The exercise scenario timed the effects
of the strike to disrupt the Red Force in its assembly
areas as they were forming for maneuver operations.46
The exercise planners included scenarios of imitative
communications deception (e.g., fraudulently joining
the enemy’s net) and jamming as part of electronic
warfare play to confuse Red Forces. Senior PLA leaders
were able to demonstrate to subordinate leaders
and troops the disadvantages under which the PLA
operates in facing a sophisticated enemy with advanced
C4ISR systems. The effort reportedly convinced junior
PLA leaders and staff officers of the need to field and
master such systems for use at the divisional level of
combat.47
Moreover, at the highest levels of the PLA, senior
officers understand that to increase the effectiveness of
combat units, the Chinese military must digitize and
network its command and control systems.48 A decade
ago, Zhang Wannian emphasized the importance of
decisive action in warfare, aided by C4ISR systems
that could locate the enemy, control attacks on that
enemy, and ascertain the effectiveness of those
attacks.49 The speeches of various PLA leaders at the
All-PLA Military Training Conference in June 2006
reflect this broad understanding of the way that C4ISR
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and information systems affect the battlefield. Jinan
Military Region (MR) commander Lieutenant General
Fan Changlun made the point that an integrated
combat capability requires scientific and technical
training, the aim of which should be winning a war.
He stressed “informationization, real war simulation,
and field training” as the focus of the MR’s training
efforts.50 Zhu Wenquan, commander of the Nanjing
MR, also discussed the importance of networked
training systems, information systems, and electronic
databases in creating a modern military force.51
Layers of Command and Control.
The PLA as an institution is relatively flexible in
layering its command and control structure. Many of its
elements still reflect back on the doctrine of “people’s
war.” For example, contemporary military command
and control systems routinely involve political,
government, and Communist Party organizations
inside the fronts or military regions in the command
group organization.52 The structure of a “command
and control joint campaign warfighting coordination
organization,” however, varies according to the
“objectives of the campaign, the scale of the campaign,
and the actual conditions on the battlefield.”53
Command and control structures, therefore, are both
pre-planned and task-organized when needed.
The “supreme command headquarters” (tongshuaibu) is the joint command and control organization
for a campaign.54 This level of headquarters may be at
the MR or war front level in a single-front or MR war.
However, a higher headquarters may be established
on the decision of the General Staff Department and
CMC for a large-scale war of two or more fronts.55 The
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command and control structure and task organization
are laid out reasonably well in Xue Xinglin’s A
Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory. The “supreme
command headquarters” includes command group
representatives from the CMC, the General Staff
Department and other General Departments, the PLA
Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery. It is a
“higher command headquarters with great power and
responsibilities.”56
The next echelon of command and control down
from the Tongshuaibu is the “War Zone” or “frontal”
joint command and control organization. In cases where
a campaign is limited to a single war zone or front and
the forces assigned to the front are sufficient for the
campaign, then the military and political leadership in
the war zone will form the War Zone Joint Warfighting
Command and Control Organization Headquarters.
The commander of the war front can draw from local
political, military, and Communist Party organizations.
This headquarters “executes orders from the higher
supreme command headquarters, the Central Military
Commission, and the General Staff Department.”57
As a third echelon of command and control, in
large-scale operations, the PLA may form Army
Groups that include more than one Group Army and
command groups from the PLA Air Force, Navy, and
Second Artillery. In a major front on a large scale, there
may be two or more Army Groups subordinate to a
war zone headquarters. Representatives from the local
political, military, and Communist Party organizations
needed to support the Army Group would be assigned
to this level of headquarters as well.
Headquarters at all levels may include representatives from other control centers, and, as needed, the
PLA may task organize the main command and control
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center, an alternate command and control center, a
forward command center, and rear area command
centers for logistics purposes.58 All of these command
centers could include local political, military, and
civil defense representatives, Communist Party
representatives, and representatives from other PLA
arms and services. The propensity to draw on the local
populace and use personnel from local universities
demonstrates the continued tradition of employing
certain vestiges of people’s war on the informationized
battlefield.
This structure has been implemented in the past at
the levels described. For the 1979 attack on Vietnam,
the PLA established a major supreme command
headquarters at Duyun that included a forward
command element from the General Staff Department
and the CMC. It controlled two war zones, one centered
in the east on Guangzhou MR and one in the west
that included forces from the Kunming and Chengdu
MRs.
For the purposes of this chapter, several points
bear emphasis. First, the inclusion of local forces and
local political and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
organizations means that concepts of “people’s war”
still have a place in PLA doctrine. Second, the PLA is
very flexible in task organizing. A frontal headquarters
commander in a war zone can draw from educational
institutions, reserve units, towns, or industries in the
zone as required for the support of his forces.59 In
addition, at least the conventional and short-range
missile forces of the Second Artillery are included in the
structure. Whether they have any nuclear weapons with
them is not clear, and how this command and control
structure relates to Second Artillery firing orders needs
more research. In any case, it is not known whether
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the Second Artillery or CMC cell or representative
in a military region or frontal headquarters has the
authority to approve or countermand firing orders.
Nor is it clear how free a frontal commander may be
to initiate a firing order for Second Artillery units in
the war zone. In Jiefangjun Bao, articles have referred to
the PLA Navy headquarters as the Navy’s tongshuaibu,
thus reinforcing the possibility that operational firing
orders at frontal or military region level could come
from the local commander.60
Nuclear Command and Control.
Despite the lack of clear definition on the degree of
control exercised by frontal commanders over assigned
Second Artillery firing orders, a number of PLA
sources make it clear that command and control for
missile forces is highly centralized. Two PLA officers
addressing strategic systems in the book, Missile Combat
in High-technology Warfare, describe Second Artillery
command and control this way: “The nodes in a ballistic
missile command and control network are (1) the
commander in chief [or supreme command authority]
(tongshuaibu),61 (2) the command organizations of
the military departments, (3) the missile bases, and
(4) the firing units.”62 Furthermore, they emphasize
that “where it concerns strategic missiles, the ability
of the supreme command authority to control firing
orders must be executed quickly, and firing orders
must be encrypted (encoded).”63 Finally, PLA manuals
specify that “the war positions of the Second Artillery
are established by the supreme command authority
(tongshuaibu) in peacetime and are dispersed over a
wide area for strategic reasons.”64
On the 40th anniversary of the founding of the
Second Artillery, Hu Jintao spoke to an assemblage of
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people that included Xiang Shouzhi, first commander
of the organization, and a number of previous leaders.
Hu was present in the combined capacity of President
of China, Chairman of the CCP, and Chairman of the
Communist Party CMC.65 He wore a PLA uniform
without insignia or rank. In the account of Hu Jintao’s
speech published by Xinhua News Service, Hu is quoted
as saying that “the Second Artillery Corps is a strategic
force directly commanded and used by the Party Central
Committee and the Central Military Commission and is
our core force for strategic deterrence.”66 In the case of
strategic systems, it is clear that the supreme command
authority for the PLA is the CMC. 67
Second Artillery command orders are centralized,
encoded, and protected, and require human authentication. As we noted earlier, PLA military writers
do not endorse completely automated command and
control systems. The PLA’s preference for human
control of decisions and a “man in the loop,” even in
modern, information age warfare, comes out clearly in
the literature on the subject. The guiding mantra for
the Second Artillery is to “strictly protect counterattack
capability and concentrate [nuclear] fires to inflict
the most damage in the counterattack.”68 Authorities
emphasize that the Second Artillery’s strategic warning
system is closely tied to the General Staff Department,
and that the Second Artillery must continually keep
current an estimate of whether the enemy will use
other forms of weapons of mass destruction.69
NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
AND OFFENSIVE ACTION
At the theoretical level, at least, the PLA seems
to have grasped the implications of “a knowledge
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infrastructure for Network-Centric Warfare.”70 In
other words, China’s military leaders believe that
communications and electronic data exchange are the
core of an integrated warfighting capability. Researchers
at the PLA’s National Defense University of Science and
Technology in Changsha are clear that the evolution
of information technology and its incorporation into
weapons and strategies will make a networked military
force more effective. In arriving at their conclusions,
these researchers have drawn on writings by U.S. and
European scholars on web technology and computer
languages as well as U.S. Department of Defense
publications on network-centric warfare. They have
followed all of the published literature in the United
States on advanced warfighting experiments and battle
laboratories. Important questions remain, of course,
as to how deeply this theoretical knowledge has
penetrated into the PLA and how widely it is applied
across the PLA.
At other PLA academic institutions, sophisticated
efforts have been under way for some time to improve
joint operations and increase the effectiveness of
attacks on ground targets by air and naval forces.71
Two graduate students at the PLA Naval Engineering
Institute published a paper analyzing ways to apply
C4ISR systems in network-centric warfare more
effectively.72
Younger officers can be quite aggressive about the
potential for using C4ISR systems to improve the PLA’s
ability to wage offensive operations. One officer from
the Navy Command Academy is clear that “the Second
Artillery is the major factor in successfully attacking an
enemy naval battle group.”73 To accomplish such an
attack,
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the PLA must use all of its electronic warfare and
reconnaissance assets properly, must neutralize enemy
anti-missile systems and missile sensor systems, and
should use electronic jamming on the enemy fleet. Such
combined kinetic and electronic attacks help the PLA
attack an enemy fleet or naval base with a combination of
explosive, anti-radiation, and fake warheads to deceive
enemy radar and sensor systems and defeat a deployed
battle group or one in port.74

For some time, American naval officers have
dismissed the idea that China could conduct an attack
on a deployed naval battle group as being beyond the
grasp of the PLA. They reasoned that since China does
not have the space sensor systems to detect warships
at sea or the maneuvering warheads required to
execute such an attack, there was no credible threat
from China in this area. However, PLA officers seem
convinced that using ballistic missiles to attack naval
battle groups is a viable concept, and they obviously
are actively pursuing the capability.
Two officers from the Second Artillery Engineering
College have studied how to modify the trajectory
of a maneuverable warhead on its reentry into the
atmosphere to determine the effective range for attacking an enemy aircraft carrier with ballistic missiles.75
They conclude that providing terminal guidance will
allow up to 100 kilometers of maneuverability on
reentry during the terminal phase of a missile attack.
They believe that a carrier “cannot effectively escape
an attack within a short period of time.”76 Simulations
to predict how the final attack ranges against moving
targets at sea will affect maneuvering reentry vehicles
are also part of the research agenda for Second Artillery
engineering officers.77 They have concluded that since a
carrier battle group can project force out to about 2,500
kilometers, the PLA must reduce its missile warhead
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circular error probable (CEP) to attack maneuvering
targets at sea from outside the carrier’s strike range.
For a military force like the PLA, lacking a welldeveloped, long-reach naval air arm and newer air
platforms, this approach makes sense. Three PLA
officers from the Second Artillery Command Academy
advance the idea that “guided missile forces are the
trump card (sa shou jian) in achieving victory in limited
high-technology war.”78 The keys to achieving such
capabilities, in the argument of other PLA officers, lie
in three areas: the use of countermeasures, the ability
to achieve precision targeting, and the use of space
platforms to support the effort.79
Analogous concepts are getting serious consideration in the United States today. Senior officers of the
U.S. Strategic Command argue that the United States
needs a conventional intercontinental or intermediaterange, submarine-launched ballistic missile capable
of attacking terrorist or special weapons targets
accurately in response times as short as 60 minutes.80
This concept, called “precision global strike,” is treated
in the Bush administration’s nuclear posture review.
Proponents of the capability believe that such missiles
would be “uniquely capable” if the United States had
to attack promptly, i.e., within hours, of the start of
an approaching conflict. Moreover, they could launch
such speedy attacks anywhere while to accomplish
similar attacks with bombers or cruise missiles might
take hours or days.81 Therefore, for a nation like China,
possessing limited force-projection capabilities, no
aircraft carriers, limited air-to-air refueling, and a Navy
that is not yet fully capable of large-scale blue water
operations, the ballistic missile concept must truly look
like a “trump card.”
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Building Knowledge-Based Warfighting
Architectures.82
Military theory is a grand thing if it is captured in
doctrine that is assimilated by military forces and can
be effectively employed in battle. However, the mere
intellectual exploration of these capabilities is nothing
but smoke and mirrors if a military does not have the
forces, equipment, and systems to use the theory and
doctrine in battle. The PLA has those requisites, albeit
on a limited scale.
In general, the PLA is transforming itself into
a modern force able to take full advantage of C4ISR
technologies and the network-centric warfighting
concept. Given the state of affairs in 1996 when the
sudden appearance of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle
groups in the Western Pacific during the Taiwan
missile crisis embarrassed China’s senior political and
military leaders, the PLA has done remarkably well
in its modernization effort.83 There is a basic dataexchange and target-acquisition locating architecture
to support the PLA Navy and Air Force, even if the
platforms have limited range. There are national-level
and regional C4ISR networks, and the PLA will have a
near real-time regional intelligence collection capability
from space in a few short years, if it does not already
have it.
The PLA theater-level automated command and
control capability is embodied in the Qu Dian system.
It is a redundant, military region or frontal (war
front) system linking the General Staff Department
headquarters and the PLA’s arms and services with
regional combat headquarters and their subordinate
major organizations. However, the system requires
satellite data-exchange support and airborne radio and
communications relay.
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China’s first defense communications satellite, the
Fenghuo–1, was launched in January 2000. Originally
designated Zhongxing-22 (Chinasat-22), it provided Cband and ultra high frequency (UHF) communications
for the integrated military command, control,
communications, computer, and intelligence system
known as Qu Dian.84 China launched a second such
satellite in 2003.85 The Qu Dian system uses fiberoptic cable, high frequency and very high frequency
(VHF) communications, microwave systems, and
multiple satellites to enable the CMC, the General Staff
Department, and commanders to communicate with
forces in their theater of war (Zhan qu) on a real-time
or near real-time basis.86 The system also permits data
transfer among the headquarters and all the units under
its joint command.87 The system has been compared to
the U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
(JTIDS), a secure network used by the United States
and some allies.88
Discussing the potential threat posed to United
States forces by a functional tactical data, communications, and intelligence distribution system like Qu Dian,
Congressman Bob Schaffer of Colorado told the House
of Representatives:
Accurate ballistic missiles and the ability to observe U.S.
forces from space will give China the potential to attack
U.S. ships at sea and in port. Thus, capability is being
enhanced by China’s development of an integrated
command and control system called Qu Dian, which
relies on its Feng Huo-1 military communications satellite
launched on January 26, 2000. Qu Dian, considered
a major force multiplier, is similar to the U.S. Joint
Tactical Information Distribution System, or JTIDS, and
boasts a secure, jam-resistant, high capacity data-link
communications system for use in tactical combat.89
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Other PLA combat systems have a more limited
capability to act as an airborne command post and
assist with combat data exchange. The enhanced
Sukhoi Su-30MKK2 fighter under development for
China will improve long-range power-projection for
the PLA. According to Janes’s Defense Weekly, when
equipped with a sensor system including side-looking
airborne radar, the Su-30MKK2 will be capable of
“tasking and controlling up to 10 other aircraft on a
common [communications] net.”90 The model already
delivered to the PLA, the Su-30MKK, controls up to
four Su-27s and, like the more advanced model under
development, functions as an airborne command
and control system with data exchange to facilitate
cooperative targeting.91
Of course, the PLA already has an airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) built around
the Russian Beriev A-50.92 The Russian aircraft (with a
NATO reporting name “Mainstay”) is designated the
Kong Jing-2000 (KJ-2000) by China. It is equipped with
Chinese-made phased-array radar and has a data link
capability; a data processing system; friendly, hostile,
and unidentified Identification Friend-or-Foe system;
and a C3I capability. The KJ-2000 can exchange data
with other aircraft and naval ships equipped with
compatible data links. The aircraft loiter time on station,
however, is only about 90 minutes.
China’s own Y-8, a four-engine turboprop, will be
equipped with an Ericsson ERIEYE AWACS system,
increasing China’s airborne early warning and
command and control capabilities.93 The original Y-8
based AWACS system apparently relied on the French
firm, Thales, for its airborne early warning radars,
and incorporated British Racal technology.94 China
has several of these in its inventory, although one was
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apparently lost in a training accident earlier this year.
The PLA Air Force configured other special versions of
the Y-8 (along with the Tu-154) for signals intelligence
collection.95
The AWACS systems have been data-linked to the
F-8 Finback fighter, produced by the Shenyang aircraft
factory, and to the Zhi-9 helicopter. The Zhi-9 is a
Chinese version of the French Dauphin 2 Eurocopter,
the AS 365N, produced under license.96 In the case of the
Zhi-9, a data-link passes targeting information to shipbased helicopters, thus some of China’s indigenously
produced destroyers presumably also have a data-link
capability.97 These helicopters are standard equipment
on the Sovremenny destroyers and elsewhere.
The system also permits data and communications
transfer to at least some PLA Navy surface ships. In
fact, according to Jane’s Fighting Ships, the Sovremennys
are “the first Chinese warships to have a data systems
link,” which Jane’s analysts believe is a PRC version
of the NATO-designated Squeeze Box.98 They also have
the Band Stand data link for the C-802 antiship missile99
as well as a data link for the SS-N-22 Moskit supersonic
antiship missile.100 Certain other destroyers can take
advantage of these data links. For example, the Luda
Type-51 destroyers have been fitted with ThompsonCSF data link systems as well as Chinese developed
systems, as have the Luhai destroyers. These systems
will link with the Zhi-9 helicopters and the surface-tosurface missiles on the destroyers.
According to the Armed Forces Communications
Electronics Association (AFCEA) journal Signal,
China’s destroyers are all now capable of data
linking with AWACS systems, each other, their onboard helicopters, and their antiship missiles.101 The
Sovermenny Ka-25 helicopters are equipped with the
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A-346Z secure data link, and other Chinese ships have
the HN-900 data link, which incorporates other foreign
technologies.
The bad news for the United States and other
navies in Asia is that today, the PLA Navy’s Luhu,
Luhai, Luda, and Sovremenny destroyers are equipped
with systems that function like the U.S. data link
combat information transfer systems to support battle
management and coordinated strikes on time-sensitive
targets.102 Chinese destroyers and most Chinese frigates
have a system that works like the JTIDS, and they can
pass data for targeting to the Su-30MKK for over-thehorizon targeting and attack vectors.103 According to
an AFCEA analyst, in some areas the Chinese ships
are limited to “1940s era radar tasks of detecting and
tracking air and surface targets for their own ship
weapons.” However, the Chinese have managed to get
foreign technology, primarily from France and Russia,
that will allow integrated battle management and the
integration of sensors, ship guns, and missiles, as well
as data management of information from other ships
and aircraft.104
Space Support for C4ISR.
To reach and support deployed naval forces or air
forces at a distance from the coast, the Qu Dian system
needs a constellation of satellites, including tracking
and data-relay satellites, as do other intelligence collection systems and sensors in the PLA.105 Space, therefore,
is increasingly critical to the PLA for the conduct of war.
PLA headquarters can support deployed forces with
remote sensing from space and airborne platforms and
process “remotely captured images of the battlefield”
in real time.106
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Digitized military mapping is part of the space
architecture needed for these capabilities. Digitized
mapping supports all types of analysis, information
networks, and targeting. At present, China’s capability
in this area is nearly real-time, according to PLA Major
General Wang Xiaotong, writing in Guangming Ribao.107
Digital mapping also supports sophisticated combat
simulations. Although the PLA is apparently not yet
in a position to provide real-time battlefield mapping
and information, it is close to that point. PLA experts
expect that as new integrated “space-ground military
remote sensing survey and mapping technology”
comes on line, the military’s processing, handling, and
distribution “will be more automatic, more intelligent,
and more real-time.” Such improvements increase the
size of the battle area in which the PLA can operate,
and the PLA is indeed working to manage forces and
information in this new expanded battle space.108
Over the mainland and in close proximity to
China’s borders, the PLA already is able to provide
real-time support for joint military operations with
communications and data relay satellites. Indeed,
China’s military forces and command organs exercise
this capability. An article in Jiefangjun Bao details
exercises in the Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang,
and Beijing “war theaters” (zhanqu) using networked
forces supported by satellite communications.109 In
Guangzhou, an exercise reportedly relied on a satellitesupported C4ISR network and fiber-optic systems to
“integrate deployed military units in field locations and
fixed locations.” The Shenyang MR exercise described
in the Jiefangjun Bao article integrated reserve units and
regular PLA forces. To accomplish this, the Shenyang
MR Commander established communications networks with local military departments, transportation
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bureaus, and meteorological bureaus. During an
exercise in Chengdu MR, the “war zone” incorporated
the General Staff Department’s Communications
Academy in Chongqing to support satellite
communications requirements.
As noted earlier, to make its C4ISR network
operational on a real-time basis, China needs tracking
and data relay satellites. Space forces cannot function
in today’s combat environment without such an
architecture. The PLA can support manned space
activities, reconnaissance, and other military missions
with a common platform placed in geosynchronous
earth orbits. It is also possible that the PLA could
rely on mini or micro satellites and constellations of
relay satellites in low earth orbit for the same purpose.
However, the PRC is working on a satellite system, the
DJS-2, that will function like U.S. tracking and data
relay satellite systems. This satellite will have a lifetime
of about 15 years, likely operating in the Ku and C
bands, making it capable of relaying communications
and imagery data.110
The Dongfanghong-IV satellite, the product of a
project announced in 2001, will meet these requirements. With a 15-year life span, it has 50 communications transmitters and is capable of multiple loads of
large-capacity communications, data, and broadcast
relay.111 The Dongfanghong-IV was developed for
military and civilian use in a program directed by the
Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense (COSTIND).112 According to
China Defence Today, this satellite can “distribute
information to the lowest echelon in a battlefield,
potentially transmitting data (maps, pictures, and
enemy deployments) on demand to small units, each
using a . . . device to receive orders and situational
information.”113
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The first satellite for launch in this Dongfanghong-IV
series carries the commercial name, XinNuo-2. It was set
for launch in 2005 as part of a constellation of satellites,
but its launch was delayed.114 The capacity to launch a
constellation of small (mini or micro) satellites is also
within the capabilities of the PLA. China will launch
a constellation of earth environmental monitoring
satellites—the HJ-1, HJ-1A, HJ-1B and HJ-1C—in the
second half of 2007.115 The 1A and 1B are small optical
satellites, while the HJ-1C is a radar satellite. In the area
of military imaging and reconnaissance, China has
launched a series of Jianbing satellites with recoverable
photo packages. It has other packages that provide near
real-time electro-optical images. Finally, there is now
in space China’s first military remote imaging satellite
using synthetic aperture radar, the Jianbing-5.116
China can use the signals from the U.S. Global
Positioning System (GPS), the European Galileo, and
the Russian Glonass satellites for precision navigation.
These signals support military requirements, including
directing precision weapons and warheads. However,
the CMC is concerned that the United States might
interrupt China’s ability to use the GPS system if
hostilities looked imminent. Therefore, China has
developed and launched its own Beidou navigation
satellites.117 Clearly, in the near term the PLA and
China’s defense infrastructure are willing to rely on
foreign partners or technology, but as in most other
areas, they seek to develop indigenous capabilities
for the long term. China can also relay electro-optical
imagery back to earth from its remote sensing satellites,
which support a military reconnaissance capability
similar to that of Western commercial sensor systems
in the 1990s.118
Without these space systems, China will not achieve
a networked, integrated C4ISR architecture to support
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the military operations it conceives or plans. Moreover,
its space reconnaissance architecture must have the
necessary tracking and data relay satellites to be able
to function on a real-time basis. If the PLA is going to
achieve its goals of tracking deployed naval task forces
and hitting them with ballistic missile warheads, let
alone with air and ship-launched cruise missiles, it will
need to collect and transmit radar returns, images, and
electronic intelligence reliably over extended distances
beyond the mainland. Also, satellite relay systems
support logistics communications necessary to ensure
that deployed military forces get supplies on a timely
basis.119
CONCLUSIONS
The PLA of today is not the force that U.S. and
United Nations forces fought in Korea in 1950. In some
cases, it may be armed with some of the same weapons,
but it has modernized significantly. At the theoretical
level, PLA academicians, strategists, and senior
military leaders have grasped the lessons of the RMA.
In the operational arena, PLA officers and leaders at all
levels are being educated in these lessons in units and
at command academies. In military doctrinal affairs,
PLA units can now turn to manuals and a range of
publications that outline how to use C4ISR systems
in war. In training exercises, the PLA practices using
these systems. In the area of offensive and defensive
information operations, the PLA is heavily involved.
In addition, the PLA is building a space architecture to
support real-time information operations.
The thrust of the conference for which this chapter
was written was to gauge the “right sizing” of the PLA.
The question to be addressed was: “Does the PLA need
the capabilities it is developing?”
220

All of the command, control, and targeting
architectures already fielded or under development
by the PLA are necessary and appropriate responses
for a major military power in the information age if
that nation desires to keep pace with improvements
in armaments and technology. Thus, the dilemma
confronting American military planners is not whether
China’s military needs these capabilities, it is rather to
anticipate the uses to which the capabilities will be put.
The problem for the United States (and its allies) is that
there is no clear roadmap or outline of the intentions of
the CCP or how its Politburo Standing Committee will
use such military power and technology. The major
straw in the wind regarding China’s intent is that many
of China’s military strategists and senior leaders seem
to conceptualize the United States as the target of this
new military force. Moreover, when Chinese strategists
talk about “comprehensive national power,” they want
the combination of economic, political, diplomatic,
military, and cultural strength to equal “the power to
compel” other nations to do China’s bidding.
The PLA has solved the over-the-horizon targeting
problem conceptually. It has solved it mathematically
and in simulation. It has built much of the hardware
necessary to underpin a modern military force. It is
also very close to fielding the full C4ISR architecture
to fight a campaign out to about 2,000 kilometers from
China’s coast. However, it is not clear how the PLA
will put such a system together, engineer it, or use it.
For the United States, this means that we must continue
to develop and stay ahead in the areas of kinetic and
electronic energy weapons, electronic warfare and
countermeasures, and information warfare.
China’s military forces are developing some
potentially dangerous capabilities, certainly more
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dangerous than they were a decade ago; but they are
still not “peer competitors” to the forces of the United
States. The PLA’s battlefield applications of net-centric
warfare concepts still heavily depend on foreign
technology. Without the AWACS and data link systems
supported by Russian and French technology, the PLA
Navy and Air Force would be relegated to the levels of
sophistication prevailing in the American and NATO
militaries of the 1960s. Even with the architecture the
PLA has built, its ability to apply the systems with
deployed forces at long distances from its borders is
limited. The duration on station of its AWACS aircraft
is short (90 minutes), their range limited, and not all of
them are capable of inflight refueling. Most of the PLA’s
combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations, but can handle only a limited number of
targets. In addition, not all of the weapons they carry
can receive the networked combat data.
All this said, the PLA has made significant strides in
less than 2 decades in transforming itself into a force that
can engage in a modern war along its periphery out to
a range of about 1,500 miles. When it achieves its goals
of deploying satellite tracking and data relay systems
and fielding new long-range missiles with multiple
(maneuverable) warheads, it may well achieve its goal
of targeting an enemy’s deployed naval battle groups.
This equates roughly to the capability to defend against
and deny access to enemy forces inside the “second
island chain” that Liu Huaqing in 1984 conceived that
China must dominate. Thus, China is close to achieving
a viable anti-access strategy that, at a minimum, would
impede U.S. and Japanese military operations. This
capability may be only 2 to 5 years away. If China is
not a peer competitor to the United States today, it is
certainly turning itself into a dominant regional power.

222

Moreover, with the exceptions of Japan and Australia,
it is perhaps the only power in the region able to fight
a “knowledge-based” war.
Much of what the PLA has achieved relies on the
technical assistance of foreign defense companies,
primarily Russian, French, and British. Because China’s
long-term intent is not clear, because it continues
to threaten Taiwan, and because it has violated the
sovereignty of Japan, a U.S. ally, some policy responses
are required. The “hedging” in the last U.S. Quadrennial
Defense Review with a shift of forces and priorities to
Asia is a military-diplomatic response.
Other responses are necessary. Former Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s “responsible
stakeholder” formulation is one type of diplomatic
policy response, as are the renewed military contacts
between the PLA and the U.S. armed forces. Effective
policy responses to Russian assistance to China are
limited, but diplomatic and economic pressure should
aim to discourage this military cooperation on the
ground that it is not in Russia’s interest to see the
military balance in Asia changed through weapons
or technology transfers. Only recently have European
Union (EU) states accepted that the United States has
security interests in the Western Pacific, and that their
technology sales to China can threaten American forces.
Legislation by Henry Hyde and Duncan Hunter got
the EU’s attention when EU nations were considering
lifting the Tiananmen-based arms sanctions on the
PLA. This legislation would have excluded European
firms from participation in U.S. defense cooperation
programs if they sold certain technologies to China.
This type of legislative response is useful against long
as PLA intentions are unclear, and China’s military
actions or declarations work against U.S. security
interests.
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It is also important to remember that as the PLA
becomes more dependent on the electromagnetic
spectrum for military operations, it is more susceptible
to interference in that spectrum. Over the last decade
or so, PLA warfare experts have concentrated on
exploiting the weaknesses inherent in the American dependence on space and information. That dependence
is becoming a two-way street. As the PLA modernizes,
it also cannot function without access to space and the
electromagnetic spectrum. Strong competition in space
control and information warfare will characterize the
future military development of China and the United
States for some time to come.
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THE PLA GROUND FORCE
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CHAPTER 6
“PRESERVING THE STATE”:
MODERNIZING AND TASK-ORGANIZING
A “HYBRID” PLA GROUND FORCE1
Cortez A. Cooper III
Rapid defense modernization is a logical priority
for a technologically challenged, combat-inexperienced
military focused on a mission that might bring it into
conflict with the world’s most powerful armed force.
Faced with the potential for such a conflict in the Taiwan
Strait and backed by the strong conviction that use of
force in certain cross-Strait circumstances would not
only be justified but legally required, China’s central
leadership has set in motion over the past decade an
Army building program of impressive scope and scale.
The progress of this peacetime modernization effort,
particularly given the low baseline from which it was
launched, is perhaps exceeded in the past century
only by the rise of the Wehrmacht in the 1930s and the
transformation of the U.S. military between 1980 and
the first Gulf War.
Despite a modernization effort covering to some
extent every aspect of military force structure and
posture, the Chinese have clearly prioritized development of capabilities to severely damage Taiwan in the
event of a conflict over the island’s stance on perpetual
separation from the mainland—and to deter or slow
U.S. responses to such a conflict. As such, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) ground force has played
fourth fiddle to missile, air, and naval forces in terms
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of modernization priority. It has not, however, been
forgotten.2 The PLA remains a Party Army in an era
when the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grip is
less than firm—PLA ground forces remain the primary
arbiter of Party control throughout the country, key
contributors to Beijing’s foreign policy initiatives, and
protectors of a 22,000-kilometer land boundary adjacent
to a number of current and potential flash points.
The ground force is also preparing for a Taiwan
contingency, albeit with a lower profile than its sister
services.3 While China appears to be avoiding for now
telltale programs to greatly increase amphibious and
airlift capacity to project ground forces onto Taiwan,
the PLA continues to train and equip task-organized
brigades and divisions to fight an island landing
campaign. Beijing wants to avoid alarming U.S. and
regional neighbors with an overt preparation for force
projection operations but has positioned a defense
industrial base to provide, when needed, the projection
platforms for a force trained and organized to attack
Taiwan and occupy, at least temporarily, key terrain.
The PLA ground force is tasked to support
domestic stability operations; defend borders across
mountain, jungle, and desert terrain; conduct military
diplomacy abroad; and prepare for a local war with
significant power projection requirements. The
approach of China’s Central Military Commission
(CMC) appears to be to task-organize specific units
for specific campaigns or local missions, rather than to
modernize the force across the board and expect each
unit to conduct myriad missions. For this reason, the
PLA ground force likely will retain well over a million
soldiers for at least the next decade having collectively
a wide range of modernity and warfighting expertise.
Outside analysts who seek to assess PLA ground force
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mission capabilities based on a homogeneous force will
thus probably miss the mark. Addressing the central
question of whether or not the PLA ground force is
“right-sized,” China’s 2006 National Defense White
Paper expresses the belief that the force is very close to
being “proper in size” and “optimal in structure” for
the missions at hand. The paper indicates that ground
force reductions begun in 1985, 1997, and 2003 were
instrumental in achieving this goal—but does not
mention any plans for further reductions.4
Analysts debate the real level of Chinese spending
on military programs—the figure is certainly higher
than official pronouncements—but China’s economic
growth ensures that military programs are wellfunded even in the context of a national development
plan that prioritizes civil programs over martial. This
fertile ground for continued, rapid modernization is
made even more productive given that military and
dual-use technologies are flowing into China with
few constraints.5 There is little reason to believe that
this situation will change substantially over the next
decade, although it would be a mistake to assume any
particular intent for military employment beyond the
general missions already mentioned.
Two strategic advantages accrue to Beijing in decisions regarding resource priorities for modernization
efforts: (1) resources are plentiful enough to develop
and maintain a “hybrid” force as long as no immediate
threats demand national mobilization; and (2) the
general levels of regional and global stability needed
for Chinese national development are provided under
the current international security architecture enforced
by the United States and its treaty allies. It is for this
latter reason that Chinese use of force in the current
geo-strategic environment is inimical to overarching
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Chinese national development priorities, and why
even a growing imbalance of power in Beijing’s favor
over Taipei is unlikely to lead to war in the absence
of severe provocation by Taiwan. Building a PLA that
is increasingly more capable of inflicting damage on
Taiwan (and perhaps U.S. forward forces), without
presenting an imminent force projection threat, appears
to be Beijing’s approach to restraining Taiwan from
just such a provocation.
CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Many analysts, both in the United States and abroad,
take it as axiomatic that China will rise to become a
superpower over the course of the next 2 to 3 decades,
with growth across all components of national power.
Some analysts take exception, believing that China may
well take a turn into political chaos due to the many
challenges inherent in managing a domestic economy
marked by a fragile financial system, the environmental
and social problems associated with rapid growth, and
a very uneven distribution of wealth. Among analysts
in China, more moderate assessments prevail—many
Chinese theorists believe that China will achieve
the status of a mid-level developed country by midcentury, but must first overcome a variety of challenges
in political, social, economic, and military realms.
Regarding a reemerging China’s position in the
world, some theorists (primarily realists) in China and
abroad believe that the international power structure
dominated by the United States and its allies will not
accommodate a more powerful and influential China.
Others believe that as long as Beijing’s intentions are
largely of a status quo bent, then conflict can be avoided
if key international actors do not reflexively seek to
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contain China’s developmental goals. Still others hold
that even though conflict is not inherent in China’s rise,
Beijing intends to drastically change the global power
structure, thus rendering significant conflict likely.6
The ultimate direction of China’s reemergence should
its economic and political influence continue to grow,
however, is likely not dependent on the workings of
a preordained theoretical framework but rather on
a number of emerging, interacting variables. These
variables include, but are not limited to:
• Beijing’s perception of a possible U.S.-Japanese
containment strategy;
• China’s ability to remain the central cog in Asia’s
increasingly linked export “workshop”;
• The success of prevailing market mechanisms in
meeting China’s growing resource and energy
appetite;
• Reactions to perceived Japanese remilitarization;
• The fielding of theater ballistic missile defenses
by other nations and the implications for China’s
strategic deterrent force;
• The scope and scale of Taiwan missile programs;
and
• The ability of the central government in Beijing to
maintain internal order as the market economy
drives internal demographic and political
ferment.
China’s policy approach to this complicated geostrategic environment is found in the successive issuance of comprehensive five-year plans. Beijing’s 11th
Five-Year Plan, in place as of 2006, paints the picture of a
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government balancing a number of domestic priorities
in the socio-economic domain, while maintaining
a pragmatic approach toward security issues that
impinge on its ability to sustain economic growth.
The transparent part of the plan does not, however,
provide insight into some of the intentions behind
Beijing’s rapid military modernization effort and the
appearance of a mercantilist bent in certain economic
and diplomatic initiatives. To better understand how
the puzzle pieces fit together, and especially to better
construe Beijing’s intent in defense modernization,
gaining an understanding of China’s approach to
building comprehensive national power (CNP) would
be helpful.
Most civil and military leaders in Beijing appear
to view the “grand environment” as a competition
among rivals for relative gains in CNP.7 As one Chinese
source puts it: “Comprehensive national power is the
basis for the national strategy and national defense
strategy, and it is also the basis for analyzing the ratio
of the international strategy and strength.”8 Developing
CNP is a quantitative endeavor for the Chinese that
involves a wide variety of factors encompassing
tangible and intangible strength in political, economic,
scientific, technological, military, cultural, and educational spheres. National development strategists
must consider all elements of power, and resolve
fundamental contradictions, in order for balanced
development to occur. CNP development focused on a
“strategic objective” that represents the “basic national
interest” will yield stability and growth.9 The “basic
national interest” for China appears to be sustained
economic growth with secure control of sovereign
territory (from both internal and external threats).
Because China’s approach to building CNP
assumes a competition for influence and resources,
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there is legitimate cause for concern in certain aspects
of Beijing’s foreign policy and military modernization
efforts. There is, however, an active debate in Beijing
regarding the “zero-sum” nature of great power
relations. Moreover, there is no assumption among
China’s leadership that a violent reordering of the
international security architecture must accompany
CNP growth.10 One source posits that Chinese CNP
rose from the eighth position in the world in 1980 to
the sixth position in 2000—a time frame in which China
did not employ military force, but instead reaped the
advantages associated with integration in a world
economy underpinned by U.S. security guarantees.1
Political-Military Strategies
• Diplomatic:
- Multilateral engagement—strategic pragmatism
- Selective regional leadership
- “Peaceful Rise” posture (for mid-term only?)
• Economic:
- Regional Free Trade Agreements/areas
- Leverage competitive advantages globally
- Fuel pan-Asian export engine
• Military:
- Increase deterrent/coercive pressure on Taiwan
- Robust, pragmatic “military diplomacy” program
- Secure market and resource access if required

China’s approach to building comprehensive
national power is evident in the evolution of Chinese
national security theory and the concomitant direction
of political-military strategies. Over the past 2 decades,
China’s national security construct has undergone a sea
change, with interstate competition replacing Maoist
ideological conflict as the driving force behind foreign
policy decision making.12 In terms of diplomacy, this
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means that Beijing has identified those multilateral
forums in which participation, and in some cases
even leadership, is essential for securing national
development objectives. In the economic realm, it means
that Beijing embraces the trend of market globalization,
particularly in those areas where China’s competitive
advantages allow for consistently high growth rates.
In the informational arena—some would perhaps say
propaganda arena—the new security construct informs
an effort to portray China as a responsible rising power
whose goals are commensurate with general regional
stability and equitable development. Finally, in the
military realm, Beijing’s approach to national security
drives a comprehensive force modernization and
“professionalization” effort. The PLA’s doctrinal shift
away from classic “People’s War” to “local warfare
under high-tech conditions” and beyond—including
current initiatives to “informationize” the force—has
dramatically changed Chinese views on military
campaign planning and operations.
It is possible that Beijing’s intentions are more
malign than current “peaceful rise” rhetoric indicates—
i.e., that even if there is no drastic downturn in China’s
growth or no concerted effort on the part of the larger
international community to contain China, Beijing
would still seek to subvert U.S. and allied influence
and access in Asia, and to undermine U.S. leadership
globally. Chinese theorists sometimes speak of the
requirement to maintain good Sino-U.S. relations “for
now,” indicating that this path could be abandoned
when China’s comprehensive national power reaches
a certain level. Most indicators, however, seem to point
to an acceptance on Beijing’s part of the status quo
security environment—as long as the Taiwan issue
is manageable and no outside power blocks Chinese
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access to the markets and resources necessary for
sustained growth.
PLA STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
Chinese force modernization and deployment
programs follow from the overarching strategic
framework according to which Beijing defines threats to
“the basic national interest.” Chinese strategists do not
envision a need for global power projection capabilities
in the first half of this century and believe that only the
United States, or the United States allied with Japan,
presents a viable military threat to strategic interests in
the near to mid term. These interests primarily include
resolution of the Taiwan issue in Beijing’s favor,
security of energy resources and economic lifelines,
and increasing Chinese leadership in Asian economic
and diplomatic decisionmaking forums. Territorial or
resource disputes between Beijing and Japan, India, or
a unified Korea could conceivably be added to the list
in certain future scenarios, as could disputes arising
from shifts in access to energy in Central Asia and
Russia. In all cases, the Chinese view their periphery
as the focus for military concern. As a result, Beijing’s
military modernization priorities are the maritime,
air, and missile programs needed to conduct shortduration, high-intensity operations against a U.S.Taiwan or U.S.-Japan foe in peripheral seas to the east
and south.
China will not have the capacity to dramatically
alter the Asian security architecture via military
competition for at least the next decade. Beijing
believes, however, that strategic objectives are in reach
if the Party can maintain internal order while the PLA
develops capabilities to control China’s immediate
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periphery. While definitions of the periphery have
expanded due to the importance of distant sea lanes for
energy and market access, the Chinese know that they
will not conduct combat operations, other than limited
anti-access activities, beyond the Asian continent or
adjacent seas.
In the last 3 decades, Chinese military thinking has
undergone a radical change, resulting in the development over time of three doctrinal templates. The first
of these was the framework of “People’s War under
modern conditions”—a moniker that gave a nod to
the Maoist boilerplate but in substance recognized
that protracted wars of attrition were no longer
suited to China’s evolving interests and geo-strategic
environment. By the early 1990s, with the first Gulf
War serving as a powerful driver, this doctrine
metamorphosed into what is commonly labeled “local,
limited war under high-tech conditions.” Chinese
military theorists are now grappling with a third template
that focuses on the correct mix of “informationized”
and mechanized forces and concepts to conduct shortduration, high-intensity combat in the information
era. This newest template is not fully formed, and
debates continue as to the relative importance of
“informationization” versus mechanization, the appropriate level of effort and funding for one over the
other, the appropriate mix in the force structure, and
other related issues. CMC member and Director of
the General Logistics Department of the PLA, General
Liao Xilong, states that mechanization is the platform
upon which “informationization” must be built.
They are inextricably linked, although the degree of
prioritization in the programmatic realm is murky.13
Informationization at the operational level appears
focused on providing an integrated platform for
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joint war zone command, control, communications,
computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) connectivity, and for peacetime command and
control (C2) within the PLA’s Military Regions (MR).
According to official Chinese media, the 11th Five-Year
Plan tasks the PLA Informationization Work Office to
move the PLA toward a “perfect universal transmission
. . . and processing platform.”14 Recent programs to
establish integrated joint communications and data
transfer capabilities attest to the priority placed on this
effort, and China’s information technology sector is
certainly capable of providing an effective architecture
commensurate with the high level of resource
commitment. As one senior PLA general notes,
success in informationized warfare hinges primarily
on “national information strength”—both in terms of
global perception management efforts and domestic
capabilities in key information technologies. 15
One of the primary tasks of conducting informationized warfare is to transform traditional modes
of mobilization to fit the conditions of modern
warfare—the concept of “people’s war” in a new era.
For this reason, the modernization and reorganization
of militia and reserve forces (the vast preponderance
of which are ground force units and personnel) is to
a great extent focused on bringing in high-technology
qualified reservists and militia members—both to
form new high-tech units (such as information and
electronic warfare detachments), and to leaven existing
or transforming units with more capable engineers
and computer technicians.16 According to a recent
PLA Daily article, “specialized technical detachments”
comprise 41 percent of reserve units; and the PLA has
introduced a number of new reserve units, including
“information protection and prevention detachments,
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satellite communications [units], and electronic
interference systems.”17 The urban militia is clearly
evolving to provide the warfighting force with hightech support, providing access to an increasingly techsavvy workforce.18
MODERNIZING THE FORCE
China’s force modernization is governed by
“strategic planning and strategic management [via]
implementation of the scientific development concept
in national defense and army-building.”19 While the
“scientific development concept” is often ambiguously
defined in Chinese sources, it focuses to a great extent
on “bring[ing] into play the superiorities of the socialist
system in concentrating our forces on major tasks.”20
This involves building a force prepared to meet both
internal and external exigencies in an informationized
society—and leveraging the advantages of an
authoritarian regime to tailor the force in accordance
with overarching national development priorities.
PLA strategists understand that for the wars they
expect to fight in the next few decades, their focus must
be on using the niche capabilities they have to counter
the moves of a technologically superior adversary. The
Chinese are carefully studying how American forces
approach dominant command and control, surveillance
and reconnaissance, rapid resupply, and quickly
overwhelming an opponent with multidimensional
firepower. PLA campaign planning; modernization
programs; and research, development, and acquisition
initiatives aim to defeat an adversary who brings a “local
war under high-technology conditions” to China’s
neighborhood. While this sounds like a defensive
focus, it is anything but. The PLA is committed to an
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offensive capability—to limited power projection and
preemptive, or at least rapid, strikes against an enemy’s
critical vulnerability. Viewing the matter in this light,
it is easy to understand why Chinese strategists are
fixated on information dominance in the early stages of
a fight, on the interdiction of enemy supply lines, and
on strikes against key adversary high-tech weapons
systems.
Within this framework, Chinese military planners
look to accomplish a “quick battle to force quick
resolution” but with an emphasis on preemptive and
unexpected strikes to remove an enemy’s technological
superiority—what Chinese strategists call “structural
destruction operations.”21 The Chinese believe that
creating local and momentary momentum (especially
air and information superiority) in a regional clash will
allow them to defeat a more advanced adversary’s plan
and bring conflict to a close under Beijing’s terms. This is
a defeat criterion more focused on an enemy’s strategy
than on its military force. The Chinese seek to deprive
an adversary of the ability to use operational and
technical superiority to control strategic outcomes.
For the ground forces, however, the focus of
modernization is not solely on fighting China’s next
war. With changing domestic demographics, and a
number of factors undermining Communist Party
control, many ground force units must also become
more effective in conducting traditional domestic
control activities, which encompass disaster relief
efforts, local civil development projects, and support
for People’s Armed Police (PAP) forces in quelling
public disturbances.
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DOMESTIC CONCERNS
AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT
Numerous internal forces drive Chinese decisions
regarding force structure and capabilities. Foremost
among these is the concern for maintaining public
order and Party control in the face of rising discontent
over corruption, illegal land grabs, and the adverse
side effects of economic reform initiatives. While exact
figures for incidents of internal unrest and protests are
difficult to parse, it is certain that such incidents have
increased in both scope and frequency in the past few
years—with an estimated 74,000 incidents in 2004, and
estimates as high as 87,000 for 2005. Party leaders are
also faced with managing anti-Japanese and, to a lesser
extent, anti-American sentiments in the populace. The
Party has also created, and must maintain, the public
expectation that progress on the Taiwan issue will
follow from military modernization expenditures,
diplomatic efforts, and economic integration initiatives.
The various requirements of domestic pressure—
looking both inward to a restive populace and outward
to Taiwan, Japan, and the United States—ensure that
the CMC will promote a force structure and posture
plan that is far from homogeneous.
Public opinion matters in the People’s Republic—
perhaps more so than at any time since its inception.
Economic reform buys loyalty for the moment, and
the Party has more or less successfully harnessed
rising nationalism for its own purposes. Relying on
continued high growth rates and public concurrence
that “national interest” equates to the Communist
Party, however, is fraught with risk, given the myriad
national development challenges facing Beijing. The
Party’s fragile position has force posture and budgetary
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implications for the PLA. The need to reinforce Party
credibility and maintain the growth essential for
domestic stability means that military spending will
not overtake civil programs for the foreseeable future.
As mentioned earlier, China is to some extent spared
the hard prioritization choices of many other nations
due to its ready reserve of capital. However, should
growth slow in the coming years, hard choices will
follow. Leadership concerns about public opinion,
nationalism, and domestic satisfaction also mean that
the PLA ground force will not be able to cut personnel
drastically in order to shore up funding shortfalls or
focus all available funds on a warfighting mission
should one arise. In a national crisis, such as a Taiwan
declaration of independence, the Party will likely have
sufficient backing to mobilize the nation for war—but
public security concerns likely will rise commensurate
with the level of economic pain.
China has reduced its ground force by about
500,000 personnel over the past decade without a major
upheaval in the civil economy or significant reduction
in the ability to control public disturbances.22 Many of
the unit and personnel cuts resulted in growth of the
PAP, thereby shoring up domestic control capabilities.
But the presence of the PLA throughout the country
provides a concrete link between central power and
local life that the Party is unlikely to relinquish. Further
minor reductions could accrue from consolidation of
headquarters, support, and training organizations, but
major unit reductions are unlikely.
Rising nationalism has accompanied the growth
of a Chinese middle class; and the ever-increasing
nationalistic impulse and its concomitant anti-U.S. and
anti-Japan flavor could drive a fragile Party to turn a
malevolent eye toward Taiwan, the last major reminder
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of Chinese national weakness. China has been content
with maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait
(applying of course Beijing’s definition of a “one-China”
status quo), but believes that indefinite support of the
current arrangement abets an American containment
strategy and growth of a nationalistic Taiwan identity,
thus the argument constructed by Beijing in passing
the Anti-Secession Law.3
The Status Quo . . . and Taiwan’s Place In It.
Accompanying China’s rise is a sense on the part
of its elites that, despite enjoying China’s best security
posture since the Opium Wars, Beijing is under siege
from the U.S. and Japan. This “siege mentality” can lead
to what might seem irrational behavior. While China
may indeed be a “status quo power,” Taiwan represents
an element of the status quo that must change in the
current international order to accommodate China’s
rise. Look no further than the Anti-Secession Law for
proof—while pundits can argue about timing, content,
and motivation, the fact remains that an “irrational
decision” was made in order to lay down a marker
toward change of the status quo in the Strait. From
Beijing’s perspective, Taipei has been inexorably laying
down anti-status quo rhetorical, if not legal, markers
over the course of the past 10 years.

Following the 2006 National People’s Congress
(NPC), Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao clearly stated that
the starting point for improved Sino-Japanese relations
is cessation of Prime Minister Koizumi’s Yasakuni
shrine visits.24 However, a plethora of security issues
plagues the relationship beyond the lingering historical
animosities—and there is little that the Chinese can
do in terms of ground force structure and posture to
place any real coercive or deterrent pressure on Tokyo.
China’s predominant view of Japan is captured in a
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recent article by Li Wen of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences:
Japan is resorting to a “curved attempt at national
salvation”—using the great vessel that is the United
States to . . . expand its sovereignty and initiative to
the greatest extent under the framework of the JapanU.S. alliance. By taking the initiative to assume more
responsibilities on behalf of the United States in East Asia
in order to acquire political and military might, it hopes
to ultimately come to a stand-off and confrontation with
China in the Asia-Pacific region, and set up a regional
order dominated by the United States and Japan.25

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY GROUND
FORCE: MISSIONS AND PRIORITIES
China’s national defense tasks as described in the
2006 White Paper on National Defense are:26
• Uphold national security and unity, and ensure
the interests of national development;
• Provide, via the PLA, the source of strength
for consolidating the rule of the CCP . . . and
a solid security guarantee for sustaining this
period of strategic opportunity for national
development;
• Guard against and resist aggression [and]
defend against violation of China’s territorial
sea and air space, and borders;
• Oppose and contain the separatist forces for
Taiwan independence and their activities; and
• Take precautions against and crack down on
terrorism, separatism, and extremism in all
forms.
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Hu Jintao refines the mission focus, stressing four
areas (three “services” and one “function”) to which
the PLA must attend: provide the “forceful guarantee”
for consolidation of CCP rule, provide a secure
environment for economic development, protect
national interests, and contribute to the maintenance
of world peace.27 Particularly telling is that “forceful
guarantee” for consolidation of Party rule occupies a
position of primacy—the concept of the Party army is
alive and well.
The 2006 session of the NPC also shed light on
PLA direction and mission apportionment. When
discussing budget mechanisms, the NPC focused on
“homeland defense”; countering “power politics” in
the international arena; and dealing with secessionism,
terrorism, and extremism. Interestingly, the NPC
called for a switch from “maintaining the status quo”
to a “limited growth development mode”—suggesting
that China’s official military expenditure of 8 percent
of total national spending is below the international
average of 12–16 percent of expenditures.28 While it is
unlikely that the priority of military spending relative
to civil programs will change, it is obvious that relative
percentages will be adjusted. This may indicate that
more of China’s hidden defense expenditures will
make their way into the light—thus answering some
of the criticisms levied by the international community
regarding budgetary transparency. But it is more likely
that the NPC is laying the foundation for moderate
defense increases as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) under the current model—increases
that in real terms are significant if prevailing growth
patterns continue.
In translating broad goals and tasks into operational
mission requirements, the ground forces are required
to provide:
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• Forces capable of domestic control and service
support operations throughout the country;
• Forces capable of conducting defensive
operations along the vast land and sea border;
• Forces capable of conducting amphibious and
airborne/airmobile operations against Taiwan;
• Forces capable of conducting heavy mobile
operations into potentially unstable areas on
China’s periphery to protect economic interests;
and29
• Units and personnel capable of supporting
global military-to-military exchange programs,
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations,
arms sale support, and foreign military training
programs—which in turn support economic
and diplomatic initiatives in regions critical
for meeting future energy and market access
requirements.
CONSTRUCTING A “HYBRID” FORCE
In an official news media interview, Academy of
Military Science strategist Chen Zhou summed up
the various mission areas the PLA must prepare to
accomplish.
The Chinese military must develop the ability to deal
with diverse security threats and accomplish diverse
military missions, not only being able to deal with
traditional security threats, but also being able to deal
with non-traditional security threats. Not only being able
to deal with external threats in a situation in which there
is a proportional imbalance in strategic forces, but also
being able to deal with internal threats brought about by
unstable factors domestically.30
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The organizational command and control structure
of the PLA from the General Staff Department (GSD)
through the MRs down to Guard Commands, although
convoluted in chain of command and reporting
channels, reflects the various missions assigned by the
party. Homeland defense missions play a large role,
occupying a sizable organizational and resource niche
within this structure.31 Preparations for amphibious,
airmobile/airborne, and special operations against
Taiwan figure prominently as well. Much less obvious
in the C2 structure are the ground force units that
play an increasingly critical role in Beijing’s pragmatic
“military diplomacy” strategies across the globe.
Even after significant reductions, the ground forces
represent about 70 percent of total PLA strength.
During the first 3 decades of the People’s Republic,
the PLA as a technologically backward but disciplined
force expected the vast majority of its soldiers to farm,
shoot, assist local construction and relief efforts, and
die in vast numbers in the unlikely event of foreign
invasion—or in Chinese force projection operations on
the periphery. Today, about a third of the PLA soldiers,
officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are
expected to be professional practitioners of modern
warfighting and are being trained and equipped to
achieve that status.
The main ground combat force of the PLA consists of
18 Group Armies spread across the seven MRs.32 Two of
these Group Armies, the 39th in the Shenyang MR and
the 38th in the Beijing MR, are “Rapid Reaction Units,”
expected to deploy on notice for combat from garrison
without personnel or equipment augmentation.
Another three Group Armies—one each in Shenyang,
Lanzhou, and Jinan—are being modernized for
modern mobile warfare missions. Four to five Group
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Armies (Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs) are focused on
amphibious operations. These nine or ten armies, along
with several special operations “Dadui” (about 1,000
troops each), the Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps, and
two Marine brigades in the South Sea Fleet, represent
the true ground combat force of the PLA.33
Local ground force units, some affiliated with Group
Armies other than those listed above and some not,
are responsible for border defense operations, garrison
and/or infrastructure defense, or providing disaster
relief and other services in their districts. Among
these units, mission-specific specialization is also
a requirement, even if the mission equates to more
traditional local defense objectives. With a few
exceptions, these units are lower on the totem pole
for equipment upgrades—but all reap benefits
from improved training programs and increased
spending on quality-of-life initiatives. Geographic
considerations continue to play a major role in PLA
force posture—determining whether units in various
locations will focus on jungle, mountain, or other
mission capabilities. Only a decade ago, both main and
local forces were heavily involved in a broad range of
financial enterprises. While the warfighting Group
Armies and their subordinates are largely free of these
diversions, the extent to which local forces continue
with such activities is less clear.
The linchpin of a more capable, “missionspecialized” PLA will be its NCO corps. Many
analysts focus on the degree to which the PLA NCO
corps will grow to resemble its U.S. counterpart in
terms of small unit leadership capabilities. This may
be a red herring—the primary expectation of the
PLA leadership is that the NCO corps will provide
systems-level technical expertise and enhanced unit-
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level readiness. The burgeoning NCO corps will be a
particularly critical driver for the variegated ground
force modernization strategy. A skills appraisal regime
for NCOs is the focus of requirements advanced in the
PLA’s “Opinions on Strengthening the Cultivation of
Well-trained NCO Contingent”—indicating a more
rigorous approach to NCO training and professional
development in specialized skills areas.34
For officers, PLA leaders expect a growing awareness of and facility in joint and combined arms operations in addition to expertise in primary skill areas. In
the Shenyang Military Region, 170 officers since 2000
have reportedly participated in a cross-service exchange
program with naval, air, and Second Artillery units.35
At the major unit level, however, officers, soldiers,
and NCOs alike are focused, generally more so than
their western counterparts, on the specific operational
campaign or local mission for which the unit is taskorganized.
Ground force reserve and militia units have
traditionally supported main and local forces in their
districts or regions, and most will continue to do so;
but recent reorganization activity indicates that certain
units and personnel, particularly in high-technology
specialties, may have primary responsibilities of
broader scope and scale.
DEFENDING HEARTH, HOME, AND PARTY
Chinese strategists have embraced the term
“homeland defense,” encompassing as it does a number
of PLA mission areas. Garrison, Fortification (coastal
defense), and Guard Commands perform missions that
would correspond to our understanding of homeland
defense—as would a number of reserve and militia units
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that would mobilize to conduct “people’s air defense”
and similar operations. Domestic stability operations,
however, expand the homeland defense concept,
incorporating both crowd control and counterterror
equipment and training requirements. Casting an
even broader net, Chinese leaders and strategists also
frequently discuss Taiwan under the homeland defense
rubric, thus bringing “active defense” operations into
the mix.
While the 1.7 million-strong Ministry of Public
Security police force and the 1.2 million-strong
paramilitary PAP are primarily responsible for
domestic civil control operations, the physical presence
of the PLA throughout the country in large numbers
remains the Party’s final defense. Capital Garrison,
Garrison, and Guard Commands are particularly
trained and equipped not only to defend key locations
from foreign (primarily air) attack but also to protect
from the enemy within. Some active and reserve forces
throughout the country, particularly those unattached
to Group Armies, continue to exist primarily as
providers of stability, protection, and services to
Provincial Military Districts and Subdistricts. Many of
them receive specialized training focused on the local
geography—mountain, desert, or jungle—but they are
not now, nor are they likely to become, recipients of
modern equipment in the near to mid term. At the same
time, they are unlikely to face large cuts in manpower
or funding, due to their important role in handling
border defense and local support missions.
It is difficult to identify fully which units outside of
the PLA’s warfighting core are responsible for which
primary homeland defense mission or combination
of missions—crowd control and counterterror
operations, disaster relief, agrarian or service sector
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support activity, key infrastructure protection, and
border defense operations. The existence of priorities
seems very likely, however, based in some cases on
unit designations (Guard, Fortification, and Garrison
Commands), and in other cases on training regimens.
The 2006 National Defense White Paper clearly indicates
that engineering units bear the brunt of agrarian and
service support activities, and that the PLA and PAP
together are responsible for disaster relief operations
on a large scale.36
THE WARFIGHTING CORE:
A “DEFENSIVE” FORCE?
Even for those main ground force warfighting units
that grab the attention of military analysts, defensive
capabilities continue to predominate. The PLA’s
defensive flavor has shifted, however, from traditional
concepts of absorbing and depleting an attacking
force to active defense, one that requires offensive
capabilities to keep attackers away from China’s
political and economic centers of gravity. As offensive
capabilities develop, and numerous programs to field
force projection systems come to fruition, China will
continue to couch its modernization effort in terms of
defense—while western and regional onlookers accuse
Beijing of developing offensive capabilities that belie
the rhetoric of “peaceful rise.”
Beijing counters with arguments concerning
the threat to China’s sovereignty from Taiwan
“separatists” and their American arms suppliers.
While the cross-Strait environment is relatively stable
for the moment, Beijing’s perception that political
and social developments on Taiwan threaten China’s
fundamental sovereignty continues to spur military
modernization programs that provide a broad
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capability base for operations against Taiwan and any
U.S. forces that join the fray. Statements by Premier Wen
Jiabao following the 2006 NPC sessions clearly reveal
Beijing’s belief that the current government in Taipei
is pursuing a “constitutional re-engineering project
aimed at de jure independence.”37 While missile, air,
and naval programs predominate in “active defense”
preparations, ground force restructuring and training
in the key Group Armies also illustrate a desire to
build a regional power projection capability for those
forces. The warfighting core of the PLA will not be
a fully modernized force, however, until maneuver
divisions and brigades reflect in training the capability
to manage the complexities of joint offensive warfare.
Despite Beijing’s belief that the regional environment is conducive to peaceful development, border security remains a fixation for the Party. Completing a
10-year program under the auspices of the National
Frontier Defense Committee, a reinforced architecture
consisting of road patrol, defensive obstacles, and
automated alarms and monitoring systems is in
place for local forces to better conduct border defense
operations, and for public security forces to maintain
social order along distant frontiers.38 While primarily
defensive in nature, the improved road infrastructure
also lays the foundation for improved mobility in areas
where future threats to energy and resource interests
might induce Beijing to deploy heavy mobile ground
forces.
OFFENSIVE ASPIRATIONS
Faced with the requirement to build an amphibious
and air-transportable force capable of responding to a
call to arms in the Taiwan Strait—and also to have a
heavy mobile warfare force for possible use in Central
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Asia, the Korean Peninsula, or the Russian Far East—
PLA force planners have clearly begun to restructure,
equip, and train units for specific offensive missions. The
2006 National Defense White Paper states that “the Army
aims at moving from regional defense to transregional
mobility, and improving its capabilities in air-ground
integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid
assaults, and special operations.”39 Over the course of
the past decade, the PLA has built at least four major
amphibious training bases, with about one quarter of
the PLA’s maneuver divisions and brigades focusing
on training for amphibious operations.40 The special
operations and airmobile capabilities needed in
support of missile and air strikes against Taiwan are
also priorities in ground force development initiatives.
Downsizing or retiring a number of old divisions in
favor of modernized, task-organized brigades possibly
improves the PLA’s capability to respond to potential
crises along the full length of China’s northern border.
It also produces units that can more effectively conduct
amphibious operations against Taiwan or Taiwancontrolled islands in the Strait.
“Integrated joint operations” is the current buzzphrase for training, equipping, and sustaining
the PLA to conduct multiservice operations in an
“informationized” environment.41 While definitions
of joint operations differ between Chinese strategists
and their American counterparts, integrated joint
operations specifically refer to multiservice campaigns
controlled by a joint headquarters using an integrated
C2 architecture. Analysts are unsure of the status of this
architecture, but PLA and MR periodicals are running
numerous articles referring to tests and experiments
involving its components. An integrated architecture
would overcome a major impediment to joint C2
and could potentially fuse data from intelligence262

surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) assets into a nearreal time “sensor-to-shooter” targeting network.
The ability to conduct long-range precision
targeting operations will increase greatly when China’s
growing constellation of space-based sensors and aerial
surveillance platforms can pass near real-time data to
a variety of PLA systems. While most PLA watchers
rightly focus on the implications of ISR enhancement
for cruise and ballistic missile systems in the Second
Artillery, Air Force, and Navy arms, the ground force
will also benefit from faster, more accurate targeting
solutions for its short-range ballistic missiles and longrange, course-correcting artillery systems. While data
link, data relay, and data fusion program details are
obviously shrouded in secrecy, we can safely assume
that systems linking and fusing data between space,
air, and terrestrial systems likely will be available to
combat commanders in 5 to 10 years.
Logistics is a key area of concern in integrated
joint operations—legacy logistics support systems for
the PLA are stove-piped, producing notoriously slow
and inefficient service. However, an automated “triservice logistic interaction platform” was reportedly
introduced recently in a subdepartment of the
Beijing MR (following a similar fielding in the Jinan
region).42 Of particular interest is that the platform was
reportedly introduced to provide joint logistic support
to the “Beijing Theater of Operation” rather than to the
Beijing MR, thus stressing the wartime mission.
Recent developments in the helicopter force indicate
that the General Staff is well aware of the need for air
assault capabilities to address shortfalls in contingency
mission areas, as would exist in a landing campaign
against Taiwan or a mechanized campaign on the
Korean border, in Siberia, or along China’s Central
Asian periphery. The Chinese Naval Encyclopedia,
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published in 1998, discussed in some detail the
command and control requirements for helicopters
in a vertical amphibious assault—clearly revealing
aspirations to overcome some of the beach landing
constraints presented by Taiwan landing sites.43 It is
a mystery to many analysts, this author included, as
to why the PLA has not poured more resources into
rapid development of air assault capabilities. The force
remains small, with limited transport capabilities, but
a recent PLA Daily report indicates that the PLA has
a coherent, focused plan for changing the situation.
An official from the Army Aviation Department of the
General Staff states that the Army aviation force would
concentrate on “rapid delivery of military strength,
precision strike, effective air domination, and timely
support [shifting] from a unitary arm to an integrated
arm, from a force with only transport capability to a
force with both transport and strike capabilities, and
from playing a supplementary role to playing the main
combat role in battle.”44
China is involved in a joint project with France’s
Eurocopter to develop civil transport helicopters. While
this would not necessarily translate to improved military
capability, past history indicates that European design
assistance in rotary aircraft provides a foundation for
improvements in army aviation systems.45 A sharp
increase in transport and Army attack aircraft along
with a production spike in amphibious lift capacity
would be key indicators of a possible shift in Beijing’s
use-of-force intentions.
Changes to the structure of two mechanized Group
Armies in Lanzhou and Shenyang have caught the
attention of some analysts, particularly as two Chinese
academics recently posited that China needs to prepare
to go to war to secure oil if required.46 It is unclear if
these units are particularly focused on providing a
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limited force-projection capability in regions where
border security and resource access are increasingly
important challenges, but it is certainly conceivable
that the PLA is posturing itself to have heavy mobile
forces in these areas for future contingencies.47
While some of the PLA’s force reorganization and
reorientation efforts seem focused on the offensive
use of heavy, task-organized maneuver brigades
and divisions, it is important to keep this effort in
perspective. A recent PLA Daily article discusses
armament readiness in Xinjiang (Lanzhou MR) units.
The Director of the Armaments Department for the
Nanjiang Military District in Xinjiang proudly pointed
to a new “three one-third” armament management
system that served to keep two-thirds of combat
systems combat-ready at all times.48 For western
armies, a 66 percent readiness rate for combat systems
would hardly be a point of pride. Training for heavy
mobile warfare power projection is also not much in
evidence—certainly not to the extent of amphibious
training. Significant sustainability and command
and control challenges face the PLA as it considers
expeditionary warfare requirements, and efforts to
address shortfalls in these areas are still in the early
stages.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SECURITY
COOPERATION: “MILITARY DIPLOMACY”
IN ACTION
Tao Shelan, noted PLA strategist, posits:
We must view international security cooperation
from the perspective of national strategy . . . having a
high regard for military operations other than war,
participating actively in UN peacekeeping operations,
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international cooperation against terrorism, and disasterrelief operations, launching bilateral or multilateral joint
military exercises, and making a greater contribution to
upholding regional peace and stability.49

In an article on conducting “People’s War under
informationized conditions,” the Hunan Military
District Commander, Major General Zheng Zhidong,
states that “establishing an extensive international
unified battlefront” is a pressing task for the PLA.50 Part
of this effort has been, and likely will continue to be,
bent on internationally isolating Taiwan, but there are
several other objectives that drive security cooperation
in the broader context.
China views military diplomacy as a key
contributor to overall diplomatic efforts, including
under this rubric UN peacekeeping missions, military
exchanges, international disaster relief support, joint
exercises, and bilateral and multilateral security
dialogue. Weapons and materiel sales and support
packages are doubtless managed as an element of this
diplomatic effort as well. Official media characterized
China’s military diplomacy as “pragmatic and active”
in 2005, encompassing exchanges with 138 countries
and including 41 bilateral or multilateral cooperation
projects. Highlighted events included disaster
assistance following the Indian Ocean tsunami and
Hurricane Katrina; U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s visit to China (especially showcasing his
visit to the PLA Second Artillery); the Seventh Round
of Defense Consultative Talks with the United States;
the first-ever “joint drill” with Russian forces; “fruitful
cooperation and dialogue” with the Shanghai Security
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations; joint patrols
with Vietnam in Beibu Bay; and “joint drills” with the
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navies of Pakistan, India, and Thailand.51 Since 2002,
Beijing claims to have held 16 joint military exercises
with 11 countries.52
The PLA has increased military exchange and
training activity across the globe, establishing itself
since 2000 as a regular contributor to UN peacekeeping
operations. According to the 2006 National Defense White
Paper, China currently has 1,487 military peacekeepers
serving in nine mission areas and in the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations.53 Much of China’s focus
has been on countries in Africa, the Middle East, Central
Asia, Latin America, and Southeast Asia—where
access to energy and markets will become increasingly
important as China’s economy grows. It is difficult
to determine whether Beijing has identified specific
units or personnel to focus on “military diplomacy”
missions—and if so, to ascertain their training and
modernization objectives. This would be an interesting
area for further study as China’s military exchange and
security assistance programs increase in number.
Africa.
Beijing’s African Policy White Paper of January 2006
clearly delineates a requirement to promote exchanges
and training programs with African militaries, and to
more closely cooperate in such areas as intelligence
exchange, counterterrorism, and counterdrug and
small arms proliferation activities. China’s peacekeeping operations in Africa are indicative of the importance it places on the region. Beijing’s ability to work
with African governments whose policies constrain
Western involvement allows China to intertwine
financial, military, and commercial components into
negotiations on energy access and developmental
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aid. The Sudan provides the best example. Khartoum
provides about 5 percent of China’s oil imports; Beijing
provides a variety of arms. 54 In 2004, China reportedly
deployed approximately 4,000 troops to Sudan, and
currently has 435 troops there.55 At the same time,
Beijing has with relative success managed the challenge
to its image as a responsible international actor—while
delaying and watering down UN sanctions, China
has provided troops for the Darfur peacekeeping
mission.56
ASEAN.
A coherent East Asian community is at best nascent,
but China’s involvement with ASEAN provides a
foundation for a significant bloc in which security issues
will become more and more enmeshed with economic
interaction.57 China’s large and variegated ground
force potentially provides security assistance expertise
for a variety of transborder challenges. Indonesia and
China instituted a so-called “strategic partnership”
in April 2005, signaling a “new era” that includes the
sale of surface-to-surface missiles and potentially a
wide range of other military ware. Although Jakarta
has been careful to stipulate that this development is
not an anti-American action, China certainly moved
into the gap left by the United States when it imposed
restrictions on military sales and contact following
Indonesian Army abuses in the East Timor secession.
The Middle East.
In a recent state visit to Beijing, Saudi King Abdullah
bin Abdulaziz inked an agreement that would increase
annual oil exports to China by 39 percent—it is not
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implausible to assume that this high-level agreement
will be followed by discussions on cooperation in other
areas, to include military exchange and training activity.
Beijing’s close relations with Tehran provide the model
for China’s strategic pragmatism in the region—while
maintaining a public counterproliferation stance
regarding Iran’s nuclear program, Beijing remains
fully engaged on commercial and security assistance
fronts.58
Latin America.
China’s military assistance efforts in behalf of
Venezuela also highlight the link between energy,
international security issues, and China’s military-tomilitary activities.59 Of particular note was the provision
in 2005 of several hundred troops, the majority of them
special operations forces, to provide Venezuela with
special operations training and President Chavez with
additional personal security.60
Central Asia.
Central Asia represents an area of extreme
importance to Beijing on a number of fronts: energy
access, counterterrorism alliances on China’s unstable
northwestern border, and an opportunity for political
influence in a region of concern to both Washington and
Moscow. Beijing is positioning itself as a major player
in what one pundit calls the “new Great Game.”61 In
2005, China and Russia (albeit with different emphases)
upped the ante in terms of political jousting with the
United States in Central Asia when they spearheaded
issuance of a SCO statement calling on Washington to
set a date for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Central
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Asia. China’s interests in the region will increase in
tandem with Beijing’s investment in Kazakhstani oil
production. The PLA has conducted counterterrorism
exercises with SCO member states for several years
running and will strengthen military-to-military ties
with participating states on this foundation. China’s
willingness to overlook unsavory internal issues in
neighboring states has allowed Beijing the flexibility
to weave a web of influence that furthers its political,
security, and economic interests. China’s support for
Uzbekistan following recent unrest and human rights
abuses there is yet another example of this “great
game” being played out in the region.62
TOWARD 2020: DEPLOYING THE NEXT GROUND
FORCE
Barring a catastrophic collapse of the Chinese
economy, or massive destabilization caused by some
other unforeseen factor, Chinese military modernization will continue apace for at least the next 2
decades. There is no sign in the current fourth
generation leadership, and perhaps even less so
in the fledgling fifth, that total, inflation-adjusted
expenditures for defense hardware and software will
decrease. A decrease in the number of missions on
the PLA ground force’s plate is also unlikely, unless
a political rapprochement with Taiwan occurs. Even in
that event, maintaining amphibious-capable forces
on the eastern seaboard might remain a priority if the
Japanese relationship sours further or Beijing perceives
an increasing threat of war on the Korean Peninsula.
While “stratagem” remains paramount in the
PLA lexicon—and Beijing continues to establish the
economic and diplomatic framework for increased
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regional influence—China’s leadership nonetheless
firmly believes that hard military power must prop up
a “peaceful rise.” Missile, naval, and air programs will
continue to receive the most funding and thus the most
attention; but the PLA will also intently pursue special
weapons programs; improved airborne, air assault,
amphibious, and mobile warfare capabilities; and niche
special operations capabilities. Wherever the potential
battlefield in Asia—whether in the East China Sea
(Taiwan, the Senkakus), the Korean Peninsula, Siberia,
the South China Sea, India, Vietnam, or Central Asia—
the Chinese seek the ability to project task-organized
combined arms forces to the fight while conducting
a limited range of advanced anti-access operations
against a responding, technologically superior force.
The tenets of Beijing’s doctrine in such a fight
will likely include rapid application of the principles
of mobile warfare and preemptive strikes against an
enemy’s C4ISR and logistics capabilities. The PLA
will rely heavily on conventional missile strikes
supported by special operations using small numbers
of highly trained teams. Denying the enemy critical
reconnaissance information during force flow will be a
top priority. China will probably achieve by 2015 the key
enablers in realizing this vision—greatly improved PLA
over-the-horizon detection and targeting based on the
deployment of new space-based sensors, long distance
air reconnaissance drones, and airborne early warning
(AEW) platforms. Integration of space-based sensors
with aerial reconnaissance aircraft will represent a real
and credible threat to U.S. forward bases, C4I nodes,
logistics assets, and forward-deployed forces should
a crisis in the Taiwan Strait escalate to armed conflict
involving the United States.
To accomplish objectives on the Asian landmass
or on adjacent islands against a regional foe (and poten271

tially against responding or forward-deployed U.S.
forces), China will continue to focus on an elite core
within the larger PLA ground force. Recent
reorganization within ground force aviation units
indicates that Beijing is serious about building an air
assault capability for the mobile warfare units making
up this core. Trends in the airborne forces indicate
improved heavy equipment para-drop capabilities.
By roughly 2015, the Chinese likely will have a taskorganized, airmobile capability, backed by heavier
forces that can be inserted by air or para-dropped.
The Chinese have already shown the production
capability to increase amphibious lift capacity in an
extremely rapid fashion—whether they choose to spike
production for a regional conflict in the next 2 decades
depends on their perception of threats in the East and
South China Seas, and their assessment of the cost in
political terms as neighbors view this activity with
alarm. The PLA has made great strides in developing
fire support for mobile operations, and in 2015 they
will have a formidable inventory of state-of-the-art,
long-range, course-correcting rocket systems. Special
operations forces (SOF) and capabilities are also seen
by Beijing as keys to success in targeting pivotal enemy
vulnerabilities and maintaining control of the pace
of a campaign. SOF teams likely will be well-trained
to conduct anti-reconnaissance and C2 disruption
operations, involving deep-attack raids and sabotage.
These teams are trained in para-drop operations,
motorized airfoil parachuting, and seaborne delivery;
and they likely will be equipped with portable
communications jamming equipment.
In many ways, the idea of “People’s War under
informationized conditions” is more than mere
rhetoric—it speaks to a genuine desire to develop over
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the next decade the national mobilization plans and
niche operational capabilities to gain control of a local
conflict rapidly. For the ground forces, the definition
of “local” will not change over time as much as it will
for the Navy and air forces, but it will include China’s
entire land border and islands within China’s maritime
territorial claims.
Because of the potential conflicts that the PLA
might face and the continued need for a significant
military presence throughout the country for purposes
of Party reach and control, it is unlikely that the
ground forces will undergo another large personnel
cut in the next decade. A reduction on the order of up
to 100,000 personnel in this timeframe is tenable, but
larger cuts would be likely only in the event that the
Party removed a major mission from the PLA’s plate,
for example, transfer of additional units to the PAP
(which would spare the economy the burden of an
influx of newly unemployed workers). Reaching some
agreed “one-China” frame work with a future Taiwan
leadership might be another example.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION
AND THE UNITED STATES
Over the course of the next 10–12 years, Beijing
hopes to build a ground force with task-organized
units capable of conducting mobile warfare, special
operations, and amphibious and airmobile operations
beyond its borders, while maintaining a large homeland
defense cohort to protect political and economic
centers of gravity. If the current unremarkable force
development trends on Taiwan itself continue, by
roughly 2012 the PLA will need only to ramp up troop
transport production (or civil asset mobilization)
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to project a force that could overwhelm Taiwan’s
defenses rapidly enough to complicate severely any
U.S. response.
Trends and developments in Central Asia and the
South China Sea do not portend Chinese use of force
in these regions, with the political costs of adventurism
in these areas promising to be extremely high. Ground
force modernization efforts, however, do not overlook
the mobile warfare and amphibious operations
capabilities that will strengthen Chinese credibility
as Beijing wields soft power to accomplish political
and economic objectives in ASEAN and the SCO. U.S.
security planners and analysts should carefully watch
specific force structure developments and training
activity among the units responsible for these missions
as clues to Beijing’s intent in dealing with potential
crises in these critical regions.
Analysts will also do well to deliberate upon the
skills being developed by PLA ground force units
charged with nontraditional roles. Many of these
troops and units will be involved in increasingly active
military diplomacy programs, and will expand contact
via training and exchange programs with militaries
across the globe. The PLA is certainly combatinexperienced, but it is drawing lessons regarding both
traditional and nontraditional operations from a large
number of recent or presently active conflicts. PLA
experience also grows with increasing participation in
UN operations.
Continued incremental modernization of the
ground forces is inevitable given Beijing’s perception
of the security environment along its periphery. China
is not building a ground force poised for large-scale
power projection, but it is developing a force capable of
conducting integrated joint operations both within and
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several hundred kilometers beyond its borders. While
Beijing frames the PLA ground force as “right-sized”
for primarily defensive missions, the warfighting
core of the force is very large by current international
standards, and increasingly capable of conducting
offensive operations.
The likelihood of U.S. troops facing PLA ground
forces in combat is very low, but a number of the areas
of overlapping interest for Washington and Beijing
represent potential security dilemmas in which crisis
escalation may be difficult to avoid. U.S. security
planners and analysts should devote the time and
resources to better understand PLA ground force task
organization and scenario-specific training in order to
make sound assessments of Beijing’s preparations for
handling developing crises. Beijing’s perception of the
competitive nature of international interaction does not
necessarily foreshadow a reliance on military solutions
to emerging challenges, but at the same time it does
not allow for complacency on the part of potential
competitors.
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CHAPTER 7
PLA GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION
AND MISSION DIVERSIFICATION:
UNDERWAY IN ALL MILITARY REGIONS1
Dennis J. Blasko
The Chinese Defense White Paper of 2004 acknowledged that “priority [has been] given to the Navy,
Air Force, and Second Artillery Force” to strengthen
the “comprehensive deterrence and warfighting
capabilities”2 of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—
a fact that has been apparent to foreign analysts for
about a decade. Despite the precedence given to the
development of the other services, the PLA ground
forces (i.e., the Army) still comprise the vast majority
of PLA forces. While the Chinese government has
not provided an official accounting of the personnel
distribution within the 2.3 million-strong PLA, most
estimates usually credit the Army with about 1.6
million personnel (about 69 percent of the force, though
this number and percentage are decreasing), the PLA
Navy with about 255,000 (about 11 percent), the PLA
Air Force with some 400,000 (about 17 percent), and
the Second Artillery with around 100,000 (about 4
percent).3 Moreover, ground force officers continue
to retain the majority of senior leadership positions
at headquarters from Beijing to local levels, though
the PLA’s leadership structure is changing gradually
as officers from other services are assigned to senior
command and staff positions. Although the Army is
sometimes overlooked when outsiders concentrate
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on high-technology developments in the PLA Navy,
Air Force, and Second Artillery, modernization of
the ground force is an integral element of the overall,
multifaceted, long-term transformation of the Chinese
armed forces.
The 2006 Defense White Paper did not repeat the
priority listing for the services, apparently because no
major change in priorities had taken place since 2004.
However, the 2006 document did disclose in general
terms the PLA’s “three-step development strategy”
to build “informationized armed forces . . . capable
of winning informationized wars” by the middle of
21st century (usually acknowledged to be 2049, or
100 years after the founding of the People’s Republic
of China [PRC]). Intermediate milestones were set at
2010 “to lay a solid foundation” and at 2020 “to make
major progress” toward that final strategic goal “in
accordance with the state’s overall plan to realize
modernization.”4
Within this strategy, the Army seeks to move
“from regional defense to transregional mobility, and
improving its capabilities in air-ground integrated
operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults,
and special operations. . . . Priority is given to building
Army aviation, light mechanized and information
countermeasures units.”5 Many of these trends have
been evident since 1999 as PLA ground forces, along
with PLA reserve and militia units, have undergone
significant modernization and increases in capabilities
in all Military Regions (MRs) in preparation for a wide
variety of potential missions. This chapter presents
evidence affirming the trends in PLA ground force
modernization identified by the 2006 White Paper. As
the PLA explores new missions for the 21st century,
the Army is building forces to maintain its relevance to
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China’s overall deterrence posture and, if deterrence
fails, to PLA warfighting capabilities, even as the force
shifts to a more maritime-oriented outlook.
THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION:
POLITICAL LOYALTY OF THE PLA
The fundamental underpinning of all aspects of
PLA modernization is the political loyalty of the PLA
to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since taking
over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission
(CMC), Hu Jintao has added his mark to ensure the
military’s subordinate relationship to the CCP. A
January 9, 2006, Jiefangjun Bao editorial set forth his
“Three Provides and One Role” to define the duties of
the PLA in supporting and defending the leadership of
the party:
. . . in the new period of the new century, our military should
provide an important, powerful guarantee for strengthening
the party’s ruling position, should provide a firm security
guarantee for safeguarding China’s opportunity for
strategic development, should provide strong strategic
support for safeguarding national interests, and should
play an important role in safeguarding world peace
and in accelerating the development of all.6 [emphasis
added]

The “Three Provides and One Role” are directly
related to Hu’s other theoretical contribution, the
“scientific development concept.” Despite its name,
the scientific development concept is basically
focused on the development of people as the key to
modernization. Thus, the “Three Provides and One
Role” are “an important reflection of the concept of
scientific development in the military field,” which
is “a significant innovation in the party’s guiding
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theory for the military, and points the direction for
revolution[ization], modernization, and standardizing
our military.”7 The 2006 White Paper repeats the content
of the “Three Provides and One Role” in its section on
“National Defense Policy” without mentioning Hu by
name.
The January 2006 Jiefangjun Bao editorial also
defined the mission of the party: “Our party is
required to unite and lead the people around the
country in completing three historic tasks: accelerating
modernization construction; reunifying the motherland;
and maintaining world peace and accelerating common
development” [emphasis added].8 A month earlier,
another report had described Hu’s application of those
tasks to the military in “an important exposition on
the historic mission of the armed forces in the new
century.” It will be useful to quote Hu at some length:
This important exposition requires that our Army must
not only pay attention to national survival interests, it must
also pay attention to national development interests; it must
not only protect the security of the nation’s land, territorial
waters, and airspace, it must also protect national security
in the electromagnetic sphere, in outer space, on the seas
and oceans, and in other respects; it must not only deal
with traditional security threats to national sovereignty,
unity, and territorial integrity, it must also deal with
nontraditional security threats of which terrorism is the focal
point; it must not only emphasize military and political
security, it must also emphasize economic and social
security; it must not only protect the overall situation of
national reform, development, and stability, it must also
protect world peace and promote development in common.
. . . It is theory which updates the place and role of the
People’s Army under the Party’s long-term governance
of the country. It is theory which updates the missions
and functions of the People’s Army in the midst of
national development and the revival of the people. It
is innovative theory for the People’s Army’s conduct

284

of peaceful missions internationally. It is theory which
updates the objectives of the construction of our Army in
the new century and the new era. It is innovative theory
for the scientific development of our Army under the
new circumstances.9 [emphasis added]

In the mindset of the CCP, national survival is
equivalent to survival of the party. The political officer
system and party committee system are principally
responsible for ensuring proper understanding
of these requirements and to maintain ideological
correctness and political obedience within the military.
Commanders and political commissars at all levels
work closely to maintain political reliability and are
jointly responsible for all aspects of the performance of
their units. When certain hardware and technological
capabilities are lacking, the PLA sees its political system
as adding ideological strength to the balance of power
equation. One commenter put it this way:
Experience shows that, given equality of weaponry
and armaments, the fighting spirit decides the result
of wars; given inferiority in weapons and armaments,
a strong fighting spirit may make up for the inferiority
in armaments, bring material strengths into full play,
and create a miracle of using inferior weapons to defeat
enemies armed with superior armaments under certain
circumstances. Our military always pays great attention
to cultivating the fighting spirit. Our military has been
invincible and undefeatable throughout the longterm revolutionary wars because our military upholds
a fearless spirit characterized by: “When fighting
formidable enemies, we are braver than the enemies and
we are stronger in the face of dangers and difficulties.”10

From outside the PLA, it is often difficult to tell
whether any of the above claims are merely rhetorical
repetition of the party line or are truly believed as
inherent strengths of the Chinese armed forces. Over
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time a more educated and sophisticated personnel
force may question aspects of ideological training to
a greater degree than would less educated peasants.
If there were significant political disaffection in the
ranks, however, it is unlikely that foreigners would
read about it directly in the PLA press, though there
may be hints in the context of some articles and internal
PLA activities. The fear of chaos and the belief that the
CCP and Chinese armed forces, imperfect though they
may be, are the ultimate protectors against turmoil
breaking out throughout the country, likely motivate
the vast majority of PLA personnel to remain loyal to
the party. There is little possibility the PLA, being a
servant of both the party and the people, would take
the lead in advocating political change within the party
or the nation. However, it would likely encourage
modifications to both government and party policies
to assure that the support the Army needed for both its
peacetime and wartime missions was forthcoming.
ARMY MISSIONS AND ROLE IN STRATEGIC
DETERRENCE
Within the political framework outlined above, the
armed forces of China have both external and internal
missions. The PLA primarily is focused outward, the
People’s Armed Police (PAP) is focused domestically,
and the militia is in general support.11 The PLA and
PAP also both have secondary missions that support
each other’s primary mission. The 2006 White Paper
defines China’s national defense policy as:
• Upholding national security and unity, and
ensuring the interests of national development.
This includes guarding against and resisting
aggression, defending against violation of
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China’s territorial sea and air space, and borders;
opposing and containing the separatist forces
for “Taiwan independence” and their activities;
taking precautions against and cracking down
on terrorism, separatism, and extremism in all
forms.
• Achieving the all-round, coordinated, and
sustainable development of China’s national
defense and armed forces, with China pursuing
a policy of coordinated development of national
defense and economy.
• Enhancing the performance of the armed forces
with informationization as the major measuring
criterion.
• Implementing the military strategy of active
defense, thus upgrading and developing the
strategic concept of people’s war, and work for
close coordination between the military struggle
and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural,
and legal endeavors; use strategies and tactics
in a comprehensive way, and take the initiative
to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts
and wars.
• Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy.
• Fostering a security environment conducive to
China’s peaceful development.12
The 2006 White Paper elements listed above are
slightly different from “China’s basic goals and
tasks in maintaining national security” as set forth
in the 2004 White Paper, which specifically began by
mandating deterrence of Taiwan independence (“to
stop separation”) and promoting reunification (which
itself was a change from the priorities listed in the 2002
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White Paper). The 2006 White Paper reference to China’s
nuclear strategy was also new, but other points from
the 2004 White Paper are similar, as seen below:
• To stop separation and promote reunification,
guard against and resist aggression, and defend
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
maritime rights and interests.
• To safeguard the interests of national
development, promote economic and social
development in an all-round, coordinated,
and sustainable way, and steadily increase the
overall national strength.
• To modernize China’s national defense in line
with both the national conditions of China and
the trend of military development in the world
by adhering to the policy of coordinating military
and economic development, and improving the
operational capabilities of self-defense under
the conditions of informationalization.
• To safeguard the political, economic, and
cultural rights and interests of the Chinese
people, to crack down on criminal activities of
all sorts and maintain public order and social
stability.
• To pursue an independent foreign policy of
peace and adhere to the new security concept
featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,
and coordination with a view to securing a
long-term and favorable international and
surrounding environment.13
The tone of the 2006 White Paper about Taiwan
was not as intense as in previous years, but still
firm. In 2004 the first mention of Taiwan was the
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following: “The situation in the relations between the
two sides of the Taiwan Straits is grim.” In 2006 the
first mention of Taiwan had a different thrust: “The
Chinese government has taken a number of significant
measures to improve relations across the Taiwan Strait,
thus promoting cross-Straits relations toward peace
and stability.” After these positive words, however,
the following paragraph reminded readers about the
gravity of the issue so far as Beijing was concerned:
The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces
for “Taiwan independence” and their activities remains
a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for “Taiwan
independence,” the Taiwan authorities aim at creating
“de jure Taiwan independence” through “constitutional
reform,” thus still posing a grave threat to China’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace
and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the AsiaPacific region as a whole. The United States has reiterated
many times that it will adhere to the “one China” policy
and honor the three joint communiqués between China
and the United States. But it continues to sell advanced
weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military
ties with Taiwan.14

In the 2006 White Paper, this detailed discussion of
Taiwan was positioned among those security challenges
that “must not be neglected,” which highlighted
“growing interconnections between domestic and
international factors and interconnected traditional and
nontraditional factors.”15 The linkage here between a
variety of internal and external factors is important to
the PLA’s allocation of time and resources. Certainly,
military planning and training for potential Taiwan
contingencies is high on the PLA’s list. In the ground
force, training for this mission is undertaken mostly
in the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs (see the
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section on Amphibious Training below). Meanwhile, the
Army also trains for many additional missions in these
and other MRs.
Among the other ground force training tasks is
preparation for a variety of nontraditional security
threats and challenges. These tasks have been
mentioned frequently since 2002 and were included in
the 2006 White Paper: “Security issues related to energy,
resources, finance, information, and international
shipping routes are mounting. International terrorist
forces remain active, shocking terrorist acts keep
occurring. Natural disasters, serious communicable
diseases, environmental degradation, international
crime, and other transnational problems are becoming
more damaging in nature.”16
Later, the White Paper reports that the PLA and
PAP “dispatched over 340,000 troops to take part in
more than 2,800 emergency rescue and disaster relief
operations, involving more than 40,000 vehicles, [flew]
more than 2,000 sorties (including the use of helicopters), [and] evacuated over 3.4 million people” in 2005
and 2006.17 In addition, “PLA personnel have joined
China’s international rescue teams in international
rescue operations after the Indian Ocean tsunami and
the earthquakes in Pakistan and Indonesia.”18 The
White Paper does not give specific numbers of troops
deployed to these international rescue missions, and it
is likely that actual numbers were small.
In another nontraditional security mission, for several years China has contributed significant numbers
of military personnel and civilian police to United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. According to
UN statistics, at the end of November 2006 China had
deployed 1,659 military troops, military observers, and
civilian police to 11 UN peacekeeping missions.19

290

In a major change to Chinese foreign and military
policy prior to 2002, the PLA now engages in combined
training exercises with many countries, mainly with
nontraditional security types of scenarios. Consider
the following synopsis broadcast on a Chinese military
affairs discussion program:
Since 2002, the relevant units of our Army have held
17 joint military exercises with 14 countries, including,
in chronological order, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan,
Kazakhstan, France, India, and the United States.
Among them, four were antiterror exercises on the
ground. The first such exercise took place on October 10,
2002, namely, the joint antiterror exercise between China
and Kyrgyzstan. It was held, together with the Kyrgyz
armed forces, on Chinese soil along the border between
China and Kyrgyzstan. The first outbound joint exercise
for our Army, in which they went to another country
with their own weapons and equipment, was with the
armed forces of Tajikistan on September 22 this year.
There have been [12] more joint exercises between China
and other countries at sea. There has been just one largescale comprehensive exercise, namely, the Sino-Russian
joint military exercise from August 18-25, 2005.20

Taiwan, nontraditional security threats, and other
factors threatening social stability were named together
in the January 9, 2006, Jiefangjun Bao editorial referenced
earlier as “factors of uncertainty surrounding China,”
and then continuing as follows:
All social contradictions are influencing one another,
and the number of factors threatening social stability has
increased. Failure to appropriately prevent or handle
problems in any field could impact or put a strain on
periods of strategic opportunity that are important for
national development. All this requires the military to
make achievements within the framework of safeguarding national security and national development.21
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Fragile domestic factors reemphasize the need to
coordinate and balance military modernization
carefully with other aspects of national economic
development. In such an environment, the military
recognizes it must share resources with other national
requirements and support the national economy at the
same time the nation supports it.
With these internal constraints in mind, the PLA
focuses on deterring or preventing war. The current
White Paper makes multiple references to the PLA’s
deterrent role, as does the January 2006 Jiefangjun Bao
editorial, which uses some familiar terminology:
The most important point in ensuring that the military
satisfactorily safeguards periods of strategic opportunity
is to use the awe created by military strength to curb or
postpone the outbreak of war. In the past, we have often
said, “Maintain an Army for one thousand days to use
it for an hour.” In fact, great changes have taken place
in the connotation of the phrase “use of the military.”
Deploying military forces for the exchange of fire is one
form of “using the military.” Utilizing the great awe created
by military strength is another form of “using the military.”22
[emphasis added]

The PLA has written openly about deterrence for
several years, including a full chapter in The Science of
Military Strategy, first published in 2001. An excerpt:
Strategic deterrence is a major means for attaining the
objective of military strategy, and its risks and costs
are less than strategic operations. . . . Warfighting is
generally used only when deterrence fails and there is
no alternative. . . . Strategic deterrence is also a means
for attaining the political objective. . . . Without resolute
determination and firm volition, deterrence is feeble.23

In order to achieve effective deterrence and
accomplish its political goals (such as reunification
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of Taiwan with the mainland), China must have,
according to PLA doctrine, a capable fighting force:
“Strategic deterrence is based on warfighting. . . . The
more powerful the warfighting capability, the more
effective the deterrence.”24 Although the PLA Navy,
Air Force, and Second Artillery have leading roles
in the Taiwan scenario, the Army also maintains an
important role in deterrence with its potential to occupy
the island physically by force. But the Army’s role in
deterrence extends to many other potential scenarios.
Along China’s 22,000 kilometers of land border with
14 nations, the Army principally shoulders the task
of deterring foreign aggression or terrorist intrusions,
despite the low probability of major land invasion in
the contemporary international environment. Coping
with the potential influx of North Korean refugees is
probably a “nonconventional security threat” foremost
on the minds of PLA planners in Beijing and northeast
China. The Army is likely to take the lead in many
antiterrorist scenarios on China’s borders and shares
that responsibility with the PAP and civilian police
force throughout the country, especially in the run-up
to the 2008 Summer Olympics. A strong, disciplined
ground force also serves as a deterrent against domestic
unrest even as the Ministry of Public Security police
and the PAP are being equipped and trained to act as
the primary forces to control internal stability.
No matter what the current likelihood of any
specific scenario, the Chinese leadership understands
that the capabilities to perform any of these missions
cannot be built overnight. Therefore, the Chinese
leadership believes it must invest, to some degree, in
the entire spectrum of military capabilities required by
a growing power, especially one that is not integrated
into a web of military alliances. Land power remains
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an important component in the range of capabilities
the PLA must acquire.
Military power, however, is only one element
of comprehensive national power. China’s strategic
deterrence is built also upon its political, economic,
scientific, technological, cultural, and diplomatic
components. With the shadow of growing military
capabilities constantly in the background, Beijing is
currently using other elements of national power in an
attempt to achieve its strategic objectives.
With political loyalty as its underlying foundation
and building a credible military component for
strategic deterrence as its goal, the PLA ground forces
are engaged in the overlapping and interrelated
processes of “Army building” and “preparation for
military struggle.” If, however, at any time during
this long-term period of military modernization and
transformation China’s civilian leaders should call
upon the armed forces to accomplish a mission, the
PLA leadership will obey the orders of its chain of
command. PLA planners will put together military
force options that incorporate capabilities developed
to date, using all assets available to them, to achieve
their assigned missions. In the meantime, the PLA
leadership appears to be keeping its civilian masters
well informed of the progress the force has made, as
well as the obstacles remaining.
ARMY BUILDING, OR THE REVOLUTION
IN MILITARY AFFAIRS WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS
The concept of Army building or national defense
construction was associated with the “Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese Characteristics”
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in the 2004 White Paper, which included a complete
chapter on the “Revolution in Military Affairs with
Chinese Characteristics,” with subsections on the
following topics:
• Reducing the PLA by 200,000 personnel,
• Strengthening the Navy, Air Force and Second
Artillery Force,
• Speeding Up Informationalization,
• Accelerating the Modernization of Weaponry
and Equipment,
• Implementing the Strategic Project for Talented
People,
• Intensifying Joint Training,
• Deepening Logistical Reforms,
• Innovating Political Work, and
• Governing the Armed Forces Strictly and
According to Law.
Thus the “RMA with Chinese Characteristics” can be
interpreted to cover the entire range of elements of
PLA military modernization and transformation. In
particular, mechanization and informationalization
are essential elements. In 2006, the PLA was said to be
“speeding up the revolution in military affairs with
Chinese features and enhancing in an all-round way its
capabilities of defensive operations under conditions
of informationization.”25
PLA publications often treat the “RMA with
Chinese Characteristics” and “preparation for military
struggle” as two different concepts but with significant
overlap between them. For example, many elements
of both the “RMA with Chinese Characteristics” and
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“preparation for military struggle” are contained in
Hu Jintao’s exposition on the PLA’s historic mission:
We must continue to arm our officers and soldiers with
updated ideology, emancipate our minds further, update
our point of view, firmly establish and implement in
full the scientific development concept, break free of
traditional views and unsuitable customs and methods
which constrain the development of combat power,
boldly explore new paths, new methods, and new
measures in military training, political work, personnel
development, and integrated support, and let the historic
mission stimulate the enthusiasm of officers and enlisted
personnel throughout the armed forces to promote the
revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics and
prepare well for military struggle.26 [emphasis added]

In order to examine some of the various elements of
the military modernization process, it may be helpful to
categorize Army building and the “RMA with Chinese
Characteristics” in terms primarily of personnel,
force structure, equipment, and professional military
education, while considering preparation for military
struggle to focus on missions, doctrine, training, and
logistics, accepting, of course, that there are many
overlaps between these two broad categorizations.
Taken together, they describe the process of
modernization and transformation in the force. The
following sections discuss recent developments in the
two halves of Chinese military modernization—“RMA
with Chinese Characteristics” and preparation for
military struggle.
Personnel Policies.
Long before Hu’s scientific development concept,
the PLA was concentrating on improving the quality
of its personnel. The counterintuitive decision to
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reduce the period of conscription to 2 years in 1999
was accompanied by a concerted effort to develop a
professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.
Many observers might have predicted a longer period
of conscription was necessary to properly train soldiers
in a more technologically advanced PLA. Instead, the
years of conscription appear now to be primarily a
probation period for identifying those who might be
qualified for and interested in extending their service
as NCOs (and, to a lesser extent, as officers). Conscripts
perform a variety of necessary tasks and provide
manpower to make things run, but many technical
tasks are assigned to an expanding NCO corps.
NCOs now perform duties, such as squad leader, that
previously were assigned to conscripts, albeit in their
last years of service. They also are taking over duties
previously performed by officers, e.g., company mess
officer (an important responsibility), to the extent
that nearly 70,000 officer positions have now been
shifted to NCOs.27 Other former officer duties now
being assigned to NCOs include “aviation technician,
captain of small-sized transportation boat, electric and
mechanic chief, observation and communication chief,
navigation chief, small warehouse chief, confidential
archives keeper, club director, auto service unit head,
driving instructor, head of soldiers training unit, nurse,
and [logistics manager] in People’s Armed Forces
Departments.”28
The PLA is in the midst of a continuing process to
seek the right ratios of conscripts to NCOs to officers
and uniformed civilian cadre (wenzhi ganbu). Officers
and uniformed civilians felt the brunt of the latest
200,000-man reduction, with 170,000 such slots being
eliminated.29 Over 60,000 of the personnel eliminated
were from MR and provincial Military District (MD)
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headquarters and administrative units.30 Most, if not
all, of these personnel wore ground force uniforms. At
the same time, the absolute number of NCOs appears to
be on the increase. The process of building an educated
officer and NCO corps is enshrined in the “Strategic
Project for Talented People,” which began in August
2003 and passes milestones in 2010 and 2020.31
Perhaps as a lesson learned from other militaries, in
the past year the PLA has implemented a new personnel
policy permitting the hiring of “nonactive duty”
contract personnel. (These workers are referred to by
a number of names, including feixianyi gongqin renyuan
and wenzhi renyuan.) This new category of personnel
is composed of civilians who are hired for specific
periods of time to perform service and support tasks
in higher headquarters, noncombat units, hospitals,
schools, etc. Though they perform many of the same
functions as NCOs and PLA uniformed civilian cadre
(wenzhi ganbu), nonactive duty contract personnel are
managed separately and are not in career competition
with the wenzhi ganbu. They were first reported being
integrated into the force in the spring of 2006.32 By the
end of the year, over 20,000 NCO posts were filled
by contract civilian personnel.33 While these contract
workers wear military uniforms (without insignia or
rank) and may be required to go to the field to support
combat operations, they are not counted among the
PLA’s active duty numbers.34 There is some irony in
this development in that it occurred exactly at the end
of the reduction of 200,000 active PLA personnel.
Better pay and living standards for PLA personnel
are necessary in order to attract and retain qualified
soldiers. As living standards improve among the civilian populace, resolving quality-of-life issues is important in maintaining morale in the armed forces. Person-
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nel pay raises have been acknowledged as a significant
part of overall increases in the officially announced
Chinese defense budget over the past decade. In July
2006 on average, pay for many personnel in the PLA
doubled. Likewise, there has been a major effort to
upgrade living facilities for all forces. In late 2005,
General Logistics Department statistics reported that
“30 percent of barrack areas have reached the standard
of new-concept barracks, and 50 to 80 percent of Chinese
military barracks will be transformed in the next 10
years.”35 Construction of new barracks is underway in
all parts of the country, especially in border areas. One
general said of the improvements: “The soldiers eat
meat at every meal, can bathe every day, and can also
get on the Internet to study; when some of them go
home on leave, they can hardly wait to get back here.”
However, not all funding for new construction is new
money from central funds. The 16th Group Army’s
land sales in downtown Changchun are an example of
a policy allowing the sale of excess property to acquire
money for essential projects:
The organs and subordinate units of a group Army of
Shenyang MR originally had their barrack areas in seven
locations in three districts of Changchun City. They
took advantage of the policy of making flexible use of
real estate, and put on the market for auction scattered
barrack areas in three locations, totaling over 20,000
square meters; these were in much sought-after locations
in the city center, and thus raised 129 million yuan for
construction; through exchange they obtained all the land
needed for construction of a new barrack area and also
gained 84 million yuan in compensation. Today, their
new barrack area occupies 560,000 square meters in the
Changchun City development zone, with a construction
area of 80,000 square meters.36 [emphasis added]
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According to the report, “The whole Army now has
several thousand idle barrack areas.” This policy raises
additional questions of how widespread the practice
of land sales has become. Does anybody pay taxes on
these transactions, and how, if at all, are the proceeds
of these sales accounted for in China’s overall military
expenditures? The potential for graft and corruption
in these sales is obvious, and central oversight over
the practice is mandatory. In fact, in the summer 2006,
a 5-year effort to combat military corruption was
announced with the audit of “983 leading officers,
including 26 at army level, 135 at divisional level, and
822 at regimental level,” to determine “if there are
any irregularities involving budgetary work, building
projects, equipment procurement, investment, real
estate projects, and profitable services.”37
Force Structure.
The 2004 White Paper contained a revelation about
provincial MDs, Military Subdistricts (MSDs), and
People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs) that
surprised at least this one PLA-watcher: these local
garrison headquarters serve as elements of their
respective local governments and are under dual
command of the military from the MR headquarters and
the local governments in which they serve:
The provincial commands . . ., sub-commands, . . . and
the PAFDs of counties, autonomous counties, cities and
municipal districts concurrently act as the military service
organs of the people’s governments at corresponding levels
and are responsible for the military service work in their
respective areas under the leadership of the military organs at
higher levels and the people’s governments at corresponding
levels.38 [emphasis added]
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These various headquarters interface directly with
local government counterparts for conscription,
mobilization, demobilization, and coordination of
military needs with local economic development
requirements (using the National Defense Mobilization
Committee system), and in response to national and
local emergencies such as war or natural disasters. A
number of local governments have built joint militarycivilian command centers. In keeping with the
military’s subordinate relationship to the CCP, these
local relationships reflect a military subordinate to
local government (and party) authority, not a separate
power sitting on a mountaintop of its own.
MD headquarters command local PLA forces
(including border and coastal defense units and some
logistics units) and reserve units in the province. The
2006 White Paper changed its translation for MSD,
using the words “prefectural military commands,” not
“subcommand” as in 2004. More importantly, however,
it gave a more complete listing of MSD responsibilities:
“The main tasks of a prefectural military command are
to oversee the military training, political work, and
equipment management of the militia and reserve
force, organize and conduct wartime mobilization, and
undertake military service registration and enlistment.
Prefectural military commands in border areas are
also in charge of the military, political, logistical, and
equipment work of border defense troops as well as
border defense duties, talks, and meetings, and border
management, protection, and control.”39 In effect, this
last sentence identifies the MSD headquarters as being
in command of border defense forces.
The 2006 White Paper also included the most detailed
description of the composition and responsibilities of
PAFDs to date:
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PAFDs are organizations set up by the PLA in counties
(banners, county-level cities, or municipal districts). . . .
A people’s armed forces department consists typically
of a military affairs section, a political work section, and
a logistics section. Its main tasks are to oversee reserve
force buildup, combat readiness, military service [i.e.,
conscription], and mobilization, and command militia
operations. The grass-roots PAFDs established by the
state at the level of township (town) or sub-district are nonactive-duty organizations. They are manned by full-time
staff that are under the dual leadership of the local Party
committees and governments at the same level and
military organs at higher levels.40 [emphasis added]

This description identifies two distinct levels of PAFDs:
county-level and “grassroots-level” in townships.
County-level PAFDs are manned by active duty PLA
ground force personnel. Grassroots PAFDs, however,
are not part of the active duty PLA and instead are local
government organizations. While county-level PAFD
personnel wear ground force uniforms like all other
active duty members, grassroots PAFD cadre wear
similar Army uniforms, but with different cap and
collar insignia and rank epaulets. As local government
workers, they are paid by the local governments
despite their duties in direct support of the PLA, such
as conscription, and their role in commanding militia
units. The White Paper did not say how many grassroots
PAFD personnel are found throughout China, but the
number is likely to be significant.
Total active duty PLA ground force personnel are
estimated to amount to somewhere around 1.5 to 1.6
million personnel, including main force units; local
defense forces such as border and coastal defense
units; most personnel assigned to MR, MD, MSD, and
county-level PAFD headquarters (personnel from
other services are increasingly being assigned to the
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Joint Logistics Departments at MR headquarters and
their subordinate units); most personnel assigned
to logistics subdepartments including hospitals and
supply/repair depots; and the staff, faculty, and
students assigned to Army-related professional
military education academies and schools.
Main force units are considered “mobile combat
troops” and include group armies with their
subordinate divisions, brigades, and regiments as
well as some independent units under the command
of MR or MD headquarters. PLA Army main force
units continue to streamline their numbers and modify
their composition. As of 2007, main ground force
units are organized into 18 group armies along with a
number of independent units (divisions, brigades, and
regiments/groups).41 Maneuver forces (infantry and
armored units) consist of approximately 35 divisions
and about 42 brigades. They are supported by roughly
40 more artillery, surface-to-surface missile, air
defense, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions
and brigades, plus various functional entities such as
Special Operations Force (SOF), reconnaissance, Army
aviation (helicopter), engineer (combat and pontoon
bridge), communications, chemical defense, electronic
warfare, and “high technology” units.42 Based on this
estimated order of battle, if local forces, administrative
headquarters, nondeployable logistics and maintenance/repair depots and bases, and personnel assigned
to professional military education institutions are
subtracted from the total number of ground forces,
then the main force combat and combat support units
currently may comprise only about half of the total
ground force personnel number (somewhere around
700,000 to 800,000 personnel).43
In 2005, the PLA announced that the number of
divisions would decrease while the number of brigades
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would increase. In particular, the number of group
armies with an all-brigade structure will increase.44
Appendices I to VII show that four of the 18 group
armies (the 20th, 27th, 40th, and 47th) currently have
this structure, with organizational levels extending
from group army to brigade to battalion. Thus
organized, all-brigade group armies are much smaller
than their corps-level counterparts in the West, making
all-brigade group armies closer in size to U.S. Army
and Marine divisions.
As also can be seen from the order-of-battle listing
in the appendices, a few other group armies have only
one maneuver division assigned (the other units being
brigades). These divisions would be likely candidates
for future downsizing, if it has not occurred already.
Currently, only the 38th Group Army has an allmaneuver division structure; previously the 39th
Group Army also had this structure, but it appears that
its 190th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was recently
restructured from division size. Most group armies
now appear to be structured with a combination of
maneuver divisions and brigades, but if the 2005
announcement proves to be accurate, several of these
group armies will lose or downsize their divisions in
the future. Some or all of the estimated nine armored
divisions in the ground force inventory may be high
on the list for conversion to brigades.
As the number of divisions decrease, several infantry divisions have been reported as being restructured
to consist of two infantry regiments and one armored
regiment. Some of these divisions apparently were in
a lower readiness category and did not have organic
armored regiments in the past (a full-strength infantry
division would have had three infantry regiments and
one armored regiment, along with artillery, AAA, and
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other supporting units). This situation allowed for
one of the three infantry regiments to be converted
to an armored regiment, with new main battle tanks
used to equip some of these new armored regiments.
Restructured divisions would have fewer personnel
than full-strength divisions, but more firepower
and mobility than their predecessors. Restructured
divisions have been identified in four MRs, including
at least three divisions opposite Taiwan, suggesting
that more such divisions may already exist or others
may be restructured in the future. Currently, at least
the six infantry divisions below are believed to have a
three-regiment structure:
• 6th Independent Mechanized Division, Lanzhou
MR;45
• 37th Infantry Division/13th Group Army,
Chengdu MR;46
• 40th Infantry Division/14th Group Army,
Chengdu MR;47
• 86th Infantry Division/31st Group Army,
Nanjing MR;48
• 91st Infantry Division/31st Group Army,
Nanjing MR;49
• 121st Infantry Division/41st Group Army,
Guangzhou MR.50
The number of mechanized infantry units in
the ground force continues to grow. Following the
identification of the 149th Mechanized Infantry
Division/13th Group Army in the Chengdu MR,
mechanized units are now found in all MRs. Five
mechanized infantry brigades have also been identified
in the ground force. The 2006 White Paper notes the
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priority on building “light mechanized” units, without
defining the term. At present, only the 127th Light
Mechanized Infantry Division/54th Group Army is
specifically identified as such, though part of the 149th
Mechanized Infantry Division may also be a light unit.
The two amphibious mechanized infantry divisions
(the 1st and the 124th) in the Nanjing and Guangzhou
MRs may also be considered as light mechanized
units.51
Heavy units (all mechanized infantry and armored
units) are approaching nearly half the number
of total maneuver units in the Army. While this
element of modernization improves ground mobility,
personnel protection, and firepower, it also increases
fuel consumption and maintenance requirements.
Mechanized units are most efficiently moved over long
distances on the ground by rail or on heavy equipment
trailers, and they require special sealift capabilities
for transport over large bodies of water. From the
standpoint of unit morale, modern mechanized units
possess a cachet that many PLA ground force units
lacked in the past.
In the late 1990s, a Nanjing MR artillery brigade was
transformed to become the first ground force shortrange ballistic missile (SRBM) brigade. In 2006, PLA
Daily carried a photograph of this unit, showing it to be
equipped with the DF-11/M-11 SRBM.52 Additionally, a
second ground force SRBM brigade has been identified
in the Guangzhou MR at Shantou, though it may not
yet be operational. As of March 2006, a Guangzhou
Library website contained an entry for “Guangzhou
MR 75810 Unit, Guangdong Province Shantou Missile
Base.”53 As in the Nanjing MR, the Guangzhou MR
headquarters department has a “conventional missile
department,” indicating supervision of SRBM assets.54
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In the mid-1990s, both the 38th and 31st Group
Armies created mixed air defense brigades. This
new type of unit upgraded traditional AAA units
by integrating tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAM)
along with AAA gun units. In the following decade,
similar units were established throughout the country
so that approximately half of all group armies now
have air defense brigades. With the PLA’s emphasis
on integrated air defense operations throughout the
country, this trend is likely to continue.
Despite having both SAMs and AAA gun units in
the same organic formation, evidence suggests that
actual integration of their combat operations has been
slow to develop. As late as the summer 2006, the PLA
newspaper announced that in peacetime “different
types of AA artilleries would train separately while at
wartime they each fought in their own way, thus it was
hard for them to form an ‘iron fist of air defense’.”
However, new “digitalized equipment” has allowed
units “to form a three-dimensional fire-net to fight
simultaneously against the incoming high-altitude,
mid-altitude, and low-altitude targets.” Reportedly,
this was the first time “different AA artilleries [were]
organized into the same artillery group in a mixed way
in training as well as in combat.”55 Similar challenges
exist in integrating SAM units with AAA units, but
progress in communications connectivity and training
appears to be underway. This is an example of how
force structure, new equipment, training, and doctrine
all must be coordinated in order to turn the potentials
of new equipment into actual operational capabilities—
a process that may take years for a single unit to
accomplish and decades to be achieved throughout the
entire force.
Despite also being identified as a priority for
development, the Army’s helicopter contingent is still
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relatively small for such a large ground force. Army
Aviation units are found in each MR (sometimes
with more than one unit per region) and in a growing
number of group armies. It is nearly certain that their
numbers will continue to increase as new aircraft,
both domestic and foreign, are added to the force.
The Military Balance 2006 reports something over 375
Army helicopters of all types in two training and eight
operational regiments.56 This estimate of both the
number of airframes and units may be somewhat low,
but in any case helicopters must be a high-demand,
low-density item in the PLA.
In 2005, The Directory of PLA Personalities identified
an Army Aviation regiment in both the 26th and 54th
Group Armies in the Jinan MR, making them the
third and fourth group armies with organic helicopter
assets (others are found in the 38th and 39th Group
Armies).57 In October 2006, Jiefangjun Bao reported
on a new Army Aviation regiment in a group army
in South China, which was formed around 2004.
This fifth Army Aviation regiment subordinated to a
group army possibly is part of the 31st Group Army
in the Nanjing MR.58 The assignment of helicopter
units to group armies is important because it makes
training with the organic infantry units more routine
and less encumbered by bureaucracy than having to
go to MR headquarters to coordinate training. The
identification of the Army Aviation unit in the 26th
Group Army suggests that this formation deserves
closer attention.59
The 2006 White Paper contains a unique chapter
on “Border and Coastal Defense” which discusses the
distribution of labor among PLA forces and Ministry of
Public Security forces (including elements of the PAP)
in maintaining security along China’s land borders and
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coasts. This chapter acknowledged that “in 2003, the
PLA border defense force took over the defense of the
China-DPRK [North Korean] border and the Yunnan
section of the China-Myanmar border from the border
public security force.” Furthermore, it described the
organization of border defense units as “a three-level
structure, namely, regiment, battalion and company,”
while coastal defense units have “a five-level structure,
namely, division, brigade, regiment, battalion, and
company.”60 Although the White Paper does not go into
greater detail about the number of border and coastal
defense units, this structure is consistent with what is
known from other sources.
Based on analysis of information from a number of
Chinese websites and official media sources, the order
of battle for this portion of PLA local forces is estimated
to be approximately 57 border defense regiments,
9 border defense battalions (not part of regiments),
4 patrol craft groups, 2 coastal defense divisions, 3
coastal defense brigades, 29 coastal defense regiments,
and 4 coastal defense battalions. Border defense units
are configured mostly as light infantry, with regiments
estimated to have three battalions of three companies
plus up to an additional four companies subordinate
to regimental headquarters (for a total of up to 13
companies per regiment).61
The patrol craft groups are Army ship units tasked
to monitor inland waterways along China’s borders,
such as the Yalu or Songhua Rivers. Coastal defense
units may be infantry, artillery, or may perhaps be
equipped with surface-to-surface anti-ship cruise
missiles, such as the SILKWORM. Assuming that
these units are slightly smaller than main force units
of equivalent organization level (for example, a border
or coastal defense regiment may have as few as 2,000
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personnel), a total of approximately 200,000 Army
troops assigned to permanent border and coastal
defense responsibilities seems reasonable.
New Equipment.
Though much attention has been paid to new
weapons and equipment in the PLA Navy, Air Force,
and Second Artillery, the Army has also received
large amounts of new gear since the late 1990s. Most
of the ground forces’ new equipment is produced by
Chinese defense industries and is being distributed to
units in all MRs. Unlike the Navy and Air Force, which
have received significant numbers of several types of
weapons systems from Russia, the ground force has
mainly received only Russian Mi-17-series helicopters
and some precision-guided artillery munitions and
technology. On the other hand, Chinese defense
industries have supplied everything from new main
battle tanks, AAA guns and SAMs, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), and small arms to logistics and repair
vans and other support equipment (all part of the
“mechanization” of the force). A major element of the
new equipment entering the force is electronics, such as
night vision devices, computers, and communications
gear, produced by Ministry of Information Industry
factories (part of the drive to “informationalize” the
PLA). Many new types of electronics can be grafted
onto existing systems provided adequate sources of
electricity are available.
The Type 96 main battle tank is the most widely
distributed new tank in the force and has been
observed in units throughout the country. The Military
Balance 2006 estimates that there are some 1,200 Type
96 tanks (roughly equivalent to 12 armored regiments)
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in a force of around 8,580 total tanks.62 The more
advanced, more expensive Type 98/99 main battle
tank has been deployed in smaller numbers, estimated
at 80 for the entire Army. (This number is less than
the complement for a full armored regiment, and, if
accurate, suggests the tank may be issued in battalion
or company-size units to a few divisions or brigades.
The Type 98/99 has been seen in the 6th Armored
Division/387th Group Army in Beijing MR and in the
3d Armored Division/39th Group Army in Shenyang
MR). Both the Type 96 and Type 98/99 have appeared
in photographs as being equipped with reactive armor
to increase protection from anti-tank weapons. The
new light amphibious tank, the Type 63A, has been
issued to both ground force (about 400) and PLA Navy
Marine units (150). HQ-7 and HQ-61 mobile SAMs are
part of the new air defense brigades, along with new
AAA guns. The Type 95 quad 25mm gun/SAM selfpropelled system (PGZ 95) has also been observed in
exercises, probably as the organic air defense system
for armored or mechanized regiments. The PTL02
Assault Gun has been reported deployed to four MRs
(likely in the 127th Light Mechanized Division and
the 162nd Motorized Infantry Division in Jinan MR,
the 6th Independent Mechanized Division in Lanzhou
MR, the 121st Division in Guangzhou MR, and the
149th Mechanized Infantry Division in Chengdu
MR).63 It would also appear to be a good candidate
for deployment to the two amphibious mechanized
infantry divisions. Some long-range multiple rocket
launchers, such as the A-100 (WC232) or WS-1/2, likely
have been deployed to artillery brigades subordinate
to some group armies, but exact numbers and locations
are uncertain. A helicopter, the Z-10, designed solely
for the attack role, is under development and will likely
enter the inventory within a few years.
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PLA units such as the 149th Mechanized Infantry
Division and some SOF units are experimenting with
small all-terrain vehicles, capable of being carried
internally by Mi-17 helicopters, to increase the mobility
of infantry forces in difficult terrain (for example, for
reconnaissance units in mountains). The Type 95 5.8mm
family of small arms is gradually replacing older models
based on the AK-47 design. Of the weapons mentioned
above, a decade ago only a few examples, such as the
Type 96, PGZ 95, and HQ-7, were beginning to enter
the inventory. Significant numbers of these and other
weapons did not enter the force until around 2000 and
later.
Currently, new weapons and support equipment
are entering the ground forces in all corners of the
country. However, often complete complements of
weapons for all subordinate elements are not issued at
the same time. Thus some units likely will have mixes
of old and new weapons for some time to come. The
number of various types and modifications of many
major items of equipment (for example, The Military
Balance 2006 identifies five distinct types of main battle
tanks and three types of light tanks), many of which
are nearing the end of their operational life, would
appear to complicate both repair and maintenance
support. Some old weapons are probably kept in units
for cannibalization to keep other weapons operational.
Continuing to downsize some divisions to brigades (or
to the three-regiment structure) will require fewer new
weapons than if full-strength divisions were upgraded
completely.
Reserve Units and Militia Forces.
Since about 1998, the reserve force (which is made up
of both PLA reserve units and the militia) has undergone
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many of the same transformations and modernizations
as the active PLA. Reserve units often receive hand-medown equipment from active forces when the latter are
upgraded to new gear, but some new equipment has
also entered into the reserve force. Local governments
are instrumental in funding operational and training
requirements for the reserves and allocating space for
training areas (which recently are being consolodated
for efficiency purposes). Reserve units and militia are
now more frequently integrated into larger exercise
scenarios than in prior decades.
Army reserve units number approximately 40
divisions, 25 brigades, and several regiments.64 Prior to
1998, few if any brigade-size units were found among
Army reserve units. Since then a major development
has been the creation of a reserve logistics support
brigade in each MR. These units support both active
and reserve forces in training. A number of other types
of brigades have also been newly formed. In the spring
of 2005, four new reserve brigades were reported by
the Chinese media, three of which were AAA units:
• Zhangjiakou Army Reserve AAA Brigade,65
• Qinhuangdao Army Reserve Artillery
Brigade,66
• Yichang Army Reserve AAA Brigade,67
• Shanxi Reserve AAA Brigade.68
New reserve AAA regiments have also been reported,
but it is unclear whether these are independent units
or subordinate to existing reserve divisions. Other new
reserve Army units have been formed, such as the Tibet
Army Reserve Mixed Brigade, and reserve and militia
units to support the other services are also gradually
being formed.
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Reflecting China’s preoccupation with being
attacked by long-range aircraft and missiles, fully
one-third of the number of PLA reserve divisions and
brigades are AAA units. Urban air defense is an area
of major emphasis for the militia, with many units
reported to be training with shoulder-fired SAMs.
Another important task for the militia is repair of
civilian infrastructure—such as roads, railroads, and
electricity grids—after China is struck by long-range
weapons.
Professional Military Education.
As the PLA has downsized, its professional military
education system has also restructured in size and
course content. In the past few years, some 15 military
academies and educational institutions have been
closed, turned over to local control, reorganized, or
reformed into comprehensive military training bases to
fulfill new requirements. With the growth of the NCO
corps, NCO education at six NCO academies and in
NCO courses at officer academies has been emphasized.
Academy course content has been modified to include
instruction on the PLA’s new doctrine. The 2006 White
Paper says,
the PLA has 67 military educational institutions [total
for all services], which are divided into two types: those
for academic credentials and those for pre-assignment
education. The former offers undergraduate education
for pre-commission officers and graduate education for
officers. The latter consists of elementary, intermediate
and advanced level institutions and NCO schools, and
offers pre-assignment training and rotational training
for active-duty officers and NCOs. Some pre-assignment
educational institutions also offer graduate courses in
military science.69
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As fewer new officers are needed for the smaller
active force, the yearly intake of officers, from various
sources, has been reduced. In 2006 the number of high
school graduates entering the officer academies was
cut in half, down to 10,000 from 20,000 in previous
years.70 Also, the number of freshman national defense
students in civilian universities on PLA scholarships
was reduced to 10,000, down from 12,000 in 2005.71
The number of college graduates who are not national
defense students but who volunteer to join the PLA
after graduation is not known. For both 2005 and
2006, the number of enlisted soldiers entering officer
academies was 5,000.72
Since the beginning of 2005, three former Army
academies (at Guilin, Dalian, and Jinan) have been
transformed into regional comprehensive training
bases for individual and unit training. Soldiers and
units will rotate in and out of these bases for short
periods of time to receive a variety of individual skill
training or engage in unit drills. This change helps
accommodate the need for additional training facilities
as the ground force transforms and also reflects the
need for fewer infantry lieutenants in the downsized
force.
PREPARATION FOR MILITARY STRUGGLE
The chapter on National Defense Policy in the 2004
White Paper defined “preparation for military struggle”
as follows:
The PLA takes as its objective to win local wars under the
conditions of informationalization and gives priority to
developing weaponry and equipment, to building joint
operational capabilities, and to making full preparations
in the battlefields. Meanwhile, it adheres to the people’s
war concept and develops the strategies and tactics of
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the people’s war. To meet the requirements of integrated
and joint operations, the PLA endeavors to establish a
modern operational system capable of giving full play
to the overall efficiency of the armed forces as well as
the national war potentials. The PLA conducts more
training and exercises with specific objectives in order
to raise its capabilities in coping with various crises and
contingencies.

“Preparation for military struggle” thus concerns
itself primarily with how the PLA will fight in case it
is called upon to perform any of a variety of military
missions to win local wars. Force structure, personnel,
and equipment all contribute to the preparation for
military struggle, but its main emphasis is how to
conduct integrated joint operations with the forces
at hand. Though the Taiwan scenario currently may
rank number one on the PLA planning agenda, it is the
first among many missions the PLA believes it must
be prepared to undertake. The guidelines for training
are drawn from the universe of PLA missions: “The
missions, tasks, and responsibilities for the armed
forces are the sources of the driving force for military
training. Missions determine tasks, and tasks bring
along training.”73
Training Guidance and Trends.
All components of the PLA are focused on
improving their joint operational capabilities through
realistic training. The developments described below
fall under the rubric of “improving [Army] capabilities
in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance
maneuvers, rapid assaults, and special operations” as
laid out in the 2006 White Paper.
PLA training consists of annual regional and service
training tasks supported by a large body of guidance
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known as the “Military Training and Evaluation
Program” (MTEP). In January 2006, the General Staff
Department declared that the year’s military training
should focus on:
1. Strengthening realistic mission-oriented
training;
2. Training according to the Military Training
and Evaluation Program;
3. Exploring integrated training;
4. Giving prominence to joint training,
including operational and tactical exercises
and coordinated technical drills to increase
integrated joint operations capabilities;
5. Enhancing the information quality of officers
and men;
6. Standardized training management;
7. Regulating training evaluation and
examinations; and
8. Intensifying personnel training, including
transformation and reform of military schools
and academies to prepare personnel for
“military struggle.”74
Many of these points concentrate on fixing shortfalls
identified in the past. For example, currently
commanders and staff at all levels are attempting to
perfect the process of evaluating training and unit
readiness. In prior years, honest assessments of training
sometimes did not percolate up to higher headquarters.
Standardized tests and evaluations, including live fire
evaluations, are now conducted to judge quality of
training. Units that perform poorly often are required
to undergo remedial training before starting a new
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training cycle. Many of the training procedures the
PLA now employs would be very familiar to foreign
professional military observers.
Throughout the country, for training commanders
and headquarters staff live exercises and computer
simulations are a major emphasis. Much of this training
concentrates on individual skills, but coordinating
individual efforts as part of integrated staff planning
is also a main concern. To better coordinate staff
work, specific training for chiefs of staff has also been
conducted. To help organize and coordinate staff efforts, the PLA has experimented in grouping battlefield functions together into systems such as command
and control, intelligence, reconnaissance and early
warning, fire support, and comprehensive logistics
support so as to integrate the efforts of disparate
units.
In 2004 the senior PLA leadership determined that
all of the military’s new equipment, capabilities, and
various components of the armed forces were not
being incorporated sufficiently in much of the training
throughout the country. In response, the leadership
developed a new phrase, “integrated joint operations,”
to refocus efforts on incorporating all existing and
developing capabilities into joint training. At the
same time, Beijing assigned the Chengdu MR to take
the lead in the integrated joint training pilot project
for experimenting in how to optimize interservice
operations.75 (At least one division in Lanzhou MR
has also been assigned the duty of experimentation in
integrated joint operations.76) Much of this training is
now being conducted by the 13th Group Army and the
33rd Air Division, both headquartered in Chongqing.
The two divisions of the 13th Group Army (37th Infantry
Division and 149th Mechanized Infantry Division) are
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involved in this work. The 149th is also testing many
new items of equipment, such as small, light all-terrain
vehicles, and working closely with helicopter units in
airmobile operations training.
An important result of this experimentation
appears to be the initial steps in developing doctrine
for PLA Air Force aircraft to provide close air support
(CAS) to ground troops.77 In the past, the PLA did
not include CAS as an Air Force mission (focusing
instead on preplanned, centrally controlled battlefield
air interdiction missions to support ground forces),
but now 13th Group Army and the 33rd Air Division
appear to be exploring the tactics and techniques for
this important joint mission, much of it a result of new
communications equipment supplied to the force.
Army Aviation helicopters are also integrated into fire
support operations for ground units. Army Aviation
units continue to work with both SOF and infantry
units in all MRs to develop airmobile concepts suitable
for the PLA. Helicopter operations include air landing
of personnel, personnel descent by ropes from hovering
aircraft (“fast rope” and rappelling), external slingloading of equipment and fuel bladders, and internal
transport of light equipment, as well as reconnaissance,
fire support, command and control, electronic warfare,
and resupply.
In recent years political officers have been called
upon to increase their tactical proficiencies in military
skills. The creation of the “Three Warfares,”—psychological warfare, media war, and legal war—has given
the political officer system tactical responsibilities on the
battlefield it did not have in the past. The incorporation
of the “Three Warfares” into training and campaign
planning is an important element of “integrated joint
operations.” Small units, usually composed of soldiers
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from political departments in unit headquarters,
have been reported to practice loudspeaker and
leaflet delivery operations to demoralize the enemy
or encourage his surrender. Political officers also
perform the function of press or public affairs officers
and lawyers in battlefield headquarters. Additionally,
political officers are in the forefront of the psychological
hardening training the PLA provides its troops to
prepare them for the sights, sounds, and stresses of the
modern battlefield. Many exercises and drills include
fire, smoke, and noises to add realism to training.
Great emphasis has been placed on “new
equipment” training and functional logistics and
armament training. The Chinese defense industries
that produce the PLA’s weapons and equipment, in
conjunction with PLA research institutes and PLA
personnel serving as “Military Representatives” to
factories, have developed a wide variety of simulators
for use by units both before and after they receive new
equipment. All types of simulators are utilized to help
soldiers learn how to fire new weapons or to drive,
operate, and maintain new equipment. Many units have
built “high-tech” facilities for equipment simulators
and computers. The use of simulators is less expensive
than firing live ammunition, can be conducted more
often by more individual soldiers, and subjects actual
equipment to less wear and tear.
Effective units spend considerable time before new
equipment arrives and after it is issued to ensure that
unit personnel know how to operate and maintain the
gear. This process is not as routine as might be expected,
with reports often citing shortfalls such as the lack of
training manuals, shortage of qualified instructors or
technicians, and personnel being “scared” of using
new equipment or refusing to take it to the field. Good
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commanders, however, find innovative ways to solve
these problems with visits by experts or liaison with
other units, schools, and factories. Similar to learning
the basics of firing a weapon, logistics and armament
units also spend a lot of time ensuring that personnel
are technically trained to perform their functions in
garrison before applying the same skills to austere
field locations in support of actual troops. New means
of communications available to support troops, such
as video links and E-mail, allow soldiers in the field
to get help from the rear in diagnosing field problems
and expediting the flow of necessary supplies, spare
parts, and medical care.
An important element of many training exercises
is the deployment phase, a logistics-intensive period
which may last for several days. Units moving to
regional training areas may use their own organic
transportation, but also increasingly incorporate
multimode means, including rail movement for heavy
equipment and fixed-wing airlift for headquarters and
communications elements. In September 2006, Jiefangjun
Bao carried a front page story about a Shenyang MR
mechanized infantry brigade stationed in Liaodong
(likely the 190th Mechanized Infantry Brigade/39th
Group Army) conducting the “first” cross-regional
mobility exercise of a full brigade to a training area in
the Beijing MR. The exercise employed both road and
rail transportation for an exercise against a Beijing MR
armored brigade in Inner Mongolia.78
Though amphibious training receives the bulk of
foreign attention, units in all MRs engage in training
for many missions, such as border defense, defense
against amphibious operations, high-altitude and desert
operations, forest and urban operations, and especially
anti-terrorist operations. Active duty units routinely
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incorporate reserve units, militia forces, and civilian
support into training scenarios. In particular, local
air defense, nuclear, chemical, and biological defense,
and anti-terrorist drills frequently integrate active and
reserve PLA units, PAP, militia, civilian police forces,
and civilian support elements. These efforts are often
coordinated in joint military-civilian command posts
linked by modern communications and manned by
military, party, and government officials. Though many
foreigners believe the likelihood of mainland China
being attacked is low, PLA ground forces continue
the process of developing capabilities that cannot be
created instantly or reconstituted quickly if allowed to
atrophy.
Modern training with mechanized and informationalized forces is more expensive and harder on
equipment than foot or motorized infantry training.
New mechanized equipment and weapons with longer
ranges require larger, more complex training areas
than those for light infantry operations. Integrated
joint operations training also requires large expanses
of land, air, and sea spaces, to which the PLA often
must coordinate with local governments for access.
Amphibious Training.
Amphibious operations are among the most complex
of military operations. Such operations test individual
training and skills, functional small unit training,
and combined arms and joint operations abilities,
and especially stress staff planning and logistics
support. Much training in preparation for amphibious
operations can be accomplished at locations away from
the coast. Moreover, many military tasks practiced
anywhere in the country can be applied to amphibious
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operations. However, the reverse is also true: many
tasks undertaken during amphibious training are
equally applicable to other scenarios.
Units from the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs
(and to a lesser degree Shenyang and Beijing MRs)
practice amphibious operations annually. Over the past
decade, the percentage of ground force units that have
practiced amphibious operations to some extent might
amount to between one-quarter and one-third of the
current total ground combat force. Not all elements of
these units have trained as extensively as others, with
the two amphibious mechanized infantry divisions and
a couple of armored units probably receiving priority
for amphibious training. Some reserve and militia units
also receive amphibious training.
Based on a review of articles in PLA newspapers
from May to September 2005, it appears that unit-level
amphibious training began in July in the Nanjing,
Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs. In many cases, prior to
moving to coastal amphibious training sites, units
practiced related skills in training areas at or near their
garrison locations. Training at the shore included basic
skills, such as swimming, loading/unloading landing
craft, beach assault, logistics support, etc., often starting
with individual training and moving up to small unit
and larger exercises.
Units often stayed at amphibious training areas for
several weeks before redeploying to home stations.
Many units deployed later in the season, which
continued through September. No exercises involving
multiple divisions or brigades controlled by group
army headquarters were noted. Instead, most exercises
appeared to be under division or brigade command.
The following units could be identified in newspaper
articles; however, it is possible that only elements of
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some of these units engaged in this training, and it is
extremely probable that not all units which conducted
amphibious training have been identified in the listing
below:
• In the Nanjing MR, the 179th Motorized
Infantry Brigade/12th Group Army and an
armored division trained in July; the Anhui
reserve infantry division and a Fujian reserve
AAA regiment were also reported training that
month. In August, a Jiangxi reserve regiment
conducted basic loading and unloading
exercises, and elements of the 1st Amphibious
Mechanized Infantry Division/1st Group Army
conducted amphibious training.
• In the Guangzhou MR, a divisional reconnaissance battalion conducted amphibious
training in July, while several other units were
reported training in their barracks areas. (Later,
another reconnaissance unit or MR SOF unit may
also have been involved in maritime training.)
In August, the 163rd Division, the 124th
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, and
the Air Defense Brigade from the 42nd Group
Army, along with an armored brigade from
the region, were reported training along the
coast (though not necessarily in coordination
with each other). In early September, the 121st
Infantry Division/41st Group Army held an
amphibious operations evaluation exercise.
• In the Jinan MR, a mechanized infantry regiment
from the 127th Light Mechanized Division/
54th Group Army conducted a landing exercise
on the Bohai Bay in July. Additionally, both
the 199th Motorized Infantry Brigade and
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the 8th Armored Division of the 26th Group
Army conducted amphibious training in July.
(The 8th Armored Division was reported to
have conducted “several years of exploratory
training.”) By August, the 58th Mechanized
Infantry Brigade/20th Group Army was
engaged in training on the Yellow Sea and an
artillery brigade moved to the Bohai.
From the unit identifications above, it seems likely that
training in the Nanjing MR was under-represented in
the media compared to the amphibious training in the
Guangzhou and Jinan MRs. The number of reserve
units involved in training in the Nanjing MR may
account for the relatively small number of active units
identified. The lack of reported larger exercises may
have been the result of command attention focused on
Peace Mission 2005 and “North Sword 2005,” which
would be conducted in August and September.
In the summer of 2006, a single armored division’s
amphibious training cycle in July was reported in
multiple media sources (likely the armored division
of the 12th Group Army in the Nanjing MR).79 A close
examination of the photos in these articles revealed
that all the various reports focused on the training of a
single division in that time frame. Amphibious training
in the Jinan MR also began in July, while amphibious
training in the Guangzhou MR appears to have begun
by early August.
Peace Mission 2005.
The combined Chinese and Russian exercise,
Peace Mission 2005, was the highlight of the PLA’s
2005 training season and covered extensively by the
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news media in both countries.80 Senior Chinese and
Russian military leaders agreed to the concept of the
exercise in the summer 2004. The scenario centered
on an internationally/UN-approved intervention by
Chinese and Russian forces to prevent an internal
conflict escalating into a local war. After “opposition
forces and armed formations” (with links to “terrorists
on a global scale”) of a third country seized cities and
rural areas in the western part of the country, the
government requested outside assistance to stabilize
the situation. The mission of the combined force was to
restore constitutional order in the state with minimal
losses to the country. Both Chinese and Russian senior
military officials stated the exercise was not targeted at
any third party, country, or region.81
After planning and deployment phases, three
main exercise events occurred from August 23 to 25,
2005, off the southern coast of Shandong peninsula, at
Langyatai on the Longwan Bay southwest of Qingdao,
and inland at a training area near Weifang. A total of
about 10,000 Chinese and Russian Army, Navy, and
Air Force personnel participated in the exercise, with
approximately 1,800 Russians deploying to the exercise
area.82 All exercises were conducted within sight of
reviewing stands and were, in effect, demonstrations
of an hour or two in length, which highlighted tactical
execution of combat and live fire drills, not interactive
force-on-force maneuvers against live opponents.
The first day of the exercise focused on air and
sea blockades to gain air and sea dominance. Fighters
and long-range bombers struck at enemy air defense
systems, command and control nodes, airfields,
and armed forces. At sea, Russian forces included
an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ship, the Marshal
Shaposhnikov, and the destroyer Burnyy. Among the
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PLA Navy ships were the ASW destroyer Number
168 Guangzhou (Type 052B, Luyang I class), Number
136 Hangzhou (Sovremenny-class destroyer), Number
567 Xiangfan (Jiangwei-class frigate), and two diesel
submarines.83
On August 24, after engineer units cleared obstacles
on the beach at Langyatai, a PLA Navy marine
armored battalion, using Type 63A light amphibious
tanks, APCs, and small boats, and a Russian naval
infantry unit equipped with BTR-80s, conducted
amphibious landings in two waves of 30 to 40 vehicles
each. The landings were supported by air and naval
bombardments of shore defenses, as well as insertion of
a SOF unit delivered by 18 helicopters and a personnel
parachute drop from three transport aircraft.84 The
exercise was conducted in rainy weather, and the
Russian news media reported that two Chinese Type
63A tanks and a Russian BTR-80 sank.85
The following day the exercise moved inland where
long-range bombers and fighters delivered preparatory
fires on and around a landing zone near Weifang. A
Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft flew overhead (implying
its control of these activities) and in-flight refueling was
demonstrated. Chinese and Russian Il-76 transports
in flights of four aircraft each dropped three airborne
armored assault vehicles per aircraft. Two more IL76s each dropped 86 paratroopers to link up with the
vehicles on the ground.
The airdrops were supported by electronic jamming
aircraft, fighters, and helicopter gunships. A flight of 18
helicopters followed by a second flight of 9 helicopters
inserted infantry (perhaps including more SOF troops)
into the battle area. Once on the ground, the airborne
forces linked up with elements (at least a regiment)
from the 127th Light Mechanized Infantry Division/
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54th Group Army, and all forces conducted a livefire demonstration against “enemy” forces that had
retreated into defensive positions. This final ground
assault was also supported by Air Force fighters.86 The
exercise, which included Type 96 main battle tanks,
WZ-551 armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled
artillery, was called a “forced isolation” drill to isolate,
surround, and annihilate enemy forces.87
Peace Mission 2005 displayed many elements
of modern joint operations over a limited period of
time in front of senior officials from both countries.
It demonstrated that the PLA and Russian military
understand the complexity of modern campaigns and
can plan, deploy, support, and control medium-sized
military formations for a few days. The number (up to
18) and types (attack and transport) of PLA helicopters
used in the mission reflected an increase over Army
Aviation capabilities seen in previous years. Moreover,
it is rare for PLA ground forces, SOF, airborne, and
marines all to be integrated into a single exercise
scenario in relatively close proximity to each other.88
To be sure, Peace Mission 2005 was a major step
in the size, scope, and complexity for the two forces
acting together. Nonetheless, the demonstrations were
mainly military choreography to demonstrate the type
of improvements in capabilities acquired by the PLA
in recent years and the continuing relevance of the
Russian military to international events. (Peace Mission
2005 was one of four military exercises conducted by
the Russian armed forces beginning on August 16.89)
The exercise was also a venue to exhibit the capabilities
of Russian hardware for potential future sales. Forces
actually involved in the exercise were too limited
in number to be effective against a modern enemy
larger than a small conventional force or guerrilla
organization. Total ground forces involved equated to
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less than a division, including all Army, SOF, airborne,
and marine units from both the Chinese and Russian
sides.
Outside commentaries on Peace Mission 2005
varied in their conclusions. One saw, or thought it
saw, “all components of a Taiwan invasion plan.”90
Another saw the exercise as “patently unrealistic
against a terrorist organization, but quite suitable for
operations against a regional naval power . . . aimed
squarely at the governments in Pyongyang and Tokyo,
to pressure North Korea to go back to the six party
nuclear talks and Japan over its border claim to the
Kurils.”91 Still another viewed the exercise as “hardly
applicable to situations of ethnic conflict and even less
so to modern counterguerrilla operations.”92 These
observers appeared to see only what they wanted
to see and were dismissive of the stated scenario as
disingenuous on the part of the Chinese and Russians.
While caution in judging exercise scenarios is always
advised, sometimes announced scenarios may actually
reflect true political objectives.
When the Chinese leadership wants to send a
message to Taiwan, it has no qualms about doing it
directly. An excellent example is found in media
descriptions of amphibious exercises on and near
Dongshan Island, which “closely resembles the west
coast of Taiwan,” in 2004:
Dongshan Island exercises in the past have usually been
conducted in three phases. Phase 1 was information
war, with the focus on electronic countermeasures and
paralyzing the enemy’s communications and command
systems. Phase 2 was a tri-service, Navy, Army, and Air
Force sea crossing and landing operation. This mainly
involved simulated missile attacks, air raids, a nighttime
airborne landing, an Army-Navy island landing assault,
special forces units attacking ports and airfields, and
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practice in street fighting. Phase 3 was counterattack
against enemy reinforcements. Mainly this has been a
simulated intervention by the U.S. Pacific Fleet. . . .93

In the case of Peace Mission 2005, most obviously,
the exercise area was held outside the Taiwan
Strait (it seems unlikely that Moscow would have
anything to gain by using this exercise in a blatant
effort to intimidate Taiwan). Moreover, there was no
reported use of ballistic missiles and little emphasis on
information operations in Peace Mission 2005. Neither
of the Army’s two amphibious mechanized infantry
divisions was involved in the exercise. Yet, all of these
omitted elements are considered major factors in any
expected campaign against Taiwan. But perhaps most
importantly for Washington, there was no indication of
a Phase 3—prevention of intervention by the U.S. fleet
(which would occur far away from shore)—something
Moscow would certainly be reluctant to include as
an intended message from this exercise. So while
the actions on display in Peace Mission 2005 indeed
could be used in a campaign against Taiwan, nearly
any military exercise contains elements that could be a
component of operations against Taiwan or any other
potential enemy. (What military operation would not be
considered a “component of a Taiwan invasion plan”?
An anti-terrorist exercise perhaps?) But objectively
speaking, significant aspects of an expected Taiwan
scenario were not included in the actual exercise.
The criticism that Peace Mission 2005 operations
were inappropriate for anti-terrorist, ethnic conflicts, or
counterguerrilla operations seems to ignore the history
of U.S. (and UN) operations in Somalia in 1992 and
1993 (which led off with an amphibious assault and
eventually developed into fighting emphasizing SOF
and helicopter operations); allied operations against
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the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 (which highlighted
airborne operations and SOF supported by long-range
bombers, fighters, and precision-guided munitions, as
well as a naval blockade offshore); or, more recently,
the 2006 Israeli incursion into south Lebanon against
the guerrilla Hezbollah enemy (which was centered
on tank, infantry, and artillery teams supported by
helicopters and fighters, also supported by a naval
blockade and precision bombing). Put into a larger
perspective, it is at least conceivable that actions taken
during Peace Mission 2005 were consistent with the
exercise’s stated scenario.
North Sword 2005.
A little more than a month after Peace Mission 2005,
a much larger PLA joint operation was conducted in
Inner Mongolia with several dozen foreign observers
in attendance, including U.S. representatives. Though
this exercise was considerably larger than Peace
Mission 2005 and also included airborne operations,
it was hardly noticed by the foreign press. As usual,
however, the Chinese news media had several detailed
descriptions of North Sword 2005.
In late September 2005, elements from two PLA
armored divisions, Army Aviation units, and a
PLA Air Force airborne division with supporting
transportation and aviation units—numbering up to
16,000 personnel—conducted a four-stage exercise
at Beijing MR’s Zhurihe Combined Arms Tactical
Training Base. The four phases included a change in
unit alert level, long-range deployment and mobility,
live-fire evaluation of armored and artillery units, and
combat execution.94 Foreign observers were present
for only 1 day of the final phase, September 27, which
consisted of a force-on-force exercise of Blue Force
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versus Red Force. The entire sequence of events would
likely have taken approximately 2 weeks from alert to
redeployment.
Although Chinese news reports usually spoke
of two armored divisions in the exercise, the total
number of troops involved (10,000 to 16,000) would
indicate that both divisions did not participate at full
strength. The Red Force was reportedly made up of
elements of an armored division (said to have “the
most advanced equipment and the greatest degree
of digitization of our Army’s armored units”), an air
defense unit with SAM missiles, an electronic warfare
unit, a helicopter unit, and other combat forces. The
Blue Force was composed of elements of an armored
division, an airborne element, and a repair battalion.
Altogether over 2,800 tanks and other vehicles such
as APCs, self-propelled artillery, command vehicles,
trucks, and jeeps were said to be in the exercise, the
“largest field maneuver” involving armored troops.95
One report noted “several thousand airborne troops
transported over 2,000 kilometers,” which would
indicate an airborne regiment from one of the two
15th Airborne Army divisions stationed near Wuhan.
This drill was alleged to be both “the largest-scale
long-range movement” and the first airborne exercise
against an armored force in unfamiliar conditions.
The confrontational exercise began the day before
the observers arrived with a Red Force preemptive
attack on the Blue Force “stealthily” moving toward
Red’s assembly areas.96 Initial operations included a
day-long series of combined arms task force attacks
and counterattacks, supported by helicopters and
electronic warfare. At the end of the first day, Blue
and Red Forces had reestablished their lines and were
planning for the next day’s operations.
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Just prior to the Red Force’s resumption of the
offensive on the second day (when the foreign observers
were present) at about 10 a.m., the Blue Force launched
a ground counterattack supported by an airdrop of
personnel, materiel, and heavy equipment behind
Red lines. Blue Force helicopters, fighters, bombers,
and ground attack aircraft—protected by airborne
jamming of enemy radars—delivered preparatory
fires throughout the battlefield. Blue Force SOF teams
attacked Red SAM units to eliminate that threat to
Blue air operations. UAVs circled above to provide
intelligence for the Blue Force. Units employed
fake buildings as camouflage to conceal armored
vehicles, most likely self-propelled artillery, from Red
observation in the desert.97
Faced with enemy to his front and rear, the Red Force
commander ordered that “most of his force” remain in
place to block the Blue advance while three combined
arms teams counterattacked the paratroopers to the
rear. In the process of this maneuver, the Blue Force
dropped dummies as a deception and also delivered
“a large number of antitank mines” to protect a flank
from Red Force assault. Though the mines delayed the
Red advance, mine clearance vehicles were brought
forward, and the Red units were able to conduct an
encircling maneuver around the Blue airborne force.
Blue Force airborne assault vehicles were no match
for the heavy Red Forces, resulting in the decision for
the airborne force to scatter and rely on additional
support from commandos and armed helicopters. The
remainder of the day was a continuation of attack and
counterattack by both forces.
The entire exercise was monitored in the training
area’s command center using various video and
computer systems. Umpires controlled the maneuvers
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in the field and laser simulation devices were employed
to assess firing accuracy.
If the Chinese reports are accurate, this exercise
demonstrated many elements of integrated joint
operations executed at division level that the PLA has
emphasized since 2004. These include combined arms
operations; airborne assault; battlefield air support;
information operations including use of UAVs and
deception activities; SOF or commando raids; and
obstacle emplacement and clearing actions. It is
noteworthy that the entire exercise took place during
the day, and it is likely the airborne operations had
been planned well in advance in order for the forces to
arrive in the training area on time. A proper evaluation
of unit readiness and exercise realism is difficult when
based only on news media reports, but on-the-scene
military observers had a unique opportunity to judge
for themselves the success of many elements of the
PLA modernization program.
However, some 9 months later, the 2006 report on
the Chinese military by the U.S. Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) made no mention of this exercise
or the participation of U.S. observers. By ignoring the
exercise’s existence, the Pentagon spared itself the
obligation to comment on its content and importance.
Instead, the report chose to emphasize China’s lack of
transparency, calling such activities “secondary areas
of military activity,” an undefined and apparently
pejorative description.98 Likewise, the Pentagon has
never made any official comment about insights by
U.S. observers who attended the first North Sword
exercise in 2003. The presence of U.S. observers at both
of these exercises and the amount of coverage by the
Chinese press actually presents a rare opportunity to
evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the Chinese
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reports against what the U.S. observers actually saw
and heard while at the exercise. Such an assessment
would be very useful to analysts, both inside and
outside the U.S. Government, who use the Chinese
media as a primary and supplementary source for
information about the PLA. As for “transparency,” the
opportunity to observe the PLA in action at division
level in a joint operation and compare that reality to the
tenor of media coverage simply did not exist a decade
ago.
PLA SELF-ASSESSMENTS
Outsiders with access only to Chinese news media
reports (including both official and unofficial sources
of information) must use great caution in coming to
conclusions about PLA readiness and capabilities.
To be sure, not all media reports are equal, and
some certainly have greater authority than others.
While over time many general trends and points of
emphasis can be discerned, some specific capabilities
and linkages to specific units can be manipulated
through inaccurate reporting (intentional or not) or
simple omission (e.g., not reporting important events).
An argument can be made that the General Political
Department propaganda (“publicity”) department has
reason to either exaggerate capabilities or understate
progress depending on the target audience and topic.
The General Political Department unquestionably has
the ability to undertake concerted deception efforts in
war or peace, which could be sophisticated enough to
outwit attempts to double check sensitive information
it seeks to protect. But the political system also has the
mission to maintain morale in the force and educate
the troops in their efforts at force modernization. So
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some degree of “truth in advertising” is required in the
official news media.
With those caveats in mind, there is value to reading
PLA self-criticism in its official new outlets. Though
the Chinese military press acknowledges progress
in developing PLA capabilities, authoritative essays
repeatedly point out gaps that exist between PLA
capabilities and requirements for modern combat.
Shortcomings include personnel education and training
levels, command and staff training, technological and
equipment levels, training in joint operations, and
funding available to the military. Examples of selfassessments from Beijing in 2006 include the excerpts
below; regional and service newspapers provide many
similar examples reinforcing and expanding upon
these topics:
General Assessments.
There is a gap between the current level of modernization
in our military and the requirement that must be met in
order to win regional informatized wars, there is still a
gap between the current military power of our military
and the requirement of fulfilling the historic mission of
our military for the new period of the new century, and
there are still some contradictions and problems in the
military work that must be tackled as soon as possible.99
At present, our military has yet to finish its tasks related
to mechanization construction and is in the initial period
of comprehensive development of informatization
construction. The overall level of military skills is still
low, informatized means used for military training have
yet to be sufficient, and the model in which combat
effectiveness is created has yet to completely shift to
reliance on science and technology.100
Now our Army has made tremendous achievements
in building itself, but it is also faced with the problems
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that its level of modernization does not meet the
requirements of winning local war under informatized
conditions and that its military capability does not meet
the requirements of carrying out its historic missions
at the new stage of the new century. Deep-seated
problems need to be solved urgently, and some major
relationships need to be grasped scientifically. . . . Ours
is a large developing country, and the contradiction
between the demand of Army modernization and the
inadequate input will exist for a long time to come. So
we should pay more attention to scientific management,
optimize the allocation of resources, and increase the
comprehensive efficiency of their utilization. . . . We
should energetically carry forward the spirit of hard
struggle, always implement the principle of building the
Army through diligence and thrift, and do a good job
in managing and using the limited military expenditure.
This has provided an important method for our Army to
follow the road of modern development with less input
but higher efficiency and of bringing about faster and
better development.101

Lack of Funds.
However, China is a large developing country. Money
is needed in many aspects. The contradiction between
the needs of military modernization construction and
the short supply of funds will exist for the long run.
Satisfactorily managing and using limited financial
resources offered by the national government is a very
practical issue before us.102
All-round national economic strength is continually
rising, but in terms of China as a large developing country,
our national economic strength is not yet powerful, and
the scale of our national defense expenditure is very
limited. We cannot compare our national defense input
with developed countries; we must follow a road of
national defense and Army modernization with Chinese
characteristics in which expenditure is relatively small
but returns are relatively high. In the management and
use of national defense expenditure, we have always
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persisted in the guideline of building the Army with
diligence and thrift, waged arduous struggle, done
everything in diligent and thrift fashion, cherished and
used well the money earned by the people’s blood and
sweat, used the limited national defense expenditure
in maintaining normal operation of the world’s most
numerous Army, ensured the smooth promotion
of preparations for military struggle, promoted the
development of building all undertakings, and provided
an effective security guarantee for safeguarding national
security and stability and the period of strategic
opportunity for economic and social development.103

Lack of Qualified Personnel.
At present, the quality of our officers and soldiers has
comparatively improved. However, there is still a gap
between the current level and the requirements that must
be met in order to win wars. The low level of military
quality and scientific and cultural quality has remained
a noticeable problem with the structure of the quality of
officers and soldiers. A serious shortage of professionals
for commanders of joint operations and professional
technicians is still apparent. All of these problems hold
back and impede the development of military capability
building.104
Some comrades think more about their personal
interests than about their work and the cause. They rush
to express their attitudes toward directives given by
the higher-ups but do not make firm efforts to do solid
work. Formalism and bureaucracy are rampant among
some comrades. They are self-complacent, making
appeals but not conducting profound investigations and
studies. They pursue only superficially great momentum
but ignore effectiveness in reality. Some comrades
do not work responsibly in daily work and are afraid
of shouldering responsibilities for problems. Some
comrades are “yes men.” They avoid contradictions, shy
away from tough problems, and are loose in regulating
their subordinates.105
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Problems in Joint Training.
At present, our military is still comparatively weak in
joint training. Some commanders have yet to strengthen
their awareness of joint operations, the leadership and
administrative framework and the operating mechanism
for joint operations have yet to be completed, joint
[operations with real troops] are still insufficient and
there is still a comparatively wide gap between the
current joint operation abilities and the requirements of
actual battles.106

Technology Gap.
Over recent years, our military has made leapsand-bounds progress in weaponry and armaments
construction. However there is still a considerable gap
between the current level and the requirement that must
be met in order to effectively fulfill the historic mission
of our military in the new period of the new century.107
However, there is a considerable gap between China
and big military powers in the world. In light of the
circumstance that we are weaker than others in “steel,” we
must be very strong in “morale.” . . . Being satisfactorily
prepared for military struggle is the most important, the
most realistic, and the most urgent strategic task that
is not only currently lying before our military, but also
undoubtedly the best activity through which to cultivate
the fighting spirit.108
At present, our military modernization construction
is in the initial period in which mechanization, semimechanization, and informatization develop together.
This determines that exploration in integrated training—
which is related to mechanization, semi-mechanization,
and informatization—is also in the initial period and our
achievements in mechanization, semi-mechanization,
and informatization are also in the initial [stage].109
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Several of the assessments above were taken from
a series by four “Contributing Commentators” in the
Jiefangjun Bao, written from the perspective of each
of the four General Departments from August 6 to
9, 2006. But as also can be seen, similar evaluations
could be found in the months before and afterward.
PLA leaders at all levels understand that the process
of modernizing and transforming the entire force is
a long-term effort and have set the target date of the
year 2020 for completion of personnel and equipment
efforts. Achieving the status of an upper tier, advanced
military could take even longer. This is exactly the
meaning of the “three-step development strategy”
identified in the 2006 White Paper.
However, if so ordered by the government and party
before it has completely achieved its modernization
goals, the PLA will follow the command of China’s
civilian leadership and utilize its best units in the most
appropriate way, supported by a large civilian effort,
to achieve the political and military goals assigned.
The self-assessments included above were not
unique to the spring and summer of 2006. Many
similar articles could be found in previous years. Even
so, the 2006 OSD Annual Report to Congress on the
military power of China alleged that “misperception”
could lead to miscalculation or crisis: “China’s leaders
may overestimate the proficiency of their forces by
assuming new systems are fully operational, adeptly
operated, adequately supplied and maintained,
and well integrated with existing or other new
capabilities.”110 While such a possibility “may” exist,
even a cursory review of Chinese self-assessments
available to the Pentagon reveals a much different
degree of self-knowledge in the PLA than suggested
by the OSD report. The self-evaluations listed above
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also do not support the conclusion of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission that
“the Chinese military may be able to assimilate new
weapons systems and technology at a more rapid pace
than other nations.”111
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence concerning personnel, force structure,
equipment, and training developments outlined in
this chapter reveals a ground force in all parts of the
country modernizing to prepare to undertake a variety
of military missions if called upon to do so. Moreover,
based on authoritative articles in the military press, the
senior leadership of the PLA appears to have a realistic
understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses
of the force.
Subtle indicators of widespread progress in the
Army are Beijing’s decisions to dispatch troops from
Chengdu MR to participate in the UN peacekeeping
mission in Lebanon, from the Jinan MR for the mission
in Sudan, and from the Shenyang and Nanjing MRs
in Liberia.112 Assigning responsibility for high-profile
missions to units outside of Beijing shows confidence
in the abilities of these units and also gives other
headquarters exposure to some of the complexities
of planning for and executing overseas operations,
especially when extended over several rotation
periods. Though these deployments are conducted
under administrative (i.e., noncombat) conditions
and are relatively small in scale—about a battalion in
strength per mission—they are not common operations
conducted by the PLA. Successful completion of realworld missions also helps build morale in commands
all over the country and increases the prestige of the
PLA with the Chinese people.
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Graft, corruption, and bribery are problems in the
general Chinese society and spill into the armed forces.
As the PLA modernizes, it will continue to fight the
battle against corruption, particularly as more money
becomes available to the force and increased interaction
with local civilian logistics support companies becomes
the norm. An insight into the scope of this challenge
was provided by an article appearing in several
Chinese news media outlets concerning the misuse of
military vehicles, even in the capital city under the nose
of the CCP and PLA headquarters: “Troops stationed
in Beijing have made progress toward standardization
and modernization, but loopholes in management, idleness,
and demoralization among a few military units are eroding
the Army’s reputation.” (emphasis added)113 As the PLA
seeks to be a model for society, such problems will
likely result in rectification campaigns for many years to
come. The full extent of many disciplinary and morale
problems in the PLA is unlikely to be publicized widely
in the Chinese news media, yet morale and discipline
are important components of military readiness.
Some of these problems may be mitigated as the
PLA becomes smaller and its personnel more highly
educated and technically competent—two trends that
are certain to continue. Although no specific plans for
future personnel reductions have been announced,
the active duty PLA ground force probably is still not
optimized for the missions it faces and could probably
be cut by at least another 100,000 without losing
combat effectiveness. Ironically, a “right size” ground
force will likely be a smaller but more capable force
with more money spent on fewer units and personnel
than at present.
In particular, the Army probably has more main
force infantry units than it needs. Some infantry troops
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can be eliminated by downsizing more divisions to
brigades or restructuring them with fewer regiments
(as has been done in recent years). As the ground force
becomes more mechanized and more mobile, perhaps
additional units can be deactivated completely because
of the creation of more flexible, powerful units. The PLA
likely has too many local headquarters, administrative
offices, and schools—most of which are manned by
ground force personnel. If the new program of hiring
“nonactive duty” contract personnel proves effective,
additional active duty members could be shed,
especially in the logistics fields. A concurrent growth
in the number of reserve units is likely as the ground
force modernizes and continues to reduce its size.
As the country’s transportation infrastructure
improves, especially its super highways and railroads,
some units might be reduced because similar units
from other parts of the country will be able to deploy
across regions more rapidly than in the past. Land
deployments, however, will require sufficient heavy
equipment trailers and other support vehicles to
transport tracked vehicles over long distances and
continued training on rail deployments. Another
key transportation factor will be increased air and
sea lift provided by the Army’s sister services and
civilian support organizations to enable it to move
long distances using joint capabilities. Ultimately,
an appreciably smaller ground force transported by
considerably larger air and sea forces will be necessary
for China to project significant land power beyond
its borders. Such a force will also require appropriate
air and sea capabilities to defend it en route to its
destination.
One component of the ground forces that may not
be reduced in size proportionately is the PLA border
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and coastal defense force. Though technological
improvements in communications, transportation,
night vision, and intruder detection will enhance border
surveillance efforts, the length of China’s borders
and the existence of terrorist, extremist, or separatist
elements on its periphery, as well as uncertainty about
stability in North Korea, argue for maintaining a
credible force on the borders to deter overt violence
and control illegal activities. But border and coastal
defense units, along with most other local force units,
would not likely be used for offensive force projection
missions.
Though the PLA apparently has yet to make a major
change to the ratio of ground to air and sea forces, a
completely modernized PLA is likely to see growth in
the relative sizes of the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second
Artillery at the expense of the Army.114 The appropriate
mix will take years, if not decades, to materialize (and
will be much more costly than a motorized ground
force). The composition of the future force, particularly
if it entails a large increase in the size of the PLA Navy
and Air Force, may also reveal something about China’s
intentions for its use. An indicator of a major move in
the direction of greater “jointness” for the PLA, and
especially for force projection, may be the assignment
of a naval or Air Force officer to command a coastal MR.
In the end, however, Chinese military planners and
political leaders will likely seek to retain a relatively
large ground force (somewhere around half of the total
PLA115) to protect its borders, deter and repel potential
invaders, provide options for land force projection in
defense of Beijing’s declared sovereign territory, and
serve as a reminder to the Chinese population that
the ground force is the government’s and party’s final
line of defense to preserve domestic stability. This last
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mission is especially relevant if the size of the PAP is
only 660,000 as reported in the 2006 White Paper and
not up to 1.5 million as estimated by foreign analysts.
At this stage in the PLA’s modernization process,
judging from their official statements, China’s senior
military leaders do not appear to be overly eager to
test their forces’ capabilities in battle. They still see the
need for up to 15 years before personnel improvement
and equipment modernization programs play out. The
longer the time frame the better, because it gives the
forces more opportunity to practice their new doctrine
using all elements and capabilities created in recent
years. PLA officers understand the value of sweat on
the training field in preparing the force for potential
missions and realize that no single silver bullet will
solve their military problems. At the same time, as it
builds its strength, the PLA’s new equipment and more
complex exercises (both those that actually improve
capabilities, as well as the firepower demonstrations
put on for psychological impact) help in demonstrating
China’s determination to build its multidimensional
strategic deterrence posture. Yet, as loyal servants of the
CCP, the PLA leadership will obey its civilian leaders
if ordered to use force against enemies threatening the
party or state.
The PLA ground force of 2007 looks quite different
from its predecessor in the mid-1990s. In 2020, it will be
different still—likely significantly smaller and seeking
to establish a role for itself in a more maritime-oriented
overall force. However, the PLA’s improvement in
capabilities in absolute terms (as measured against
itself) is only half of the equation for victory. Future
PLA capabilities must also be measured relative to the
capabilities of potential opponents and the likelihood
that they, too, will continue to modernize and improve
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their own capabilities. No matter how much the PLA
“mechanizes” and “informationalizes,” future combat
will not be any easier for it than in its light infantry
days. More depends on the intellectual capabilities of
the PLA’s officers and NCOs to plan for and execute
a new and unproven joint doctrine, the battlefield
techniques and procedures they have developed
through realistic training, and their ability to adapt
to changing circumstances, than on the capabilities of
any single weapon or weapons system the force may
acquire in coming years.
Barring a major internal economic setback, it seems
inevitable that Beijing will continue to increase the resources available to the military. But the force also faces
constantly increasing costs for personnel, operations,
and equipment. Unless official defense budgets are
increased by even larger percentages than those of the
last decade, it is likely the PLA will continue to stress
economizing and the efficient use of centralized funds
by its relatively large force, along with an unknown
amount of support from local governments and an
uncertain boost from other sources of income.
The PLA’s missions may be modified as China
grows and the international situation changes. New
circumstances require close attention by China’s
neighbors and the United States. New evidence must be
gathered and additional analysis undertaken to ensure
that developments in the ground force are understood
in the context of overall PLA modernization. Despite
the important changes underway in the other services,
it appears the Army will likely continue to be the single
largest major component of the PLA for some time into
the future. The ground force should not be overlooked
in our zeal to understand the other dimensions of
China’s “non-transparent” military.
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APPENDIX I
SHENYANG MILITARY REGION FORCES
16th Group Army, Changchun, Jilin.
46th Motorized Infantry Division, Changchun, Jilin
48th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Tonghua, Jilin
68th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Qiqihar, Heilongjiang
69th Motorized Infantry Division, Harbin, Heilongjiang
4th Armored Division, Meihekou, Jilin
Artillery Brigade, Yanbian, Jilin
AAA Brigade, Changchun, Jilin
39th Mechanized Group Army, Liaoyang, Liaoning.
115th Mechanized Infantry Division, Yingkou, Liaoning
116th Mechanized Infantry Division, Haicheng, Liaoning
190th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Benxi, Liaoning
3rd Armored Division, Siping, Jilin
Artillery Brigade, Liaoyang, Liaoning
Air Defense Brigade, Liaoning
Chemical Defense Regiment
Army Aviation Regiment
40th Group Army, Jinzhou, Liaoning
Unidentified (UI) Motorized Infantry Brigade, Yixian,
Liaoning
UI Motorized Infantry Brigade, Chifeng, Inner Mongolia
5th Armored Brigade, Fuxin, Liaoning
Artillery Brigade, Jinzhou, Liaoning
AAA Brigade, Jinzhou, Liaoning
Units Subordinate to MR or MD
191st Motorized Infantry Brigade, Dandong, Liaoning
Army Aviation Regiment
ECM Regiment
Special Operations Dadui, Huludao, Liaoning
High-Technology Reconnaissance Bureau, Shenyang
Border and Coastal Defense Units
Heilongjiang
1st Border Defense Regiment, Dongning
2nd Border Defense Regiment, Mishan
3rd Border Defense Regiment, Raohe
4th Border Defense Regiment, Fuyuan
5th Border Defense Regiment, Luobei
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Jilin

6th Border Defense Regiment, Jiayin
7th Border Defense Regiment, Heihe
8th Border Defense Regiment, Tahe
9th Border Defense Regiment, Mohe
1st Patrol Craft Group, Jiamusi
2nd Patrol Craft Group, Heihe

1st Border Defense Regiment, Linjiang
2nd(?) Border Defense Regiment, Tumen
3rd Border Defense Regiment, Hunchun
Patrol Craft Group, Ji’an
Liaoning
Border Defense Regiment, Dandong
Coastal Defense Regiment, Haiyangdao
Coastal Defense Regiment, Zhangzidao
Coastal Defense Regiment, Shichengdao
4th Coastal Defense Regiment, Guangludao
Coastal Defense Regiment, Zhuanghe
Logistics Subdepartments and Units
1st Subdepartment, Jilin, (merged with
Subdepartment)
2nd Subdepartment, Shenyang, Liaoning
4th Subdepartment, Jinzhou, Liaoning
40th Subdepartment, Qiqihar, Heilongjiang
Army Ship Transport Group

former

3rd

Reserve Units
Liaoning Army Reserve 192nd Infantry Division, Shenyang
Liaoning Army Reserve 1st AAA Division, Shenyang
Liaoning Army Reserve 2nd AAA Division, Dalian
Liaoning Jinzhou Reserve Logistics Support Brigade
Liaoning Army Reserve Communications Regiment, Anshan
Jilin Army Reserve 47th Infantry Division, Jilin city
Jilin Reserve Artillery Division, Changchun
Jilin Reserve Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, Baicheng
Jilin Reserve AAA Brigade, Changchun
Jilin Army Reserve Communications Regiment, Tonghua
Reserve Water Supply Engineer Regiment
Heilongjiang Army Reserve Infantry Division
Heilongjiang Army Reserve AAA Division, Daqing
Heilongjiang Reserve Artillery Brigade
Reserve AAA Brigade, Jiamusi, Heilongjiang
Heilongjiang Army Reserve Chemical Defense Regiment,
Harbin
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APPENDIX II
BEIJING MILITARY REGION FORCES
27th Group Army, Shijiazhuang, Hebei
235th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Xingtai, Hebei
80th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Luquan, Hebei
188th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Xinzhou, Shanxi
UI Armored Brigade, Handan, Hebei
7th Armored Brigade, Datong, Shanxi (Blue Force for the
Combined Arms Training Base in Inner Mongolia)
Artillery Brigade, Handan, Hebei
AAA Brigade, Shijiazhuang, Hebei
38th Mechanized Group Army, Baoding, Hebei
112th Mechanized Infantry Division, Baoding, Hebei
113th Mechanized Infantry Division, Baoding, Hebei
6th Armored Division, Nankou, Beijing
6th Artillery Brigade, Pinggu, Beijing
Mechanized Air Defense Brigade, Shijiazhuang, Hebei
Chemical Defense Regiment
Army Aviation Regiment, Baoding, Hebei
65th Group Army, Zhangjiakou, Hebei
193rd Division (“Red 1st Division”), Xuanhua, Hebei
194th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Huai’an County, Hebei
UI Motorized Infantry Brigade, Chengde, Hebei
UI Armored Brigade, Zhangjiakou, Hebei
14th Artillery Brigade, Huailai, Hebei
Beijing Garrison
1st Garrison Division, Beijing
3rd Garrison Division, Shunyi
Tianjin Garrison
196th Infantry Brigade, Yangcun, Tianjin municipality
1st Armored Division, northern Tianjin municipality
(the subordination of this unit to Tianjin Garrison is
speculative)
Other Units Subordinate to MR or MD
205th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Hohhot, Inner Mongolia

362

UI Motorized Infantry Brigade, Datong, Shanxi
AAA Brigade
Special Operations Dadui, Daxing, Beijing
Engineer Brigade, Nankou, Beijing (UN PKO force)
Engineer Water Supply Regiment
Border Defense Units
Inner Mongolia
1st Border Defense Regiment, Wulatezhongzhen
2nd Border Defense Regiment, Erlianhaote
3rd Border Defense Regiment, Dongwuzhumuqinzhen
4th Border Defense Regiment, Ejinazhen
5th Border Defense Regiment, Baotou Guyang
6th Border Defense Regiment, Haila’er
7th Border Defense Regiment, Manzhouli
8th Border Defense Regiment, Xinbaerhuzuozhen
9th Border Defense Regiment, A’ershan
Patrol Craft Group
Logistics Subdepartments and Units
5th Subdepartment, Taiyuan, Shanxi
6th Subdepartment, Fengtai, Beijing
7th Subdepartment, Shijiazhuang, Hebei
8th Subdepartment, Tianjin
Reserve Units
Beijing Garrison Reserve AAA Division
Beijing Garrison Reserve Chemical Defense Regiment
Tianjin Army 1st Reserve AAA Division
Hebei Army Reserve Artillery 72nd Division, Tangshan
Hebei Army Reserve Infantry Division, Shijiazhuang
Hebei Army Reserve Artillery Brigade, Qinhuangdao
Hebei Army Reserve AAA Brigade, Zhangjiakou
Hebei Army Reserve Brigade, Handan
Hebei Langfang Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade
Shanxi Army Reserve Infantry 83rd Division, Xinzhou
Shanxi Army Reserve AAA Brigade, Taiyuan
Neimenggu Army Reserve 30th Infantry Division, Hohhot
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APPENDIX III
LANZHOU MILITARY REGION FORCES
21st Group Army, Baoji, Shaanxi
61st Division (“Red Army Division”), Tianshui, Gansu
12th Armored Division, Jiuquan, Gansu
Artillery Brigade, Zhongnig, Ningxia
Air Defense Brigade, Linxia, Gansu
47th Group Army, Lintong, Shaanxi
139th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Weinan, Shaanxi
55th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Zhangye, Gansu
56th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Wuwei, Gansu
UI Armored Brigade, Chengcheng, Shaanxi
Artillery Brigade, Gansu
AAA Brigade, Lintong, Shaanxi
Engineer Regiment
Communications Regiment
Units Subordinate to MR or MD
4th Division (“Red Army Division”), Xinjiang MD
6th Mechanized Infantry Division, Hetian, Xinjiang MD
8th Motorized Infantry Division, Tacheng, Xinjiang MD
11th Motorized Division, Urumqi, Xinjiang MD
Artillery Brigade, Xinjiang MD
AAA Brigade, Xinjiang MD
Army Aviation Regiment, Xinjiang MD
Special Operations Dadui, Qingtongxia, Ningxia
ECM Regiment, Lanzhou, Gansu
High-Technology Reconnaissance Bureau, Lanzhou
Border Defense Units
Xinjiang
1st Border Defense Regiment, Balikun
2nd Border Defense Regiment, Qitai
3rd Border Defense Regiment, Habahe
4th Border Defense Regiment, Fuyun
5th Border Defense Regiment, Emin
6th Border Defense Regiment, Tuoli
7th Border Defense Regiment, Bole
8th Border Defense Regiment, Huochenghuiyuan
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9th Border Defense Regiment, Zhaosu
10th Border Defense Regiment, Wushen
11th Border Defense Regiment, Wuqia
12th Border Defense Regiment, Tashenku’ergan
13th Border Defense Regiment, Zepu
Border Defense Battalion, Hami
Border Defense Battalion
Kashen Border Defense Battalion,
		
plus eight Border Defense Companies,
		
one independent Border Defense Battalion
Logistics Subdepartments and Units
25th Subdepartment, Xining, Qinghai
27th Subdepartment, Lanzhou, Gansu
28th Subdepartment, Xi’an, Shaanxi
29th Subdepartment, Xinjiang
30th Subdepartment, Xinjiang
31st Subdepartment
32nd Subdepartment, Yecheng Xian, Xinjiang
Motor Transport Regiment, Xinjiang MD
Reserve Units
Shaanxi Army Reserve 141st Infantry Division
Shaanxi Army Reserve AAA Division, Xi’an
Hanzhong Reserve AAA Regiment (possibly subordinate to
the Shaanxi AAA Division)
Shaanxi Baoji Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade
Gansu Army Reserve Infantry Tianshui Brigade
Gansu Army Reserve AAA Division, Lanzhou
Xinjiang Army Reserve Infantry Division
Urumqi Reserve AAA Regiment (possibly subordinate to the
Xinjiang Army Reserve Infantry Division)
Qinghai Army Reserve Infantry Division
Qinghai Army Reserve Infantry Brigade
Yinchuan Reserve AAA Regiment
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APPENDIX IV
JINAN MILITARY REGION FORCES
20th Group Army, Kaifeng, Henan
58th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Xuchang, Henan
60th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Minggang, Xinyang, Henan
UI Armored Brigade, Nanyang, Henan
Artillery Brigade, Queshan, Henan
AAA Brigade, Shangqiu, Henan
Engineer Regiment, Xinyang, Henan
26th Group Army, Weifang, Shandong
138th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Laiyang, Shandong
199th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Zibo, Shandong
77th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Haiyang, Shandong
8th Armored Division, Weifang, Shandong
8th Artillery Brigade, Weifang, Shandong
Air Defense Brigade, Jinan, Shandong
Army Aviation Regiment, Liaocheng, Shandong
54th Group Army, Xinxiang, Henan
127th Light Mechanized Infantry Division (Tie Jun, includes
Ye Ting Independent Regiment) Luoyang, Henan
162nd Motorized Infantry Division, Anyang, Henan
11th Armored Division, Xinyang, Henan
Artillery Brigade, Jiaozuo, Henan
Air Defense Brigade, Xingyang, Zhengzhou, Henan
Army Aviation Regiment, Xinxiang, Henan
Units Subordinate to MR or MD
Special Operations Dadui, Laiwu, Shandong
Electronic Warfare Regiment, Zhoucun, Shandong
3rd Technical Reconnaissance Unit, Jinan, Shandong
Pontoon Bridge Regiment, Pingyin, Shandong
Pontoon Bridge Regiment, Mangshan, Luoyang, Henan
Coastal Defense Units
Shandong
1st Coastal Defense Regiment, Chenghuangdao
2nd Coastal Defense Regiment, Zhangshandao
3rd Coastal Defense Regiment, Penglai
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4th Coastal Defense Regiment
5th Coastal Defense Regiment, Rushan
Coastal Defense Regiment, Weihai
8th Coastal Defense Regiment, Laoshan
9th Coastal Defense Regiment, Rizhao
Logistics Subdepartments and Units
9th Subdepartment, Zaozhuang, Shandong
10th Subdepartment, Laiyang, Shandong
11th Subdepartment, Jinan, Shandong
33rd Subdepartment, Zhengzhou, Henan
34th Subdepartment, Xinyang, Henan
Army Ship Transport Group, Zhangdao
Army Ship Transport Group
Army Ship Transport Group
Reserve Units
Shandong Army Reserve 76th Infantry Division, Yantai
Shandong Reserve Artillery Division, Jining
Shandong Reserve AAA Division, Qingdao
Shandong Reserve Army Logistics Support Brigade
Henan Army Reserve 136th Infantry Division, Kaifeng
Henan Army Reserve AAA Division, Zhengzhou
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APPENDIX V
NANJING MILITARY REGION FORCES
1st Group Army, Huzhou, Zhejiang
1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, Hangzhou,
Zhejiang
3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade, Jinhua, Zhejiang
10th Armored Division, Suzhou, Jiangsu
9th Artillery Division, Wuxi, Jiangsu
Air Defense Brigade, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu
12th Group Army, Xuzhou, Jiangsu
34th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Chuzhou, Anhui
36th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Xinyi, Jiangsu
179th Motorized Infantry Brigade (“Linfen Brigade”), Nanjing,
Jiangsu
12th Armored Division, Xuzhou, Jiangsu
Artillery Brigade, Xuzhou, Jiangsu
Air Defense Brigade, Huai’an, Jiangsu
31st Group Army, Xiamen, Fujian
86th Motorized Infantry Division, Fuzhou, Fujian
91st Motorized Infantry Division, Zhangzhou, Fujian
92nd Motorized Infantry Brigade, Quanzhou, Fujian
UI Amphibious Armored Brigade, Zhangzhou, Fujian
Artillery Brigade, Quanzhou, Fujian
Air Defense Brigade, Xiamen, Fujian
Army Aviation Regiment (possible)
Shanghai Garrison
1st Coastal Defense Brigade
2nd Coastal Defense Brigade
Other Units Subordinate to MR or MD
Army Aviation Regiment
31st Pontoon Bridge Brigade, Jiangsu MD
Special Operations Dadui, Quanzhou, Jiangsu
Chemical Defense Regiment, Nanjing, Jiangsu
Surface-to-Surface Missile Brigade, Shangrao, Jiangxi
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Coastal Defense Units
Jiangsu
2nd Coastal Defense Regiment, Lianyungang
3rd Coastal Defense Regiment, Nantonghaimen
Coastal Defense Battalion, Sheyang
Zhejiang
13th Coastal Defense Regiment, Shengsi
15th Coastal Defense Regiment, Daishan
17th Coastal Defense Regiment, Putuo
18th Coastal Defense Regiment, Dinghai
Shipu Coastal Defense Battalion, Xiangshan
Dachen Coastal Defense Battalion, Taizhou
Wenzhou Coastal Defense Battalion
Fujian
11th Coastal Defense Brigade, Lianjiang
12th Coastal Defense Division, Changle
13th Coastal Defense Division, Jinjiang
52nd Coastal Defense Regiment
54th Coastal Defense Regiment, Dadeng
56th Coastal Defense Regiment, Zhangzhou Dongshan
Logistics Subdepartments and Units
13th Subdepartment, Wuxi, Jiangsu
15th Subdepartment, Huai’an, Jiangsu
16th Subdepartment, Nanjing, Jiangsu
17th Subdepartment, Yingtan, Jiangxi
18th Subdepartment, Fuzhou, Fujian
Army Ship Transport Group
Reserve Units
Shanghai Army Reserve AAA Division
Jiangsu Army Reserve 2d AAA Division, Yangzhou
Jiangsu Reserve AAA Division, Nanjing
Anhui Army Reserve Infantry Division, Hefei
Anhui Army Reserve AAA Brigade, Wuhu
Fujian Army Reserve AAA Division, Fuzhou
Fujian Zhangzhou Reserve Logistics Support Brigade
Jiangxi Army Reserve Infantry Division, Nanchang
Jiangxi Army Reserve Artillery Brigade
Zhejiang Army Reserve Infantry Division
Reserve Coastal Defense Regiment, Ningde
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APPENDIX VI
GUANGZHOU MILITARY REGION FORCES
41st Group Army, Liuzhou, Guangxi
121st Infantry Division, Guilin, Guangxi
123rd Mechanized Infantry Division, Guangxi
UI Armored Brigade, Guilin, Guangxi
UI Artillery Brigade, Liuzhou, Guangxi
UI Air Defense Brigade, Hengyang, Hunan
42nd Group Army, Huizhou, Guangdong
124th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, Boluo,
Guangdong
163rd Division, Chaozhou, Guangdong
UI Armored Brigade, Guangzhou, Guangdong
UI Artillery Division, Qujiang, Guangdong
Air Defense Brigade, Chaozhou, Guangdong
Hong Kong Garrison
Infantry Brigade
Logistics Base, Shenzhen
Macao Garrison
Other Units Subordinate to MR or MD
132nd Infantry Brigade, Wuzhishan, Hainan
Surface-to-Surface Missile Brigade, Shantou, Guangdong
(may not yet have reached operational status)
Army Aviation Regiment, Foshan, Guangdong
Special Operations Dadui, Guangzhou, Guangdong
32nd Pontoon Bridge Brigade, Hubei MD
Electronic Warfare Regiment
Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, Guangzhou, Guangdong
Coastal Defense Units
Guangdong
1st Coastal Defense Regiment, Nan’ao
2nd Coastal Defense Regiment, Guishan
4th Coastal Defense Regiment, Xuwen
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Hainan
10th Coastal Defense Regiment, Wenchang
11th Coastal Defense Regiment, Danzhou
Guangxi
1st Border Defense Regiment, Fancheng Huashishen
3rd Border Defense Regiment, Pingxiang
4th Border Defense Regiment, Longzhou
5th Border Defense Regiment, Jingxi
12th Coastal Defense Regiment, Weizhoudao
Logistics Subdepartments and Units
19th Subdepartment, Hengyang, Hunan
20th Subdepartment, Guilin, Guangxi
21st Subdepartment, Guangzhou, Guangdong
Army Ship Transport Group, Zhuhai
Vehicle and Ship Transport Group, Qiongshan
Reserve Units
Hunan Army Reserve Infantry Division, Changsha
Hunan Hengyang Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade
Guangdong Reserve AAA Division
Guangdong Zhanjiang Reserve AAA Brigade
Guangxi Army Reserve Infantry Division, Nanning
Hainan Army Reserve Division
Hubei Army Reserve AAA Division, Wuhan
Hubei Xiangfan Army Reserve Artillery Brigade
Hubei Yichang Reserve AAA Brigade
Shenzhen Reserve Chemical Defense Regiment
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APPENDIX VII
CHENGDU MILITARY REGION FORCES
13th Group Army, Chongqing
37th Division, Chongqing
149th Light(?) Mechanized Infantry Division, Leshan,
Sichuan
UI Armored Brigade, Pengzhou, Sichuan
UI Artillery Brigade, Chongzhou, Sichuan
UI AAA Brigade, Mianyang, Sichuan
14th Group Army, Kunming, Yunnan
31st Division, Dali, Yunnan
40th Division, Kaiyuan, Yunnan
UI Armored Brigade, Kunming, Yunnan
UI Artillery Brigade, Yunnan
UI AAA Brigade, Kunming, Yunnan
Chemical Defense Regiment
Chongqing Garrison
Other Units Subordinate to MR or MD
52nd Mountain Infantry Brigade, Nyingchi, Xizang
53rd Mountain Infantry Brigade, Nyingchi, Xizang
Army Aviation Regiment
“Cheetah” Special Operations Group, Chengdu, Sichuan
Special Reconnaissance Group, Chengdu, Sichuan (Technical
Reconnaissance Bureau?)
Electronic Warfare Regiment
Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, Kunming, Yunnan
Chemical Defense Technical Group
Border Defense Units
Yunnan
1st Border Defense Regiment, Funing
2nd Border Defense Regiment, Malipo
3rd Border Defense Regiment, Hekou
4th Border Defense Regiment, Pingbian
5th Border Defense Regiment, Jinping
6th Border Defense Regiment
7th Border Defense Regiment, Jiangcheng
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8th Border Defense Regiment, Mengla
9th Border Defense Regiment, Diqing
10th Border Defense Regiment, Lancang
11th Border Defense Regiment, Cangyuan
12th Border Defense Regiment, Luxi
Xizang
1st Border Defense Regiment, Shannanlongzi
2nd Border Defense Regiment, Cuonei
3rd Border Defense Regiment, Dingri
4th Border Defense Regiment, Changdu
5th Border Defense Regiment, Saga
6th Border Defense Regiment, Yadong
Jiangzi Battalion
Gangba 2nd Battalion
Luozha 5th Battalion
Milin Battalion
Motuo Battalion
Logistics Subdepartments and Units
22nd Subdepartment, Kunming, Yunnan
37th Subdepartment, Chongqing
38th Subdepartment, Chengdu, Sichuan
Reserve Units
Sichuan Army Reserve Infantry Division, Chengdu
Sichuan Army Reserve AAA Division
Sichuan Leshan Reserve Infantry Brigade
Sichuan Dazhou Army Reserve Artillery Brigade
Chongqing Reserve AAA Division
Chongqing Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade
Guizhou Army Reserve Infantry Division
Yunnan Army Reserve Infantry Division
Tibet Army Reserve Mixed Brigade
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CHAPTER 8
FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE
OF THE CHINESE AIR FORCE1
Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam
INTRODUCTION
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is
in the midst of a major modernization campaign aimed
at retiring and replacing obsolete aircraft designed in
the 1950s and 1960s. While modernization has been
underway in earnest for the past 15 years, China’s Air
Force is still in a transition phase, caught in the middle
between the type of force the PLAAF fielded over its
first 50 years and the development of a “new PLAAF”
with modern equipment and capabilities.
This chapter seeks to illuminate the future force
structure of the Chinese Air Force by examining current
PLAAF modernization efforts and exploring the key
decisions and tradeoffs likely to shape the aircraft and
capabilities the PLAAF will pursue. Our focus is not on
producing a quantitative estimate of the future PLAAF
air order of battle or on analyzing the future Air Force
organizational structure. These approaches have been
performed by other knowledgeable analysts.2 Instead,
our emphasis is on the choices that will determine
the future PLAAF force structure, with the goal of
illustrating a range of possibilities and providing a
guide to interpreting future developments.
The first section reviews PLAAF missions and
describes five ways of thinking about the “right
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size” of the PLAAF. The second section describes the
capabilities and limitations of the “old PLAAF” (circa
1995) as the Air Force acquired its first fourth generation
fighters3 and advanced surface-to-air missiles from
Russia. It then examines the new systems China is
acquiring and developing and the aspirations of the
Chinese Air Force to build a “new PLAAF” capable
of executing a broader range of missions. The second
section concludes with an assessment of the progress
the PLAAF has made in its transition to a modern Air
Force. The third section of the chapter analyzes how
decisions about the relative effort to be devoted to air
defense vis-à-vis conventional strike missions and how
the tradeoffs between foreign and domestic production
and between high-technology and lower-cost systems,
as well as the relative emphasis on support systems,
will shape the future PLAAF. It argues that perceptions
of the international threat environment (to include
assessments of the likelihood of a crisis over Taiwan or
a conflict with the United States) and budget concerns
will have significant influence on the overall size of the
future PLA and the speed of modernization.
The most likely path for PLAAF force modernization is to continue present efforts to build the Air
Force using a variety of means, including continued
procurement of advanced aircraft from Russia;
continued domestic efforts to design and produce
advanced aircraft; and incorporation of imported
engines, avionics, and munitions into Chinese aircraft
designs. However, the chapter sketches three alternative
possibilities to illustrate a range of potential outcomes:
(1) efforts to maximize capability quickly; (2) a hightechnology Air Force; and (3) a domestically-produced
Air Force. Although the choice of modernization
pathways and decisions about tradeoffs will have a
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significant influence on future PLAAF force structure,
it is already clear that the future PLAAF will be a
significantly smaller, but more capable Air Force.
IS THERE A “RIGHT SIZE” FOR THE PLAAF?
This volume asks the question “What is the right size
for the PLA?” For this chapter, the appropriate question
is, “What is the ‘right size’ for the PLA Air Force?”
To be useful, the concept of a right size must refer to
capabilities as well as quantitative yardsticks such as
number of personnel and aircraft, organizational units,
and overall budget. Unfortunately for those seeking
clear predictions, the right size depends heavily on
which perspective is used to evaluate the future
force. Moreover, some perspectives focus on relative
capabilities, which imply taking the modernization
efforts of the air forces of China’s potential adversaries
into consideration. The five perspectives on PLAAF
modernization presented below highlight the reality
that there is no single right size for the future Chinese
Air Force, while illustrating some of the different
considerations that will influence modernization
efforts.
The first perspective focuses on China’s external
security environment, the military missions derived
from potential threats, and the Air Force capabilities
and force structure necessary to carry out these
missions. Outside observers can analyze these factors,
but it is China’s subjective assessments—and the relative weight that China’s internal assessment process
places on different contingencies—that will determine
how threats translate into requirements for Air Force
capabilities. The poor performance of the Iraq military
(which had more advanced weapons than the PLA)
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in the 1991 Gulf War highlighted how advanced U.S.
military capabilities and operational concepts could
make an enemy vulnerable, prompting intensified
efforts to build a more advanced and capable PLA.
Most of the aircraft acquisitions and development
programs shaping today’s PLAAF were initiated prior
to the Chinese leadership’s intensified concern about
the possibility of Taiwan independence that arose in
the early 1990s. These included the Air Force’s initial
acquisition of Russian Su-27/Flanker fighters, the J-10
fighter development program, and efforts to acquire
or build tankers and airborne early warning/airborne
warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft. These
programs were all part of long-term efforts to create
a modern Air Force that could respond to a range of
contingencies.
The increased threat of Taiwan independence and
the perceived need to be prepared to fight against the
U.S. military if it intervened on Taiwan’s behalf have
accelerated Chinese military modernization and shaped
it toward acquiring capabilities useful for a Taiwan
contingency. China has emphasized building near-term
combat capability through purchase and coproduction
of Russian multirole fighters such as the Su-30, while
placing less emphasis on some potential Air Force
capabilities such as modern strategic bombers and air
refueling, which are less critical given the relatively
short distance between Taiwan and mainland China.
PLA strategists are now beginning to look beyond the
Taiwan issue and articulate the rationale for a Chinese
military capable of longer-range operations in defense
of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and China’s
expanding global interests, though it is unclear how
persuasive this rationale will be to Chinese leaders.4
General assessments of the international security
environment will influence overall Chinese defense
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budgets and the resources available for Army building,
but specific contingencies might shape Air Force
modernization more directly. One scenario would
be a relatively benign security environment in which
the Air Force concentrates on its air defense mission.
This would imply greater emphasis on air bases and
air defense assets along China’s land and maritime
borders, and a relative neglect of long-range strike
capabilities. Another scenario would involve increased
efforts to develop power projection capabilities to help
protect China’s SLOCs and to support Chinese claims to
islands in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
This would imply increased emphasis on air refueling,
antiship missiles, over-water flight training, longduration maritime patrol and intelligence collection,
and (perhaps) strategic bombing capabilities. This
scenario would bring the PLAAF into conflict with
PLA naval aviation over which service would have
responsibility for these missions.
A third scenario would involve greater attention to
potential threats from Japan and/or India. For the Air
Force, this would involve greater attention to training
for operations against well-equipped, technologicallysophisticated Air Forces. Geographically, the PLAAF
might deploy its assets differently to improve its
ability to operate or conduct air strikes against India
or, to a lesser degree, Japan. A fourth scenario would
involve preparations for potential conflict against
the United States that ranges beyond Taiwan. Given
U.S. Air Force capabilities, this would be the most
demanding scenario for PLAAF force modernization.
China’s policy of not basing PLA forces overseas
constrains the contributions tactical aviation assets
(such as multirole fighters) can make to scenarios that
require long-range operations. Air refueling can help
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extend the operational range of tactical aircraft, but
is an imperfect substitute for overseas bases. Without
overseas bases, the PLAAF might be at a disadvantage
relative to the Navy and Second Artillery in fighting
for budget resources for some scenarios.
A second means of assessing the right size for the
PLAAF is to look at the potential military requirements
associated with China’s growing international interests.
China’s increasing integration into the world economy
has created greater demand for resources (especially oil
and gas) and access to international markets to support
continued economic growth. This is stimulating a more
activist Chinese foreign policy that might eventually
require new military missions.5 The extent to which
China’s expanding international interests translate
into new military requirements for the PLAAF will
depend on how Chinese leaders decide to pursue their
interests and the relative value of military instruments
(especially air power) in these efforts. To date, Chinese
leaders have stressed China’s peaceful development
and downplayed the potential for using force to pursue
Chinese interests. If this approach continues, the most
likely new missions for the PLAAF would be strategic
airlift to support Chinese contributions to international
peacekeeping, disaster relief, and potential evacuation
of Chinese nationals from conflict zones. A more
aggressive Chinese approach to resource conflicts
could generate requirements for an Air Force capable
of expeditionary operations, but this appears unlikely.
A third approach for right-sizing the PLAAF would
focus on the priorities of China’s top civilian leaders,
which encompass a range of strategic, developmental,
and political objectives. From this perspective, the
right size is a function of the leadership’s estimate of
the return on investments in Air Force capabilities
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relative to other uses of the resources. Chinese civilian
leaders are clearly concerned with the need to keep
defense expenditures in proper proportion to economic
development efforts; the 2006 Defense White Paper calls
for “coordinated development of national defense
and the economy.” However, defense and civilian
industries can have positive synergies, so Chinese
leaders might support some military expenditures
(especially in research and development [R&D]) due to
their benefits for the civilian economy. Chinese civilian
leaders might also view defense spending increases as
a means of helping to ensure the loyalty of the military
to the Communist party. Significant portions of recent
increases in military spending have been devoted to
increased pay and improved living conditions for the
military.6 Investments in military capabilities give
Chinese leaders increased international options, but
acquiring certain capabilities (such as strategic bombers
or an aircraft carrier) might also impose costs by
stimulating adverse reactions from China’s neighbors.
Without more detailed knowledge of how Chinese
civilian leaders think about the costs and benefits of
various Air Force capabilities, it is difficult to derive a
right size for the PLAAF from this perspective.
A fourth approach would focus on the relative return
on investment in Air Force capabilities compared to
other military capabilities. The right size for the PLAAF
then depends on the relative contributions air power
can make to the PLA’s overall ability to perform its
missions and execute its campaign plans. This requires
a detailed examination and prioritization of PLA and
PLAAF missions and responsibilities. The PLAAF’s
primary mission has long been air defense, with support
for ground troops an important secondary mission.
The air defense mission requires close coordination of
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both aircraft and ground-based air defenses such as
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA).7 Despite the long-standing secondary mission
of supporting ground troops, the PLAAF has never
been able to perform close-air support missions for
ground forces and has had only a limited capability to
perform bombing and interdiction missions in support
of ground operations.
The 2004 Defense White Paper describes the PLAAF
responsibility “for safeguarding China’s airspace
security and maintaining a stable air defense posture
nationwide,” noting that “the Air Force has gradually
shifted from [a mission] of territorial air defense to
one of both offensive and defensive operations.”
It highlights “the development of new fighters, air
defense, and anti-missile weapons” and emphasizes
training to “to improve the capabilities in operations like
air strikes, air defense, information countermeasures,
early warning and reconnaissance, strategic mobility,
and integrated support.”8 The 2006 Defense White Paper
stresses PLAAF efforts to speed up “its transition from
territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive
operations” and to increase “its capabilities in the areas
of air strike, air and missile defense, early warning and
reconnaissance, and strategic projection.”9 The white
papers and other PLA doctrinal literature reveal that
the PLAAF’s air defense mission is now conceived
of as a nationwide responsibility that incorporates
both offensive and defensive actions. The emphasis
on offensive operations, air strikes, and strategic
mobility (coupled with the PLA-wide emphasis on
joint operations and joint campaigns) imply a higher
priority for operations that support ground forces.
These broad missions are translated into specific
operational concepts and training requirements
through campaign theory, which can be thought of as
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the PLA’s operational doctrine. Throughout the 1990s,
the PLA has been engaged in a major effort to revise
and update its doctrine. This produced new PLAAF
operational guidance in the form of a 1999 “gangyao”
(operational regulation) titled “The Essentials of
Campaigns of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
Air Force.”10 In their contribution to the present volume,
Kevin Lanzit and Kenneth Allen provide a fuller
treatment of how doctrinal reforms and new operational
concepts are influencing PLAAF modernization.11 The
PLAAF trains for three dedicated Air Force campaigns.
The offensive air campaign employs air strikes on enemy
territory to suppress or destroy enemy air defenses and
to attack both strategic and campaign level targets. The
air defense campaign seeks to establish air superiority
over the war zone through several measures,
including deterrence based on denial, resisting attack
by targeting hostile intelligence and service platforms,
and launching timely counterstrikes against enemy air
bases and support assets. The air blockade campaign is
designed to effect political coercion against the enemy
via means such as air strikes that target ports and
navigation routes. In addition, the PLAAF has major
roles in two joint service campaigns: the joint anti-air
strike campaign and the airborne campaign.12
The overall balance between offensive and defensive
capabilities, the emphasis placed upon dedicated
Air Force missions and campaigns, and the relative
contributions the PLAAF can make to joint campaigns
will all influence the right size for the PLAAF compared
to other services. The 2004 Defense White Paper called for
giving “priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force
and Second Artillery Force,” implying the need for
greater investment in Air Force capabilities. However,
ground force officers remain dominant within the
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PLA, so that parochial service considerations are likely
to continue to influence resource allocations.
A fifth approach would emphasize building the
PLAAF into a modern Air Force capable of engaging
and defeating other air forces.13 Here the most
ambitious benchmark would be the ability to engage
and defeat the U.S. Air Force; a less ambitious goal
would be to tackle advanced Asian air forces such as
those of Japan and India. This approach implies an
emphasis on the development of advanced fighter
aircraft and force multipliers such as tankers and
AWACS aircraft. In terms of force structure, such an
approach would emphasize additional procurement of
Russian aircraft, efforts to acquire advanced Western
technology for Chinese platforms, and a reluctance to
procure less-capable indigenous systems. Chinese air
power advocates succeeded in persuading the Central
Military Commission (CMC) to incorporate an Air
Force component in China’s Active Defense strategy
in 2004.14 But despite its appeal to Air Force officers, an
air power-centric approach to warfighting is unlikely
to be adopted by the PLA as a whole.
The five perspectives discussed above outline
different ways of thinking about the right size of the
PLAAF. Each suggests a different view about the role
the Air Force might play in national security and what
force structure would be appropriate. However, none
provides a straightforward prediction as to what the
future PLAAF will look like. In reality, future PLAAF
force structure will be the product of a political
process that incorporates some aspects of each of these
perspectives.
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THE PLAAF IN TRANSITION
The Old PLAAF.
The PLAAF was designed as a defensive force
charged with the primary mission of air defense and a
secondary mission of support for the ground forces. Air
defense responsibilities included defending China’s
airfields, other critical infrastructure, political and
economic centers, and ground forces.15 The PLAAF
was also charged with supporting ground troops via
close air support and bombing operations, but has
never really been able to perform this mission.
J-6 fighters and Q-5 attack planes, both variants of
the 1950s vintage Soviet MiG-19 fighter, made up the
numerical bulk of the PLAAF force through the mid
1990s. The J-6 is a second generation fighter designed
primarily as an air defense interceptor; the Q-5 is a
Chinese variant with ground attack capabilities.16 At
its peak, the Chinese Air Force deployed more than
3,000 J-6s in training and operational roles. The J-6 is a
low-technology fighter, greatly inferior to the aircraft
employed by modern air forces like those of Taiwan,
India, and the United States. Although the PLAAF
deployed vast numbers of J-6 fighters, their combat
effectiveness was limited due to limited range, lack of
on-board radar, and lack of all-weather capability. 17
China made several attempts to produce more
advanced fighters to replace or augment the J-6 in the
1970s and 1980s. The Chinese produced hundreds of
J-7 fighters (a Chinese variant of the Soviet MiG-21
design) and several different variants of the J-8 fighter.
Both the J-7 and J-8 were improvements over the J-6 in
avionics and performance, but still lagged far behind
the fourth generation fighters deployed in the Soviet,
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United States, and Western European air forces in the
1980s. China attempted to upgrade the F-8-II using U.S.built avionics under the “Peace Pearl” program, but
this effort was aborted when the United States imposed
sanctions on military exports to China after the 1989
Tiananmen incident. In the end, the PLAAF procured
relatively small numbers of J-7 and J-8 aircraft, which
upgraded Air Force capabilities somewhat but did not
replace the J-6 as the principal aircraft. This may have
reflected a decision to wait until more advanced aircraft
were available from Chinese manufacturers before
procuring new ones in large quantity. China did begin
purchasing advanced fighter jets in the early 1990s
with the acquisition of the fourth generation Su-27s
from Russia as part of the effort to begin modernizing
and updating the fighter force.18 One objective in
purchasing the Su-27 was to gain experience operating
and maintaining an advanced fighter.
The ground-attack and bomber aircraft in the
PLAAF inventory in the mid 1990s were also derived
from late 1950s Soviet designs. The Q-5 attack fighter,
a derivative of the J-6, is a close air support aircraft
with ground attack and air-to-air combat capabilities.
The Q-5’s capabilities are limited by its relatively
short range (about 800 km) and primitive avionics. 19
The Q-5 is capable of carrying a nuclear payload, and
at one point several dozen Q-5s were designated for
nuclear missions.20 However, the Q-5’s effectiveness
as a nuclear delivery platform was compromised by
its very short range. The H-6, the Chinese version of
the Soviet Tu-16/Badger medium bomber, served as
the PLAAF’s primary dedicated bomber. Some H-6
bombers had a strategic nuclear role in the 1960s and
1970s, but it is unclear whether the PLAAF still has a
nuclear mission.21 The H-6’s effectiveness in a traditional

388

bombing role is limited by its range and slow speed,
which make it highly vulnerable to modern air defense
systems. At that time the PLAAF lacked air-launched
cruise missiles that could have allowed the H-6 to then
concentrate on a stand-off attack role.
Although this chapter concentrates primarily on
aircraft, the PLAAF also has responsibility for longrange ground-based air defenses. (PLA ground force
units also operate shorter-range SAMs and anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) to protect themselves.) The Chinese
air defense strategy is centered on the belief that an
air defense system needs to be “layered, redundant,
robust, and operate as an integrated battle space air
defense network.”22 Air defense systems are generally
classified either as strategic, long-range systems
that defend a wide area or as shorter-range, tactical
systems used for defense of ground forces or point
targets. The first Chinese SAM was the HQ-1, an SA-2
variant produced under license from the Soviets in the
1960s.23
Over the next several decades, China worked
to develop and produce domestic SAMs, including
Chinese versions of foreign systems such as the French
short-range mobile Crotale system. Most of these
systems were essentially obsolete by the early 1990s.
In 1991, China bought equipment for four to six S300PMU-1/SA-10 battalions from Russia, but did not
take delivery until 1993. These missiles were deployed
around Beijing and the Su-27 airbases at Wuhu and
Suixi.24 The S-300 gave China its first long-range airdefense system, with missiles capable of intercepting
high and low altitude targets at ranges up to 150 km.
The S300 also had a limited capability to intercept
ballistic missiles.25 Deployment of the S300 greatly
enhanced the PLAAF’s ability to control air space and
conduct air defense missions.
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The PLAAF of the 1980s and early 1990s was not
equipped with aircraft capable of carrying out its
missions of air defense and support for ground forces
against a modern adversary. The limited capabilities
of the Chinese attack and bomber force and the lack
of communications with ground forces made them
relatively ineffective in ground support missions.26
PLA bombers were also extremely vulnerable to the
modern air defense systems they would likely meet in
nearly any regional conflict that might have required
the aircraft to undertake bombing missions. However,
the low-technology aircraft that China’s defense industry could produce were also relatively inexpensive, so
that the PLAAF compensated for technical limitations
by procuring large quantities of aircraft. The PLAAF was
one of the largest air forces in the world, but backward
technology and obsolete aircraft constrained its ability
to carry out its missions. Limited flight training time
and unrealistic training aggravated the situation. In
the late 1980s, PLAAF fighter pilots were flying only
about 100 hours per year.27 Most of those hours were
conducted under good weather conditions, during the
day, and with very little over-water training.
PLAAF limitations were evident when measured
against the tasks it would confront during a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan. PLAAF assignments would have
included air defense of mainland China, achieving
air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, and attacking
airfields and strategic targets on Taiwan. The PLAAF
would have had difficulty achieving these objectives
against a Taiwan Air Force that historically enjoyed
advantages in both technology and training. The
PLAAF’s acquisition of Russian Su-27 fighters in
the early 1990s offered some challenge to Taiwan’s
technology lead, but the Taiwan Air Force began
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taking delivery of U.S. F-16 fighters and French Mirage
2000 fighters in 1997 to complement its existing F-5
and Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) aircraft. These
systems restored Taiwan’s unchallenged technological
superiority and the ability to command the skies above
the Taiwan Strait in the early stages of a conflict.
The potential involvement of U.S. forces in a Taiwan
conflict scenario would have further increased the
challenge for the PLAAF. The USAF had extraordinary
advantages over the PLAAF in almost every respect
except geography. In the mid-1990s, the United
States was flying fourth generation fighters with
much greater capabilities than China’s most modern
fighters. The United States also had AWACS, electronic
warfare systems, and air refueling capabilities that
China lacked. The PLAAF’s operational limitations
became more important as Chinese concerns about
Taiwan independence began to grow in 1992-93. The
U.S. deployment of two aircraft carriers in March
1996 following China’s “missile tests” to intimidate
Taiwan led the Chinese military to conclude that an
attack on Taiwan would likely precipitate U.S. military
intervention. As a result, China’s planning for Taiwan
contingencies began to take U.S. military capabilities
into account. Although PLAAF modernization efforts
were already underway, concerns about Taiwan
independence gestures stimulated increased funding
and efforts to build a modern Air Force capable of
effective combat operations.
The New PLAAF.
The PLAAF is now in transition between the
limited force consisting mainly of obsolete aircraft that
it fielded in the 1980s, and the more advanced force it
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intends to field in the coming decades. The J-6 fighters
that once made up most of the PLAAF fighter fleet have
now been completely retired.28 The remaining J-7 and
J-8 fighters have been updated and remain in service,
but these aircraft comprise only about 1,000 planes. The
PLAAF’s future aircraft are now beginning to enter the
force, although the total numbers and precise mix of
foreign and domestic aircraft remain an open question.
The PLAAF now has 15 years experience operating the
Su-27 fighter, as well as experience with the Su-30s and
J-10s and modern surface-to-air missiles.
The Chinese vision for a new PLAAF embraces a
highly trained modern Air Force equipped with hightech aircraft, advanced precision-guided munitions,
support aircraft that serve as force multipliers, and
networked command, control, and intelligence
capabilities that allow the PLAAF to fight and win a
high-tech war under informationalized conditions.
This force would not only be more capable of carrying
out traditional missions such as air defense and support
for ground forces against a modern adversary, but
could also undertake offensive strikes against ground
and naval targets further away from China’s borders.
The new PLAAF will be a smaller force, but composed
primarily of more advanced third- and fourthgeneration multirole fighters and fighter-bombers. It is
uncertain whether China will decide to build or acquire
new bombers, but the deployment of advanced cruise
missiles should allow existing bombers to contribute
more effectively to a variety of PLAAF missions,
including antiship and ground-attack missions. The
new PLAAF will also fully integrate support systems
such as airborne early warning (AEW)/AWACS,
aerial refueling tankers, intelligence collection, and
signal jamming aircraft to increase the effectiveness of
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combat aircraft and enhance warfighting capability. Air
force modernization will also include larger numbers
of more capable air transports, which will enhance
the effectiveness of PLAAF airborne forces for both
internal security and external missions. The PLAAF
will continue to update and modernize its groundbased air defenses, and will likely seek to develop more
effective defenses against cruise missiles and ballistic
missiles.
The PLAAF is building a more capable fleet of
multirole fighters that will include both foreign
and domestically produced aircraft. The foreign
component will be comprised of the Su-27 and Su-30
fighters being procured from Russia. Those aircraft
will be supplemented by the J-11, the Chineseassembled version of the Su-27. Initial “coproduction”
involved Chinese assembly of unassembled aircraft
provided by the Russians, but the Shenyang Aircraft
Corporation plans to increase gradually the proportion
of domestically produced components for the J-11.29
There were indications that the Chinese had concerns
about the technological limitations of the Su-27s in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. China complained
that Russia was offering more advanced versions of
the Su-27 to other customers. The Su-27SM system
exhibited at the Zhuhai airshow was reported to
have upgrades aimed at addressing China’s concerns,
including multifunction liquid crystal displays (LCDs)
and a precision navigation system incorporating laser
gyroscopes and a GLONASS/NAVSTAR receiver. 30
China has continued to purchase Russian-built Su-30s
and to assemble J-11/Su-27 aircraft.
The J-10 is China’s first domestically produced
fourth-generation aircraft and will likely make up a
large portion of the future Chinese force. The J-10 is
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a highly capable, multirole fighter strongly influenced
by the Israeli Lavi, which was itself influenced by
the F-16.31 The J-10 is equipped with aerial refueling
capabilities, which significantly improve its range and
flexibility.32 The J-10 has entered into serial production;
some 60 aircraft (enough to equip about three Chinese
aircraft regiments) are reportedly already deployed.33
The PLAAF may also field the Xiaolong/FC-1, an
indigenously developed fighter that is the product of
a Chinese-Pakistani joint venture.34 Originally known
as the Super-7, the project sought to upgrade the J-7
(MiG-21) fighter with a more advanced engine and
upgraded Western avionics to provide a capable but
less expensive fighter.35 The PLAAF is reportedly not
enthusiastic about acquiring the Xiaolong, but the
aircraft’s producer, the Chengdu Aircraft Industrial
Group, is pushing for PLAAF purchases in order
to validate the aircraft for foreign customers.36 The
Xiaolong/FC-1 would provide a less expensive
alternative to the fourth generation aircraft the PLAAF
is currently acquiring. The precise mix of the PLAAF
fighter force will depend on decisions about the
optimum ratio of high-tech to medium-tech fighters,
itself a function of the imported-to-domestic ratio.37
A key limitation on China’s ability to produce
advanced aircraft has been its inability to produce
suitably advanced engines. China’s most advanced
aircraft currently employ Russian engines. Chinese
defense industries have made considerable efforts
to develop the capability to produce modern jet
engines. The Shenyang Liming Engine Manufacturing
Corporation has now developed the Taihang aeroengine, also known as the WS-10, the first high-thrust
turbofan engine to be domestically researched and
developed in China. The WS-10 may eventually be
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installed in China’s J-10 fighters and possibly also its Su27 variants.38 The ability to produce advanced engines
in China would give the PLAAF increased flexibility
in choosing between domestic and foreign fighters in
the future. However, the WS-10 has reportedly not yet
been installed in operationally deployed aircraft, and
Russian manufacturers hope to continue to supply
engines for Chinese fighters in the future.39
Along with fighters, the PLAAF will continue to
modernize its ground-attack and bomber forces. The
centerpiece of China’s efforts to improve its groundattack capabilities is the JH-7/FB-7 Flying Leopard. JH7 development began in 1975, but the aircraft did not
fly for the first time until 1988 and was not revealed
publicly until 1998. Although the JH-7 is a multirole
aircraft, its limited capabilities against modern fighters
suggest that it will be used mainly for ground attack
and antiship missions. The JH-7 is capable of carrying
C-801/802 antiship missiles, and was initially deployed
with PLA Navy (PLAN) Aviation units.40 About 20
JH-7s are currently deployed with the PLAAF 28th
Air Division in Hangzhou.41 The PLAAF is reportedly
unenthusiastic about the JH-7 and would probably
prefer to acquire more advanced multirole fighters
instead.
The direction of Chinese efforts to modernize
its bomber force is less certain than those in behalf
of ground-attack aircraft. Production of the H-6/
Badger bomber has resumed, with an emphasis on
production of a new variant possessing the ability to
employ antiship cruise missiles and land-attack cruise
missiles.42 Chinese military websites show pictures of
the H-6 and the modified H-6D with cruise missiles on
them, as well as pictures of the H-6 firing cruise missiles
from the air.43 The H-6’s vulnerability to modern
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air defenses suggests the aircraft will be employed
primarily as a standoff platform to deliver cruise
missiles from outside the reach of enemy air defense
systems. The capability to locate enemy ships and pass
target information to bombers and fighter-bombers
would be critical for successful antiship operations.
It is unclear whether the PLAAF will procure a new
bomber capable of penetrating air defense systems. The
“Peace Mission 2005” joint military exercises conducted
by Russia and China in August 2005 included Tu-22
and Tu-95 bombers.44 Russian officials have openly
discussed their interest in selling these aircraft to
China.45 The Chinese defense press has extensively
discussed the pros and cons of the Russian Tu-22 and
the Tu-95 bombers, but thus far there has been no
decision to purchase either aircraft. Some critics note
that both craft were designed in the 1960s, and that even
with upgrades these aircraft would not mark a great
technological leap forward.46 Others argue that it is
important to get experience flying supersonic bombers,
and that the Tu-22 and Tu-95, being significantly more
capable than the H-6, would therefore improve the
capabilities of the PLAAF bomber force. Some argue
that it is as important to procure the Tu-22 and Tu-95
now as it was to purchase the Tu-16 more than 40 years
ago. 47 Chinese sources have stated that the only reason
China would buy new strategic bombers would be to
prevent the United States from entering any Taiwan
scenario. Such a purchase would signal that China
was moving towards a bomber fleet capable of longrange operations.48 Some Chinese analysts believe that
procurement of strategic bombers would cause a major
shift in the balance of power in Asia.49 However, these
arguments highlight a potential downside to PLAAF
acquisition and operation of advanced strategic
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bombers: the United States and China’s neighbors
are likely to view these systems as highly threatening
advances in Chinese military capabilities.
Along with fighters and bombers, the PLAAF will
devote significant efforts to develop and deploy force
multipliers that will enhance the capabilities of its
combat aircraft. These systems include tankers, AEW
aircraft, electronic warfare and intelligence collection
aircraft, as well as transports that will support a
rapid-response capability for internal and external
contingencies. The PLAAF already has a number of
aircraft capable of aerial refueling. Though the Su-27
and J-11 fighters are not capable of air refueling, the
Su-30 can be refueled by Il-78/Midas tankers.50 China
has ordered four Il-78 tankers from Russia, but delivery
of the aircraft has reportedly been delayed due to
production problems.51 PLAAF J-8 and J-10 fighters can
be refueled by HY-6 tankers, based on a modified H-6
platform. The PLAAF has a regiment of HY-6 tankers
based at Leiyang in the Guangzhou MR to support its
J-8 and J-10 fighters.52 The HY-6 is capable of refueling
two J-8II aircraft at the same time from a refueling pod
extended from each wing. Expansion of the tanker force
and delivery of Il-78 tankers from Russia will extend
the range and endurance of the PLAAF’s refuelable
combat aircraft. However the mix of different tanker
platforms and limitations on which aircraft each tanker
can support will impose some limits on operational
flexibility.53
China has made several efforts to acquire or develop
AEW and AWACS capability, but current information
suggests that only limited progress has been made.
Some Chinese sources take the position that an AEW
capability, which would relay aerial radar information
to ground-based air controllers, would be better suited
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to the PLAAF than AWACS since it would require
fewer changes in current operational practices.54 China
reportedly signed a deal in 1996 to acquire the A-501
Phalcon AWACS from Israel, but the purchase was
cancelled in July 2000 after the Israeli government
came under pressure from the Clinton administration.55
China’s initial effort to develop a domestic AEW
capability used the Il-76 as a platform for the KJ-2000,
equipped with an indigenously designed phasedarray radar.56 R&D on this system has reportedly made
significant progress, but the program was set back by
the crash of a prototype in June 2006 that killed some
40 technicians involved in the R&D effort.57 A second
domestic AEW program, the KJ-2, is being developed
based on the Chinese Y-8X transport aircraft.58 Both
the KJ-2 and the KJ-2000 are to be equipped with data
links compatible with the J-7, J-8, J-10, J-11, JH-7, and
H-6. Both of the AEW aircraft carry an indigenouslydeveloped phased-array radar.59 If the KJ-2 and KJ2000 are compatible with Chinese-built J-11 fighters,
China might also be able to modify its Russian-built
Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft to work with them. The 2004
Department of Defense report on Chinese military
power projected that the PLAAF will have several
AWACS or AEW aircraft by 2010.60
China is also making efforts to modernize its
transport fleet. China currently operates about 13
Russian-built Il-76/Candid transports, and reportedly
has ordered 38 more.61 It is continuing production of
the Y-8 and preparing for the introduction of the Y9 transport.62 The Y-8 is a medium-lift turboprop
transport based on the Soviet Antonov An-12. This
platform has also been adopted for various other
missions including maritime patrol, AEW, electronic
intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) carrier,
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and airborne radar test bed. 63 The Y-9 military transport
was first shown in public at the 2005 Beijing Aviation
Expo. The Y-9 is a medium-size tactical support aircraft
that is an upgrade of the Y-8. It is capable of carrying
98 armed soldiers or paratroopers, or 72 seriously
wounded patients plus three medics. 64 In addition to
these dedicated military transports, Chinese airlines
fly large numbers of commercial aircraft (including
European and U.S. airliners) that could be pressed into
service in a crisis.65
China’s efforts to update its air defense capabilities
are focused on building a modern integrated air
defense system capable of both offensive counterair and
defensive counterair operations.66 For ground-based
air defenses, this will involve continued procurement
of advanced Russian SAMs and efforts to develop
more capable domestic SAMs. Since 1999, China’s air
defense efforts have emphasized the “three attacks and
the three defenses.” The three attacks refers to efforts to
develop air defense systems capable of attacking stealth
aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters, while
the three defenses refer to efforts to protect against
precision strikes, electronic jamming, and electronic
reconnaissance and surveillance.67 Chinese analysts
have been particularly impressed by U.S. cruise missile
capabilities; defense against cruise missiles is likely to
be an increasingly important element of Chinese air
defense efforts.
China’s ground-based air defenses have been
significantly upgraded with wider deployment of
Russian S-300 SAMs, the acquisition and deployment
of new short-range mobile SAMS such as the Tor
M1/SA-15 from Russia, and the development of new
indigenously produced models.68 The PLAAF has built
on its initial deployment of Russian S-300/SA-10 SAMs
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by procuring and deploying the longer-range followon S-400/SA-20 system to extend air defense coverage
over the Taiwan Strait. China is expected to deploy
the S-300/PMU2 soon and is also working to reverseengineer the S-300 to allow indigenous production.69
China has developed a modern indigenous SAM, the
KS-1A, which incorporates a phased-array radar and
associated ECM systems for use against high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, air-tosurface missiles, and other targets.70 China is also
developing the FT-2000 and FT-2000A antiradiation
SAMs, which could be used against early warning
and jamming aircraft. The extent to which these
indigenously developed systems are actually deployed
with PLAAF ground-based air defense units is
unclear.71 The net result is a major upgrade of Chinese
air defense capabilities. However, the extent to which
Chinese radars, surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft
artillery are effectively tied together into a genuinely
integrated air defense system also remains murky.
The distribution of air defense responsibilities and
assets among Army, Air Force, and Navy units greatly
complicates efforts at effective integration.
The new PLAAF will be a high-technology force
able to engage most modern air forces. It will be
increasingly capable of conducting joint operations
with other services and combined operations with
multiple branches of the PLAAF. The Chinese have
already made joint operations a priority in doctrinal
revisions and training and will continue to do so in
the future, although joint operations capabilities are
currently still at an early stage.72 Along with better
equipment, PLAAF pilots will be better trained than
the pilots of the old PLAAF. The PLAAF has begun
to intensify all-weather training, increase the number
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of flight hours, and conduct more over-water flight
and attack training.73 The PLA is making significant
efforts to improve the training and professionalism of
its officer corps, which may improve its capability to
command and execute more complex operations. Joint
operations, increased force-multipliers, better training,
and a more highly technological, more capable force
will combine to give the new PLAAF greater operational
capabilities, allowing China to project power away
from the mainland and into Asia.
TRADE-OFFS IN PLAAF MODERNIZATION
EFFORTS
The previous section described the PLAAF as an
Air Force in transition between the “old PLAAF,”
composed primarily of obsolete aircraft and limited
support systems, and the envisioned “new PLAAF,”
equipped with advanced aircraft and support systems
capable of carrying out more ambitious missions and
military campaigns. While the outlines of this new
PLAAF are apparent, the precise mix of types and
numbers of aircraft that will make up the force structure of the future PLAAF remains undetermined.
This section will first highlight and discuss key
decisions that Chinese leaders will confront in the
next decade, and then speculate on how their choices
will influence PLAAF force structure. The decisions
China reaches on allocating roles and missions among
services and branches, and on the proportions for
domestic versus foreign procurement, low-technology
systems versus high-technology systems, and combat
aircraft versus support aircraft, will be key shapers
of PLAAF modernization efforts and future force
structure. Chinese assessments of the international
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security environment and the resulting resource
allocations for military and Air Force modernization
will also influence the pace of modernization and the
size of the Air Force.
Division of Labor.
One important choice is how key missions are
divided among services, branches, and weapon
systems. Missions such as air defense and conventional
strike can be performed by several different types of
weapon systems and assigned to different services
or branches. How China’s military leaders decide to
allocate missions will have a significant impact on
PLAAF force structure.
The air defense mission now belongs primarily to
the Air Force, which operates most of China’s fighters
and most of its long-range ground-based air defenses.
However the Chinese Navy also operates fighters
with an air defense mission, while PLAN ships are
armed with increasingly capable surface-to-air missile
systems. The question is further complicated when
the broad range of potential threats that Chinese air
defenses must defend against is considered. These not
only include aircraft, but also existing and emerging
cruise and ballistic missile threats. China’s “three
attacks and three defenses” concept calls for efforts to
develop systems capable of attacking stealth aircraft,
cruise missiles, and armed helicopters and of defending
against precision strikes, electronic jamming, and
electronic reconnaissance and surveillance. Successful
air defense will likely require a mix of active and passive
defenses and a range of air defense capabilities.
Three considerations are especially relevant. The
first is whether the existing division of air defense
responsibilities between the PLAAF and the PLAN
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will be maintained.74 Currently the PLAAF has
responsibility for long-range ground-based air defenses
and responsibility for air defense along China’s land
borders, while the PLAAF and PLAN aviation forces
divide air defense responsibilities for China’s sea
borders on a geographical basis.75 This division of
labor creates potential gaps in coordination among
ground-based air defenses, ground-controllers run
by the Air Force, and the fighters operated by Navy
aviation units. Increased joint training and efforts to
build a truly integrated air defense system could ease
these coordination problems if properly carried out.
The extent to which the PLAN retains some air defense
responsibilities will affect the number of PLAAF
fighters assigned to air defense missions. In doctrinal
terms, this question is evident in the potential overlap
between the PLAAF’s responsibility to execute an air
defense campaign and the multiservice responsibilities
in a joint antiair strike campaign.
A second consideration is the relative emphasis on
ground-based air defenses versus fighters. China has
made significant investments in surface-to-air missiles
in recent years that have significantly improved its air
defense capabilities. China’s S-300 and S-400 SAMs
have effective ranges long enough to reach most of
the way across the Taiwan Strait, posing a serious
threat to Taiwan fighters on air defense or potential
strike missions. PLAAF SAM radars routinely “paint”
Taiwan fighters while they are flying on the Taiwan
side of the center line; PLAAF SAM systems are now
assessed to be effective enough to make Taiwan Air
Force attack missions against mainland targets very
dangerous.76
A third consideration is China’s interest in defending against threats posed by cruise missiles and ballis-
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tic missiles. These threats are generally best dealt with
by ground- and sea-based defenses rather than aircraft.
China’s advanced Russian SAMs such as the S-300
have fairly good capabilities against cruise missiles,
but only a limited capability against short-range
ballistic missiles. However, China has limited longrange radar capability and no early warning radars
or overhead IR sensors to provide warning of ballistic
missile launches. Filling these gaps would require a
significant investment in sensors and communications
equipment. Moreover developing and deploying a
significant ballistic missile defense capability would
require a major commitment of resources. The
threat posed by U.S. cruise missiles and by Taiwan’s
emerging cruise and ballistic missile capabilities may
force China to devote resources to this task. A decision
to pursue more comprehensive cruise and ballistic
missile defenses, with the consequent additional drain
on resources, would represent a significant national
commitment on a vast scale.
While decisions about which active defenses to
pursue will have the biggest impact on PLAAF
force structure, the PLA also puts great emphasis on
passive defenses as a means of surviving enemy air
and missile attacks. Mobility, camouflage, decoys,
underground shelters, and a logistics system that can
support dispersed operations are all important parts
of efforts to protect PLA forces from attack. The cost of
developing and employing passive defenses is borne
by all the PLA services, but Air Force investments in
mobility and passive defenses will draw resources
from other aspects of the modernization program.
Conventional strike, against both land and naval
targets, is a second major area where decisions
about the division of labor among PLA services and

404

branches may have a significant impact on PLAAF
force structure. China is currently pursuing a range
of conventional strike capabilities, including ballistic
missiles controlled by the Second Artillery, cruise
missiles that can be fired from air, ground, and naval
platforms, and strike aircraft (including both multirole
fighters and bombers). Chinese military officers see
value in having a range of conventional strike options,
which will permit multidimensional attacks against
targets such as aircraft carriers and provide for more
flexible attack options in a Taiwan contingency.
Nevertheless, decisions about whether ballistic and
cruise missiles can substitute for a new strategic
bomber and about how the PLAN and PLAAF will
divide maritime strike responsibilities will play a large
role in determining the forces in the future PLAAF.
With the Air Force increasingly training over water
and procuring advanced aircraft with aerial refueling
capabilities, there will be the potential for the PLAAF to
perform some missions heretofore assigned to PLAN.
It is unclear whether the PLAAF will develop or
procure a new strategic bomber capable of penetrating
modern air defense systems. China may ultimately
decide that more accurate and longer range ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles delivered from a variety
of land, air, and naval platforms can substitute for
strategic bombers. A related question is whether the
PLAAF still has a nuclear delivery mission, and, if so,
whether this mission will be a driver of future PLAAF
force modernization. The 2004 Defense White Paper
refers to nuclear missions for the Second Artillery and
the Navy, but not the Air Force.77 Recent studies of
PLA strategic modernization have not found PLAAF
interest in building or acquiring a new strategic bomber
to perform nuclear strike missions.78 At this point, it
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does not appear that the PLAAF has a nuclear role. If it
re-acquires such a role in the future, China would most
likely develop nuclear-armed cruise missiles that can
be delivered by an H-6 bomber rather than develop a
strategic bomber fleet.
Domestic vs. Foreign Production.
A second issue we have earlier noted is the
balance between domestic production and foreign
purchases of aircraft. China has historically sought
to be self-reliant in military production, but this goal
has so far eluded it. PLAAF weapon systems have
mostly been reverse-engineered from Soviet/Russian
systems, been purchased outright, or incorporated
significant amounts of foreign technology.79 China’s
defense industry reform and modernization efforts
are intended to improve China’s capability to develop
and produce high-technology weapons, including
advanced aircraft. China’s defense industries are
currently unable to develop and produce state-of-theart weapons, with the aviation industry struggling
to produce military aircraft at the mid-1980s level of
technology. Chinese leaders must therefore strike a
balance between domestic production of less capable
aircraft and munitions on one hand, and acquisition
of more capable weapons from foreign suppliers (with
attendant uncertainties about excessive dependence
and future support), on the other.
The degree to which the domestic-foreign trade-off
actually constrains China’s choices depends heavily on
the quality of the weapons produced by China’s domestic aviation industry. Chinese leaders are devoting
significant attention to improving the country’s overall
science and technology base, including its militaryindustrial base. This includes significant resources
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devoted to R&D and the goal of building the capacity
for “indigenous innovation.” The effort to reform and
improve China’s defense production also included
a major restructuring of the military procurement
system in 1998. The reforms established (1) the PLA’s
General Armaments Department for the purpose of
identifying military needs and managing procurement
for the military; and (2) a civilianized Committee on
Science, Technology, and Industry for the National
Defense (COSTIND) to supervise the defense industry
and coordinate procurement.80 Additional reforms in
July 1999 reorganized China’s core defense industries
into ten major enterprise groups. This reform created
the China Aviation Industries Corporation I and II
as the two holding companies that manage more
than 100 industrial enterprises related to the aviation
industry.81 The goal is to raise quality and reduce costs
by introducing increased competition into the defense
industry, but the extent to which the reforms have
succeeded is unclear.
These reforms hold the potential to improve
significantly the capabilities of Chinese domesticallyproduced aircraft, but the pace and extent of the
improvement is difficult to assess. At the moment,
China still has only a limited ability to produce modern
combat aircraft. China’s most advanced indigenouslybuilt fighter, the J-10, relies heavily on Israeli technology
and design assistance to attain performance roughly
equal to that of the F-16, a fighter introduced into the
USAF in 1976. The JH-7, the most advanced aircraft
China’s defense industry has produced on its own, is
equivalent to attack aircraft that entered service in the
United States, Russia, and Europe in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s.82 Advanced fighters often have extended
development cycles (the U.S. F-22 took 20 years to
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develop83), but China’s 20-30 year development cycle
is producing aircraft that are well behind state-of-theart fighters. The defense industry reforms described
above, combined with efforts to provide increased and
uninterrupted funding for aircraft R&D programs,
will likely help speed up this lengthy development
cycle. However, greater reliance on indigenous aircraft
development programs rather than acquisitions of
foreign aircraft would greatly slow the pace of PLAAF
modernization.
PLAAF efforts to acquire modern combat
aircraft have relied heavily on purchases of Russian
aircraft, technical assistance from Russia and Israel
in developing Chinese fighters, and imported
components from Russia and European countries.
Chinese leaders worry about excessive dependence
on foreign sources for several reasons. First, changes
in political relations could cut off the availability of
technologies, components, spare parts, or maintenance
support. China experienced this in 1960, when the SinoSoviet split led the Soviet Union to withdraw technical
assistance to Chinese military industries. A less severe
version occurred in 1989, when the United States and
Western European countries imposed an arms embargo
after the Tiananmen massacre. This cut China off from
U.S. assistance in modernizing its F-8-II fighter and
limited China’s access to spare parts for other weapons
systems, such as the Black Hawk helicopters it had
purchased from the United States. More recently, the
United States has pressured Israel to cancel a contract
to build an AWACS system for China and urged the
European Union (EU) to retain its arms embargo
against China.84 Even if technology and maintenance
support remain available, the need to send weapons
systems to other countries for maintenance may limit

408

their availability for military missions. China’s Su-27
and Il-76 aircraft still depend heavily on Russia for
spare parts and periodic overhauls.
A second concern is that the aircraft, avionics,
ordnance, and technologies foreign countries are
willing to make available to China may lag behind
state-of-the-art systems. Russia has been willing to
transfer a great deal of aviation technology to China,
but other suppliers have been more cautious in what
they are willing to sell. Since the available technologies
were more advanced than what China could produce,
China has pursued these deals. But as China’s
military technology base improves, limitations on the
availability of advanced technologies will likely be a
greater concern. Moreover, because Russia is making
only limited investments in advanced military R&D,
at some point Russian technology will be of less value
in helping China close the gap between its aircraft and
avionics and those of the United States and Western
Europe.85
A related concern is that excessive dependence
on imported components and technologies may
permanently lock China into an inferior position.
Without independent R&D capabilities, Chinese
manufacturers will be unable to make advances
beyond the technologies they are able to import.
Indigenous innovation is the ultimate goal of China’s
R&D effort. While imported technologies are important
in allowing China to catch up, continued progress will
ultimately require the ability to conduct independent
design and development work. China’s leaders are
committed to self-reliance in arms production, even
though this is not practical at the present time. This
point is evident in recent Chinese press reports about
the J-10 and JH-7 aircraft stressing that China owns the
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intellectual property rights for these aircraft as a key
achievement.86
Foreign procurement offers the ability to build an
advanced, highly capable Air Force more quickly than
waiting for Chinese manufacturers to move up the
learning curve and produce more advanced aircraft
themselves. Although the PLAAF’s initial purchase of
the Su-27 was intended to gain experience operating
and maintaining a modern fighter, the subsequent
purchase of additional Su-27s, the co-production of
the F-11, and the purchase of Su-30s reflect an outright
effort to build a significant combat capability based on
Russian fighters.
How the foreign-domestic trade-off affects future
PLAAF force structure will depend on continued
availability of foreign aircraft that are more advanced
than Chinese designs, the degree to which Chinese
manufacturers are able to close the quality gap, the
perceived urgency to build combat capability, and the
availability of foreign engines, avionics, and ordnance
that can be incorporated into Chinese aircraft. At
present, China is primarily pursuing both foreign
purchases and Chinese platforms incorporating
foreign components, but the leadership’s intention
is for Chinese companies to master military aviation
technologies and reduce China’s dependence on
foreign suppliers. The extent to which this goal can be
attained remains to be seen.
High-technology vs. Cost.
A third issue is how the PLAAF will manage the
balance between expensive, high-technology aircraft
and less expensive, less capable aircraft that can
be procured in greater numbers. This dichotomy
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overlaps with the foreign-domestic tradeoff discussed
above, since foreign aircraft are generally both more
expensive and more capable than aircraft produced
in China. (However, domestic systems may actually
be less economical if all the relevant R&D costs are
included.) A senior Chinese Air Force officer indicated
that PLAAF procurement costs for “foreign aircraft”
were 10 times higher than for “domestic aircraft.”87
All air forces confront the challenge of optimizing
the mix of expensive high-performance aircraft and
cheaper less-capable aircraft in their inventory. This
challenge is compounded by continuing improvements
in the technology employed in advanced military
aircraft. Marginal improvements in capabilities are
typically accompanied by major increases in costs. More
advanced aircraft also usually have higher maintenance
and operating costs. The result is a general pattern
wherein the quality and capabilities of the aircraft in
an air force’s inventory increase, but the total number
of combat aircraft declines. This dilemma is especially
acute for countries such as China and India with large
territories to defend and the consequent need for large
air forces. As older aircraft that were produced in large
quantities (such as the Chinese J-6 fighters and Indian
MiG-21s) are retired, they are usually replaced with
more capable aircraft but in smaller quantities. The
net result is a significant decrease in the size of the
inventory.
Table 1 compares changes in the number of combat
aircraft in the PLAAF, the Indian Air Force (IAF), and
the U.S. Air Force (USAF) from 1995-96 to 2006. The
Chinese and U.S. Air Forces both shrank significantly.
The number of IAF combat aircraft shrank only slightly
(partly because of previous down-sizing in the early
1990s).
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China		
1995-1996 2006
Bombers

India		
1995-1996 2006

United States
1995-1996 2006

420

222

0

0

201

177

Fighters/
Ground Attack

4,426

2,421

815

763

2,501

1,565

Total Combat
Aircraft

4,846

2,643

815

763

2,702

1,742

Source: The Military Balance, 1995-96 and 2006 editions, International Institute for
Strategic Studies.

Table 1: Comparison of PLAAF, IAF, and USAF
Combat Aircraft Quantities, 1995-96 to 2006.
Most air forces have a bias for more capable, hightechnology aircraft, but this preference is usually
tempered by budget realities. Although the general
trend is for air forces to get smaller as they upgrade their
fleet to more capable (and more expensive) aircraft, the
amount of the size reduction depends on the costs of
the replacement aircraft, which will in turn depend on
the particular mix of high/low capability aircraft. The
USAF has historically sought a mix of limited quantities
of high-performance fighters and larger quantities of a
less expensive fighter. This amounts to a compromise
between having a few maximum performance aircraft
for air superiority against an adversary’s best fighters
while also providing enough aircraft to carry out a
range of Air Force missions. In the 1970s, the USAF
implemented this high/low mix by procuring the F15 Eagle, a more expensive fighter interceptor, and
the F-16 Falcon, a medium performance fighter.88 The
USAF is currently deciding on the proper mix of F-22
Raptor interceptors and less-expensive F-35 joint strike
fighters.89
Like other air forces, the PLAAF faces the
dilemma of optimizing the mix of expensive high
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performance aircraft and less-expensive, less-capable
planes. Historically, the Chinese military has sought
to compensate for the inferior quality of its weapons
systems by procuring large quantities. A broad effort
is now underway across the Chinese defense industry
and the PLA to improve the quality of Chinese
weapons. In 1995, the CMC called for a shift “from an
army based on quantity to an army based on quality.”90
For the Air Force, this requirement will be met by
procurement of aircraft from two sources: purchases
of advanced Russian fighters, transports, tankers, and
(possibly) bombers and AEW/AWACS systems; and
procurement of aircraft developed by the Chinese
defense industry, such as the J-10, JH-7, and FC-1.
Within the fighter force, there will be two key
decisions. The most important decision affecting
PLAAF force structure is whether the PLAAF will
procure less capable aircraft such as the FC-1 fighter
and the JH-7 attack fighter in large numbers. The
PLAAF has been reluctant to purchase either aircraft
due to concerns about limited performance such as
low speed and limited maneuverability. The JH-7 is
currently in service in PLAN aviation units and one
PLAAF regiment, however.91 If the PLAAF decides
(or is forced by civilian leaders) to procure the FC-1
or JH-7 in quantity, this would push the PLAAF in the
direction of a larger, less capable fleet of aircraft.
The second decision will involve the mix of
advanced Russian aircraft and less-capable Chinese
aircraft. Will the future PLAAF consist largely of Su27s and Su-30s, or will the J-10 become the PLAAF’s
mainstream advanced multirole fighter? At this point,
it is difficult to know the exact cost and performance
differentials between the Su-27/Su-30 and the J-10, but
the J-10 will likely be less expensive and somewhat less
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capable. This decision will shape the composition of
the high-end of PLAAF fighter capabilities. If rumors
of a Chinese effort to develop an advanced fighter with
stealth capabilities are correct, this would add another
wrinkle to decisions about the proper mix of fighters.
The PLAAF will confront similar procurement decisions
with regard to transports (Russian Il-76 versus Chinese
Y-8 and Y-9 transports), tankers (Il-78/Midas versus
modified H-6 tankers), and AEW/AWACS (Russian A50/Mainstay versus domestic AEW/AWACS aircraft).
The tanker and AEW/AWACS decisions will likely be
influenced by decisions concerning the fighter fleet.
Support Systems vs. Combat Aircraft.
A fourth issue is the balance between investments
in support systems that serve as force multipliers, on
one hand, and procurement of combat aircraft, on the
other. The 2004 Defense White Paper declares the PLA’s
objective as winning “local wars under the conditions
of informationalization.” The Defense White Paper
highlights the importance of informationalization
as the correct orientation and strategic focus of PLA
modernization. It notes that modernization will
strengthen military information systems and speed up
informationalization of main battle weapon systems,
making full use of various information resources and
focusing on increasing system interoperability and
information-sharing capability. The Defense White Paper
also highlights the need to accelerate the modernization
of weaponry and equipment and to improve joint
operational capabilities.92
Informationalization involves improving collection
of intelligence about the position of enemy forces from
a variety of sources, sharing that information widely
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among command elements and operational units,
and controllilng forces in a networked manner to
make optimal use of information for tactical purposes.
As applied to the Air Force, this implies a greater
investment in intelligence collection, command and
control, and support systems that can help ensure that
ground-based and air assets function in an integrated
and more effective manner. This suggests that the
PLAAF will increase its investments in support systems
such as tankers, transports, AEW/AWACS, intelligence
collection platforms, and electronic warfare systems.
This investment, plus the communications capabilities
needed to tie the sensors, command and control system,
and weapons systems together, would compete with
procurement of additional combat aircraft.
The PLA desire to proceed in the direction of
informationalization is clear, having been reinforced
by the 2006 Defense White Paper. The principal question
is whether hardware capabilities, operational concepts,
and training will support this shift in emphasis,
especially under combat conditions. With respect to the
Air Force, questions about informationalization center
upon China’s ability to build effective AEW/AWACS,
intelligence collection, and electronic warfare systems
and to integrate these systems effectively with aircraft
and ground-based air defenses. Integration of avionics,
information display, communications, and weapons
systems is likely to be a particularly challenging task,
especially given the PLAAF’s mix of Russian and
Chinese aircraft (and the fact that some Chinese aircraft
incorporate foreign avionics). The degree of difficulty
will be further heightened if the goal of improving joint
operations capability requires integration across the
services. The crash of a prototype during flight testing
in June 2006 highlights the obstacles China will face in
fielding an indigenous AEW/AWACS capability.93
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It is clear that the PLAAF intends to develop and
procure a range of support aircraft and capabilities to
improve the combat effectiveness of its aircraft and
air defenses. The chief uncertainties concern China’s
ability to procure foreign platforms and technology,
the capabilities of indigenously-developed systems,
the capacity to integrate sensors, weapons, and C4I
systems using secure communications, and whether
the PLAAF will develop the operational concepts
and training necessary to use these new capabilities
successfully in multiplying the effectiveness of combat
forces.
Assessments of International Environment
and Budget Constraints.
The decisions of China’s military leaders regarding
the four trade-offs discussed above will have a significant impact on the future force structure of the PLAAF.
How China’s top civilian leaders assess the overall
international security environment and the resources
they are willing to devote to military modernization
will shape the overall budget and policy environment
in which military modernization takes place.
A leadership reassessment of China’s security
environment might change the relative priority and
resources devoted to military modernization. For
example, the need to prepare for a possible conflict
over Taiwan independence has been a key justification
for increased military spending in recent years. If
the Taiwan situation appears more stable and the
international environment relatively benign, the need
for increased military spending may be less persuasive
to civilian leaders focused on domestic priorities
such as promoting development and reducing
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inequality between urban and rural China. There are
some indications that PLA strategists are beginning
to look beyond the Taiwan issue and articulate the
rationale for building a Chinese military capable of
global operations in defense of China’s sea lines of
communication and expanding global interests. It is
unclear how persuasive this rationale will be to Chinese
leaders. Conversely, a downturn in Sino-U.S. relations
could reinforce Chinese concerns about potential U.S.
threats, thus bringing increased emphasis on military
modernization. Concerns about Japan’s emergence as a
“normal country” with fewer restraints on its military
could also heighten Chinese threat perceptions.
The civilian leadership’s assessment of the security
environment will have a major impact on the resources
available for military modernization, but other
factors will also influence military budgets. These
include China’s ability to continue rapid economic
growth, whether China avoids a serious economic or
financial crisis, the relative weight placed on military
expenditures compared to other leadership priorities,
and additional costs for social spending as China’s
population ages.94 Barring an economic collapse, Air
Force budgets are likely to increase even if China’s
recent pace of double-digit increases in real defense
spending slows. Nevertheless, budgets will still be
a constraint on Air Force modernization, forcing
China’s leaders to grapple with the trade-offs described
above.
ALTERNATIVE MODERNIZATION PATHS
The most likely path for PLAAF force modernization
is to continue present efforts to build the Air Force using
a variety of means, including continued procurement
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of advanced aircraft from Russia; continued domestic
efforts to design and produce advanced aircraft; and
incorporation of imported engines, avionics, and
munitions into Chinese aircraft designs. The Chinese
preference is to shift gradually away from foreign
procurement and use of foreign components as the
Chinese aviation industry’s capabilities to produce
advanced aircraft and components improves. Three
variations on this force modernization path illustrate
alternative possibilities.
Efforts to maximize capability quickly. This path
would likely flow from a leadership assessment that
China’s security environment was deteriorating and
that more resources needed to be devoted to accelerate
military modernization. The likely consequences
would be increased procurement of foreign aircraft;
redoubled efforts to acquire foreign AWACS, tanker,
and transport aircraft; and accelerated production of
both high and medium-quality indigenous aircraft.
Efforts to replace imported components with Chineseproduced equivalents would be deemphasized in
favor of buying increased stocks of critical foreign
components. Given procurement and production
lead times, this scenario would require at least 2 to 3
years to produce substantial gains in capability. The
PLAAF’s ability to absorb and employ additional
aircraft would be constrained by its capacity to train
pilots and maintenance personnel and the time needed
to upgrade units to operate more advanced aircraft.
A high-technology Air Force. This path would
emphasize advanced aircraft, support systems,
and the C4I capabilities to integrate aircraft into
informationalized operations. The PLAAF would
focus procurement on Russian fighters and possibly
the J-10 fighter, while procuring few if any FC-1 or JH-
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7 aircraft. China might also explore the possibility of
codevelopment of new advanced aircraft with Russian
partners as a means of upgrading its aircraft inventory
and improving the R&D capability of its defense
industry. The PLAAF would retire older aircraft as
more capable replacements entered the force in order
to focus its resources on advanced aircraft. Investment
in support aircraft such as AEW/AWACS and tankers
would be a priority, with renewed efforts to procure
foreign platforms and technology combined with
intensified indigenous development efforts. The
PLAAF would resist efforts to replace foreign engines
and avionics with Chinese-produced equivalents that
did not deliver the same performance or reliability.
A domestically-produced Air Force. This path would
emphasize indigenous efforts to produce advanced
weapons and seek to avoid reliance on foreign
suppliers. It implies less emphasis on procurement of
Russian aircraft, increased purchases of J-10 fighters
(and possibly FC-1 and JH-7 aircraft), and intensified
efforts to replace foreign engines and avionics with
indigenous equivalents. Development of force
multipliers such as AEW/AWACS, tankers, and
transports would depend on how quickly the Chinese
defense industry’s R&D efforts progressed. (A “spiral”
development model where initial capabilities were
deployed and then improved over time would be a
possibility.) This approach implies a more relaxed pace
of modernization, but would lay a firmer foundation
for future Chinese efforts to develop advanced
aircraft. This path would likely result from leadership
confidence that China’s security environment was
improving and that a military conflict was unlikely in
the medium term.
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CONCLUSION
The PLAAF hopes to build an Air Force consisting
primarily of advanced aircraft integrated with effective
support systems, with the capability of conducting
offensive strike missions against ground and naval
targets and effective air defense against advanced
militaries. This Air Force would be capable of
conducting and supporting joint operations, and would
rely heavily on networking and informationalization
to employ air power effectively. These aspirations
will likely be constrained by the current technological
limitations of the Chinese aviation industry and by
the resources made available to support defense
modernization. One of the biggest uncertainties is
whether the PLAAF will choose (or be forced) to
procure large quantities of less capable aircraft as a
means of developing and strengthening the Chinese
aircraft industry and/or supporting the leadership’s
goal of indigenous innovation and self-reliance.
PLAAF decisions about how many J-10, FC-1, and JH7 fighters to procure will be a key indicator. In theory,
the defense reorganization of 1998 that established the
General Armaments Department should give Air Force
requirements greater weight in procurement decisions,
but this may not be true in practice.
Chinese leadership perceptions of the international
threat environment (to include assessments of the
likelihood of a crisis over Taiwan or a conflict with
the United States) and PLAAF budget allocations will
have a significant influence on the overall size of the
future PLA and the speed with which modernization
takes place. PLAAF force structure will also be shaped
by decisions about the division of labor on air defense
and conventional strike missions and about the proper
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proportions between foreign and domestic production,
high-technology and lower-cost systems, and combat
aircraft and support aircraft. Regardless of the specific
decisions on these issues, it is already clear that the
future PLAAF will be a significantly smaller, but more
capable Air Force.
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APPENDIX I
PLAAF AIRCRAFT
FIGHTERS AND GROUND ATTACK
J-6

The J-6 is now in full retirement and no longer deployed.

J-7

The J-7, the Chinese version of the Mig-21, is a fighter
interceptor for air defense and attack. The J-7 is tasked with
providing local air defense and tactical air superiority. The
active J-7 fleet includes upgraded J-7II/J-7IIA, J-7IIM and J-7C/
D models. The upgrades feature advanced avionics, better radar,
and better engines than the originals, as well as helmet-sighted
Air-to-Air Missiles (AAM).95 There are roughly 750 J-7s in active
service, deployed in all seven Chinese military regions.96
J-8

The J-8 is a single-seat twin-engine second generation air
superiority fighter with ground attack capabilities. The PLAAF
flies upgraded J-8I, J-8II versions of the J-8. The J-8 is armed with a
23 mm Type 23-3 twin-barrel cannon. It carries the PL-2B and PL7 AAM. It is also armed with 57 mm Type 57-2 unguided air-to-air
rockets, launchers for 90 mm air-to-surface rockets and bombs.97
The upgraded J-8E has been equipped with new radar and
defensive electronics while some J-8Ds have been equipped with
aerial refueling capabilities. It is possible that some J-8s have been
armed with helmet-guided AAM, either the PL-8 or the PL-9.98
Currently there are 245 J-8s deployed by the PLAAF.99 The J-8 is
likely deployed in the Nanjing, Beijing, Lanzhou, and Guangzhou
MRs.100
J-10

The J-10 is a multirole, light-weight air superiority fighter
and attack aircraft. There is also the J-10B, a two seat trainer with
potential attack missions, as well as the Super-10, an advanced J-10
model possibly deployed in 2006. The J-10 is powered by the Al31 FN turbofan engine, but may eventually employ a domestically
developed turbofan engine. The J-10 is armed with PL-8 AAMs,
with capabilities to carry the more advanced PL-11 and PL-12.
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The J-10 also has the potential to carry the Vympel R-73 and R77 AAMs, as well as C-801 or C-802 ASMs, YJ-8K (antiship) or
YJ-9 (antiradiation) missiles. The J-10 can reach Mach 2.0, with a
maximum ceiling of 18,000 meters and a combat radius of 1,100
kilometers, making it a viable aircraft for most potential conflicts
China may face. The J-10 also has aerial refueling capabilities.101
The J-10 entered large-scale production in 2006; 62 aircraft are
already deployed.102
J-11/SU-27SK
The Su-27SK is a single-seat fighter, while the Su-27 UBK is
a twin-seat trainer. The J-11 is the Chinese co-production model
of the Su-27. Su-27SK is powered by the Russian Twin Al-31 FP
thrust-vectoring aero-engine. Upgraded Su-27s are suspected to
be armed with AA-10 and AA-11 AAMs.103 The KnAAPO website
also claims that the Su-27SK is capable of carrying six R-27R1
medium range AAMs, six RW-AE medium-range AAM, six R-73E
short-range AAMs, and a 30mm automatic single-barrel cannon.104
There are roughly 116 Su-27/J-11s deployed in the PLAAF. The J11 and the Su-27s are now deployed in the Nanjing, Guangzhou,
Chengdu, Shenyang, Jinan, and Beijing MRs.105
Su-30MKK
The Su-3MKK is a multirole, twin-seat fighter. It is powered by
two Al-31F aero-engines and is equipped with in-flight refueling
capabilities that extend its range.106 The weapons package on
the Su-30MKK consists of 30-mm cannon, missiles, and bombs
mounted on 12 hard-points under the wing and fuselage. Airto-air missiles include the R-27R1 (R-27ER1) guided mediumrange missiles with semiactive seekers, 2 R-27T1 medium-range
missiles with heat seekers, the RVV-AE medium range missiles
with active radar seekers, the R-73E dogfight missiles with heat
seekers. The air-to-surface weapons are comprised of up to 6 Kh31P anti-radiation missiles with passive radar seekers, up to 6 Kh31A antiship missiles with active radar seekers, up to 6Kh-29T
(Kh-29TE) short-range missiles with TV-seekers or Kh-29L with
semi-active laser seekers, two Kh59ME medium-range missiles
with TV-commanded seekers, and up to three KAB-500Kr or
one KAB-1500Kr guided bombs with TV-correlated seekers.107
The PLAAF has roughly 73 Su-30s in their force, deployed in the
Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs.108
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Q-5

The Q-5 is a single seat, supersonic attack aircraft.109 Recently,
the upgraded Q-5D was fitted to carry and deliver Laser Guided
bombs.110 It is also armed with one 23mm canon with 100 rounds
and can carry a 250 kg bomb in the fuselage as well as Norinco
90-1 rockets or four 130-1 rockets. It is also capable of carrying the
C-801 antiship missile, the PL-2, PL-2B, PL-7, AIM-9 Sidewinder,
or the R-550 Magic missile systems.111 New trainer versions of the
Q-5 are being powered by the Al-222-25F turbofan, suggesting
that the PLAAF may be upgrading the Q-5 program. There are
more than 400 Q-5s still deployed, mainly in the Shenyang, Jinan,
Beijing, and Nanjing MRs.112

Xiaolong/FC-1
The Xiaolong/FC-1 (previously known as the Super-7;
sometimes referred to as the FC-4) is a multirole fighter bomber
and the most advanced fully indigenous fighter in domestic
development in China. The FC-1 flew its first test flight in
Chengdu on April 28, 2006.113 It is the most advanced aircraft the
PLAAF is domestically producing and is the product of a joint
Chinese-Pakistani cooperative. It is powered by the WP-13F
turbojet engine.114 The Xiaolong has intercept and ground attack
capabilities. It is not yet deployed into the PLAAF force.
JH-7
Initial aircraft have gone primarily to the PLANAF, although
the PLAAF had received models by 2004. The JH-7 has an
advertised maximum payload of 14,330 pounds, carrying up to
4 C-801/802ASMs, freefall bombs, and AAMs.115 The PLAAF
operates one regiment of JH-7 aircraft.
BOMBERS
Hong-5
The H-5 bomber is a light bomber that has been in production
since the 1950s. It has a relatively short range for a bomber, roughly
2,400 km. There has been a slight resurgence in production over
the past several years, despite the H-5 being rather obsolete. The
PLAAF has roughly 94 H-5s deployed.116
Hong-6
The H-6 is a medium bomber based on the Tu-16, with land
attack and sea attack missions. The H-6 has a maximum range of
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2,672 miles and five plus hours of flying time. The H-6 has been
converted to carry the Y-63, a 200-300km range cruise missile that
was derived from the C-601 family of cruise missiles. Some H6s have been converted to HU-6 refueling platforms.117 There are
currently about 128 H-6 bombers in service throughout China.118
TANKERS
H-6/Il-78
China has a number of H-6 bombers converted into tankers,
which are deployed in the Guangzhou MR. China signed a contract
with Russia to purchase 8 Il-78M tankers in 2005, although these
aircraft have not yet been delivered.119 The Il-78 has a cruising
speed of 466 mph, with a refueling speed between 267 and 366
mph. The Il-78s can refuel China’s Su-30s, while the H-6s serve
the J-8Ds and J-10 aircraft.120
TRANSPORTS
Y-8

The Y-8 is based on the Antonov An-12 and serves as China’s
medium-weight military transport. The Y-8 is armed with twin
23 mm cannon mounted on the tail turret. The Y-8 has a reported
payload of 20,000 kg, enough for 96 troops with vehicles and
weapons, or 130 passengers.121 It is unclear how many Y-8s are
currently deployed in the PLAAF.
Y-9

The Y-9 was unveiled at the 2005 Beijing Aviation Expo.
According to reports it is so similar to the Y-8 that it was hardly
noticeable as a new aircraft. The Y-9, like the Y-8, is a medium
transport but is slightly smaller than some variants of the Y-8. It
is capable of carrying 98 armed soldiers or paratroopers, as well
as 72 littered patients plus 3 medical staff members, or 98 lightly
wounded patients at one time.122 A relatively new aircraft, it is not
yet fully deployed with the PLAAF.
Il-76
The Il-76 is a 1970s vintage Russian military transport with a
40-ton payload.123 The Institute of International Strategic Studies
estimates that there are 13 Il-76s in service in the PLAAF, with
another 38 on order. The PLAAF has various other transports
deployed, with a total force of about 295 transport aircraft.124
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AEW/AWACS
The PLAAF AEW/AWACS aircraft in development are the KJ2000 and the KJ-2, based on the Il-76 and the Y-8X, respectively.125
China has been making a concerted effort to develop AEW/
AWACS aircraft domestically; however, there have been
complications as highlighted by the crash of a prototype in June
2006.126 It is unclear if any AEW/AWACS aircraft are currently
operationally deployed in the PLAAF.
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CHAPTER 9
RIGHT-SIZING THE PLA AIR FORCE:
NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS DEFINE
A SMALLER, MORE CAPABLE FORCE
Kevin M. Lanzit and Kenneth Allen
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is stepping
up preparations for military struggle. To meet the
requirements of informationalized air operations,
the Air Force has gradually shifted from the
mission of territorial air defense to that of both
offensive and defensive operations. Emphasis
is placed on the development of new fighters,
air defense, and antimissile weapons, and the
means of information operations and automated
command systems. Combined arms and multirole
air combat training is intensified to improve the
capabilities in operations such as air strikes, air
defense, information countermeasures, early
warning and reconnaissance, strategic mobility,
and integrated support. Efforts are being made to
build a defensive Air Force, which is appropriate
in size, sound in organization and structure,
advanced in weaponry and equipment, and
possessed of integrated systems and a complete
array of information support and operational
means.
China’s National Defense: 20041

Introduction.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is in the midst of a
dramatic transformation aimed at transitioning from a
benign defensive force to one that incorporates modern
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defenses and robust offensive strike capabilities. During
the next decade, China’s Air Force will gain significant
additional capabilities in a number of important mission
areas.2 These will come as a result of several programs
which are already in, or soon will be, an advanced state
of development. In fact, the introduction of new airand ground-based weapons has already led to major
advances in all-weather defensive and, for the first
time, offensive operations.
Anticipated future enhancements in command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) will enable
China to significantly improve its ability to perform
long-range strikes using stand-off, precision-guided
munitions. The emerging capacity of indigenous
Chinese defense plants to design and build their own
complex weapons can be expected to further accelerate
deliveries of high-tech hardware into operational units
and wean the PLAAF from its dependence on Russian
systems.
In charting the PLAAF’s progress, it is tempting
to focus on the hardware. However, this would be a
mistake since the PLAAF’s further advancement will
hinge on a broad range of long overdue doctrinal and
institutional changes that are now underway. Beginning
in the 1990s, the PLAAF embarked on an expansive
program of reforms that targeted doctrine, leadership,
force structure, organizational structure, and officer
and enlisted education, and training.3 New mission
requirements and an emphasis on joint operations are
forcing military strategists to rethink old concepts of
air doctrine. Force modernization and the drive for
joint capabilities have imposed new challenges on
Air Force leaders and led to substantial restructuring
of command elements. Additionally, the introduction
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of highly advanced weapons has created the need
for the PLAAF to revamp its education and training
programs. These and other “software” developments
will play a key role in determining the pace and scope
of the PLAAF’s further modernization and provide
important clues about how the force is being “rightsized” for its new missions.
Evolving PLAAF Mission Requirements.
China’s National Defense in 2006 states, “The Air
Force aims to speed up its transition from territorial
air defense to simultaneous offensive and defensive
operations. It also aims to increase its capabilities in
the areas of air strike, air and missile defense, early
warning and reconnaissance, and strategic projection.”4
To “meet the requirements of informationalized air
operations,” the PLAAF is in the process of a long-term
transformation from a territorial air defense force to a
modern force capable of conducting short-duration,
high-intensity offensive operations against high-tech
adversaries.5 This new orientation for the Air Force
is part of a broader Chinese military doctrine that
emphasizes mobility, speed, and long-range attack,
plus synchronized combined arms and joint operations
through the full spectrum of air, land, sea, space, and
electromagnetic battlespace, all while relying heavily
upon extremely lethal, high-technology weapons.
What is new and strikingly different is the PLAAF’s
focus on its offensive capacity. The pursuit of a robust
set of offensive capabilities became an imperative for
the PLA after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis exposed
operational deficiencies and the limited range of
military options that could be executed against Taiwan.
Since that time, the PLA has striven to develop the
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capability to carry out a variety of military operations
against Taiwan—air and missile attacks, a naval
blockade, or even an outright invasion of the island—
to block a move towards independence by Taiwan.
These capabilities are also intended to deter, delay,
and complicate U.S. efforts to intervene on behalf of
Taiwan. The successful execution of such military
actions will depend upon a broad range of advanced
air operations—both offensive and defensive.
Modernization Leads To a Smaller,
More Capable Force.
Following a worldwide trend toward smaller,
more capable air forces, the PLAAF is downsizing
and reshaping the force structure to perform a variety
of new support tasks that are required to conduct
both defensive and offensive air operations. Since
the PLAAF was founded, territorial air defense has
remained the highest mission priority for China’s Air
Force, with successive commanders allocating force
structure accordingly. To detect an air attack and
direct air defense operations, the PLAAF developed
an extensive network of ground-based air warning
radars and air defense operations centers. To ward off
and defend against attacks, the PLAAF deployed and
has maintained fixed antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and
surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries in the vicinity of
most major population centers and key installations.
Ground-based point defense weapons were augmented
by a vast fleet of air interceptors to rove the skies and fill
the voids between potential targets and the relatively
short-ranged, ground-based weapons.
For PLAAF commanders, the challenge of defending China’s airspace became increasingly complex
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through the 1970s and 1980s as China continued to
lose ground to the technologically advanced weapon
systems that were entering service in the air forces
on its periphery. With their attention concentrated on
the air defense mission, PLAAF leaders allocated far
less attention and far fewer resources to secondary
mission responsibilities, including medium-range
nuclear weapons delivery, battle area interdiction, and
airborne and airdrop operations.
Throughout its history, the PLAAF’s growth and
development have experienced challenges from a
ground force-dominated PLA opposed to a more
independent Air Force. A statement by Liu Yalou, the
PLAAF’s first commander, aptly makes this point.
In 1951, Liu wrote, “The PLAAF must oppose two
erroneous tendencies. The first tendency is to believe
that the PLAAF is a new service that can disregard
the legacy of the Army. The second tendency is to be
[cognizant of only] some of the Army’s experience.
Both of these tendencies are wrong and will impede the
PLAAF’s development.”6 These points were reiterated
in February 1951, when at the first expanded meeting of
the PLAAF Party Committee, it was formally affirmed
that “the Air Force will be developed [as a part] of the
Army.”
In the early 1980s, when the PLA began reorganizing
the ground forces into group armies, the PLAAF
was tasked only to provide defense for group army
positions. Specific guidance was given that “each
branch and unit of the PLAAF must establish the
philosophy that they support the needs of the ground
forces and that the victory is a ground force victory.”7
Thus, the PLAAF was still effectively tied to supporting
the ground forces rather than acting in its own right as
a service with a unique and valuable role. This mindset
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began to slowly change in the mid-1980s when, almost
40 years after the PLAAF’s founding, General Wang
Hai became the first aviator to be appointed as the
commander.
Changing Capabilities
to Meet Mission Requirements.
The Air Force is now attempting to develop the
capability to conduct all-weather, day-night, highintensity simultaneous defensive and offensive
operations, while extending its ability to operate
beyond the periphery of China’s coastline. This major
shift in mission orientation has forced the PLAAF to
embark on a broad range of new weapons and ancillary
programs—air refueling, air defenses, airborne warning
and control—required to support offensive operations.
Integration of these new weapons and capabilities
will require substantial readjustments in the size and
composition of the Air Force. In addition to obvious
realignments at the tactical level, operational command
and control elements will require fundamental
restructuring to facilitate the planning and execution
of offensive air operations beyond China’s borders.
Establishing Acquisition Priorities.
In recent years, the PLAAF has employed a number
of approaches to acquiring new platforms. Historically,
political, economic, and security considerations have
caused the PLAAF to rely on domestic producers for
new equipment. Although Chinese defense industries
successfully introduced a number of incremental
improvements to legacy fighters and air defense
systems, it was not until recently that they were able
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to design and develop new weapons incorporating
advanced technologies. As a result, the PLAAF
entered the 1990s with a weapons inventory that was
more representative of the technology of the 1960s and
1970s.
In May 1990, just prior to Central Military
Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Liu Huaqing’s
visit to Moscow to negotiate the first SU-27 contract,
the PLAAF issued an internal document that laid out a
weapons procurement plan addressing doctrinal needs
and budgetary constraints.8 This document argued
that it would take many years to attain its needs if
China relied solely on indigenous efforts to develop
new capabilities. Although self-reliance in designing
and developing new equipment remained a strategic
goal for the aviation industry, this left the PLAAF with
few alternatives for fleet modernization and often led
to unmet requirements. The PLAAF adopted four
criteria—New, Quality, Modify, and Introduce—to
address its modernization challenges:
• New—Use the newest weapons and equipment
already in the inventory.
• Quality—Focus on acquiring and employing
weapons and equipment that provide
meaningful military capability and possess
high operational capability. Maintain aircraft
and engines to extend their service lives.
• Modify—Use new technology and materials to
upgrade existing equipment, thus giving it new
life. Designing and developing a new aircraft
from the ground up is not considered a feasible
option and would consume vast amounts of
capital.
• Introduce—Acquire and integrate advanced
weapons and equipment from abroad.
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The PLAAF also announced that it would deploy
modern equipment based on the threat facing each war
zone. This would ensure rapid mobilization for battle
and facilitate training. Finally, the 1990 guidelines
argued against spreading new equipment evenly
among every unit, on the grounds that this would
dissipate strength where it was needed most.
In deciding which weapons and equipment to
modernize, the PLAAF determined that it must focus
on six combat and combat support capabilities:
• Air superiority,
• Ground attack,
• Transporting troops and supplies,
• Airborne early warning and reconnaissance,
• Electronic countermeasures, and
• Maintenance and logistics.9
The 1990 plan also laid out the following general
guidelines for proportionally developing its force,
although no precise percentages or numbers were
specified:
• Fighter aircraft must have the highest priority.
• The proportion allocated for ground attack
aircraft must be larger than the portion for
bombers, since ground attack aircraft with a
refueling capability could be used against rearechelon targets.
• There must be a certain proportion of bombers,
especially strategic bombers.
• Reconnaissance aircraft, jamming aircraft, and
airborne early warning aircraft must be supplied
in relevant proportions.
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• Development of transport aircraft, which have
a strategic capability of moving troops and
supplies, cannot be slowed.
• Aerial refueling must constitute a certain proportion of combat aircraft as a force multiplier.
• China must pay attention to developing helicopters, especially armed helicopters, for the
Army and Navy.
• The Air Force must develop ground-based
weapon systems, particularly air defense missiles, radar, and communication systems.10
During the past 15 years, the PLAAF has largely
achieved the goals established under the 1990 guidelines through the implementation of an equipment
modernization strategy that relied heavily on access
to Russian military equipment.11 Major acquisitions of
aircraft and air defense systems from Russia include
Su-2712 and Su-30 fighters, Il-76 transports, S-300
SAMs, and Mi-17, Ka-28, and Mi-8 helicopters. The
PLAAF has also deployed its first B-6 aerial refueling
tankers for J-8II fighters, and is trying to acquire the
Il-76 refueling variant for its Sukhoi aircraft. Since
2003, the PLAAF has taken delivery on as many as 60
new J-10 fighters, a highly evolved derivative of the
Israeli Lavi program, developed in Chengdu, China.
Significantly, the PLAAF has not yet achieved its goals
in the development of strategic bombers or airborne
early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.
Force Restructuring.
The PLAAF, along with other branches of China’s
military, has steadily reduced force structure through
the retirement and replacement of outmoded weapons
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systems with smaller numbers of advanced weapons.
In this process, the PLAAF has trimmed personnel
and equipment and deactivated units, while adding
new capabilities and combat power to its forces.
Recapitalization and realignments within the PLAAF
follow the global trend toward smaller, more capable air
forces. Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF has completed
the following force reductions and realignments:
• Decreased total personnel strength from 490,000
to less than 400,000;
• Reduced combat aircraft from more than 5,000
to about 2,000 (and the number is continuing to
decrease annually);
• Reduced combat air divisions from 50 to 28;
• Decreased the average number of regiments per
air division from three to two; and
• Decreased the number of aircraft per regiment.13
As shown in Table 1, the PLAAF, despite a concerted
effort to modernize its forces, continues to operate a
large fleet of legacy aircraft that are variants of Soviet
designs—MiG, Tupolev, Antonov—originating from
the 1950s. These aircraft slow modernization efforts
by consuming operational and maintenance funds
while contributing little to China’s defense. During the
past two decades, the PLAAF has retired nearly 3,000
aircraft, shrinking its combat inventory from roughly
5,000 to approximately 2,000 combat aircraft. This has
removed many, but not all, of the vintage airframes
from the fleet. Yet, further reductions may prove
more difficult to justify and execute because many of
the remaining legacy airframes were manufactured
as recently as 10 years ago. This creates a number of
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PLAAF Combat Aircraft
Advanced Fighters
All Flankers*
J-10

Numbers
240
50

Other Fighters
J-6, J-7, J-8

1,200

Attack
JH-7, Q-5

420

Bombers
H-5, H-6

100

Reconnaissance

180

Total Combat Aircraft

1,800

Table 1. PLAAF Combat Aircraft.14
programmatic challenges for PLAAF leaders as they
contemplate modernization schedules in the years
ahead. With at least two stealth programs under
development, China may elect to restrain near-term
acquisitions of nonstealth aircraft in anticipation of
more capable airframes becoming available in the near
future.
Aircraft replacement rates over the course of the
next several years will determine the pace of transition
to a truly modern force. At present, the PLAAF’s
inventory of advanced fighters—300 Flanker and J10 aircraft—remains modest. The newest and most
formidable additions to the Flanker line-up are the 76
multirole Su-30MKKs stationed in the Guangzhou and
Nanjing military regions (MRs) where they are poised
to conduct precision strikes against Taiwan and U.S.
military bases in Okinawa. Each of these aircraft is
currently equipped with an aerial refueling probe.
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Once the PLAAF receives the first batch of Russian
Il-76 tankers to air refuel the Flankers, their range and
loiter capability will be further improved.
By many measures China’s Air Force remains
relatively small. China’s size—along with its growing
power and influence—dominates the Asian landmass.
Yet it borders 15 other nations, thus creating unique
challenges for an Air Force tasked to maintain air
sovereignty along 22,000 kilometers of national
boundary. Although PLAAF basing has been concentrated along the eastern seaboard, China has not
neglected other security concerns and vulnerabilities
to the northeast and northwest. This can be evidenced
in the basing of Flankers, which are spread among each
of the seven MRs.
DOCTRINAL REFORMS
China’s military modernization is underpinned by
a new PLA operational doctrine, still evolving, that
emphasizes preemption, surprise, and shock based on
the concept that the early stages of conflict are crucial
to the final outcome. To implement this doctrine, the
PLA has assigned priority to modernizing naval, air,
and strategic missile forces.15 This new doctrine reflects
China’s shift away from its historical predominant
reliance on ground forces toward a more balanced
defense posture incorporating the full panoply of
PLAAF capabilities.
As Table 2 shows, the PLAAF began developing
its current doctrine in the mid-1980s, starting with
campaigns, then tactics, and, finally, strategy. Note that
the doctrine on PLAAF strategy was published in 1995;
however, the culmination of the PLAAF’s efforts in
behalf of its own strategic doctrine did not truly come
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to fruition until 2004, when the CMC incorporated a
PLAAF component into the National Military Strategic
Guidelines.
Doctrinal Title
Science of PLA Air Force Campaigns
Science of Air Force Tactics
Science of Air Force Strategy
Introduction to Air Force Military Thought
Science of Integrated Air and Space Operations

Preliminary
Approval

Publication
Date

1984
1989
1992
1998
2003

1988
1994
1995
2006
2006

Table 2. Chronology of PLAAF Doctrinal
Development.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAAF’S
STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
The PLA’s collective National Military Strategic
Guidelines (guojia junshi zhanlue fangzhen) have three
major components. The first is a strategic assessment
of the international environment. The second is the
operational component, known as the “Active Defense”
(jiji fangyu) strategy. The third is “Army Building.”
From its founding in 1949 and until 2004, while
lacking its own strategy component to establish a broad
direction for air operations, the PLAAF relied almost
solely on the PLA ground force’s “Active Defense”
operational component as its strategic-level doctrinal
guidance. Chinese military literature indicates that
initial discussions on the development of a PLAAF
strategic theory may have begun in the mid-1980s. In
1987, PLAAF commander General Wang Hai proposed
that the PLAAF be accorded its own operational
component in the PLA’s “Active Defense” strategy.
General Wang introduced “the goal of transforming
449

from defending the country’s airspace to building an Air
Force capable of simultaneous offensive and defensive
operations (gong fang jian bei).”21 Wang emphasized
that the combined arms combat environment of the
1980s required a force that could:
• Move quickly over long distances;
• Fight in an electronic environment;
• Have the capability to attack an enemy; and
• Protect the PLAAF from sustaining catastrophic
damage from an enemy air attack.
The China Air Force Encyclopedia declares that the
capability to conduct simultaneous offensive and
defensive operations is the “guiding concept for Air
Force building.”22 The capacity for simultaneous
offensive and defensive operations is closely linked to
the PLAAF’s organizational structure, weapon systems
and equipment, education and training, C4I system,
and logistics support system.
Concurrent with General Wang’s proposals,
National Defense University (NDU) commandant
General Zhang Zhen broached the idea of establishing
Air Force strategic theory as a specialty within the
university.23 Although this suggestion did not take
hold, it apparently led to further discussions on the
need to develop strategic guidelines for air operations.
In fact, the PLA debated this issue vigorously during
the mid-1980s in what could best be described as “turf
wars” or “internal politics” within the PLA. According
to Science of Air Force Strategy, Chinese military theorists
of a ground-dominance bent put forward several
arguments countering the alleged need for Air Force
strategic guidelines:
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• China can have only one national military
strategy, and that is “Active Defense”;
• The PLAAF does not have strategic weapons, so
it is not qualified to have an Air Force strategy;
• The PLAAF already has half of an Air Force
strategy in that it has the strategic mission of air
defense of the nation, but supporting the ground
forces does not qualify as a strategic mission;
• Because the PLAAF’s command personnel can
implement directive guidance only from above,
lacking command and decision authority in its
own right, there is no Air Force strategy; and
• The PLAAF is a multifaceted service with many
missions; therefore, it already has a strategy.24
As we saw in Table 2, beginning in 1992 the PLA
established a committee of NDU and PLAAF officers
to initiate research on Air Force strategy, culminating
in the publication of Science of Air Force Strategy
in 1995. This book laid out an argument, based on
international air power doctrine, for the PLAAF to be
an “independent” service and to be assigned its own
operational component in the PLA’s National Military
Strategic Guidelines.
The Gulf War and the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis
provided additional ammunition for the PLAAF to
seek its own strategic doctrine. For example, statements
by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military
Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin and
recently installed PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao
emphasized the PLAAF’s requirement to fight offensive
battles. In 1997, General Liu stressed this new strategic
direction in the following words:
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The Chinese Air Force plans to build up state-of-the-art
weapon systems by early next century, including early
warning aircraft, electronic warfare warplanes, and
surface-to-air missiles. The PLA Air Force is now able
to fight both defensive and offensive battles under hightech conditions. The Air Force is now capable of waging
high-level long-distance combat, rapid maneuverability,
and air defense, and is able to provide assistance to Navy
and ground forces. The Air Force now sources most of
its equipment domestically, fielding a large number of
Chinese-designed and produced high-quality fighters,
attackers, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and special
purpose aircraft. Over the next few years, the Chinese
Air Force will enhance its deterrent force in the air, its
ability to impose air blockades, and its ability to launch
air strikes, as well as its ability to conduct joint operations
with the ground forces and Navy.25

The CMC Approves the PLAAF’s Strategy.
In 2004, the CMC approved the PLAAF’s “Active
Defense” strategy as a component of the National
Military Strategic Guidelines for air operations.26 The
PLAAF’s strategic component was designated as
“Integrated Air and Space, Simultaneous Offensive and
Defensive Operations” (kong tian yiti, gong fang jian bei).27
According to Hong Kong press reports, the CMC’s
approval was timed to coincide with the PLAAF’s 10th
Party Congress in May 2004 and represented a major
milestone in China’s efforts to build a strategic Air
Force.28 The approval also signaled a fundamental shift
in how the PLAAF was to be viewed. The article states
that this change is encapsulated in three bold new
assertions on the strategic positioning of the PLAAF:
• First, the PLAAF is a national Air Force led by
the CCP.
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• Second, a modern Air Force must be built to unify
aviation and spaceflight, combine defense and
offense, and unify information and firepower.
• Third, the PLAAF should be a strategic Air
Force standing side by side with the Army and
Navy to achieve command of the air, ground,
and sea.
Integrated Air and Space.
China’s 2004 and 2006 Defense White Papers clearly
show the growing importance of the PLAAF and
its missions. However, although both white papers
describe the PLAAF’s transition to simultaneous
offensive and defensive operations, neither paper
references integrated air and space.
Even though the two white papers did not refer to
this component, however, the PLAAF has apparently
thrown its hat into the air/space ring, having indicated
its desire to become actively involved in managing
China’s military space program with an emphasis on
the informationalization aspects. Specifically, in March
2004, the PLAAF published Air and Space Battlefield
and China's Air Force, following in August 2006 with
The Science of Integrated Air and Space Operations.29
Although the first doctrinal book did not provide
linkage between space and the PLAAF, the last
chapter of the second book, which contains forewords
by PLAAF commander General Qiao Qingchen and
political commissar General Deng Changyou, lays
out six steps for China in establishing a model in
which “the PLAAF is the leading organization for
‘integrated air and space’, the PLAAF is . . . the leading
organization to manage China’s military space force,
and the PLAAF is the primary force for [air and space]
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combat.”30 However, the book focuses on managing the
“informationalization” aspects of the space program,
and does not indicate that the PLAAF wants to manage
the launch sites, satellite development, and missile
program. The six proposed steps are as follows:
• Determine a sound scientific development model for creating a process for the employment of
air and space power.
• Establish an Air Force Space organization (kongjun hangtian jigou) to use as the base for organizing integrated air and space operations.
• Establish PLAAF space units (kongjun hangtian
budui).
• Establish information links that provide technology for integrated air and space operations.
• Nurture Air Force space personnel possessing a
knowledge of space.
• Expand the PLAAF's overall scope of warfighting power, increasing the PLAAF’s air offense
capabilities, air defense countermissile capabilities, and airborne troop combat capabilities.
In the introduction to The Science of Integrated Air
and Space Operations, General Qiao states that under
the Party Central Committee’s and CMC’s leadership,
the PLAAF is implementing the transformation
from mechanization to informationalization, from a
force based on national air defense to one based on
simultaneous offensive and defensive operations, from
a force based on aviation to one based on integrated air
and space, and from a force based on quantity to one
based on quality.31
In 2006, the PLAAF published An Introduction
to Air Force Military Thought with opening remarks
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by PLAAF commander Qiao.32 The inaugural edition
of this new Air Force primer argues that the PLAAF
should use informationalization to control the land and
sea, and should move toward developing integrated
air and space operations.33 These declarations may be
just the beginning of a long turf war within the PLA
over managing and employing China’s military space
assets.
CAMPAIGN THEORY (OPERATIONAL
DOCTRINE)34
The PLA’s Science of Campaigns categorizes military
operations into 22 distinct types of campaigns. Three
among these—air offensive, air defense, and air
blockade—are specifically designated as Air Force
campaigns.35 Moreover, PLAAF airborne forces and
aircraft are key elements of the joint airborne campaign,
and PLAAF AAA and SAM forces can be expected
to play a major role in the PLA’s joint anti-air strike
campaign.
PLAAF Campaign Theory.
Historically, the PLAAF has conducted operations
as a series of air campaigns in support of the PLA’s
overall campaign objectives. In the early days, the
PLAAF had little choice but to adopt operational
concepts and tactics of foreign as air forces. By the
mid-1950s, however, the PLAAF was able to apply
operational experiences obtained during both its civil
war and the Korean War to create its own adaptations of
air campaign theory and tactics.36 During the mid-1960s,
the PLAAF codified its rules and regulations, courses
of study, and teaching materials, demonstrating “use
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the PLAAF as the primary force [during a conflict]”
(yi wo wei zhu) doctrine.37
Beginning in the early 1980s, the PLAAF’s research
on military theory focused even greater attention on
air campaign theory. In 1988, the PLAAF formally
published Science of PLA Air Force Campaigns, which
described the characteristics of operational art, the
development of campaign theory, and the mission
of the PLAAF’s campaign headquarters, and then
discussed how these three elements pertain to a unified
command organization.38 Thereafter, the PLAAF
published various teaching materials, such as the Course
Material for the Science of Air Force Campaigns [Kongjun
Zhanyi Xue Jiaocheng], to guide campaign training.39 In
1999, the PLAAF revised its Campaign Gangyao, which
provides the doctrinal basis and general guidance for
how the PLAAF will fight future campaigns.40
PLAAF Campaign Terminology.
Before we discuss PLAAF campaigns, a brief
discussion of key terms is necessary. The term “Air
Force campaign” applies to all types of Air Force
campaign operations.41 The PLAAF describes an Air
Force campaign as the use of “from one to several
campaign juntuan (zhanyi juntuan) or campaign and
tactical bingtuan (zhanyi zhanshu bingtuan) to carry
out the integration of a series of battles according to a
unified intention and plan to achieve a specific strategic
or campaign objective in a specified time. An Air Force
campaign is implemented under the guidance of the
national military strategy and the PLAAF’s strategy.”42
For the PLAAF, a juntuan-level organization refers to
the seven MR Air Force (MRAF) headquarters, and a
bingtuan-level organization refers to division, brigade,
or regiment headquarters.
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An Air Force campaign is also described as “a
campaign conducted independently by an Air Force
campaign juntuan or with the coordination of other
services and branches. An Air Force campaign is
guided by the national military strategy and is limited
by the PLAAF’s strategy. An Air Force campaign
involves various air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surfaceto-air battles to achieve specific military objectives.
The campaign determines the battle’s character, goals,
missions, and actions, and directly supports the local
and overall war.”43
PLAAF Campaign Categories.
In this regard, the PLAAF has been methodical in
the way it has defined its campaign theory and used
the theory to provide operational guidance for its
forces. PLAAF campaign theory can be categorized
into that for aviation (aircraft), for air defense (SAM,
AAA, and radar troops), and for airborne troops.44
Not surprisingly, these three categories reflect the
way the PLAAF is organized administratively and
operationally.
Characteristics and Objectives. Based on campaign
characteristics and objectives, the publication Science of
PLA Air Force Campaigns identifies three specific types
of PLAAF campaigns:45
• Offensive air campaigns (kongzhong jingong
zhanyi);
• Air-defense campaigns (fangkong zhanyi); and
• Air-blockade campaigns (kongzhong fengsuo
zhanyi).
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Also based on their characteristics and objectives,
Science of PLA Air Force Campaigns identifies the
following two types of joint-service campaigns where
the PLAAF plays a major part:
• Joint anti-air strike campaigns (lianhe fankongxi
zhanyi); and
• Airborne campaigns (kongjiang zhanyi).46
Operational Scale. Based on a campaign’s operational
scale, Science of PLA Air Force Campaigns divides PLAAF
campaigns into the following three types:
• Multiple war zone (duo zhanqu) Air Force
campaigns, such as an air defense campaign
of the capital (shoudu fangkong zhanyi), and
Air Force offensive campaigns to destroy the
enemy’s potential power (quanli);
• War zone (zhanqu) Air Force campaigns; and
• War zone direction (zhanqu fangxiang) Air Force
campaigns.
Command Relationships between Services
and Branches.
Based on the command relationships and the
services and branches participating in the war, PLAAF
campaigns can be divided into the following three
types:
• Independent (duli) Air Force campaigns;
• Combined arms (hetong) Air Force campaigns;
and
• Jointly executed (lianhe shishi de) Air Force
campaigns.
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THE PLAAF’S TACTICAL DOCTRINE
On its 45th anniversary in November 1994, the
PLAAF published The Science of Air Force Tactics,
an internal military tactics manual which has not
been made publicly available. According to a brief
explanation provided in the China Air Force Encyclopedia,
the manual discusses both basic theory (tactics) and
practical application theory (techniques and procedures).47
The manual identifies weapons and equipment,
combat personnel, the battlefield environment, combat
command, and combat support as the principal factors
influencing the tactical level of conflict. The tactics
manual also includes practical application theory
(techniques and procedures) for aerial combat, air-toground combat, and surface-to-air combat.
Training Guidance Concepts.
Instructions titled “military training guidance
concepts” (junshi xunlian zhidao sixiang) issued by
the PLAAF in 2001 downplay safety considerations,
focusing rather on realistic and demanding training.
Training guidance concepts are issued by the PLAAF
Party Committee to unify training ideology, address
major challenges, identify training restrictions, and
establish overall training objectives.48 The concepts are
reviewed and modified when “situations and mission
development change, weapons and equipment
are replaced, and new regulations and outlines
are implemented.49 The first set of PLAAF training
guidance concepts was published in 1951. Revisions
have been issued only seven times—1952, 1954, 1958,
1965, 1974, 1987, and 2001. A comparison of the two
most recent sets of concepts, shown in Figure 1, clearly
demonstrates the shift in training philosophy that
459

occurred between 1987 and 2001. In 1987, “safety” was
the watchword, with little focus on training per se. In
2001, every line points to practical, realistic training.
Concepts issued in 1987
Adhere to reform (jianchi gaige)
Enhance effectiveness (tigao xiaoyi)
Improve steadily (wenbu qianjin)
Ensure safety (baozheng anquan)
Concepts issued in 2001
Closely adhere to actual combat situations (jintie shizhan)
Stress training against opposing forces (tuchu duikang)
Be strict during training (cong nan cong yan)
Apply science and technology during training (keji xingxun)

Figure 1. Comparison of 1987
and 2001 Training Concepts.
The Dagang (military training and evaluation
outline or program). The PLA published its first
training guidance in 1955 under the title PLA Combat
Training Dagang (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zhandou
Xunlian Dagang), usually denominated simply as the
“dagang”). The dagang established the military training
plan for all services and branches of the PLA. Between
1957 and 1980, the PLA revised the basic dagang three
times. When the dagang was revised again in 1989, the
General Staff Department (GSD) became responsible for
issuing the Army dagang, with the PLA Navy, the PLA
Air Force, and the Second Artillery each responsible
for issuing its own.
The dagang provides the general plan for military
training. It establishes the “laws governing military
training” and the “foundation for organizing and
implementing military training.”51 It includes training
goals, principles, content, implementation phases and
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procedures, timing, methods, and quality-control
inspection procedures.52 Each dagang is divided into
separate volumes according to different objectives and
levels, with each volume then further divided into
subsections by organization or specialty. For example,
in 1997, the Army dagang had a total of five volumes
comprising 35 subsections.
In 2001, the GSD revised the dagang for the ground
forces yet again. The English version of the 2002 Defense
White Paper translated this dagang’s title as Outline of
Military Training and Evaluation (junshi xunlian yu kaohe
dagang).53 It appears this was the first time the word
evaluation (kaohe) was included.
In April 2002, the PLAAF published its own
revised Air Force New Generation Outline of Military
Training and Evaluation (kongjun xinyidai junshi xunlian
yu kaohe dagang).54 The PLAAF’s dagang was divided
into several sections, addressing command personnel,
headquarters department, branches (aviation, AAA,
SAM, airborne, and radar), and all support elements
such as the communications troops.
a growing Leadership role for the plaaf
Historically, Army officers have held all key
leadership positions in the four General Departments,
the National Defense University, the Academy of
Military Science (AMS), and the seven MR headquarters.
In recent years, however, this has begun to change
slowly. Since 2000, the CMC has steadily assigned
PLAAF officers to an increasing number of pivotal
leadership positions in Beijing and MR headquarters.
These steps indicate a gradual but more concerted
effort to implement joint reforms at the highest levels
within the PLA.
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Over the years, general officer realignments have
been observed within the headquarters at the seven
MRs. The first changes occurred in the late 1980s,
when the seven Military Region Air Force (MRAF)
commanders were concurrently appointed as deputy
commanders of MR headquarters. Today, some, and
possibly all, of the MRAF political commissars are
also concurrently appointed as MR deputy political
commissars. In 2002, the first PLAAF general officer was
appointed to serve as deputy director of the Nanjing
MR Operations Department. In late 2003, the PLAAF
began to augment each of the seven MR headquarters
by appointing a major general to serve as a deputy
chief of staff in the Headquarters Department.
In August 2003, Lieutenant General Zheng Shenxia
was elevated from the position of Chief of Staff of the
PLAAF to the commandantship of the PLA’s Academy
of Military Science.55 As the first Air Force officer to
hold this post, General Zheng has already brought
new emphasis to the integration of air operations into
PLA strategic doctrine.
In 2004, the CMC made several significant
decisions and appointments affecting the Air Force.
During a May meeting, the CMC approved a PLAAF
component as part of the National Military Strategic
Guidelines and elevated PLAAF Commander General
Qiao Qingchen to be a member of the CMC.56 Although
the PLAAF remained subordinate to the four General
Departments, the placement of an Air Force commander
on the CMC demonstrated a remarkable change in
the PLA protocol.57 Also in 2004, the CMC selected
Shenyang MRAF Commander Lieutenant General Xu
Qiliang to serve as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff,
making him only the second officer in the history of
the PLAAF to hold this position.58 In late 2004, two
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more PLAAF generals were named as deputies of a
General Department.59 PLAAF Deputy Commander
Lieutenant General Li Maifu was appointed as the
first Air Force deputy director of the General Logistics
Department, and Lieutenant General Liu Zhenqi was
named as the first PLAAF officer to hold the position
of deputy director of the General Political Department.
Another significant appointment occurred in August
2006, when Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian was
appointed as the first PLAAF commandant of the
National Defense University,60 but, surprisingly, no
PLAAF officer has as yet been assigned as a deputy in
the General Equipment Department.
As a whole, these appointments and the CMC’s
approval of an Air Force component to the National
Military Strategic Guidelines represent a significant
break with a past in which the Army retained a
stranglehold on senior leadership positions, enabling
them to subordinate Air Force interests and potential
contributions. These changes in senior officer
appointments reflect a significant change in the PLA
culture that can be observed in other more subtle
ways. For example, up until the late 1990s, irrespective
of service or branch, all military personnel assigned
to duty within the PLA General Departments, NDU,
AMS, or an MR headquarters were required to wear
a PLA uniform. Today, personnel assigned to “joint”
positions are allowed to wear the uniform of their own
service. In 2006, the PLAAF introduced new military
uniforms, which, for the first time, were not of the basic
Army uniform pattern.
The PLA is at an early stage of transition
toward improved joint operational capabilities. The
appointment of several Air Force officers to nationallevel positions is a clear signal of intent and purpose.
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However, it remains unclear whether power and
authority have shifted in any substantial way to senior
PLAAF leaders. Greater PLAAF authority might
manifest itself in more Air Force discretion over the
direction and management of Air Force weapons
development and acquisition programs. It might also
be anticipated that the PLAAF will enjoy a larger
role in planning and execution of operations. Future
advancement along this path toward greater jointness
might be evinced by the appointment of Air Force
officers to key director or deputy director billets in
the MR first-level departments (i.e., Headquarters,
Political, Joint Logistics, and Equipment Departments),
or the second-level departments such as the Operations
Department.
ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS
The PLAAF has been engaged in a PLA-wide
restructuring aimed at achieving “optimal force
structures, smoother internal relations, and better
quality.”61 Ten rounds of PLA force reductions since
1985 have trimmed nearly 2 million uniformed
personnel from the PLA active duty ranks. Under the
most recent order, the PLA was directed to eliminate
200,000 active duty positions between September 2003
and the end of 2005, cutting the size of the PLA to 2.3
million. Previous cuts fell on enlisted ranks, resulting
in mass demobilizations and unit deactivations. This
round targeted the PLA’s bloated officer rosters.62
Approximately 170,000 officers—85 percent of the
announced reduction in force—were pared from the
top-heavy personnel rosters.63 Based on a proportional
slice, the PLAAF was forced to cut 30,000 officer
billets.
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Two specific goals of this latest force reduction were
to replace junior officers with noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) and reduce the number of general officers.
For reducing the number of staff officers assigned to
headquarters, the solution was to downgrade by two
echelons all five air armies (kongjun jun) and the five
army-level bases to division-level command posts.64 As
a result, the PLAAF currently has a total of 13 command
posts, with two in each of five military regions, three in
the Lanzhou MR, and none in the Jinan MR.
These structural changes were necessary to reshape
the PLAAF’s operational command structure, but the
changes have also adversely affected morale among
officers at all levels whose jobs were eliminated or who
have been denied an eventual promotion to the next
level to secure their retirement benefits.
The possibility exists for yet another major PLA
force reduction by the end of the decade, which could
further restructure headquarters staffs. In addition, the
PLAAF can be expected to continue the restructuring
of air divisions and air regiments. As the PLAAF
continues to introduce the Su-30, J-11, J-10, FC-1, and
JH-7 into the inventory as replacements for the vintage
Q-5, J-6, and J-7, some units will transition to new
weapon systems; others will be deactivated.65 The final
restructuring by the end of the decade could leave the
PLAAF with just under 30 operational divisions, most
of which will have only two regiments each.
PLAAF logistics and maintenance units have experienced significant reorganization and restructuring
since the 1990s. Major changes were necessary to
accommodate new operational mission requirements
as the PLAAF transitioned from a force confined to
employing single branches (aviation, surface-to-air
missiles, antiaircraft artillery, radar, and airborne
troops) and single aircraft types in positional defensive
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campaigns, to a force capable of combined arms
operations in mobile, offensive campaigns.66 Ultimately,
the PLA is striving to conduct joint service operations
supported by joint logistics. To achieve these goals, the
PLAAF has reconfigured logistics and maintenance
systems, which traditionally have not been structured
to support mobile, offensive operations. While many
of the changes are still underway, some are still only
aspirational.
Historically, a single airfield has hosted one
regiment fitted to a single type of aircraft. The logistics
and maintenance structure was organized to support
only that type of aircraft. When aircraft deployed, they
flew to a base with the same type of aircraft. Today,
however, that situation is changing as a result of the
PLAAF’s emphasis on achieving new mobility goals.
Now, small logistics and maintenance teams deploy,
usually by rail or road, along with the deploying
aircraft to any type of airfield. Furthermore, efforts are
underway at PLAAF airfields to instruct specialized
maintenance teams in the cross-servicing of multiple
aircraft types.
NEW PERSONNEL PROGRAMS
Significant changes in the PLAAF’s recruiting
and training of conscripts, NCOs, and officers (cadre)
have taken place since the late 1990s and will continue
through the end of the decade.
Enlisted Force.
Prior to 1999, the PLAAF’s enlisted conscripts
served for 4 years. At the end of that period, they
could remain on active duty as a “volunteer” for an
additional 12 years. In 1999, China revised its Military
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Service Regulations, which reduced the conscription
period for all of the PLA’s services and branches to 2
years.67 All conscripts report for duty on November
1 and are demobilized 2 years later on October 31.
During the early 2000s, the PLAAF began recruiting
civilian college students who had not yet completed
their studies to join as enlisted troops. The goal is to
have them remain on active duty as NCOs at the end
of their initial 2-year service.
The revised service regulations also established a
formal NCO corps, whose members can now serve
until they have 30 years of service or until they reach
age 50. The PLAAF must now provide housing for
them and their families as well. In terms of education,
some PLAAF NCOs can attend an officer academy to
receive a technical degree before returning to their unit
as an NCO.
Although the PLA does not announce specific
figures for the number of troops by rank and specialty,
it appears that the number of conscripts has gradually
been reduced, while the number of NCOs has increased
accordingly to provide greater experience and stability
to the overall enlisted force.
Officer Corps.
The PLAAF has also begun to reform the way
it recruits officers. Historically, most officers were
recruited from high school graduates or the enlisted
force. Once they join the PLAAF, they attend a PLAAF
academy, where they receive a 3- or 4-year degree and
are commissioned as an officer. Today, the PLAAF is
recruiting civilian college graduates and providing
them with 3 months of basic training before they are
commissioned as officers.

467

The most significant changes have taken place in
recruiting pilots, which historically relied on high
school graduates and enlisted personnel selected for
officer pilot training. In 2000, the PLAAF began to
recruit its pilots from graduates who have a 4-year
bachelor’s degree in specific areas from one of the
PLA’s academies, including the Army, Navy, and
Second Artillery.68 In 2003, the PLAAF extended the
program to civilian college graduates with specific
bachelor’s degrees.69 These graduates receive 2 years
of flight training at a PLAAF flight academy and 1
year of transition training before being assigned to an
operational unit. As a result, the first group of pilots
selected from PLA college graduate began entering
the operational force in 2003. The first group of pilots
selected from civilian college graduates entered the
operational force in mid-2006.
ENHANCEMENTS TO EDUCATION PROGRAMS
The total number of PLAAF schools and academies
has expanded and contracted over the years in response
to policy changes regarding training objectives or war
preparations. At one point, the PLAAF had over 30
academies, including as many as 17 flying schools
during the Cultural Revolution. Today, the PLAAF
has less than 20 academies, including eight flying
academies and one NCO school.
In 1986 the PLAAF upgraded its officer schools
to academies and began offering master’s degrees in
certain subjects. In 1999, three schools in the Xian area
were combined administratively to become the PLAAF
Engineering University, so that the first 2 years of
basic training could be conducted in a single location,
and doctorate degrees could be offered. The PLAAF’s
Antiaircraft Artillery Academy also expanded its
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curriculum to include training airborne officers for
the first time. In 2004, three additional academies
in the Changchun area were combined into the Air
Force Aviation University. The trend of consolidating
academies into universities and expanding the
curriculum will most likely continue through the end
of this decade.
The PLAAF has always placed great emphasis on
training officers to be proficient in tactics and technical
skills, but did not begin focusing on officer education
until the mid-1980s. Whereas the schools before the
1980s taught officers to fly, maintain, and support
aircraft, these technically oriented schools did not
spend much time on the theory of warfighting at the
campaign and strategic levels.
In 1996, the PLAAF’s official magazine, China
Air Force, carried an article written by the PLAAF’s
Command College that discussed the lack of adequate
combined arms and joint training characterizing the
PLAAF officer corps in the early 1990s.70 The article
described the PLAAF’s commanders at the regimental
to MRAF headquarters levels as “lacking knowledge,
having poor concepts, and being incompetent in joint
operations.” As part of the reforms to produce transcentury commanders, the Command College began
focusing on theories such as joint combat operations,
mobile warfare, information warfare, and electronic
warfare, and updated its combat theory.
Not only was the PLAAF concerned about its
commanders being unable to command combined
arms and joint forces, it was also concerned about their
inability to use high-tech systems effectively. According
to a People’s Daily article in May 2000, the PLAAF began
requiring all of its officers at and above the regimental
commander level to receive high-tech training within
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1 year.71 The new course includes modern air combat
theory, development trends in modern fighter aircraft,
weaponry for modern combat, equipment for hightech warfare, and command automation devices.
On the occasion of the PLAAF’s 56th anniversary
in 2005, commander Qiao Qingchen and political
commissar Deng Changyou stated, “We should
continue to step up the training of Air Force pilots,
new equipment operators, combined arms force
commanders, and high-level scientists, technicians,
and experts, and gradually create a sufficient number
of outstanding young and middle-aged qualified
personnel.”72
By the end of this decade, the PLAAF will most
likely still be concerned about its officers having the
ability to command at the combined arms and joint
level due to the dearth of PLAAF officers assigned
to joint positions in the seven MR Headquarters and
four General Department headquarters. However, the
computer skills of its officer corps should be much
better as younger officers who have grown up with
computers move into command and staff positions at
the regiment and division level.
SUMMARY
While the PLAAF has made impressive progress
towards comprehensive force modernization, most
Western observers have concluded that it will
require an additional 10–15 years before the process
is complete. Several obstacles stand in the way. The
most visible impediments are the lingering hardware
deficiencies. China’s Air Force continues to face
significant shortfalls in key weapon systems and
other hardware—advanced fighters, airborne warning
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and control (AWACS), aerial tankers, and C4ISR
infrastructure—that are essential for the conduct of
high-intensity, offensive air operations. Chief among
the PLAAF’s challenges is a large inventory of obsolete
aircraft that contribute little to capabilities and will
require substantial additional time and resources to
maintain and replace. Modernization has also been
hampered by lengthy delays in fielding command
and control and air surveillance aircraft, two systems
that are essential for the Air Force to extend its reach
beyond the shoreline.73
PLAAF modernization also rests on its ability to
introduce the full measure of reforms that are currently
underway within the ranks. The force structure is being
radically reshaped to accommodate the introduction
of advanced new weapons and the logistics support
required to sustain these systems. In addition, Air Force
strategists are actively engaged in the development of
new operational concepts and doctrine, tasks made
doubly difficult by the PLAAF’s lack of recent combat
experience. Significant changes are also underway
in the training and educational programs to ensure
that Chinese airmen have the skills and knowledge
required to operate advanced weapons in a complex
operational environment. Many of these changes are
just now taking shape, and another dozen years will be
needed before today’s lieutenants mature into seasoned mid-grade professionals.
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CHAPTER 10
THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
CONTEXT DRIVING PLA NAVY BUILDING
Michael McDevitt
INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to place the ongoing
development of the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) in the context of China’s overall strategy.
Because building and sustaining an up-to-date navy
capable of conducting a “modern war under hightech informationalized conditions” is a very expensive
proposition, to understand why the leadership of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is willing to commit
the resources to “navy building” is central to answering
the question of what “drives” the force posture, size,
and capabilities of the PLAN.1
That the PLAN has been introducing capable
new ships, submarines, and weapons over the past
15 years means that a compelling strategic case has
convinced a national leadership unschooled in things
maritime to dedicate the resources necessary for naval
development. PRC leaders have thus come to believe
that the strategic interests of the state can be secured
only with a robust naval force—which is a historic
departure from the dominant strategic traditions of
China.2
This chapter postulates five separate but interrelated
factors that animate, or drive, the leadership to actively
support the development of the PLAN: first, what
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the PLA calls the “major strategic direction,” which
essentially means the compass direction from where
potential threats to Chinese interests originate; second,
a maritime strategy that comports with the continental
strategic tradition of China; third, the need to deter
Taiwan’s independence and, if necessary, to deter
or defeat a U.S. Navy relief force if the PRC elects to
attack Taiwan; fourth, the historically novel situation
in which international seaborne trade is what drives
the economic growth of China; and fifth, the increasing
dependence of the PRC’s economic development on oil
and natural gas delivered to the PRC by ships.
This chapter also will speculate about future PLAN
developments regarding out-of-region presence deployments and will briefly comment on the possibility of the PLAN developing a robust sea-based leg for
its strategic nuclear deterrent.
THE FIRST DRIVER:
MAJOR STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Recently the PLA’s Academy of Military Science
published in English an important work on PLA
strategic thought. Entitled The Science of Military
Strategy, it has nearly 500 pages worth of important
insights into how the PLA thinks about strategy.3
One of the chief among them is the significance that
strategic planners attach to determining the “major
strategic direction.” This determination is central to
translating strategy into real operational plans and
concepts because “the major strategic direction” forms
the basis on which operational plans are then developed and
appropriate forces are procured, postured, and trained.4
The Academy of Military Science defines the major
strategic direction as “the focal point of the struggle of
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contradictions between ourselves and the enemy . . .
in the overall strategic situation, it is the vital point of
greatest importance” (emphasis added). In other words,
the major strategic direction is where China’s most
important interests are either threatened or unresolved.
The Science of Military Strategy goes on to say, “The major
strategic direction is basically determined according to
the national strategic interests and the fundamental
international and domestic strategic situation.”5
Once established, the major strategic direction
tends to remain fixed. Since it involves fundamental
national interests, and forms the basis for procuring
specific military capabilities, it is not subject to arbitrary
changes. In The Science of Military Strategy, this point is
explicit:
For example, the main strategic direction of China has
seen three major adjustments since the establishment
of the PRC. . . . In the mid-1950s the Party Central
Committee and the Central Military Commission [CMC],
in light of the strategic encirclement of China by foreign
forces led by the United States and the serious situation
of a possible strategic offensive launched against China,
specified the southeastern coastal area of China as the
main strategic direction. Between the 1960s and 1970s,
as Sino-Soviet relations broke up and the Soviet Union
deployed a million troops along the Sino-Soviet border
and posed an increasingly serious military threat
to China, the leadership changed the main strategic
direction decidedly to the three northern regions. In
the 1980s, they once again adjusted the main strategic
direction according to the new international situation.6

This means that there have been only three iterations
of the main or major strategic direction since 1949. The
authors of The Science of Military Strategy are coy about
its current direction, but it is not hard to discern since
the authors point out that it has to do with the current
international situation.
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In analyzing the “current international situation”
from the perspective of Beijing, it is clear that over the
past 15 years PRC party leaders and diplomats have
done a good job of advancing the national interest of
stability in the area around China. They have secured
the PRC’s land frontiers by resolving or mitigating
territorial disputes with Russia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and India. They have also negotiated
“strategic partnerships” with most of these countries,
and, in the case of the “stans” and Russia, have knitted
them into the fabric of a regional security relationship
called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).7
As a result, the PRC does not face a credible military
threat from its continental neighbors in the near to
middle time frame, nor does it have a territorial dispute
with them that could be the pretext for military action.
In terms of simple military capability, Russia is an
exception to this judgment because of its still substantial
strategic nuclear force; however, that threat has been
moderated by good political relations enshrined in the
“Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship,”
which went into effect on March 1, 2002.8
However, while its land frontiers are stable, looking
east from Beijing beyond its eastern seaboard the
situation is more strategically problematic. The PRC’s
maritime approaches are replete with unresolved
sovereignty issues and genuine vulnerabilities.
Strategic vulnerability from the sea is not a new issue
for China. Weakness along its long maritime frontier
has been a problem for Beijing since at least 1842,
when the Treaty of Nanking ended the first Opium
War. This 3-year conflict with Great Britain exposed
Imperial China’s military weakness, and ushered in
the so-called “Century of Humiliation.” The repeated
military and diplomatic humiliations and defeats that
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China suffered were inflicted by Western powers,
including Japan that came mainly from the sea.9
The difference today, is that the PRC has the
resources and political coherence necessary to address
the reality that the vast majority of China’s outstanding
sovereignty issues and unresolved strategic problems
are maritime in nature. For military strategists and
planners, this makes establishing the major strategic
direction a reasonably straightforward proposition.
Consider the following issues, which are aspects of “the
focal point of the struggle of contradictions between
ourselves and the enemy”:
• With Taiwan being an island, it is the
combination of Taiwan’s air defense and the
threat of intervention by the U.S. military
(primarily the U.S. Navy) that effectively keeps
the Taiwan Strait a moat rather than a highway
open to the PLA.
• Perhaps as strategically significant to a PLA
planner as Taiwan is the geostrategic reality that
the PRC’s economic center of gravity is its east
coast. Because it is a “seaboard,” it is extremely
vulnerable to attack from the sea—a military
task the United States is uniquely suited to
execute.
• Territorial disputes with Japan over islands and
seabed resources in the East China Sea have
become more serious, representing a potential
flashpoint where Sino-Japanese interests are
contested. Each state is emphasizing its claims
by the periodic deployment of naval and coast
guard vessels. The entire issue is maritime in
nature.10
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• Unsettled territorial disputes, and their concomitant resource issues, remain with respect to the
Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. Again,
this problem is maritime in nature.
• China’s entire national strategy of reform
and opening depends largely upon maritime
commerce—i.e., trade. The PRC’s economy
is driven by the combination of exports and
imports which together account for almost 75
percent of PRC gross domestic product (GDP).
This trade travels mainly by sea.11
• Finally, there is the issue of energy security—or,
as one commentator put it, “energy insecurity.”
It has become commonplace to observe that
the PRC will increasingly depend upon foreign
sources of oil and natural gas, most of which
come by sea.12
Beijing’s primary military competitor is the United
States, the world’s foremost naval power, which has
maintained—for the past 50 years—a significant naval
presence on “China’s doorstep.” Should the PRC elect
to use force to resolve either the reunification dispute
with Taiwan or outstanding maritime claims, the
United States is the one country that could militarily
deny success. Also by its air and naval presence in the
region, it could stymie any Chinese attempt to use the
growing capability of the PLA to settle these issues by
force majeure. The United States is also becoming even
more closely allied with China’s historical antagonist
Japan, which itself has an excellent navy and a
formidable maritime tradition.13
Because of these factors, and especially because
China’s economic health depends upon unimpeded
access to and use of the high seas, Beijing has been
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forced to think more seriously about how to deal
with its maritime frontier. In the past, China could
simply surrender ground to an invader without being
defeated. But now, although the threat of invasion is
long past, being complacent about its maritime frontier
is no longer a viable strategic choice.
Given the maritime nature of all the PRC’s
outstanding strategic issues and its dependence
upon trade for continued economic development,
there is little question that the PRC’s “main strategic
direction” is eastward toward the central Pacific
Ocean, and southeast toward the South China Sea
and the shipping lanes from the Middle East. This
judgment is reinforced by the December 2004 Chinese
Defense White Paper, which breaks with the tradition of
land force dominance, clearly stating that the PLAN,
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the ballistic missile
force—the Second Artillery—are to receive priority
in funding. Further, it explicitly lays out its ambitions
for the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery in these
words:
While continuing to attach importance to the building
of the Army, the PLA gives priority to the building of
the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery force to seek
balanced development of the combat force structure, in
order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command
of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic
counter strikes. (emphasis added)14

It is noteworthy that the authors of The Science of
Military Strategy date the current (i.e., toward the
sea) strategic direction from the 1980s. This seems to
coincide with Deng Xiaoping’s “strategic decision” in
May–June 1985. At an enlarged meeting of the CMC
during that period, he stated flatly that while there
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were still dangers of wars and conflicts in the world,
the possibility of war with the Soviets was remote, as
was that of war with the United States. My colleagues,
Dr. Paul Godwin and Dr. David Finkelstein, have
argued that as a result of this announcement, almost
every aspect of China’s national security orientation
(political, economic, and military) shifted “from
continent to periphery.” The shift to the periphery
included looking toward the sea. This time frame
also coincided with a shift in the strategic focus of the
PLAN, from coastal defense to offshore defense.15
GEOGRAPHY IS STRATEGIC DESTINY

Throughout China’s long history, its strategic
orientation could be categorized as continental, and
hence its strategic tradition—its way of thinking about
and framing strategic issues—has been largely focused
on land war.
Today, however, the risk of cross-border aggression
has moderated. The combination of globalization,
democratic governance and the resulting “democratic
peace,” international norms of state behavior, and the
deterrent value of nuclear weapons have substantially
lowered the likelihood of cross-border aggression. The
threat of invasion—the primary worry of Chinese, or
indeed most Eurasian strategists for many centuries—
has all but disappeared. As globalization proceeds,
economic growth increasingly depends on trade, most
of which is carried in containers loaded on ships. As a
result, security on the high seas is becoming a growing
preoccupation of countries that historically were not
strategically focused on the maritime domain. The
PRC is in the midst of this evolving strategic zeitgeist.
Of course, this does not mean that PLA strategists
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have totally abandoned their land warfare strategic
traditions.16
The PRC’s maritime strategic outlook is securely
nested in the continental tradition of using maritime
power in a defensive strategic context—which, in the
PRC’s case, translates to protecting offshore sovereign
interests and denying other nations the use of the high
seas as an avenue for attacking China. This perspective
dates back to August 1985, when then-CMC Vice
Chairman Yang Shangkun addressed a meeting of the
PLAN Party Committee and directed that the concept
of “offshore defense” become the strategic concept that
guides naval modernization. In effect, the PLAN was
told to become more than merely a coastal defense
force.17 As former Navy Commander Vice Admiral Shi
Yunsheng put it, “Following the . . . Central Military
Commission meeting in 1985, we established the
Navy’s strategy of offshore defense . . . and defined the
strategic mission of the Navy in the new period.”18
THE SECOND DRIVER:
DEFENSE-ORIENTED MARITIME STRATEGY

Arguably, a major reason the PLAN has fared so
well in the internal competition for resources is that
it presented a compelling strategic rationale for Navy
building that managed to fit comfortably within a
decisionmaking milieu dominated by a continental
and ground force-oriented strategic culture. Thus
Navy building circumvented that culture’s fixation on
the Navy as a defensive force, as opposed to a powerprojection force.
The PLAN’s notion of offshore defense is based on
how another continental power thought about maritime
strategy—the Soviet Union.19 The Soviets developed
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a defensive maritime strategy with spaced, roughly
parallel sea lines of defense (so-called “thresholds”) at
varying distances from the Soviet Union’s coasts, with
each succeeding line defended by weapon systems and
tactical schemes appropriate to its location. This linear
ground combat approach to thinking about maritime
defense, or what might be thought of as “layered”
defense, was used to rationalize the operational
capabilities Soviet naval and air forces required to
deny the use of the sea to its canonical threat, the
United States. The high point of the Soviet approach
to maritime defense was realized by the mid 1980s,
when the Kremlin had in place a force of about 270
attack submarines, 280 major surface combatants, and
over 1,300 naval aircraft allocated between the North
Atlantic, eastern Mediterranean, and Pacific maritime
approaches to the Soviet Union. The difference between
the Soviets and the PRC approaches is that PLA has
elected to define distance-related thresholds in terms
of “island chains.”
The parallels between the Soviet and PLA
approaches to coastal defense almost certainly have
much to do with continental strategic culture and Soviet
mentorship, but it is also a very sensible approach to
addressing the operational problem of defending the
homeland against a force approaching from the sea.
In today’s U.S. Defense Department jargon, what the
Soviets planned to do and what the PRC is planning
to do are called “anti-access”—keep U.S. forces from
getting close enough to the Chinese mainland to
attack the PRC itself, or to interfere in a PLA attack on
Taiwan.
The Soviet template considered the waters closest
to the mainland out to approximately 200 nautical
miles to be an area that Soviet naval forces and land-
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based air forces must be able to “control.” Beyond
this threshold, moving further to sea (to a range of
about 1,000 nautical miles) the Soviets’ strategy was to
“deny” those waters to the U.S. Navy.20 In other words,
the military requirement is sea control close in, and sea
denial as the distances from the mainland increase.
Overlaying this template on a map of East Asia
results in a requirement for the PLAN to “control” the
Yellow Sea, much of the East China Sea, the Taiwan
Strait, the very northern portion of the South China
Sea, and the Tonkin Gulf. Not surprisingly, this sea
control area also closely approximates the PRC’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and also generally
follows the contour of the so-called “first island chain”
that stretches southeast from Japan, through the
Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Pratas and Paracel islands
in the northern portion of the South China Sea.
If the entire South China Sea is included within the
first island chain threshold, the “sea control” zone runs
beyond 200 nautical miles, greatly increasing the degree
of difficulty in executing the mission. But by doing so, it
encompasses the entirety of Beijing’s territorial claims
in the South China Sea, thus creating a “requirement”
to improve the military potential of disputed islands
as bases or outposts in the South China Sea. Whether
or not all of the South China Sea is in or out of the sea
control area, the PLAN faces an enormous challenge in
controlling it. First, it is a vast space, and the waters are
heavily traveled. Sea “control” implies a requirement
to keep track of all the ships and craft at sea in the area
to be controlled. To actually control the sea in time
of conflict would require very thorough around-theclock surveillance and control of the air space above
the surface. These are a capabilities the PLA does not
yet possess.
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The expanse beyond the sea control threshold to
the PLA’s second island chain threshold is considered
to be the sea “denial” area. This second threshold,
approximating the Soviet 1,000 nautical mile (NM) line
encompasses the enormous strip between 200 to 1,000
NM from shore. This is the area in which use of the
seas would be “contested.” The PLA ambition would
be to deny it when necessary to U.S. forces.
Such considerations are not as arcane as might seem
on first blush. These thresholds establish requirements
for specific PLAN capabilities and as such are a driver of
PLAN requirements. By establishing specific distances
and areas where certain military effects are deemed
to be necessary, it becomes simpler for “scientific
strategists” to then stipulate precise operational
characteristics for specific weapon systems, thus to
determine how many ships, submarines, and aircraft
are required to accomplish the intended missions.
LAYERED DEFENSE—ANTI-ACCESS
The first and most important requirement of a
layered defense of the seaward approaches to China
is an effective surveillance system that covers ocean
approaches. Finding and locating ships on the high seas
are very difficult because of the vastness of the oceans.
Moreover, since ships move, simply determining
the location of a ship at a particular point in time is
quickly perishable information. One must keep track of
moving ships by constantly updating the surveillance
plot. In addition, a surveillance system must be able
to distinguish between merchant ships and oil tankers,
on one hand, and warships on the other.
Without effective surveillance, it is impossible to
position offensive weapon systems or intercept moving
naval task forces. The Soviets built an integrated
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surveillance system composed of radio directionfinding, electronic “spy ships” that could locate
electronic signals, and space-based satellites designed
to detect either electronic or infrared emissions from
ships. It is worth noting that surveillance satellites are
in relatively low orbits around the earth and therefore
pass overhead relatively quickly. Constant, aroundthe-clock coverage of any geographic area requires
a large constellation of satellites. That is why highaltitude drone aircraft have become such important
new surveillance tools: they can loiter over a specific
area for a long time.
The second element in the Soviet’s layered defense
system was land-based long-range aircraft that could
be employed en mass to fire long-range antiship cruise
missiles. The Soviet Backfire bomber remains the prototypical example of this capability. The Soviet tactic
was to send aerial raids composed of two regiments
(approximately 46 aircraft) against each enemy carrier
battle group to ensure that enough bombers would
survive the defensive screens to get within range to
launch ship-killing cruise missiles.
It was this tactical threat that drove the U.S. Navy to
develop the well-known Aegis radar-based air-defense
system. The system was built specifically to permit
missile defense ships to shoot down barrages of cruise
missiles. China does not have anything equivalent to
the Backfire, and this aspect of its layered defense is
therefore not especially capable. The closest aircraft it
has to the Backfire are the FB-7 fighter-bomber and the
Chinese variant (B6H) of the venerable Soviet Badger
bomber. Neither of these aircraft has the range of the
Backfire or carries long-range cruise missiles.21
The third facet of the Soviet layered strategy was
the use of submarines directed to their targets in much
the same way that German U-boats were dispatched
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toward transiting convoys: they were vectored
by commands from shore, based on surveillance
information. The Soviet variant of this old operational
concept was to intercept carrier battlegroups by
the use of nuclear-powered submarines especially
equipped with large magazines of cruise missiles.
The PLAN is adapting this approach. It has focused
on more modern, high-performance, conventionallypropelled submarines, which, while lacking the time
on station and submerged speed of nuclear-powered
submarines, are much more difficult to detect. But
because conventionally-powered submarines do not
have sustained endurance, they depend relatively more
on accurate surveillance to help them locate targetable
ships.
The Soviets recognized the vulnerability of their
surface ships to both U.S. submarines and U.S. carrier
aircraft, both of which could attack before the Soviet
ships reached their cruise missile firing range. As a
result, the Soviets intended to use their surface ships in
roles closer to shore, either to defend against air raids
headed toward the Soviet mainland or as last-ditch
defenses. PLAN surface combatants suffer from the
same vulnerability. It is likely that the PLAN would
opt for the same solution as the Soviets: use surface
warships closer to shore. In the PLAN’s case, this would
mean keeping them within the first island chain as lastditch defenders, or to search for enemy submarines, or
to fight the Taiwan Navy if the scenario included an
attack on Taiwan.22
The operational template that the Soviets developed
and the PLAN has adopted is a classic response of
a continental strategic culture more interested in
defending itself from attack from the sea than in using
the ocean as a highway to attack another country.
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This being the case, it is reasonable to inquire, given
that the PLAN is optimized to deploy a layered defense
against an expeditionary force or a force responding to
a PLA attack on Taiwan, How does a layered defense
contribute to an attack on Taiwan that is an offensive,
not a defensive, undertaking?
THE THIRD DRIVER: TAIWAN

Anyone who has serious discussions with PRC
uniformed or civilian officials will almost inevitably,
at some point, be informed about how important
Taiwan is to China as a matter of national sovereignty
and territorial integrity.23 Taiwan is the remaining
unresolved territorial issue from China’s Century of
Humiliation. What is less frequently discussed is the
geostrategic importance of Taiwan to the PRC. PLA
strategists claim that Taiwan can have either a negative
or a positive impact on the “survival and development
of the Chinese nation and the rejuvenation of the
great nation of China in this century.”24 The following
argument is typical:
Taiwan is located in the southeast of our sea area and is
in the middle of the islands surrounding our coastline. It
is in the key area of sea routes of the Pacific Ocean, and
is thus crowned as “the key to the southeast coastal area
of China,” and “the fence to the seven provinces in the
center of China.” The sea routes from the East China Sea
to the South China Sea, from Northeast Asia to Southeast
Asia, as well as the route from the West Pacific to the
Middle East, Europe, and Asia pass here.
It is where we can breach the chain of islands surrounding
us in the West Pacific to the vast area of the Pacific, as
well as a strategic key area and sea barrier for defense
and offense. If Taiwan should be alienated from the
mainland, not only our natural maritime defense system
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would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to outside
forces, but also a large area of water territory would
fall into the hands of others. What’s more, our line of
foreign trade and transportation which is vital to China’s
opening up and economic development will be exposed
to the surveillance and threats of separatists and enemy
forces, and China will forever be locked to the west side
of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.25

This remarkable assessment makes clear that in PLA
strategic thought, Taiwan in the hands of the PRC
provides an important element in the seaward defenses
of mainland China, while Taiwan in unfriendly hands
constrains China’s access to the open ocean and could
provide a base for attacks against the PRC.
During much of the Cold War, when China’s military
potential was focused on a threat from the Soviet Union,
or was consumed by the “Cultural Revolution” and
remained wedded to a doctrine of “people’s war,” the
PLA did not possess the wherewithal to surmount the
barrier posed by the Taiwan Strait to the application
of PLA power against Taiwan. During this time, when
the PRC threatened Taiwan with military punishment,
its threats were largely empty. The PRC itself was “a
paper tiger.”
In retrospect, after the 1950s this did not matter
much. Mao could trigger a Cultural Revolution, and
Deng could focus on the Soviets because there was little
threat that Taiwan would be permanently lost to China.
The political leaders on both sides of the strait sought
the same end: eventual reunification of the island and
mainland. The argument was over what party would
be in charge of the “uniting,” not over whether to have
one Taiwan and one China. Beijing displayed little
urgency in improving its capability either to credibly
deter Taiwan’s independence or to field the means to
capture it.26
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This situation changed during the early 1990s,
when democracy and notions of a de jure independent
Taiwanese state began to resonate politically in Taiwan
among the electorate. In turn, Beijing made policy
pronouncements on the use of force to prevent the
permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland.
Taiwan became an operational idée fixe for the PLA,
which sought to field capabilities that would lend
credibility to these anti-reunification pronouncements.
In this whole process of fielding capabilities that could
deter a declaration of independence by Taiwan, the
PLAN has not played a central role.27
The PLA’s single-minded focus on the operational
problem of Taiwan has resulted in weapons and
military capabilities that allow the PLA to “reach out
and touch” Taiwan in a way that was not possible in
earlier decades. This capability has translated into two
PLA focus areas: putting hundreds of ballistic missiles
in the hands of the Second Artillery; and purchasing
excellent Russian tactical aircraft systems, which have
allowed the PLA to credibly begin to match Taiwan’s
heretofore qualitatively better aircraft. The two strands
of development go hand in hand: the missiles will
punish Taiwan, destroy its command and control, and
ground its air force, while the tactical aircraft will exploit
this effort by gaining and sustaining air superiority (or
“air control”) over the strait and perhaps over Taiwan
itself. Control of the air over the Taiwan Strait is the
main prerequisite for an invasion of Taiwan.28
In a campaign to invade Taiwan, the PLAN has
the seemingly prosaic but vital mission of getting the
Army across the strait once air superiority has been
achieved. Presumably, it is also responsible for dealing
with Taiwan’s small Navy, either at sea or by sealing
it within its naval bases by mining the entrances. The
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requirement to get the Army to Taiwan is a driver for one
aspect of Navy building, resulting in a steady growth
of small, specially-designed amphibious warships.
The PLAN also has at its disposal the substantial and
modern PRC merchant fleet, plus a mobilizable fishing
fleet.29 Everything hinges on the PLA Air Force’s
ability to execute its mission. If that force can achieve
and sustain air superiority over the strait, getting the
Army to Taiwan would be within the capability of the
PLAN.
But getting the PLA Army to Taiwan is not the most
difficult problem for the PLAN. Its most important
and most difficult mission is to stop the U.S. Navy
from intervening. The PLAN must deter or defeat
the hypothesized actions by U.S. Navy carrier strike
groups to keep them out of the fight long enough for
the combined forces of the Second Artillery, the PLA
Air Force, and the Army to succeed. “Success” means
creating the circumstances necessary to cross the strait
(establishing air superiority), get ashore, and establish
a defensible foothold on Taiwan, and subsequently
cause the government in Taipei to surrender or flee.
Any one of these enablers can be upset if the United
States is able to intervene effectively.
In other words, the PLAN has an important role in
a joint strategic mission to keep the most disruptive
element of U.S. power at bay long enough for the
actual assault to be effective. This is a primary driver for
the PLAN and is in harmony with the PLA’s doctrinal
emphasis on what is called “key point strikes.”30
In our discussion thus far on drivers, the conceptual
approach to denying access through a layered defense
was discussed within the context of a Soviet operational
template. The translation of the conceptual approach
into a specific operational task for the PLAN highlights
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both strengths and shortcomings in the PLAN as well
as areas where it is reasonable to expect the PLA to
focus its future efforts. The most obvious shortfalls in
the PLA (that is, the entire PLA, since the Air Force
and Second Artillery have important roles) are its
weakness in the area of surveillance of the open oceans
and its shortage of land-based aircraft to attack enemy
warships before those ships launch aircraft that could
interfere with the Taiwan attack or conduct attacks
against mainland China.
For reasons of economy, internal development,
prestige, and defense requirements, the PRC has
focused on space-based systems. Because space-based
systems are so important in open-ocean surveillance,
it is reasonable to expect a continued emphasis in this
area. Space-based surveillance is not a direct driver
for the PLAN per se, but without surveillance the
Navy’s ability to execute its anti-access mission would
be severely impaired. According to open sources, the
PRC currently has seven satellites in orbit that can
contribute to ocean surveillance. Significantly, in April
2006, Beijing launched its first radar satellite. It carries
synthetic aperture radar, which can probably inspect
objects as small as 20 meters in length and is thus
excellent for identifying ships.31 This may be the first
in the constellation of radarsats necessary to maintain
around-the-clock coverage.
The land-based air component of the layered
defense consists of both PLAAF and PLAN Air Force
aircraft. Based on open-source information, the only
PLAAF bomber complement with antiship missiles is a
single regiment (about 20 aircraft) of the Badger-variant
B6H bomber. According to PLA airpower expert Ken
Allen, these aircraft have been practicing over-water
missions and antiship attacks since around 2002. The
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PLAAF also has one regiment of FB-7 fighter-bombers
and two of the new Russian-built Su-30MKK multirole
regiments that could be used in antiship roles. PLAN
organic aviation has one bomber regiment, one FB7 regiment, and one Su-30MKK regiment that are
capable of launching antiship cruise missiles. Again,
each regiment has about 18–20 aircraft.32
In sum, the PLAAF and naval aviation force can field
about seven regiments of aircraft with cruise missiles
to attack approaching warships—perhaps 130–140
aircraft. Based on a metric of two aircraft regiments to
oppose each enemy carrier battlegroup, the PLA could
muster enough aircraft to attack a three-carrier force.
But it has not fielded a long-range, air-launched cruise
missile that would permit these aircraft to launch while
remaining outside the surface-to-air missile envelope
of U.S. warships. As a result, the aircraft would be
vulnerable to U.S. Navy air defenses.
The PLA has apparently decided upon its submarine
force as the most important element in its layered
defense. This makes sense, given the inherent difficulty
for the U.S. Navy or, for that matter, any navy, to
locate very quiet modern submarines. The PLAN gets
the most “bang for the buck” from submarines because
they are very difficult to find, and hunting them will
take a large number of USN ships, airplanes, and
submarines. In the 10 years between 1995 and 2005,
the PLAN commissioned 31 new submarines, but only
two are nuclear-powered. As previously mentioned,
because the vast majority of the PLAN submarine
force is conventionally powered, it has significant
operational drawbacks—limited endurance and
speed. 33 Nonetheless, it is today an imposing force,
and there is every expectation that it will continue to
improve as it adds more nuclear-powered subs.
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Operationally, submarines may have to be stationed
as far away as 750 nautical miles from the PRC coast for
sea denial so they can concentrate and attack enemy
carrier forces before carrier aircraft can be involved
in numbers in the air battle over the Taiwan Strait. If
the intent is to delay the U.S. Navy, and perhaps even
deter it from proceeding toward Taiwan, the PLAN
will have to mass submarines in large numbers once
carrier forces have been located in order to raise the risk
to U.S. surface ships to the point where commanders
might elect to stay outside the denial area until it clear
of PLAN submarines. This deterrent task may take
as many as six or more submarines per approaching
carrier strike group.
Assuming that three to four U.S. carriers were
assembled to respond to an attack against Taiwan,
the PLAN would need at least 18 to 24 submarines on
station. Its ability to sustain that posture would be a
function of how often submarines rotated home and
how long it would take to transit between homeport
and patrol station. A rough estimate is that 60 modern
submarines would be required for the anticarrier
mission, if we assume the need to relieve on-station
boats on a sustainable basis. In other words, it is
reasonable to expect the PLAN to continue to grow
a modern submarine force if it is to execute an antiaccess strategy with confidence.
The PRC has added a new element to the layered
defense—one that is uniquely Chinese and exploits
one of the PLA’s most effective capabilities. This new
wrinkle is to use ballistic missiles to attack moving
surface warships.34 Traditionally, ballistic missiles
were considered a poor weapon to use against ships
at sea: ships move, and once the missile is fired, the
aimpoint of a ballistic trajectory, by definition, would
not be altered to account for target movement.
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However, the PLA is apparently trying to place
seekers in high-explosive missile warheads that will
activate as the warhead descends into the target area,
and then steer the warhead to the moving ship. I am
informed that this is a difficult but not impossible
technical task that depends on accurate surveillance
(once again) plus missile warhead maneuvering
technology that can slow down the warhead when
it reenters the atmosphere so the seekers are not
incinerated by the heat of reentry.35 If the PLA can
master and field this weapon system, it will be able
to present a challenge to the U.S. Navy as serious as
the one presented by Soviet Backfire-launched cruise
missiles before the introduction of the Aegis radar
system.
The foregoing discussion of how the PLAN might
operate in support of a Taiwan invasion scenario is
not based on any special insight into PLAN’s plans.
Rather, it is based on a good understanding of how
the Soviet Union thought through the very same
operational problem—defense against attacking carrier
forces.36 Since the principles of war on the high seas
and the employment of warships and submarines do
not greatly differ from one body of water to another
as long as the operational scenario is similar (the high
seas have no unique terrain features), this discussion
is intended to respond to the question of what would
drive PLAN force structure and capabilities.
THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DRIVERS: MARITIME
TRADE AND IMPORTING ENERGY BY SEA
For discussion’s sake, these two drivers can be
combined since the issues are similar as far as the
PLAN is concerned. In the case of both international
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maritime trade and the importation of oil by tankers,
PRC reform and opening up have created new Chinese
dependencies and therefore new problems that China
has not confronted before. These dependencies create
a probable requirement for the PLAN to contribute
to the safe passage of ships bound for China with oil
and natural gas or trade goods in times of crisis or
conflict. This is a future requirement, in my judgment,
because in a practical sense today the PLAN could not
have much effect one way or another on the safety of
merchant ships sailing to or from China in time of war
with the United States.
China never had this problem in a strategically
significant way because of its traditional economic
“independence.” Until Deng Xiaoping’s decision
to reform economically and “open up” China, the
economy was largely autarchic. In 1793, George, Earl
Macartney, headed the first British mission ever to be
received by the Chinese court. His objective was to
initiate relations so that trade could be established. The
Qianlong emperor’s oft-cited response that “China
possesses all things and does not need European
trinkets” is worth remembering if only to remind
ourselves of what a unique turn-about China is facing
today, when such a huge amount of its economic life
is bound up in international trade.37 Today, about
75 percent of the PRC’s annual GDP is based on
international trade (imports and exports, including
both goods and services). Hong Kong port facilities
alone process something close to 25 million containers
annually.38
That China’s economic life was not centered on
trading abroad does not mean that Chinese did not
venture to sea to fish and trade: these activities were
always pursued. The difference is that they were not
vital economic activities. One reason why China has
503

so seldom focused on maritime issues is obvious: its
security threats historically came from “barbarians” to
the north and west. But it is also because the economic
life of the country was not dependent on maritime
commerce. This is not unusual among great states: over
the course of history very few nations—“ten or fewer,”
in Colin Gray’s calculation—have had a commercedriven maritime strategic outlook.39
According to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), China’s integration into the world economy is a
landmark event with huge implications for both global
and regional economies. This historical evidence,
together with the still substantial development potential
of the country, suggests that China could maintain
relatively strong export growth for a number of years,
provided that its growth momentum is not upset by
the prevailing economic and political vulnerabilities.
In other words, if all goes well, trade will continue to
be an important aspect of China’s growth.40
Dependence on foreign sources of oil is an
irreversible fact of life for China—a fundamental
feature of its energy profile and of the global energy
market for years to come. West Africa and the Persian
Gulf are both natural magnets for China in this regard.
Indeed, Gulf suppliers are already vitally important
energy partners for China. Since 1996, about 60 percent
of China’s crude oil imports have come from the
Middle East.41 Because most of this oil comes to China
by sea via the Strait of Malacca, the PRC leadership
reportedly became concerned about the possibility that
in a conflict over Taiwan, the United States might try to
block the strait and cut off PRC oil imports that come
by that conduit.42
Clearly, PRC leaders who worry that the United
States will block the Malacca Strait need to look at a
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map so they can understand that if this vital strait were
closed, there still would be other deep-water passages
through the Indonesian archipelago. Even if all these
passages were somehow closed, maritime traffic from
Africa and the Middile East could sail around Australia
and proceed to East Asia via the central Pacific. The
point is that the oceans of the world are seamless, and
stopping traffic once it is operating on the high seas is
very difficult. Oil travels to China in ships flying the
flags of many nations. Today, only some 10-12 percent
of China’s oil imports are carried by Chinese flag
tankers. The wide variety of carriers would complicate
any attempt to identify and isolate tankers bound for
China from those bound for Japan or Korea. Ironically,
Beijing wants to reduce its dependency on foreign flag
carriers, and over the next 15 years has set the objective
of shipping 75 percent of its oil imports in Chinese
flag carriers, making it easier for the United States
to determine which ships are carrying oil to Chinese
ports. 43
Protecting commerce at sea from a determined
opponent has been a mission that only a handful of
Western navies have ever done successfully. Preying
on commerce has been going on for centuries. Historically, it has taken two forms: piracy by independent
actors, and state-sponsored attacks. In fact, the
U.S. Navy was established because President John
Adams needed to protect American trade plying the
Mediterranean from the depredations of North African
state-sponsored commercial warfare.
Historically, trying to cut off a country’s maritime
trade by intercepting ships on the high seas has been
very difficult to do. The most successful attempts at
cutting off maritime trade have been either at the point
of origin or at the destination. (The Royal Navy’s tight
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blockade of Europe during the Napoleanic Wars or of
the United States during the War of 1812 were relevant
examples of blockades at the destination, as was the
U.S. success in isolating Japan during World War II.)
Although PRC oil dependency has become an issue
long after the “first island chain” was described as
including the entire South China Sea, sea lane security
for oil will now provide an additional driver for PLAN
capabilities to exercise control over the sea lane from
Singapore to China.
At the other end of the oil sea lane, tankers carrying
Persian Gulf oil to East Asia, including China, must
pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to
the Persian Gulf, a choke point the U.S. Navy already
dominates. Unlike Malacca, where alternative transit
options are available, there are no other alternatives to
getting large amounts of oil out of the Gulf except via
Hormuz. If the PRC were serious about protecting Gulf
oil bound for China, it either would have to be on the
scene with a significant naval capability or would need
to depend upon an ally in the area capable of acting
efficaciously on Beijing’s behalf.
So far, there have been no indications that the
PLAN is actively planning to maintain a naval presence
in this region, but it would be foolish to rule out the
possibility. We should recall that throughout the 1980s
the Soviet Union maintained a small naval force of
submarines and surface ships in the Northern Arabian
Sea, using facilities provided by Yemen. This squadron
had the mission of demonstrating a Soviet presence,
showing the flag in a region that the Soviets considered
important. That the Soviets normally included a
submarine in this mix ensured that U.S. Naval units in
the area were always in a high state of readiness. One
cannot rule out the possibility of similar facilities in
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either Iran or Pakistan being made available for a PLAN
squadron. Such a squadron would be valuable both for
a PRC peacetime presence and in crisis situations, but
would probably be lost if an all-out conflict with the
United States over Taiwan broke out.44
Deployed peacetime presence squadrons are one
of the missions that the growing PLAN destroyer and
frigate force could perform. It is not entirely clear that
maintaining ships on distant stations is something the
PLAN is planning to do, but it would not be a surprise if
in time it elected to do so. For example, today most North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries—as
well as Asia powers Australia and Japan—maintain a
more or less permanent naval presence in the Persian
Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea region.
The model could become a driver of force structure.
PLAN surface combatants can act as valued symbols of
China as a great power with global interests, capable of
operating and exercising around the world. Showing
the flag is an important peacetime mission. These
ships also have the capability to perform escort roles
and would have some functions in a Taiwan scenario,
operating against the Taiwanese navy. However,
in a conflict against the U.S. Navy, the inadequate
antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses on these ships
would make them very vulnerable to U.S. tactical air
or U.S. and allied submarines. The PLA has spent
considerable time studying the United Kingdom’s 1982
Falklands campaign, and is aware of the sinking of the
Argentine cruiser Belgrano, a dramatic illustration of
surface ship vulnerability to submarine attack.45
The best way for the PRC to protect its sea lanes
and commercial traffic is to maintain good diplomatic
relations with trading partners and littoral states
adjacent to them. The only country that could seriously
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disrupt merchant traffic destined to or from China is
the United States, and it is not clear to this observer
what the PLAN could do about it. It will be many
years before the PLAN is able to operate surface ships
independently at sea in the face of a hostile United States.
That is not to say that maintaining distant squadrons
lacks high utility in peacetime and in periods of crisis.
Whether such utility results in a demand for surface
ships remains to be seen.
A LOOMING DRIVER: THE MILITARY
IMPLICATIONS OF OVERSEAS INTERESTS AND
OF BEING A RESPONSIBLE “STAKEHOLDER”
Theorists of naval strategy have always drawn a
close connection between a nation’s far-flung economic
interests and a strong navy. It seems clear that China
has bet its future on globalization and its ability to
succeed in the global system. The latest PRC White
Paper on National Defense explicitly makes the point
that “China has never been so closely bound up with
the world as it is today.”46 What this means in practical
terms is that the PRC is developing global interests
that are derived from its global trade and quest for
energy security. As discussed above, China has reaped
tremendous economic benefits from opening up and
becoming an integral part of the global economy.
According to Assistant Foreign Minister Lu
Guozeng,
After more than 20 years of development, China is now
enjoying closer and closer relations with other countries.
There were very few Chinese-funded businesses overseas
at the beginning of reform and opening up. In contrast,
by the end of 2003, China has had an accumulative
foreign direct investment (FDI) of USD 33.4 billion with
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3439 companies covering 139 countries and regions.
The statistics released by United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recently show
that China is expected to surpass Japan to become the
5th largest source country of FDI. Therefore, China's
overseas interests are on the rise.47

In a more recent speech, PRC Vice President Zeng
Qinghong stated, “Overseas investment by Chinese
companies has increased by over 20 percent annually,
with 80 percent of it made in Asia. In 2005, Chinese
made 31 million overseas visits. Asia is the top choice
of a large number of Chinese tourists. All this has
played and will continue to play an important role in
promoting economic growth in Asia and the world.”48
According to the PRC Consulate in Houston,
Texas, Chinese workers overseas face greater danger
than ever before. An article posted on the consulate’s
website raises the question of how China should protect
its citizens overseas. There were some 30,000 Chinese
workers in Iraq before the war and some 230,000 spread
among Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and
Egypt. Chinese workers were attacked in Afghanistan,
and about 5,000 are working on various projects in
Pakistan. The point of the article was that, as more
and more Chinese go abroad, the danger of Chinese
citizens being harmed or killed increases.49
Recently, a car bomb detonated harmlessly near
an oil refinery in Nigeria, and the group claiming
responsibility warned, “We wish to warn the Chinese
government and its oil companies to steer clear of the
Niger Delta. Chinese citizens found in oil installations
will be treated as thieves. The Chinese government
by investing in stolen crude, places its citizens in our
line of fire.” The correspondent reporting this episode
raises an interesting rhetorical point: How did China
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find itself in the crosshairs of the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta? The answer, of course,
is that China is active around the world, especially in
search of energy.50
Just as China is economically engaged globally,
it is also increasing its global military presence by
increasingly participating in United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping missions. The latest is the Lebanon
mission: Prime Minister Wen Jiabao pledged 1,000 PLA
soldiers in response to UN Resolution 1701. The BBC
report editorializes that this pledge is evidence that
China is starting to intensify “its diplomacy in areas it
had not seen as vital.” This is the sort of behavior one
could expect from a responsible stakeholder.51
That the PRC is going global is well recognized and
the subject of frequent commentary, which need not be
repeated here. By going global, Beijing is translating
economic engagement into political interests. Historically, economic and business interests, when paired with
concerns about the safety of citizens, have translated
into the employment of naval forces on distant stations
to safeguard those interests and to respond to local
crises and disturbances. In previous eras, this was
often dubbed “gunboat diplomacy.” While this form
of coercive diplomacy is no longer routinely practiced,
the modern counterpart of dispatching naval forces
when instability threatens a nation’s economic interests
or the lives of its overseas nationals is still very much
alive. Over the past few years, Great Britain, France,
and the United States have deployed forces to various
crises in West Africa. The recent evacuation of foreign
nationals from Lebanon by French, Italian, and U.S.
naval forces is just the latest example.
Clearly, officials in the PRC are considering the
implications of its global interests in terms of respond-
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ing to threatening events. When combined with
Beijing’s worries about energy security and sea lane
protection, it is likely only a matter of time before we
witness periodic deployment of PLAN ships or small
task groups designed to show the flag and maintain
presence in areas where the PRC has economic interests
or large numbers of citizens abroad.
This driver is reinforced by pressure from
Washington for the PRC to become a responsible
stakeholder. Responsible stakeholders participate in
UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions, as the PLA
is increasingly doing. If this trend continues, it will
certainly create a demand for a PLAN that can support
these UN missions. Such erstwhile responsible
stakeholders as the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France routinely deploy naval forces abroad to
perform these sorts of missions. The other member of
the UN permanent five, Russia, used to do so during
Soviet days—and now that its energy export-driven
economic resurgence is taking hold, there are signs that
its still large Navy is stirring back to life. If the former
tendency resumes, it will leave the PRC as the only
member of the permanent five not to have a globally
deployable naval force.
If the PLAN begins to conduct distant peacetime
presence operations, and I suspect it will, it will be
accomplished by ships with modest expeditionary
capabilities. The current trend in naval construction
in Europe, as well as East Asia, is for 12,000 to 17,000
ton multipurpose amphibious (or expeditionary) ships
that can carry a few hundred soldiers or marines,
several helicopters, good medical facilities, and the
wherewithal to establish good command, control,
and communication centers. These are the sorts of
ships that are useful in missions such as humanitarian
relief, disaster relief, evacuation of people in danger,
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or simple presence to signify a willingness to protect
interests in jeopardy.
A NON-DRIVER: TAKING STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SEA
Another potential driver would be the desire on the
part of the PRC to take advantage of the vastness of the
open ocean to enhance the survivability of its nuclear
deterrent against the United States and potentially
circumvent U.S. missile defense by being able to
launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from
submarines along azimuths outside the engagement
zones of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. Should
the PLA elect to pursue this course of action with
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), it would need to
overcome a potentially serious vulnerability by making
certain that its SSBN force was so acoustically quiet
that it could not be tracked by U.S. attack submarines.
Russian advisors to the PLAN may have discussed
Cold War vulnerability issues related to the Soviet
Navy’s own SSBN force. These issues were so serious
that the Soviet Navy had to cluster its ballistic missile
submarines in heavily protected maritime enclaves
(called bastions) to ensure that its boats survived in
case of war with the United States.
The combination of close contacts with the Russian
navy and the growing body of unclassified studies
on Cold War naval operations52 must have made it
abundantly clear to PLA planners that unless PLAN
SSBNs can operate undetected by U.S. forces, it would
be risky to make substantial investments in a sea-based
leg of their nuclear retaliatory capability. Noisy SSBNs
would be vulnerable on the high seas, and would
become a resource black hole if the PLA had to create a
Soviet-like “bastion” defense to protect them.53
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The PLA has an alternative basing option that can
take advantage of the vastness of the Chinese mainland,
in which the Second Artillery’s new solid-fuel roadmobile systems are far more survivable. A far more
likely PLAN option, and one that its modernization
program suggests it is pursuing, is to arm nuclear
attack submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.
These multimission submarines can be employed in a
wide range of operational tasks, and at the same time
provide a hedge in support of China’s avowed “nuclear
counterattack” doctrine.54
CONCLUSION

The PRC is investing in Navy building for the
straightforward reason that, without a capable Navy,
it has serious strategic vulnerabilities otherwise
unaddressable—especially in the case of Taiwan.
Without a credible naval establishment, it can threaten
Taiwan with punishment but not seizure.
Given that the strategic case for Navy building
emerged some 20 years ago, the CMC and PLA had to
choose what sort of Navy to build. The choices were
relatively clear. One was the historical model of the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The IJN is tangible proof
that a Western-style blue water Navy was possible in
an Asian context. But developing such a Navy would
have meant a departure from China’s continentalist
strategic tradition. Besides being countercultural to
an Army-dominated PLA, such a blue water Navy
would have been expensive and very difficult to make
credible in terms of training and technology. China’s
only attempt to field such a Navy met with disaster in
1895.
The PRC’s early relationship with the Soviets
provided the second, more obvious, template for
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the PLA. The geostrategic circumstances facing the
Soviet Union and China were similar when it came
to threats from the sea, and the defensive Soviet-style
anti-access model was also less expensive and easier
to build because the PLA could capitalize on Sovietdeveloped technology and operational concepts.
Finally, this approach to Navy building fitted within
the continentalist worldview at the highest levels of
military and party decisionmaking.
As it turns out, this approach to Navy building also
fits well with the political message that Beijing has
been sending to the world: China’s rise will be peaceful
and nonthreatening. Fielding an obviously defenseoriented Navy would be tangible evidence that the PRC
was not going to become an expeditionary or powerprojection threat. Exceptions to this assessment of the
PRC as nonthreatening are the cases of Japan and both
Koreas. They are within or adjacent to the PLAN seadenial area—the first island chain.
The PLAN submarine force in particular is a
capability-based threat to Japan’s economic lifelines
of maritime trade that Japan cannot, and probably
will not, ignore. For the rest of Asia, an avowedly
power projection PLAN would be counterproductive
to China’s broader strategic objectives of not creating
powerful enemies in the region, especially since such
a naval force would not be essential to satisfying the
PRC’s strategic objectives. In this context, the PLAN’s
focus on commissioning many more diesel submarines
than nuclear submarines also helps reinforce the
positive diplomatic message of a peaceful rise. They
are quieter, are very hard to find, and create the image
of being defensive in nature. They fit within the template
of East Asian naval developments that feature South
Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia joining Japan, Taiwan,
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and Australia as nations with conventionally-powered
submarines.
It is unlikely that when Liu Huaqing developed
his “island chain” approach to maritime strategy, he
foresaw the tremendous growth in China’s global
trade and quest for natural resources (especially
energy). Nor is it likely that he foresaw the PRC’s
growing international role in UN peacekeeping. The
idea that thousands of PRC citizens would be working
or traveling abroad did not seem likely to any student
of China 20 years ago. That those citizens might need
protection from terrorists or criminals was equally
unanticipated, if similar American failures in longrange thinking are any guide.
A combination of such factors, plus the pressure
from the United States to become a responsible
stakeholder, is creating demand signals for a PLAN
that can support UN-sanctioned missions, protect
PRC interests abroad with a show of force, protect or
evacuate PRC citizens in jeopardy, protect sea lines
of communication, respond to natural disasters, and
demonstrate PRC resolve in support of embattled
friends in Africa and along the South Asia littoral. But
today these are issues that Beijing and the PLAN are, I
believe, just beginning to think about seriously. It is not
enough simply to think about wartime employment
concepts, the PLAN, unique among all of the PRC’s
military services, must also now consider distant,
prolonged peacetime operations as part of its core
mission set.
These combinations of potential missions will,
I believe, require the PLAN to learn how to deploy
and sustain surface combatants, amphibious ships,
and support ships on distant stations for long periods
of time. Also, it will almost certainly create a sound
rationale for having some sort of an aircraft carrier,
515

since helicopters are particularly valued in most of
these missions.
This means that the PLAN probably faces another
addition to its core mission in its future. It will continue
to maintain a defensive strategy for the defense of China
and its possessions, but it will also deploy a force whose
primary utility will be to provide peacetime presence,
sea lane monitoring, and crisis response. This force will
probably not be particularly valuable in case of a real
war with the United States, but such a war is not likely.
This next-generation Navy will be useful to the PRC in
furthering its own interests while also demonstrating
that it too can be a responsible stakeholder among
military forces of the community of nations.
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CHAPTER 11
RIGHT-SIZING THE NAVY:
HOW MUCH NAVAL FORCE
WILL BEIJING DEPLOY?
Bernard D. Cole
INTRODUCTION
This chapter evaluates China’s plans for building
naval forces based on estimates of need by Beijing.
Addressing this question and associated issues involves
exploring the current state of China’s naval forces and
strategy. A brief assessment of how this force compares
to the missions laid down in the national defense
white paper will be offered as well. The current state
of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will be
described in terms of both numbers and capabilities.
Future developments will be estimated out to 10
years. The PLAN in 2016-17 will almost certainly be
operating in an international environment different
from that prevailing today. How different the Chinese
government believes that environment might be will
in turn go far toward determining the character of the
naval forces Beijing estimates it needs.
That decision, in turn, will depend on Chinese national security aspirations and concerns. Implementing
that decision—or rather a whole range of associated
decisions—will be empowered by the economic and
personnel resources available within a framework
of national industrial and research capabilities. The
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geography of maritime Asia will remain the same, of
course, but the interests, resources, and intentions of the
nations therein will not. How these are interpreted by
China, by her allies, and by her opponents will strongly
influence Beijing’s decisionmaking process with
respect to future Navy building. Hence, this chapter
will use maritime scenarios as a vehicle for evaluating
situational parameters that are likely guiding, and will
guide in the future, China’s decisions on how strong
and capable a PLAN will be deployed.
China’s naval ambitions and possible employment
will be measured in accordance with three scenarios.
While somewhat arbitrary in selection, these scenarios
are based on several plausible possibilities. Each
scenario will be developed within the following five
parameters. First, each describes an existent (2006-07)
conflict of interests between China and at least one
other nation. Second, none of these conflicts appears to
be susceptible of near-term resolution (that is, before
2016-17), although this is admittedly the most arbitrary
of the selected parameters. Third, each scenario is
inherently maritime in character in terms of geographic
location and access to naval forces, and would dictate
a PLAN deployment against significant naval power
should Beijing elect to implement the naval instrument
of statecraft.
Fourth, the scenarios are not predetermined to lead
to the employment of violent naval force, although that
would be an attractive option in each case. Resolution
through diplomacy, through third-party arbitration,
or via multilateral negotiation might very well serve
as a decision path, but will not receive the focus that
employment of the PLAN will receive. Fifth, thirdparty naval intervention will be considered, but will not
form an integral part of the discussion of each scenario.
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The navies of Japan and South Korea are formidable,
modernizing forces, but the only likely navy the PLAN
is considering in its active planning process is that of
the United States. Despite the U.S. Navy’s current and
likely future ability to exercise overwhelming naval
power anywhere in maritime Asia, Chinese naval
planners are doubtless working to develop a way to
avoid, counter, or perhaps even co-opt that power.
The process of evaluating the PLAN will focus
on its force structure, to include surface combatants,
aircraft, submarines, and shore establishment. An
attempt will also be made to assess the state of PLAN
training, from the individual to fleet and joint levels,
in terms both of theory and practice. This assessment
will lead in turn to a discussion of PLAN doctrine, the
goal being to evaluate its origins and its linkages to
force structure, perceived threats, and possible future
developments. Finally, China’s 2006 White Paper on
National Defense will be used as a baseline from which
to measure PLAN capability today and in 2016: Can
the Navy meet its mission requirements, as spelled out
in the 2006 White Paper?1
CURRENT PLAN COMPOSITION
Evaluating China’s naval capabilities will begin
with the size of the force. This is the most obvious
first indicator in evaluating naval capabilities, and it is
the strongest possible indicator of national intentions:
What proportion of national treasure is being devoted
to naval strength? This may not necessarily serve as
a gauge of national belligerency or of the likelihood
of Beijing choosing to employ naval force. Available
naval resources do provide a strong indicator, however,
of Beijing’s propensity to utilize the PLAN as an
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instrument of statecraft in a crisis involving perceived
threats to vital security interests.
The PLAN will be analyzed in Western naval
terms, that is, as “communities” or classes. These
are the surface, subsurface, and aviation warfare
communities.
Surface Forces.
Surface ships form the oldest, most visible, and
most vulnerable naval community. Almost all are
“warships,” but these are usually classified as either
combatant or noncombatant. The former are built to
do battle, and in the PLAN include destroyers, frigates,
and patrol craft. The first two types of ships are intended to serve as multimission platforms; they are
armed, equipped, and crewed with the goal of enabling
them to conduct operations in all primary naval warfare areas.
The first area is antisurface warfare (ASUW).2 This
area refers to operations conducted to detect, localize,
target, and attack surface ships, typically carried out
with radars, guns, missiles, or torpedoes. ASUW
missions may also be carried out by submarines,
aircraft, or shore batteries.
The second is antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations, conducted to detect, localize, target, and
attack submarines. These are typically carried out by
sonar and torpedoes, both tube-launched and rocketassisted. ASW is best carried out by submarines but is
also assigned typically to aircraft as well as to surface
ships.
The third primary surface ship warfare area is
antiair warfare (AAW), conducted to detect, track,
target, and attack manned aircraft and unmanned air
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vehicles. The usual means of conducting AAW are
radar, missiles, and guns. AAW is a primary mission
assigned to aircraft, as well as to shore batteries.
Less prominent but not unimportant naval warfare
areas include mine warfare (MIW), which—with
sonar, unmanned vehicles, divers, and mammals—
includes operations both to install mine fields and to
detect, localize, and destroy or remove mines planted
by opposing forces. MIW is also carried out by aircraft,
both fixed and rotary wing, as well as by submarines.
There is also information warfare (IW), consisting
of information operations, operational security
(OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOPs), military
deception, and electronic warfare (EW). EW in turn
includes operations to utilize the electronic spectrum
for detection and warning, while denying an opponent
the ability to do so. Finally we have amphibious warfare
(AMW), referring to operations designed to move
ground forces ashore, usually with small seaborne
landing craft, air cushion vehicles (LCACs), helicopters,
or vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) fixed-wing
aircraft. Navies typically operate with marine forces for
this mission, but most armies also have units dedicated
to AMW. Indeed, the PLA has divisions stationed in
Fujian and Guangdong Provinces that are dedicated
to the amphibious mission.3 AMW includes several
categories, ranging from the full multidivision assault
against an opposed beach to small raids conducted by
special operation forces (SOF).
China’s surface ship force is riding on the leading
edge of current PLAN modernization. New ships
have been launched every year since 2000, following
a more deliberate but well-funded ship design and
commissioning program during the 1990s. Two ship
types are conspicuous—destroyers and frigates—
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both armed with very capable antisurface ship cruise
missiles (SSM). All of these ship classes are designed
to be multimission-capable, which means they are
assigned missions across the spectrum of naval warfare
areas, especially ASUW, ASW, and AAW.
Destroyers of two classes and frigates of a single
class were commissioned during the 1990s. The
two Luhu-class and one Luhai-class destroyers are
essentially identical in capability; the latter is larger—
displacing 6,000 rather than the former’s 4,600 tons—
primarily because China was forced to buy Ukrainianbuilt gas turbine engines as the ship’s main propulsion
plant. This resulted from the U.S. embargo on sales
of military equipment to China following the 1989
Tiananmen Square massacre: prior to that event, the
United States had sold China five General Electric-built
LM-2500 gas turbine engines, four of which power the
two Luhu-class destroyers.4 The Ukrainian engines are
significantly larger than the U.S. machinery, hence the
Luhai’s hull had to be increased in size. The 2,250 ton
displacement Jiangwei-class frigates, at least 12 of which
have now been built by China, are smaller versions of
the destroyers, powered by German-designed diesel
engines.
These 1990s shipbuilding programs were tentative
in nature, as the PLAN built small types of ships, trying
different combinations of mostly foreign-built or at
least foreign-designed weapons, sensors, command
and control, and propulsion systems. The decade was
also one in which PLAN budgets had yet to begin
benefiting in a major way from the significant defense
budget increases that began in the early 1990s and have
come to fruition in the 21st century. Such increases will
no doubt continue, as China’s remarkably expanding
economy continues to yield greater revenues to the
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national government. However, none of the ships
built during the last 10 years of the 20th century were
capable of operating successfully in a modern fleet
environment with opposition from U.S., Japanese,
South Korean, or perhaps some other navies.
The PLAN surface force that deployed in 1999—
Luda-class destroyers and Jianghu-class frigates in addition to the ships discussed above—was characterized
by a formidable anti-surface ship capability, but only
weakly equipped to conduct ASW and AAW operations. In fact, none of these ships is capable of
operating at less than very great risk to themselves in
an environment subject to attack by land- or carrierbased aircraft. And they would have to rely on luck to
work against well-operated submarines successfully.
Two ship classes have bridged the gap between 20th
and 21st centuries for the PLAN, however. China has
continued to modify the Jiangwei-class frigates, of which
three subclasses now exist. The second class (Jiangwei
II), featuring a Chinese-built copy of the Jiangwei I’s
French-built AAW missile system, was not successful.
The Jiangwei III, at least one of which is in commission,
appears to differ from its earlier sisters primarily in its
improved command and control capabilities.5
The second cross-century combatant is the
Sovermenny-class destroyer, four which China has
purchased from Russia. This 8,000 ton displacement
ship was designed by the Soviet Union specifically to
target U.S. aircraft carriers, with its long-range, heavywarhead Sunburn antiship cruise missile. That the ships
were designed to operate as part of a multimissioncapable task force is indicated by its marginal ASW
and AAW capabilities. The Sovermennys’ steam plants
also have a problematic history. The PLAN will have
to employ the boats conservatively, so as to avoid

529

exposing them to the air attacks against which they are
so vulnerable.
With the dawning of the 21st century, the PLAN
launched shipbuilding programs reflecting a new
confidence and technological expertise by the Chinese
warship construction industry. By the middle of the
new century’s first decade, China has already launched
three new classes of destroyers and a new class of
frigate. All have continued the PLAN’s emphasis on
very capable antiship cruise missile batteries and,
while still equipped with problematical ASW systems,
are armed with the most advanced AAW system
yet put to sea by China. The Luyang I, Luyang II, and
Luzhou-class destroyers are all gas-turbine powered
ships designed with some stealth characteristics and
intended to provide the PLAN for the first time with
ships capable of area AAW defense.6
Which of these ships will be a class leader, and how
many hulls will be built in each class are unanswered
questions. The Luyang II is the most intriguing of this
new class of destroyers, since it is equipped with an
antenna array characteristic of the U.S.-designed Aegis
AAW system. Probably two of these classes of ships—
Luyang I, II, Luzhou—are armed with a highly capable
Soviet-designed antiaircraft missile system known as
the Grizzly in NATO parlance.
China’s frigate force is now led by the dieselpowered Jiangkai-class, three of which have reportedly
been commissioned. This ship appears to be a larger
version (3,500 ton displacement) of the Jiangwei-class,
the chief difference being a hull and superstructure
design exhibiting “stealthy” characteristics. In
fact, with its sleek rounded surfaces and reported
radar absorbent coatings, the Jiangkai bears a strong
resemblance to the French-designed Lafayette-class
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frigates operated by Taiwan’s Navy. A less obvious
but significant advantage is the Jiangkai’s size; with half
again the displacement of the Jiangwei, the Jiangkai will
offer a significantly more stable platform for weapon
and sensor systems, and will be a better sea-keeping
ship.
These modern ship classes—Luhu, Luhai, Luyang
I and II, Luzhou, Jiangwei, Jiangkai—augment China’s
older Luda and Jianghu combatants. These older ships
are armed with capable antisurface ship cruise missiles,
although being even less ASW and AAW capable then
their newer fleet mates.
Since 2000 the PLAN has commissioned several
new ships in other mission areas as well, including at
least 17 amphibious warfare ships. Most significant of
these are the 4,800 ton displacement Yuting I and IIclass landing ship-tanks (LSTs), which are designed
to beach themselves for direct off-loading of troops
and vehicles. Although lightly armed—as are all
amphibious assault ships—the Yutings are equipped
with helicopter landing platforms, which increase
their flexibility by allowing the vertical transport of
embarked troops and equipment. An additional 10
Yunshu-class landing ship-mechanized (LSMs) have
also been commissioned since 2003. These are smaller
versions of the Yuting-class, displacing 1,460 tons. Even
more significant is a much larger amphibious ship,
displacing between 18,000 and 25,000 tons, that was
launched in late 2006. This ship looks almost identical
to the U.S. San Antonio-class Landing Platform Dock
(LPD); it will offer the PLAN a platform capable of
deploying at least four helicopters and four air-cushion
landing craft, and embarking at least 400 troops.7 It
will be the first Chinese naval vessel capable of force
projection as defined by Western navies.
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The PLAN mine warfare force remains limited to
one dedicated mine laying ship (few, if any, of the
world’s navies dedicate vessels to this single mission)
and a force of aging Soviet-designed minesweepers.
The PLAN certainly is not ignoring this warfare area,
however, since new MIW technology is being acquired
and exercised.8 MIW would occupy a prominent
place in any scenario involving PLAN action against
Taiwan.
Discussion of the Chinese Navy’s future plans
often poses questions about an emergent blue water
navy or talk about power projection. Both of these
expansionist courses depend on logistical support for
viability. Hence, the PLAN’s inventory of ships capable
of replenishing combatants and amphibious ships at
sea while underway is a critical indicator of China’s
naval ambitions. Until 2005, the PLAN included just
three such ships, and only one of these, the ex-Soviet
Vladimir Peregudov (renamed Nancang by China),
is large enough for fleet operations, at 37,000 tons
displacement. It is also the only PLAN replenishment
ship with a helicopter deck and hangar.
Two replenishment vessels of the Fuqing-class
displace just 21,000 tons. In 2005, however, China built
and commissioned two new Fuchi-class replenishmentat-sea (RAS) ships, each displacing 28,000 tons and
capable of supplying the fleet with fuel, ordnance,
food, and other supplies. If Beijing uses these new
RAS ships as replacements for the two smaller units, it
will indicate a continued lack of blue water ambition.
If, however, the Fuqings are retained until replaced by
larger ships and each of China’s three naval fleets—
North Sea, East Sea, South Sea—grows to include two
or more large RAS ships, then the PLAN will be capable
of more long-range deployments. This capability will
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also indicate Beijing’s more ambitious intentions for its
Navy.
Submarine Force.
True long-endurance submersible warships became
feasible only with the advent of nuclear propulsion
in the U.S. Navy in the mid-1950s. Nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSN) are expensive, however, and
modern conventionally-powered submarines have
developed into extremely capable antisurface ship
and mine-laying platforms. Germany and Russia have
led the way in designing such boats, and China has
benefited directly from both.
The PLAN first built SSNs in 1980, with the earliest
of the five-ship, Han-class. These boats were built
along the lines of the 1950s vintage Soviet-designed
November-class SSN. They are “noisy” and have experienced significant maintenance problems during their
lifetime; in fact, no more than four and perhaps just
three of the Han-class remain operational.9 China is
currently building and deploying a new class of SSN,
however, the Type-093 or Shang-class. Two of these
boats are operational, with at least one more under
construction. They strongly resemble the 1980s Sovietdesigned Victor III-class SSN, although no doubt much
modernized. This similarity almost certainly reflects
Russian assistance in China’s construction of this new
generation of SSN. The Shangs have been compared to
the U.S. Los Angeles-class SSNs which, although now
30 years old, continue to form the bulk of the American
submarine force.10
The PLAN has never succeeded in deploying
a nuclear-powered submarine armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying nuclear
warheads. The Xia-class fleet ballistic missile submarine
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(FBM or SSBN) was constructed in 1987, but apparently
never regularly patrolled, probably due to engineering
problems.11
China is building a new FBM, the Type-094 or Jinclass. This seems surprising, given the nation’s already
successful DF-31 and 31A land-based, road-mobile,
solid fuel ICBMs, which are much less expensive, much
more secure, and much more controllable than are seabased missiles. It may be that Beijing is determined to
have more than one leg to its nuclear deterrent force. A
PLAN desire to have a role in this mission may also be a
factor, although FBMs are subject to the command and
control of the Chinese national command authority,
operating through the Second Artillery and not directly
with the PLAN.
China already owns the world’s most formidable
force of conventionally-powered submarines (SS). The
oldest part of this force consists of almost 60 Romeoclass boats, copies of an early 1950s Soviet design. The
PLAN probably operates no more than a dozen of
these submarines, however, due to high maintenance
requirements and the lack of crew personnel. More
useful are the 17 boats of the Ming-class, an updated
version of the Romeo, which began entering active
service in 1975.12 This submarine offers only slightly
improved capabilities over the Romeo, and China is
well into a large-scale construction program for its
next-generation conventionally-powered attack boat,
the Song-class.
At least 12 Songs have been commissioned or are in
production. The first two of these boats demonstrated
serious shortcomings in China’s ability to design and
construct advanced submarines, but these problems
have apparently been overcome, and the Song
appears to be the PLAN’s indigenously produced,
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conventionally-powered submarine of choice for the
first three decades of the 21st century.
China has also purchased 12 Russian-built Kilo-class
boats, hitherto one of the very best SSs in the world. A
thus far new class of submarine, named the Yuan, was
unveiled in the summer of 2004; it may be a follow-on
to the Song class, but given the Yuan’s relatively small
size and lack of significant follow-on production, it is
more likely an experimental boat of sorts, perhaps an
attempt to reverse engineer the Kilo-class.
China has yet to incorporate air-independent
propulsion (AIP) in any of its conventionally-powered
submarines. An AIP plant allows a boat to remain
submerged for up to 14 days instead of the 4 associated
with conventionally-powered boats (when only slow
speeds are called for). The technology is not thoroughly
proven, however, and Beijing may be waiting for
further Russian (or other foreign) developments in AIP
engineering before purchasing the plants.
Naval Aviation.
PLAN aviation is the Navy’s weakest branch,
although progress is being made. All fixed-wing
aircraft are based ashore, including approximately
48 of the Su-30 fighter-attack aircraft that China has
purchased from Russia. This is the PLAN’s only truly
modern tactical aircraft, although the 18 JH-7s and 120
J8-IIs are the result of indigenous attempts to produce
a contemporary fighter.
China’s naval aviation force also deploys Sovietdesigned B-6 bombers capable of firing antiship cruise
missiles (ASCM), its primary tactical role. The PLAN’s
patrol and ASW aviation force is relatively weak, with
approximately 24 H-5 and H-6 aircraft operating.
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The PLAAF apparently continues to provide China’s
primary air-to-air refueling and electronic warfare
aircraft for maritime missions.
The PLAN’s main aviation strength lies in its
shipborne helicopter fleet. Of either French or Russian
design, about 60 aircraft are deployed, mostly onboard
ships. Each of China’s new destroyers and frigates is
capable of hangaring and operating one helo, although
only the four or so newest ships appear capable of
digital linkage with its aircraft in flight. This computer
connection permits automated flight control and
engagement information to be passed both ways
between ship and aircraft, and is crucial for prosecuting
engagements.
Personnel and Training.
The PLAN is currently coping with personnel
shortages, a common issue among almost all
modernizing military forces. These shortages have a
basis in the booming Chinese economy and the growing
technological sophistication of the weapons, sensor,
and engineering systems with which new PLAN
ships, submarines, and aircraft are being equipped.
The traditional Chinese serviceman of Mao Zedong’s
construct—an uneducated “man of the people” who
could put down his hoe and pick up a rifle—is no longer
adequate material for molding a proficient modern
sailor. Whether draftee or volunteer, the new PLAN
enlisted man must possess both the native intelligence
and formal education necessary to maintain and
operate complex electronic and mechanical systems.
To this end, during the past decade and a half, the
PLAN has significantly revised its system of educating
and training enlisted technicians. While the draft
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remains in place, its usefulness has been restricted by
the reduction of obligated service to just 24 months.
Hence, promising enlisted conscripts must agree
to an extended period of service, perhaps 4 years at
a minimum, before justifying a PLAN investment in
extensive education and training. The needs of naval
modernization and operational requirements have
also persuaded the PLAN that a well-developed corps
of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who are both
proficient technicians and effective leaders is needed.
Such a corps of technicians and NCOs is indeed
emerging in the PLAN.13
A similar phenomenon is occurring in the PLAN’s
officer corps. The days of poorly educated, even
illiterate, officers is past; the Navy simply cannot afford
officers who do not possess the education necessary
to understand how to maintain and employ the
complex technological systems with which their ships,
submarines, and aircraft are equipped. To expand
the available base of qualified officer candidates, the
PLAN has in recent years established several officer
accession programs similar to the U.S. Naval Reserve
Officer Training Corps (NROTC).14 These programs are
oriented toward attracting civilian students majoring
in engineering or the sciences, reflecting the PLAN’s
awareness of the need for technologically competent
officers.
However, the PLAN’s training paradigm remains
based on the calendar year, a relatively rigid construct
that inhibits effective operational training and focuses
maximum operational readiness on a narrow period
of time. One moderating development, however,
allows for ships to enter the training program during
the calendar year when the timing of unexpected or
extended maintenance periods so dictates, rather than
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being restricted to the beginning. The PLAN follows
a Navy-wide training program that at least on paper
proceeds from individual personnel training to team,
crew, multiship, and finally to joint training on a
significant scale, sometimes involving units from all of
China’s three fleets, the Army, and the Air Force.
Maintenance is a topic seldom addressed by
observers of naval strength. This is a crucial failing,
since naval forces are only as effective as their state
of readiness, and their readiness is more dependent
on effective materiel maintenance than any other
factor, even personnel proficiency. Of course, the two
are directly connected: personnel must be effectively
trained to conduct effective maintenance on their
assigned equipment and platforms.
For example, an aircraft with an improperly
maintained engine or inaccurately aligned fire
control radar obviously will not be able to carry out
its mission. At sea, if a ship’s propulsion plant is not
properly maintained, it will operate neither efficiently
nor reliably. A destroyer designed to cruise for 2,000
kilometers (km) at 16 knots (kts) may as a result be
able to cruise for only 1,600 km at that speed; or a ship
designed to operate in combat at 28 kts may be able to
attain a speed of only 25 kts, which could be fatal.
Another example is improperly performed or
falsified maintenance on a shipboard guided missile
fire control system, which would lead to unsatisfactory
daily system operability. In time of need, that system
would either not operate at all or would perform at a
level well below design specifications, again a possibly
fatal shortcoming.
The most pointed example of the importance of
proper maintenance applies to that performed on
almost any of a submarine’s many pumps. As noted
above, submarines depend for stealth above all other
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factors for their operational effectiveness, indeed,
for their very survival at sea. The primary factor in a
submarine’s ability to operate stealthily is the lowest
possible noise signature. This requires the most detailed
attention to maintenance procedures, to ensure that all
equipment onboard, from the galley food mixer to the
main engine, is operating as quietly as possible.
If, for instance, the prescribed procedures for repacking a bearing on a particular pump calls for Grade
“A” lubricant, but because of an onboard shortage of
that product the maintenance personnel use Grade
“B” lubricant, than no immediate deleterious effect
will be observed. Over time, however, the substitute
will break down more quickly than would the proper
lubricant, and the pump bearing will begin to operate
at a higher than designed noise level. This means that
the submarine will be generating more noise and will
be more detectable by opposing submarines, ships, or
listening devices.
How effective are PLAN maintenance programs,
especially when considered in relationship to PLAN
personnel training? Anecdotally, the PLAN does
not have a good reputation for the detailed attention
to maintenance demanded of an effective navy.15
First, PLAN ships deploying on long cruises, to the
Western Hemisphere for example, have been assigned
additional, specially trained maintenance personnel
and special spare parts allocations, a clear admission
that normal maintenance protocols are not up to the
task of trans-oceanic deployments. Second, the loss
of the submarine Ming 361 in 2003 certainly reflected
an unsatisfactory training paradigm for maintenance
personnel.16 Third, two PLAN senior captains embarked as observers on several American warships during
the 1998 Rimpac exercise conducted in Hawaiian
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waters. Part of their extensive report of that experience
appeared in the military press in China: one of the
factors most attracting the PLAN officers’ attention
was that U.S. sailors continued performing equipment
maintenance during underway operations, indicating
that this was not the practice in the PLAN.17 Fourth,
another apparent lesson learned by the PLAN from
the U.S. Navy is the absolute requirement to have an
NCO corps able to assure effective maintenance with a
minimum of officer supervision.
THE FUTURE: 2016-17
The PLAN understands the importance of personnel
education and training, as it does that of systematic
training ranging all the way from individual to unit to
fleet to joint service levels. Improvements in these areas
began a decade ago and will almost certainly continue
during the next 10 years, resulting in substantial
increases in operational competence. The loss of Ming
361 resulted in the relief of the responsible chain of
command, extending from PLAN commander Admiral
Shi Yunsheng down to the senior captain responsible
for the maintenance failures that contributed to the
loss of the submarine’s crew.18 In other words, PLAN
personnel in 2016-17 will be better educated and more
thoroughly trained than their predecessors, and at least
as patriotically dedicated to their mission.
Meanwhile, platform and materiel modernization
is occurring across all PLAN communities: aviation,
surface, and subsurface. The latter has clearly been
selected by Beijing to serve as China’s primary
instrument of naval force, however. The force of 6 SSNs
and 25 modern SSs cannot be ignored by any potential
maritime opponent, be it Taiwan, with its almost
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negligible undersea force of two boats, or the United
States, with the world’s largest and most capable Navy.
And it is these two forces that Beijing has in mind as it
deploys and increases its submarine fleet.
Detecting, localizing, targeting, and sinking
submarines—the essence of ASW—remains the
most difficult of naval warfare areas. China’s PLAN
development program in 2006 is proceeding not to
challenge any particular foreign navy directly, but
rather to serve as an effective instrument of national
will in specific strategic scenarios. Three of these
scenarios are most likely and thus most predictive of
Beijing’s naval plans for the next decade: Taiwan, the
East China Sea, and the Straits of Malacca.
Taiwan.
Taiwan is China’s number one geostrategic concern.
More than that, ensuring Taiwan’s reunification with
the mainland is a matter of revolutionary ardor and
has been elevated by Beijing to symbolize Chinese
nationalism. Since Beijing consistently refuses to
discount the possibility of employing military force
against Taiwan should the island’s government cross
any one of several thresholds, PLAN would be one of
the military instruments of choice in that case.
Options for employing maritime forces against the
island range from various levels of restricting seaborne
trade to full-scale amphibious invasion. The PLAN
would presumably play a prominent role in other
applications of military pressure as well, including
special operations, decapitation, and blockade. The
Navy’s most important role in a Taiwan scenario,
however, would be to isolate the battlefield by deploying submarines to prevent or at least delay interven-
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tion by other countries’ naval forces. This means the
U.S. Navy, of course, although the Australian Navy
and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)
could conceivably assist American intervention in the
face of a large-scale Chinese assault on Taiwan.
Such U.S. intervention would almost certainly
be built around aircraft carriers and other surface
ships; effective intervention would not require these
ships to enter Taiwanese harbors, or even be close
to 200 nautical miles of the island. However, some
20-30 Chinese submarines deployed north, east, and
southeast of Taiwan would cause American and other
naval commanders to proceed very cautiously.
If China were able to maintain even a dozen
submarines on station in the East China Sea for 1 month
in the face of the U.S. Navy’s approach, it would likely
provide an uncomfortable Taipei government with
enough time to decide that negotiating was preferable
to fighting essentially by itself. There is no reason to
expect Beijing to waver in its stated resolve to employ
military force to prevent Taiwan from achieving de jure
independence. Hence, the PLAN will continue to be a
primary vehicle for pressuring Taiwan, a role that will
likely end only with Taiwan’s accession—to a degree
acceptable to both—to China’s governance.
The East China Sea.
The East China Sea is China’s front porch and thus
vital for national defense. It contains the nation’s most
important fishing grounds and possibly rich energy
deposits, and is the scene of a sovereignty dispute with
Japan. This dispute concerns the Daoyutai (in Chinese)
or Senkaku (Japanese) Islands, a cluster of barren,
uninhabited rocks claimed by both nations. Although
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they lie equidistant (170 km) from the Japanese
Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan, the Daoyutai are located
on China’s continental shelf as it is defined in the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), some
350 nautical miles from the coast.19
China and Japan both appear to have a respectable
legal argument, however, and the conflict is most
unlikely to be voluntarily settled by the two disputants
themselves. More important than any possible
economic gains resulting from undisputed possession
of these barren land features, however, is the national
hubris of China and Japan. Moreover, Taiwan further
unsettles the pot with its own claim to the Daoyutais,
echoing China’s. During the past decade, groups of
private citizens from Taiwan, as well as from Hong
Kong, mainland China, and Japan, have all conducted
forays among the islands, attempting to establish their
nation’s sovereignty. The groups from China-TaiwanHong Kong have all failed, sometimes at the cost of
life, while at least one Japanese group temporarily
succeeded in establishing a lighthouse on one of the
islets.20
Despite their doubtful material value, the
Daoyutais-Senkakus might serve as a casus belli as
manifested in naval conflict between the JMSDF and
the PLAN. A recent four-session study by several
greater Washington, DC, analysts concluded that
such a conflict was not unlikely, although it would
almost certainly be of short duration. Nonetheless,
any shooting incident between Japan and China risks
unintended escalation into a serious conflict, one that
might well involve the United States by virtue of its
Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan.21
China has not made overt threats of military
action to enforce its claims to either the Daoyutais or
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the natural gas deposits in the East China Sea ocean
floor. This latter issue does bear significant economic
gravitas, given the not insignificant oil and natural gas
reserves that may lie in two to four sea bottom fields,
perhaps as much as 200 billion barrels of the former and
7 trillion cubic feet of the latter.22 Of current concern
is the Chunxiao (Chinese) or Shirakaba (Japanese)
natural gas field, currently being extracted from by
both China and Japan, while still in dispute. Resolution
of the field’s ownership by the disputants themselves
is no more likely than that concerning the DaoyutaisSenkakus.
Beijing and Tokyo have both used military forces to
establish a presence in the area, with China employing
ships and aircraft, and Japan using its Coast Guard
and aircraft.23 This patrolling could, as is the case
with forays around the Daoyutias-Senkakus, lead to
unintended escalation. China has been conducting
extensive sea bottom surveys during the past 5 years;
such exploration serves both to ascertain the presence
of mineral deposits and to map the ocean bottom so as
to enhance submarine operations.
Six sessions had been held by Beijing and Tokyo
by the summer of 2006 in an attempt to reach a
diplomatic resolution of their dispute over East China
Sea resources. They failed to reach resolution, but the
two sides have established “two expert groups to help
settle [their] dispute.”24
Presumably, any strong move by Beijing in the East
China Sea, whether over the Daoyutais-Senkakus or
the disputed oil and gas fields, would be conducted
by surface combatants, supported by long-range
aircraft and submarines. Similar forces would likely
be deployed by Tokyo. While China and Japan would
likely curtail a naval conflict immediately, the JMSDF’s
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significantly more advanced naval capabilities would,
if employed, almost certainly cause the destruction of
PLAN units, with significant loss of life. Given China’s
sensitivity to sovereignty issues, its dramatically rising
nationalism, and its historical enmity toward Japan,
any such losses at sea would be difficult to accept or
relegate to negotiation.
PLAN improvements to better cope with the JMSDF
will be a spur to its modernization programs during
the next decade. These will likely focus not so much
on equipment as on doctrine: joint and integrated
operations are one way to describe part of the intent of
“netcentric warfare,” an American concept which the
PLAN undoubtedly aspires to master.
The Chinese Navy of 2016-17, given even moderate
progress, will be able to operate in an East China Sea
scenario with commonly accepted tactical doctrine,
with surface and air forces that have trained and
exercised together, and with effective communications
among units and shore stations using integrated
systems. The continuing submarine modernization
program in which Beijing is so heavily investing will
enable the East China Sea to be divided into submarine
operating areas with each patrolled by at least 24
modern submarines armed with highly effective cruise
missiles capable of submerged launch.
Malacca.
Speaking in 2004, President Hu Jintao took note
of China’s “Malacca dilemma.” He was referring to
both “indigenous” problems such as piracy, but also
to the possibility of the United States having a “choke
hold” on China’s seaborne energy imports, 80 percent
of which flows through Malacca.25 Since the Malacca
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and Singapore Straits connect the South China Sea
with the Indian Ocean, Hu’s concern is justified by
the geography and the problems in those waters (this
point may be argued—see Chapter 10 by Michael
McDevitt).
Six nations claim all or some of the land features that
dot the South China Sea, if one counts Taiwan (which
echoes Beijing’s claims). China is the only claimant,
however, that apparently delineates the entire South
China Sea—water areas as well as land features—as
sovereign territory.26 The South China Sea’s value is
both realized and potential, including fisheries, oil
and natural gas deposits, national hubris, and most
important the fact that more of the world’s seaborne
traffic uses the area than any other comparable body of
water in the world.
All of these elements require a second look, however. First, while oil and natural gas are already being
extracted from the seabed underlying the northern and
southern South China Sea, the central area is untapped
and may or may not contain significant reserves. With
the signing of the February 2005 agreement by China,
the Philippines, and Vietnam to jointly explore the
area, the level of tension associated with the various
sovereignty declarations has been very much reduced.
Significantly, however, Beijing has not displayed any
willingness to compromise on its own sovereignty
claims.27
Second, not only do the fisheries belong to no single
nation, but the stocks in the South China Sea are being
over-fished by all claimants; at the present rate, and
with the bordering nations’ inability to control even
their own fishermen, the dispute may soon be moot.28
Third, while national pride is not usually assuageable
by the balm of diplomacy, sovereignty claims in the
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South China Sea are susceptible to resolution based on
other criteria affecting more substantive issues.
Fourth and finally, what are the threats to the
SLOCs in and surrounding the South China Sea that
might elicit the use of naval power by one of the
claimants? In fact, presently existing threats are of
the nonstate variety—piracy and transnational crime,
terrorism, and environmental degradation. These may
worsen over the next decade, but will best be solved or
at least ameloriated through international cooperation,
as is indeed occurring today. There is little evidence
that the next decade will witness a breakdown of the
cooperative international approach to safeguarding
these sea lanes. All concerned nations benefit from
free and safe sea lanes. Obviously, however, if a truly
ominous dispute ever breaks out between the United
States and a risen, revanchist China, all bets are off.
Should Beijing decide that the PLAN must be
capable of defending South China Sea LOCs and the
Malacca Strait, it would have to make extremely large
investments in materiel and personnel resources, since
it is incapable today of carrying out such a mission.
The Navy would need to have an increase in its
number of state-of-the-art warships from the less than
20 it currently deploys to at least triple that number. A
similar increase in RAS ships would also have to occur,
from five to perhaps ten, to support those surface ships
during the relatively long periods at sea required to
guard against international threats.
If Beijing decides it will deploy the PLAN against
any future U.S. and allied interference with the Southeast Asian SLOCs, China’s submarine force will have to
continue to increase the number of its 22 most modern
boats (Song, Kilo, Shang), again to approximately three
times that number. Most importantly, the PLAN will
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have to increase its aviation capability to be able to
support surface ship task groups operating more
than 1,000 nautical miles from home base. This will
require not only the construction of bases on disputed,
difficult-to-defend South China Sea and Andaman
Sea islands, but also creation of a defensive system
effective enough both to protect the bases and to afford
the degree of protection necessary to allow conduct of
offensive missions.
West of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the
Andaman Sea is not subject to the sovereignty disputes
of the South China Sea, but it is subject to competing
Indian and Burmese interests. Burma, in fact, is
currently the subject of a veritable economic invasion
by China that has strong political and military facets.
Barring the overthrow of the well-established Burmese
military dictatorship, this trend will almost certainly
continue—despite Indian attempts to establish a
contravening influence in the country. By 2016-17,
the world may witness PLAN support facilities, if not
outright bases, on Burma’s coast and islands.29
Such facilities, if matched by the Chinesemodernized port at Gwadar, Pakistan, would in theory
for the first time provide the PLAN with the logistic
infrastructure to conduct extended operations in the
Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea. Even with the
three-fold PLAN expansion noted above, however,
such distant operations may not be feasible. First, the
Indian Navy is a formidable force, and one that will
continue to modernize and expand during the next
decade. Second, Pakistan and Burma are two of the
world’s most unstable nation-states, and are as likely
as not to have fallen into anarchy by 2016-17.
Finally, two factors argue against Beijing making
such a decision for distant operations and basing. First,
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despite increasing energy needs, including growing
dependence on foreign sources, China currently relies
on seaborne imports for only 10 percent of its total
energy needs. Furthermore, this percentage is likely to
decline rather than increase during the next 10 years, as
Beijing invests increasingly in pipelines and alternative
(nonfossil) energy sources. Second, the United States is
more than capable of countering any PLAN moves to
resolve the Malacca dilemma or to dominate the Indian
Ocean.
2006 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
The 2006 White Paper on National Defense continues
the 2004 White Paper’s theme of increased PLAN
stature and perceived value in the eyes of Beijing’s
decisionmakers.30 The first section of the 2006 version,
“Security Environment,” notes “growing complexities
in the Asia-Pacific,” highlighting potential dangers to
China posed by the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance.
Other threats listed—“territorial disputes, conflicting
claims over maritime rights and interests”—are also
maritime in character. One significant difference from
the 2004 paper is that while the 2006 version criticizes
continued U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan, it does not
dwell on the island’s threat to China, but simply notes
the importance of “promoting cross-Straits relations
toward peace and stability.”
The national military strategy of “active defense”
includes a role for the Navy, which is described as
“aim[ing] at gradual extension of the strategic depth
for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its
capabilities in integrated maritime operations and
nuclear counterattacks.” This last phrase is of particular
interest, perhaps attesting to Beijing’s determination
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to deploy ICBM-armed submarines, despite the
apparently more attractive option of concentrating
on land-based, road-mobile missiles such as the DF31/31A.
The PLAN is described as benefiting directly
from Beijing’s determination to instill in its military
the benefits of a revolution in military affairs (RMA),
including “informationalization” as a goal. To this end,
the PLAN is afforded priority in the “development
of firepower, mobility, and information capability”
to “strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and
warfighting capabilities.” This last priority might
explain in part Beijing’s apparent determination to
build a sea-based nuclear deterrent force with the Jinclass FBM.
According to the 2006 White Paper, the PLAN will
not experience the previously planned personnel
reductions, but in fact will continue to claim a larger
percentage of overall PLA personnel strength. The Navy
is cutting headquarters personnel and reorganizing
the shore establishment and some fleet units, but
these moves are aimed at smoothing the path for the
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
The Navy is charged with “build[ing] itself into a
modern maritime force . . . of combined arms with both
nuclear and conventional means of operation.” It will
take “informationalization as the goal and strategic
focus,” giving “high priority to the development of
maritime information systems.” The PLAN is directed to
emphasize building “mobile maritime troops” capable
of “operations in coastal waters, joint operations, and
integrated maritime support.” Finally, it will continue
to “improve and reform training programs . . . in
joint integrated maritime operations . . . exploring the
strategy and tactics of maritime people’s war under
modern conditions.”
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The PLAN is described as being integral to China’s
efforts to improve logistics by establishing across the
armed services an integrated system of “materials
procurement and management.” Similarly, the Navy’s
reserve and militia forces will be strengthened “to
pursue the principle of self-defense by the whole
nation,” with a Navy focus on making national
“border and coastal defense unified, effective, solid,
and informationized.”
Of particular interest is the 2006 White Paper’s
extensive discussion of national law promulgated in
support of China’s interpretations of various articles of
the UNCLOS. These maritime laws reflect a continuing
legal codification of Beijing maritime interests and
claims.
At the strategic level, Beijing is awarding the PLAN
a first-rank role, especially in dealing with sovereignty
and international issues. Operationally, China is
determined to continue naval modernization across the
spectrum: ships, submarines, aircraft, and personnel.
The emphasis on improving amphibious and surface
combatant forces underlines China’s concern with the
Taiwan situation, while the importance accorded to
improving joint operational and long-range precision
strike capabilities implies direct concern with possible
U.S. intervention in that situation.
For the Navy, then, China’s White Paper is not
mere public posturing, but accurately describes
the developments already underway in naval
modernization. Its intentions are not transiet, but
rather will continue to guide PLAN developments for
the foreseeable future.
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CONCLUSION
China has built formidable navies on several
occasions during its history. The Yuan Dynasty
employed powerful naval forces in coming to power
and striving for national security objectives in the 13th
century, while the Ming Dynasty in the early 15th
century deployed the world’s most advanced and
capable Navy. Both dynasties allowed their navies to
atrophy, however, once specific strategic objectives
had been accomplished. The Qing Dynasty’s mid-19th
century efforts to build and deploy a modern navy
were less successful, first quickly coming to naught
before the guns of the French fleet, and then that of the
Japanese.
The Chinese People’s Navy has since its founding
in 1949 labored as an adjunct of the Army. It has been
only since the end of the Cold War and the removal
of the Soviet threat that Beijing has felt moved to
direct significantly increased defense resources to
modernizing what has throughout its existence been a
marginally effective coastal defense force. The 2004 and
2006 White Papers on Defense illustrate the new emphasis
Beijing and the PLA are placing on modernizing the
Navy. The PLAN is accorded heightened importance
strategically, operationally, and doctrinally in China’s
national security paradigm.
By 2006, China had already deployed a Navy with
the ships, submarines, aircraft, and systems ready to
serve in pursuit of specific national security objectives,
with Taiwan at the head of that list. This process of
modernization includes improved personnel education
and training, further doctrinal development, and
a coherent maritime strategic view from Beijing, a
process that will almost certainly continue throughout
the next decade. By 2016-17, China will have available
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as an instrument of national power a Navy capable of
carrying out ambitious assigned missions. The Taiwan
imbroglio may still head that list, but the PLAN a
decade hence will also be capable of denying command
of the East and South China Seas to another power,
and of commanding those seas for discrete periods. In
other words, the PLAN of 2016-17, at three times its
present size, will dominate East Asian navies, with the
possible exception of the JMSDF—we cannot rule out
a major Japanese rearmament in this time frame—and
will offer a very serious challenge to the U.S. Navy
when it operates in those waters.
This relatively higher PLAN status will not result
from a failure of either Japan or the United States to
pursue its own naval modernization, but does take
account of Japan’s constrained defense budget and
personnel pool, and reflects the continuing reduction in
American naval numbers and the U.S. operational overstretch from increasingly widespread and marginal
missions in Southwest Asia and in the Global War on
Terrorism. By 2016-17, present trends indicate that the
Chinese Navy will allow Beijing to exert hegemonic
leverage in maritime East Asia.
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PART VI:
THE WRAP UP
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CHAPTER 12
THE “RIGHT SIZE” FOR CHINA’S MILITARY:
TO WHAT ENDS?
Ellis Joffe
Any attempt to discuss the “right size” for China’s
military immediately raises an integrally connected
question: The “right size” for what purpose? “Size,”
it should be emphasized, refers not necessarily to
the quantity of men and weapons, but to the overall
capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—its
force structure, technological levels, and organization.
And “right” refers to the appropriate size of the PLA as
determined by the Chinese alone, in accordance with
their interests.
Most analysts of Chinese military affairs agree that
the purpose of China’s military buildup during the
past decade or so has been to acquire a capability that
would enable China to coerce Taiwan into accepting a
“one-China” solution to the Taiwan problem, or at least
to prevent it from moving toward formal independent
status. In fact, the title of the wrap-up chapter in the
volume preceding this one was “China’s Military
Buildup: Beyond Taiwan?” Its main point was that
although China’s post-Mao military modernization
was driven by several factors, the chief reason for the
accelerated buildup that began in the mid-1990s and
increased after 1999 was the emergence of the Taiwan
issue in a form that threatened the “one China” solution
and was thus unacceptable to the Chinese.
This issue provided the impetus for the acceleration
of military modernization. Its purpose was to give
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the Chinese leadership the military clout needed to
prevent the separation of Taiwan—preferably by
intimidating the Taiwanese or, failing that, by military
moves that could culminate in an invasion of the
island. Since the Chinese believed that in this latter
event the United States would intervene militarily, an
integral purpose of the buildup was to deter or delay
American intervention by raising its costs and, in the
worst-case possibility, to increase China’s chances of
overcoming it. This buildup provided the Chinese with
collateral capabilities that raised questions about their
intentions “beyond Taiwan,” but these questions have
been peripheral to the central issue of Taiwan itself.
By 2007 the overwhelming significance of the
Taiwan issue has diminished dramatically, primarily
because the specter of a major war no longer hovers
over the Taiwan Strait, even if it has not disappeared
entirely. This has been due to a combination of factors—
the readiness of China’s leaders to acquiesce in the
status quo rather than to push for unification as long as
Taiwan refrains from declaring formal independence;
their belief that economic and other ties will advance
the chances for peaceful reunification; the political
difficulties of independence-seeking Taiwan President
Chen Shuibian and China’s expectation that he will not
be reelected; and the new determination of the United
States to restrain Taiwan from provocative actions.1
The more relaxed attitude of the Chinese presumably
derives from an additional reason: confidence in their
increased capability to coerce or conquer Taiwan,
while making it more difficult for the United States
to intervene. At the same time, the Chinese have no
illusions about narrowing the gap between their
overall military strength and that of the United States,
nor about their chances of defeating the United States
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in an all-out war over Taiwan.2 These assessments
must have raised questions among China’s leaders
about the future objectives of military modernization
and the right size for their armed forces. Now, then,
is an appropriate time to take a closer look at the
objectives—beside Taiwan—which will shape the PLA
in the next stage of its development.
TO MAKE CHINA A GREAT POWER
The purpose of building up the Chinese armed
forces is, of course, to provide military backing for the
foreign policy objectives of the leadership. However,
these objectives differ in the priority attached to them
by the leadership and in the time frame for their
attainment. They also differ in the capability of the
military to support them. Therefore, their influence
on the development of the armed forces varies in
accordance with the importance of the objective and
the connection between its attainment and military
force.
The most basic long-range and unalterable objective of the Chinese leadership has been to obtain
recognition for China as a great power and to gain
the appropriate respect and standing in the eyes of
the international community, especially of other great
powers, that come with this status. However, although
the objective has remained constant, the strategies for
attaining it have changed radically over the years—
from revolutionary strategies aimed against the great
powers and designed to destabilize the international
system, to diplomatic strategies aimed at cooperating
with the great powers and working within the system.
The Chinese have never publicly articulated in print
their vision of this objective, and it is not at all certain
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that they themselves have thought out the specifics.
Nonetheless, inferences from pronouncements and
actions make it clear that they have been motivated
by two fundamental principles: the preservation of
China’s independent position in global politics and the
upholding of its national honor; and membership in
the exclusive group of major powers that make the key
decisions defining the workings of the international
system. However, if the specifics are vague, the
powerful forces driving the objective are not.
The first of those forces consists of China’s physical
attributes—territory, population, and geographic
location—that together endow it with an overwhelming
presence and provide an underpinning for the claim of
its leaders that China is entitled to a prominent global
status. More important is the political and emotional
significance of modern Chinese nationalism that has
its roots in the grandeur of the ancient Chinese empire,
and its power in the determination of Chinese leaders
to avenge past imperialist-inflicted humiliations
by restoring China to a position of international
prominence. Most important is China’s economic surge
that has catapulted it to the front rank of the global
economy and to a position of major political influence.
It has also provided China with the economic strength
that constitutes one of the two essential pillars of great
power status.
The other pillar—military force—is nowhere near a
level commensurate with great power status. Although
there are no mandatory international criteria that
qualify a country for such status, it seems axiomatic that
there are at least three conditions: a large population
and territory; a credible nuclear capability; and sizable
advanced conventional forces that enable it to project
military power for long periods far from its borders.
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At a minimum, such forces would presumably need
to include aircraft carriers; long-range combat and
combat support aircraft; transport aircraft and ships
for moving large numbers of troops and supplies; air
and sea refueling capabilities; global communications
systems; and bases in friendly countries. Although
China is working on developing some of these
capabilities, it still lacks most of them.
Because such capabilities will be out of China’s
reach for generations, its leaders have never set their
attainment as a realistic objective. And for good
reasons. First, their global aspirations are a political
and emotional goal, not a strategic one, and the absence
of these capabilities does not put China’s security at
risk. Second, this is a long-range goal and the Chinese
can move toward it without the urgency that would
require an immense and draining military effort. And
third, the military effort required to bring China closer
to great power levels is so immense that movement
toward it has to be incremental in any case, and can
begin by focusing on China’s short-term objectives.
For these reasons, China’s global aspirations have
not until now determined the pace and scope of China’s
military modernization. From the start of post-Mao
modernization, the military component of China’s
great power aspirations remained dormant while
Beijing focused on realistic near-term objectives—first,
an upgrading of its backward armed forces, and then
a rapid buildup after the Taiwan issue burst on the
scene. This focus has greatly increased China’s military
power and has vastly enhanced its regional and
international standing—to say nothing of generating
at times exaggerated fears and concerns—but it has not
moved China much closer to the level of great power
capabilities.
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How to move China toward such capabilities has by
2007 likely become a subject of discussion, if not debate,
among China’s leaders, perhaps in connection with a
review of the PLA’s future direction. A new phrase,
reflecting either a consensus among the leaders or a
line of argument in a debate, has appeared in an Army
newspaper article: “It is a matter of great importance to
strive to construct a military force that is commensurate
with China’s status . . . so as to entrench China’s
international status.” A similar view was expressed
by PLA Navy Rear Admiral Yang Yi, director of the
Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University: “As a responsible power, China needs to
establish a military force that is commensurate with
its international position and this is needed . . . to
safeguard world peace.” Admiral Yang emphasized,
however, that “because of insufficient investments
over a long period of time . . . the gap between China
and the developed counties in the military realm has
not shrunk, but rather is continuing to grow.”3
From the logic of the situation and from fragments
of data, it is reasonable to conclude that China’s global
aspirations will continue to drive PLA modernization
into the future. However, because of the PLA’s relative
backwardness and the gap between it and advanced
armies, these aspirations alone will not determine the
speed of modernization and the resources that will be
allocated to it. It does not make sense for the Chinese
leadership to devote resources needed elsewhere for
an objective that is both remote and only partially
attainable at best in the far-off future. It makes much
more sense to focus on more relevant near-term
objectives which, over the long haul, will also advance
its global aspirations.
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SEEKING A PARAMOUNT REGIONAL POSITION
Although the Chinese leadership has been explicit
regarding its desires or demands on specific regional
issues, its broad objectives have been just as vague as
its global aims. However, from inferential evidence it
is possible to identify these objectives. The primary
one is to gain a paramount position in the East Asian
region—a position from which China will have the final
say about what does or does not go on in its extended
neighborhood. The most important example of what,
from China’s standpoint, should not be permitted to
go on is the conclusion of strategic alliances between
countries in the region and the United States.
These objectives are driven by the same powerful
forces—physical presence, nationalism, and economic
power—that motivate China on the global scene.
However, additional considerations are at work in the
region which make the attainment of China’s objectives
more imperative. The first and most important is
security. Whereas China’s global aspirations are
relevant to its prestige and political standing, its
regional objectives are directly connected to the defense
of the homeland. The Chinese undoubtedly want
Asian countries to acknowledge China’s paramount
position by virtue of its economic strength and political
influence, and to act accordingly. This is probably the
main reason why they have in recent years pursued
policies designed to make friends of influential leaders
in Asia. However, there are exceptions—Japan’s
tougher stance toward China and its closer strategic
relations with the United States are one outstanding
instance. Whereas China can presumably use its new
economic leverage to put pressure on Asian countries,
in the end it is only military strength that can protect
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its interests and ensure its national security. Moreover,
unlike the global situation, building a military force for
limited regional objectives is within China’s reach.
Nonetheless, for more than a decade after the
start of modernization, the Chinese felt no urgency
about building such a force. During that period,
military modernization was limited primarily to the
nontechnological aspects of the Army’s capabilities
and, with a few exceptions, was marked by upgrading
old weapons rather than acquiring new ones. The
Chinese had good reasons to adopt this policy.
First, the United States did not loom as a military
threat, and whatever danger they still perceived
from the Soviet Union was remote and required no
rapid improvements beyond the progress made by
upgrading weapons and other reforms. Moreover,
the cost of buying new weapons in large quantities
was prohibitive and compounded by the difficulties
of assimilation and the reluctance of the Chinese to
become dependent on foreign suppliers. From its
neighbors, the Chinese faced no military threat and
were presumably confident they could carry out
limited military actions beyond China’s borders after
the adoption of the “local, limited wars” doctrine in
the latter 1980s. Although modernization was stepped
up in the early 1990s, primarily due to the availability
of advanced weapons from the former Soviet Union, it
was still relatively slow because it lacked the impetus
of a strategic focus and sense of urgency.
The emergence of the Taiwan issue and the need
to cope with a U.S. military intervention (which the
Chinese believed was inevitable if they decided to take
military action) provided this impetus. What followed
was a decade of intensive preparations marked by the
procurement of new weapons and the adoption of new
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doctrines. These preparations completely transformed
China’s regional capabilities, which began to arouse
serious concerns among American policymakers
and defense officials regarding China’s military
capabilities and regional intentions, which seemed
increasingly ominous. Numerous statements reflecting
these concerns were forthcoming, best exemplified by
the remarks of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
at a famous 2005 news conference in Singapore. He
first observed that China was “improving its ability
to project power” in the Asia-Pacific region. Then he
added: “Since no nation threatens China, one must
wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these
continuing and expanding arms purchases? Why these
continuing robust deployments?”4
Why indeed? What the Chinese viewed as defensive
moves designed to counter a strongly presumed U.S.
intervention over Taiwan, which the Chinese still
consider an internal civil war-related issue, the George
W. Bush administration has interpreted as an aggressive
buildup that not only challenges American interests
with respect to Taiwan, but also poses a long-term threat
to the U.S. presence in the western Pacific. The Report
on China’s Military Power submitted to Congress by
the Department of Defense in 2005 warned that China’s
“attempt to hold at risk U.S. naval forces . . . approaching
the Taiwan Strait” potentially poses “a credible threat
to modern militaries operating in the region.” The
Defense Department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
said that China had “the greatest potential to compete
militarily” with the United States, and that its buildup
“already puts regional militaries at risk.” A top defense
official stated that “China’s military acquisitions . . . go
beyond a Taiwan scenario and are intended to address
other potential regional contingencies, such as conflict
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over resources or territory.”5 And a former official
wrote in the Washington Post that “China has already
changed Asia’s balance of power. It is past time for
America to get serious about deterring the potentially
worst sorts of Chinese behavior and to provide allies in
the region with reason for renewed confidence in the
U.S. security umbrella.”6
It is not clear as to what specific evidence such
assessments are based on. It is particularly questionable
whether China has “already changed Asia’s balance
of power,” since without a U.S. presence, the balance
remains in China’s favor, while with a U.S. presence
China remains plainly inferior militarily. Whatever
its wider regional objectives, the Chinese buildup has
so far been oriented toward capturing Taiwan and
interdicting U.S. naval intervention. They have pursued
a denial strategy for the maritime areas close to Taiwan
and their borders, but they have not demonstrated an
intention of maintaining a dominant presence in the
western Pacific. The capabilities they are acquiring
may have a marginal “dual use” purpose—such as
sending signals to Japan, an American strategic ally, by
penetrating Japanese waters with Chinese submarines
or Japanese airspace with spy planes. But it is difficult
to see how these capabilities can be used to advance
broad Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In
fact, if they induce Japan to discard the restraints on its
present defense-only armed forces, the Chinese signals
to Japan would be positively counterproductive.
China’s military development in both quality and
quantity—submarines and not aircraft carriers, diesel
rather than nuclear submarines, for example—has
not been directed toward mounting a challenge to the
U.S. presence in the western Pacific. Its capabilities are
far from adequate for that purpose. And, it should be
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noted, even China’s limited interdiction capabilities
have never been tested in battle—they are enveloped
in a fog of no-war. As much as the Chinese would
presumably like to evict the United States from the
region, they know this is an unattainable goal. They will
have to settle for less—a defensive strategy designed
to protect the maritime approaches to China.
Such a strategy is dictated not only by security
calculations, but also by China’s political aspirations.
If China cannot defend its own neighborhood, the
same one in which the traditional Chinese empire held
sway, it can hardly expect recognition as a paramount
power in the region, to say nothing of its great power
aspirations. China also needs to strengthen its maritime
forces in order to secure its position on issues and
areas in dispute with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, South Korea, and Brunei. Given their
growing dependence on imported oil, natural gas, and
other resources, the Chinese likewise need to protect
their sea lines of communication, especially those from
the Middle East, but the Chinese Navy at present is
unable to accomplish this mission.7 And looking further
ahead, the Chinese are probably thinking of strategic
challenges that might arise from the reappearance of
Japanese militarism and the emergence of Japan as a
regional military power or from the growing military
power of India.
All these are reasons for sustaining long-term
military modernization, but they do not provide a
motive for an intense, rapid military buildup since
they do not pose a strategic threat to China in the short
term. Such a threat can come only from the United
States, as it does over Taiwan. However, even though
the possibility of war over Taiwan has receded, China’s
perception of a U.S. threat is not likely to recede
significantly as well.
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This is because U.S. apprehensions about China’s
buildup have already prompted it to adopt a “hedging”
strategy against possible aggressive Chinese actions
in the future by strengthening American forces in the
western Pacific. These measures include adding at least
one aircraft carrier and at least five nuclear submarines
to the Pacific fleet over the next decade, which would
place half the U.S. Navy’s carriers and 60 percent of
its submarines in the Pacific. Other measures include
upgrading the U.S. missile defense system, transferring
long-range bombers and attack submarines to Guam,
stationing stealth bombers in South Korea, redeploying
troops to Japan, and establishing new combat headquarters in Honolulu.8 They also include efforts to
strengthen ties and alliances with nations such as Japan,
India, and Australia. And to make sure the Chinese get
the message, in June 2006 the United States carried out
a massive exercise near Guam in which three aircraft
carriers, more than 40 surface vessels, and 160 aircraft
participated, watched by an official delegation from
the PLA.
The Chinese undoubtedly got the message—the
United States is engaged in a major long-range military
buildup aimed at China. As the Chinese government’s
2004 White Paper on Defense put it, “Complicated security
factors in the Asia-Pacific region are on the increase. The
United States is realigning and reinforcing its military
presence in this region by buttressing military alliances
and accelerating deployment of missile defense
systems.”9 They see the United States as building up
its forces and strengthening strategic alliances in East
and Central Asia in order to block China’s rise to
great power status in the region and beyond. Since the
Chinese view their rise as rightful, they are probably
echoing Secretary Rumsfeld’s own question: “Since no
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nation threatens the U.S., why these continuing robust
deployments?” In a proverbial case of self-fulfilling
prophecy, the Chinese will presumably continue to
build up their own forces—especially air and naval—as
a “hedging” strategy aimed at countering U.S. military
might in the western Pacific. Although the speed and
scope of China’s buildup may change in accordance
with internal needs, political factors, and economic
considerations, its direction most probably will not.
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